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Summary	  
This	   thesis	   contributes	   to	   closing	   a	   gap	   in	   the	   field	   of	   science,	   technology	   and	  
innovation	  (STI)	  policy	  research:	  despite	  many	  theoretical	  advances	  in	  the	  field,	  
we	   still	   do	   not	   know	   why	   some	   urgent	   societal	   issues	   (or	   ‘challenges’)	   remain	  
unaddressed,	  notwithstanding	  the	  technological	  advances	  that	  could	  potentially	  
address	  them.	  In	  particular,	  radical	  technological	  innovations	  –	  innovations	  that	  
depart	   from	   the	   established	   technological	   trajectory	   –	   would	   offer	   greatest	  
potential	  to	  address	  societal	  challenges.	  While	  the	  source	  of	  radical	  innovations	  is	  
often	   new	   entrepreneurial	   firms,	   established	   firms	   (‘incumbents’)	   are	   likely	   to	  
play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   developing	   them	   because	   of	   the	   vast	   resources	   and	  
complementary	   assets	   they	   possess.	   Incumbents	   however,	   face	   few	   immediate	  
incentives	  to	  develop	  radical	  innovations	  in	  response	  to	  societal	  challenges.	  
The	  analytical	  puzzle	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  thus	  to	  explain	  how,	  when,	  and	  why	  
industries	   change	   (or	   not)	   their	   strategies	   (in	   particular,	   their	   technological	  
strategy)	  in	  order	  to	  address	  a	  societal	  problem.	  This	  puzzle	  is	  disentangled	  into	  
interrelated	  research	  questions:	  
A) How	   do	   societal	   issue-­‐related	   pressures	   (on	   the	   incumbent	   industry)	   from	  
different	  domains	  (namely,	  civil	  society,	  science,	  political	  arena,	  economy)	  evolve?	  
B) How	  does	  the	  incumbent	  industry	  respond	  to	  changing	  pressures	  around	  societal	  
issues,	  in	  terms	  of	  technological,	  political,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  strategies?	  	  
C) In	   particular,	   when	   and	   why	   do	   industry	   actors	   decide	   to	   develop	   substantive	  
technological	  responses?	  
To	  answer	  these	  questions,	  the	  thesis	  develops	  a	  new	  analytical	  perspective	  that	  
combines	   insights	   from	   (a)	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   and	   issue	   attention	   cycle	   theories	  
(from	  the	  Business	  &	  Society	   field)	  with	  (b)	   the	  so-­‐called	   ‘Triple	  Embeddedness	  
Framework’	  and	  (c)	  concepts	   from	  business	  strategies,	   innovation	  management,	  
corporate	   political	   strategies,	   and	   technology	   policy.	   This	   novel	   perspective	  
represents	  an	  ideal-­‐typical	  model	  of	  issue	  evolution	  (‘issue	  life-­‐cycle’).	  The	  model,	  
which	  I	  call	  the	  Dialectic	  Issue	  Life-­‐Cycle	  (DILC)	  model,	  is	  applied	  to	  three	  case	  
studies	   of	   the	   American	   automobile	   industry’s	   responses	   to	   various	   societal	  
problems	   (local	   air	   pollution,	   auto	   and	   highway	   safety,	   and	   climate	   change).	  
Combining	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  research	  methods	  in	  an	  original	  way,	  the	  
case	  studies	  aim	  not	  only	  to	  investigate	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  framework,	  which	  also	  
provides	  conceptual	  answers	  to	  the	  research	  questions,	  but	  also	  to	  further	  refine	  
it	   and	   nuance	   the	   conceptual	   answers.	   By	   explaining	   how	   incumbent	   industry	  
actors	   respond	   to	   societal	   challenges,	   this	   thesis	   ultimately	   contributes	   to	   the	  
practical	  policy	  debate	  of	  how	  incumbents	  can	  be	  stimulated	  to	  develop	  radical	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  demands	  proved	  invaluable	  
throughout	  my	  DPhil	  ‘journey’	  –	  a	  carrot	  and	  stick	  approach	  that	  I	  only	  learned	  to	  
appreciate	  later.	  Frank	  is	  a	  great	  supervisor	  who	  is	  keen	  to	  transmit	  his	  academic	  
knowledge	  about	  how	  to	  carry	  out	  qualitative	   research,	  how	  to	  write	  a	  paper	   for	  
publication	   in	   a	   peer	   reviewed	   journal,	   and	   the	   importance	   of	   academic	  
networking.	   I	   am	   grateful	   for	   his	   encouragements	   when	   I	   was	   demotivated,	   his	  
patience	   with	   my	   flaws,	   his	   trust	   in	   my	   competence	   –	   and	   for	   his	   accurate	  
criticisms.	  But	   above	   all,	   I	   am	  grateful	   for	  his	   generosity,	  which	   is	   a	   quality	   that	  
seems	   to	   be	   disappearing	   from	   the	   increasingly	   competitive	   and	   individualist	  
academic	  world.	  Thank	  you!	  
My	  second	  supervisor	  Prof.	  Andy	  Stirling	  also	  deserves	  my	  fullest	  gratitude.	  
From	  a	  more	  distant	  position,	  due	  to	  lesser	  supervisory	  responsibilities,	  Andy	  gave	  
critical	  feedback	  to	  every	  step	  of	  my	  research,	  challenging	  me	  to	  think	  again	  about	  
what	  I	  was	  doing,	  from	  epistemological	  and	  ontological	  choices	  to	  the	  use	  of	  words	  
and	  concepts.	  His	  critical	  comments	  helped	  me	  to	  understand	  my	  own	  ideas	  and	  
to	  sharpen	  my	  research.	  With	  his	  experience	  in	  SPRU	  and	  Sussex	  University,	  Andy	  
also	  helped	  to	  arrange	  the	   institutional	  support	  that	   I	  needed	  upon	  my	  arrival	  at	  
SPRU.	  Thank	  you!	  
The	  decision	  to	  come	  to	  SPRU	  to	  do	  a	  doctorate	  with	  Prof.	  Frank	  Geels	  was	  
crucially	  influenced	  by	  Prof.	  Carlota	  Perez.	  Back	  in	  2008,	  when	  I	  was	  still	  finishing	  
my	  MA	  in	  Technology	  Governance	  in	  Tallinn	  University	  of	  Technology	  (Estonia),	  
Carlota	   told	   me	   there	   were	   two	   funded	   DPhil	   positions	   at	   SPRU,	   and	   that	   she	  
strongly	   recommended	   me	   to	   apply,	   because	   I	   would	   work	   with	   an	   excellent	  
professor.	   So	   did	   I,	   and	   here	   I	   am	   submitting	  my	   thesis.	   Carlota,	   thank	   you	   for	  
opening	  up	  this	  opportunity	  to	  me	  and	  for	  encouraging	  me	  in	  my	  academic	  career	  
during	   the	   DPhil	   process	   and	   beyond.	   But	   my	   gratitude	   to	   Carlota	   goes	   well	  
beyond	  this:	   she	   is	   truly	  my	  academic	  mentor,	  whom	  I	  seek	  when	  I	  need	  advice,	  




are	  always	  unique,	  and	  I	  hope	  we	  can	  do	  it	  more	  often	  in	  2014.	  Also	  from	  Tallinn	  
University	  of	  Technology,	  Prof.	  Erik	  Reinert	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  I	  went	  to	  Estonia	  in	  
the	  first	  place;	  and,	  therefore,	  why	  I	  met	  Carlota.	  For	  this	  and	  for	  his	  generosity,	  I	  
will	  be	  always	  thankful.	  
In	  my	  final	  DPhil	  year,	  I	  started	  working	  in	  two	  different	  research	  projects	  
with	   Prof.	   Mariana	   Mazzucato.	   She	   is	   an	   exciting	   academic	   to	   work	   with,	   who	  
showed	  me	  that	  academic	  impact	  must	  go	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  policy	  impact.	  Prof.	  
Mazzucato	  opened	  up	  many	  opportunities,	  by	  introducing	  me	  to	  her	  academic	  and	  
policy	   circles.	   Indeed,	   she	   enabled	  me	   to	   establish	   new	   academic	   links	  with	  my	  
home	  country,	  Brazil.	  Mariana,	  I	  am	  very	  thankful	  for	  this,	  and	  for	  your	  patience	  
and	  understanding	  during	  a	  year	  that	  was	  very	  challenging	  to	  me	  on	  a	  personal	  and	  
professional	  level.	  	  	  
If	  the	  initial	  months	  of	  my	  DPhil	  journey	  were	  not	  easy,	  one	  person	  helped	  
me	  stand	  them:	  Dr.	  Bruno	  Turnheim,	  who	  also	  carried	  out	  his	  DPhil	   research	  as	  
part	  of	  the	  DESTABLE	  project.	  Bruno,	  thanks	  for	  sharing	  your	  DPhil	  experience	  with	  
me,	  for	  the	  moral	  support,	  and	  for	  the	  stimulating	  intellectual	  discussions	  during	  
those	  years.	  Thanks	  also	  to	  Dr.	  Bram	  Verhees,	  who	  shared	  with	  me	  his	  knowledge	  
about	   keyword	   search	   in	   newspaper	   databases;	   and	   to	   Dr.	   Alex	   Coad,	   who	  
explained	  me	  the	  basics	  of	  Stata.	  
I	   would	   also	   like	   to	   express	   my	   gratitude	   to	   Prof.	   Gordon	   MacKerron,	  
director	  of	  SPRU	  during	  almost	  all	  of	  my	  DPhil	  research,	  who	  was	  ready	  to	  give	  me	  
institutional	   support	   whenever	   I	   needed.	   I	   would	   also	   like	   to	   thank	   SPRU	  
professors	   and	   lecturers	   who	   not	   only	   evaluated	  my	   progress	   but	   also	   provided	  
stimulating	  feedback	  during	  my	  research	  committees:	  Prof.	  Ben	  Martin,	  Dr.	  Mike	  
Hopkins,	   Dr.	   Markku	   Lehtonen,	   Prof.	   Mariana	   Mazzucato,	   and	   Prof.	   Ed	  
Steimueller.	   I	   am	   also	   indebted	   to	   Prof.	   Ed	   Steimueller,	   Prof.	   Joseph	   Tidd,	   Dr.	  
Adrian	   Smith,	   and	   Prof.	   Peter	   Wells	   (from	   Cardiff	   University)	   who	   read	   early	  
versions	   of	   my	   case	   studies	   and	   gave	   me	   constructive	   criticisms.	   Thank	   you.	  
Thanks	  also	  go	  to	  Janet	  French	  for	  her	  administrative	  help	  over	  the	  years.	  
Of	  course,	  I	  must	  thank	  all	  my	  friends	  who,	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  made	  my	  
PhD	   journey	   in	   Brighton	   a	   pleasant	   and	   easier	   one	   (not	   the	   least	   by	   ‘offering’	  
shelter	  whenever	  I	  needed!)	  –	  in	  alphabetical	  order	  of	  surnames:	  Caroline	  Barrow,	  
Robert	   Byrne,	   Tommaso	   Ciarli,	   Tobias	   Denskus,	   Eva-­‐Maria	   Egger,	   Javier	   Lopez	  




Renan	  Moioli,	  Eugenia	  Aguilar	  Nova,	  Cian	  O’Donovan,	   João	  Picão	  Osório,	  Pedro	  
Patraquim,	   Vedad	   Sablic,	   Maria	   Savona,	   Tammy-­‐Ann	   Sharp,	   Regina	   Silverio,	  
Michele	  Stua,	  and	  Annie	  Wilkinson.	  Thank	  you	  all	  for	  your	  friendships!	  
Special	  thanks	  goes	  to	  Rodrigo,	  Hannah	  and	  Luana	  Schwabe	  –	  Rodrigo	  has	  
been	  by	  my	  side	  (even	  if	  at	  times	  physically	  distant)	  since	  we	  were	  four	  years	  old,	  
and	  he	  is	  the	  brother	  I	  never	  had.	  Coming	  to	  the	  UK	  for	  my	  DPhil	  made	  us	  live	  in	  
the	  same	  country	  again,	  which	  was	  priceless.	  Thanks	  for	  the	  good	  times,	  Rod!	  And	  
to	  my	  friends	  in	  Brazil:	  don’t	  worry,	  one	  day	  I’ll	  go	  back!	  
How	  can	  I	  thank	  my	  family?	  Words	  cannot	  express	  the	  love	  I	  feel	  for	  them.	  
By	   choosing	   to	   follow	   I	  DPhil	   abroad,	   I	  was	   prevented	   from	   their	   company	   and	  
prevented	   them	   from	  mine.	  This	  has	  perhaps	  been	   the	  most	  difficult	  part	  of	  my	  
journey.	  It	  is	  however	  my	  parents’	  fault,	  because	  they	  ‘raised	  a	  son	  to	  be	  a	  citizen	  of	  
the	  world’,	  as	  they	  put	  it	  themselves.	  To	  my	  uncle,	  Bernard	  Christophe,	  my	  thanks	  
for	  the	  inspiration	  to	  become	  a	  Doctor.	  To	  my	  father,	  Carlos	  Leonam,	  all	  my	  thanks	  
for	   the	   support,	   opportunities,	   and	   love.	   To	   my	   big	   sister,	   Manoela	   Penna,	   my	  
deepest	  gratitude	  for	  being	  there	  with	  mom	  and	  dad,	  for	  taking	  care	  of	  our	  ‘piece	  
of	   paradise’,	   and	   for	   inspiring	  me	   in	  my	   career	   (she	   is	   an	   overachiever!).	   To	  my	  
little	  sister,	  Elisa	  Christophe,	  my	  thanks	   for	  being	  here	  with	  me	  since	  mid-­‐2012	  –	  
you	  don’t	  know	  how	  this	  was	  and	  is	   important	  to	  me	  (thank	  you,	  Cash!).	  And	  to	  
my	  mom,	  Micheline	  Christophe:	   thank	  you	   for	  your	   love	  and	  emotional	  support,	  
for	  stimulating	  my	  curiosity	  about	  the	  world	  and	  for	  shaping	  my	  moral	  and	  ethical	  
standards.	  This	  thesis	  is	  for	  you.	  
Last	  but	  not	  least,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  my	  dearest	  Iva	  Rakić.	  Iva	  and	  I	  met	  
in	  January	  2010	  in	  Brighton,	  and	  are	  together	  since	  then.	  This	  means	  Iva	  has	  been	  
patient	  enough	  to	  wait	  for	  me	  for	  more	  than	  two	  years,	  when	  I	  was	  in	  Brighton	  and	  
she,	   in	   Zagreb.	   Iva’s	   encouragement,	   trust	   in	   me,	   emotional	   support,	   and	  
understanding	  –	  her	   love	   –	  were	   crucial	   for	  me	   to	   complete	   this	   thesis.	   She	  was	  









Modern	  capitalist	  societies	  face	  serious	  environmental	  and	  social	  problems	  such	  as	  
climate	   change,	   resource	   depletion	   and	   degradation,	   limited	   water	   and	   food	  
supply,	   energy	   efficiency	   and	   security,	   obesity,	   diseases,	   demographic	   change,	  
ageing	  and	  wellbeing	  etc.	  One	  important	  way	  to	  help	  address	  these	  societal	  issues1	  
is	  the	  development	  of	  technical	  innovations.	  Indeed,	  addressing	  these	  problems	  –	  
often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘Grand	  Societal	  Challenges’	  (GSC)	  –	  has	  become	  the	  focus	  of	  an	  
emerging	   innovation	  policy	   agenda,	   best	   exemplified	  by	   ‘Horizon	   2020’,	   the	  new	  
EU	  Framework	  Programme	  for	  Research	  and	  Innovation	  (2014-­‐2020).2	  	  
In	   particular,	   radical	   technological	   innovations	   –	   innovations	   that	   depart	  
from	  the	  established	  technological	  trajectory	  –	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  offer	  greatest	  
impacts	   in	   tackling	   societal	   challenges	   (Hoogma	   et	   al.,	   2002;	   Hellström,	   2007).	  
While	   the	   source	   of	   radical	   innovations	   is	   often	   new	   entrepreneurial	   firms	  
(Hockerts	   and	  Wüstenhagen,	   2010;	  Ansari	   and	  Krop,	   2012),	   established	   firms	   are	  
likely	  to	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  helping	  address	  societal	  problems	  (Geels,	  2012a),	  
because	   of	   the	   vast	   resources	   and	   complementary	   assets	   they	   possess	   (Tripsas,	  
1997;	  Rothaermel,	  2001).	  However,	  incumbent	  firms	  have	  little	  immediate	  incentive	  
to	  address	  societal	  problems	  via	  radical	  innovations.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  thus	  
to	   develop	   a	   theoretical	   framework	   that	   explains	   how	   incumbents	   respond	   to	  
societal	  challenges,	  and	  so	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  practical	  policy	  debate	  of	  how	  they	  
can	  be	  stimulated	  to	  develop	  radical	  innovations	  in	  response	  to	  these	  challenges.	  
I.1. RESEARCH	  MOTIVATION	  AND	  THEORETICAL	  GAP	  
Incumbent	  firms	  in	  an	  established	  industry	  often	  have	  little	  immediate	  incentive	  to	  
address	   societal	   problems,	   particularly	   via	   radical	   innovation.	   The	   reason	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  “Societal	  issues”	  and	  “societal	  problems”,	  as	  well	  as	  “social	  issues”	  and	  “social	  problems”,	  are	  used	  
as	  synonyms	  throughout	  this	  thesis.	  “Stages”	  and	  “phases”	  are	  also	  employed	  as	  synonyms.	  
2	  “Horizon	  2020	  reflects	  the	  policy	  priorities	  of	  the	  Europe	  2020	  strategy	  and	  addresses	  major	  
concerns	  shared	  by	  citizens	  in	  Europe	  and	  elsewhere.	  A	  challenge-­‐based	  approach	  will	  bring	  
together	  resources	  and	  knowledge	  across	  different	  fields,	  technologies	  and	  disciplines,	  including	  
social	  sciences	  and	  the	  humanities.	  This	  will	  cover	  activities	  from	  research	  to	  market	  with	  a	  new	  
focus	  on	  innovation-­‐related	  activities...	  Funding	  will	  be	  focussed	  on	  the	  following	  challenges:	  
Health,	  demographic	  change	  and	  wellbeing;	  Food	  security,	  sustainable	  agriculture,	  marine	  and	  
maritime	  research,	  and	  the	  bio-­‐economy;	  Secure,	  clean	  and	  efficient	  energy;	  Smart,	  green	  and	  
integrated	  transport;	  Inclusive,	  innovative	  and	  secure	  societies;	  Climate	  action,	  resource	  efficiency	  




twofold.	   Firstly,	   many	   societal	   problems	   are	   ‘negative	   externalities’	   of	   the	  
production	  or	  use	  of	  key	  incumbent	  technologies	  (Fischer	  and	  Schot,	  1993),	  so	  that	  
the	   cost	   of	   developing	   a	   radical	   innovation	   to	   address	   these	   problems	   is	   not	  
reflected	  in	  markets	  and	  cannot	  be	  readily	  recouped	  by	  incumbent	  firms.	  Secondly,	  
incumbents	   tend	   to	   suffer	  when	   radical	   innovations	   succeed,	   because	   they	  often	  
disrupt	   their	   core	  competencies,	   capabilities	  and	  markets	   (Henderson	  and	  Clark,	  
1990;	  Anderson	  and	  Tushman,	  1991;	  Ansari	  and	  Krop,	  2012).	  Sometimes	  incumbents	  
therefore	  not	  only	  do	  not	  innovate,	  but	  also	  put	  up	  active	  resistance	  to	  changes	  –	  
leading	  to	  radical	  innovations	  –	  that	  could	  help	  address	  societal	  problems,	  through	  
e.g.	   challenging	   scientific	   findings	   connected	   to	   the	  problem	  or	   lobbying	   against	  
regulations.	  
Yet,	  past	  examples	  –	  such	  as	  major	  oil	  companies’	  development	  of	  biofuels	  
to	  help	  cut	  CO2	  emissions	  (to	  mitigate	  climate	  change),	  automakers’	  promotion	  of	  
safety	   devices	   to	   address	   road	   fatalities,	   DuPont’s	   active	   promotion	   of	  
technological	  alternatives	  to	  CFC	  to	  avoid	  the	  depletion	  of	  the	  ozone	  layer,	  or	  big	  
electricity	   utilities’	   development	   of	   ‘smart	   meters’	   to	   promote	   efficient	  
consumption	   (and	   thus	   reduce	   CO2	   emissions)	   –	   show	   that	   at	   some	   point	  
incumbents	  can	  change	  their	  strategies	  and	  become	  more	  seriously	  committed	  to	  
developing	  and	  marketing	  technological	  solutions	  to	  a	  given	  societal	  problem.	  This	  
raises	  the	  puzzle	  of	  understanding	  how,	  when,	  and	  why	  incumbent	  actors	  change	  
their	  technological	  strategy	  to	  address	  a	  societal	  problem.	  	  
In	   theoretical	   terms,	   the	   thesis	   aims	   to	   address	   a	   gap	   in	   the	   science,	  
technology	   and	   innovation	   (STI)	   policy	   research	   literature.	   	  More	   than	   30	   years	  
ago,	  Richard	  Nelson	   (1977)	  outlined	  an	  evolutionary	   framework	   to	  analyse	  policy	  
issues,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  why	  some	  urgent	  societal	  problems	  remained	  
unaddressed,	  despite	   technological	   advances	   (a	  puzzle	   summed	  up	  by	  Nelson	   in	  
the	  question,	  ‘If	  we	  can	  land	  a	  man	  on	  the	  moon,	  why	  can’t	  we	  solve	  the	  problems	  
of	  the	  ghetto?’).	  “In	  Nelson’s	  view,	  our	  ability	  to	  solve	  a	  particular	  social	  problem	  –	  
including	  specifying	  what	  the	  problem	  is,	  as	  well	  as	  what	  might	  offer	  a	  solution	  –	  
also	  requires	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  genesis	  of	  policy	  problems...”	  (Morlacchi	  and	  Martin,	  
2009,	  p.	  574).	  Since	  the	  publication	  of	  his	  essay,	  STI	  policy	  research	  has	  matured,	  
and	  yet,	  as	  Morlacchi	  and	  Martin	  (2009,	  p.	  575)	  put	  it,	  “we	  still	  do	  not	  have	  a	  very	  




rather	  limited,	  and	  we	  do	  not	  know	  why	  we	  appear	  to	  have	  achieved	  only	  modest	  
gains	  in	  relation	  to	  many	  societal	  problems”.	  
Indeed,	   the	   contribution	   that	   the	   field	   of	   innovation	   studies	   can	  make	   to	  
the	   new	   ‘Grand	   Societal	   Challenges’	   agenda	   is	   currently	   limited,	   due	   to	   three	  
reasons	  (cf.	  Geels	  and	  Penna,	  2013).	  Firstly,	  the	  main	  approach	  used	  to	  tackle	  this	  
new	  topic	  is	  the	  traditional	  innovation	  system	  approach	  (Mowery	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  	  see	  
the	  especial	  issue	  of	  Research	  Policy	  edited	  by	  Foray	   et	  al.,	  2012),	  which	  has	  been	  
originally	  developed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  competitiveness	  agenda	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  
1990s	   (Morlacchi	   and	  Martin,	   2009;	  Martin,	   2012).	  While	   the	   innovation	   systems	  
approach	   succeeded	   in	   tackling	   issues	   of	   speed	   of	   knowledge	   flows,	   amount	   of	  
innovative	   outputs	   and	   their	   effects	   on	   profitability	   and	   development	   (Geels	   and	  
Penna,	  2013),	  the	  GSC	  agenda	  calls	  for	  theoretical	  approaches	  that	  tackle	  the	  issue	  
of	  directionality	  of	  innovation	  (Stirling,	  2007;	  Stirling,	  2009).	  Secondly,	  innovation	  
scholars	  concerned	  with	  societal	  challenges	  (e.g.	  Mowery,	  2010;	  Mowery	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  
Foray	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  tend	  to	  draw	  a	  parallel	  with	  mission-­‐oriented	  R&D	  policies	  of	  the	  
immediate	  post-­‐Second	  World	  War,	  thus	  focusing	  on	  knowledge	  generation	  to	  the	  
neglect	  of	   introduction	  of	  products	   in	  markets	   (Hargadon,	  2010).	  Thus,	   firm	  and	  
industry	   strategies	   are	   downplayed,	   particularly	   social	   and	   political	   strategies	  
(Geels	  and	  Penna,	  2013),	  because	  of	  the	  focus	  of	   innovation	  systems	  approach	  on	  
economic	  issues.	  	  Thirdly,	  societal	  issues	  are	  not	  objective	  realities	  that	  only	  create	  
‘new	   performance	   criteria’	   to	   be	   resolved	   by	   managers	   and	   engineers:	   societal	  
issues	   are	   socially	   and	  politically	   constructed	   (Blumer,	   1971;	   Spector	   and	  Kitsuse,	  
1973;	  Hilgartner	  and	  Bosk,	  1988).	  For	  an	  issue	  to	  rise	  in	  the	  socio-­‐political	  agenda,	  
mobilization	  is	  needed	  (Lamertz	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  Societal	  problems	  thus	  have	  complex	  
dynamics,	   which	   impact	   on	   and	   co-­‐evolve	   with	   the	   development	   of	   solutions	  
(innovations).	  
This	  thesis	  therefore	  aims	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  field	  of	  STI	  policy	  
research	  by	  addressing	  this	  gap	  and	  contributing	  to	  the	  challenge-­‐oriented	  agenda.	  
The	  thesis	  puts	  forth	  a	  phase-­‐model	  of	  societal	  problem	  evolution,	  which	  tries	  to	  
capture	   the	   genesis	   process	   of	   problems,	   and	   which	   also	   incorporates	   strategic	  
responses	   from	   the	   incumbent	   industry	   (and	   interactions	   with	   new	   entrants),	  
highlighting,	   in	   particular,	   technological	   responses	   to	   a	   societal	   problem.	   In	  




field,	   namely,	   the	   Greening	   of	   Industry	   literature	   (see	   Kemp	   and	   Soete,	   1992;	  
Freeman,	   1996),	   which	   has	   proposed	   stage	   models	   that	   conceptualized	   how	  
industries	   respond	   to	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   societal	   problem:	   environmental	  
(‘greening’)	   problems.	   Differently	   from	   the	   innovation	   systems	   approach,	   this	  
literature	  has	  paid	  particular	  attention	   to	  a	  certain	   issue	  of	  directionality:	   that	  of	  
technologies	  and	  industries	  towards	  more	  environmentally-­‐friendly	  configurations.	  
However,	  the	  literature	  has	  limitations	  of	  its	  own,	  and	  therefore	  I	  combine	  it	  with	  a	  
research	  strand	  from	  outside	  the	  STI	  field:	  Issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory,	  from	  the	  Business	  
&	  Society	  field,	  which	  I	  review	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
I.2. THE	  GREENING	  OF	  INDUSTRY	  LITERATURE3	  	  
In	  the	  past	  four	  decades,	  academic	  thinking	  on	  how	  industries	  respond	  to	  issues	  of	  
‘greening’4,	  represented	  by	  what	  may	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Greening	  of	  Industry”	  
literature,	   has	   changed	   substantially,	   in	   terms	   of	   main	   disciplines	   drawn	   upon,	  
central	   focus,	   strategy	   implications,	   and	   level	   of	   analysis.	   Accordingly,	   the	  
Greening	  of	   Industry	   literature	  may	  be	   stylized	   into	   three	   (at	   times	  overlapping)	  
periods	  (Table	  I.1).	  
The	   first	   period,	   which	   began	   in	   the	   1960s,	   saw	   the	   emergence	   of	  
environmental	   problems	   such	   as	   air,	   water	   and	   soil	   pollution.	   Drawing	   on	  
economics,	   these	   problems	   were	   conceptualized	   as	   externalities	   of	   technology	  
change	   (Kemp	   and	   Soete,	   1992)	   or	  market	   externalities,	   i.e.	   their	   costs	  were	   not	  
reflected	   in	   prices,	   and	   therefore	   regulations	   would	   have	   to	   be	   enacted	   to	  
internalize	  them	  (Fischer	  and	  Schot,	  1993;	  see	  Crandall	  et	  al.,	  1982	  for	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  
analysis	  of	  early	  regulations	  of	  externalities	  to	  automobile	  use).	  These	  regulations	  
were	  thus	  seen	  as	  imposing	  additional	  costs	  to	  firms,	  which	  then	  had	  to	  engage	  in	  
innovation	   that	   otherwise	   would	   not	   be	   demanded	   by	   consumers	   (who	   would	  
ultimately	   bear	   the	   added	   costs)	   (Jaffe	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   The	   implication	   of	   this	  
economics	   perspective	   was	   that	   firms	   were	   expected	   to	   employ	   ‘resistant	  
compliance’	  strategies:	  they	  would	  engage	  in	  environmental	  innovation	  (basically,	  
incremental	   innovations,	   such	   as	   pollution	   control	   technologies	   and	   waste	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  This	  section	  expands	  on	  Penna	  and	  Geels	  (2012).	  
4	  ‘Greening’	  means	  transforming	  products	  and	  processes	  (i.e.	  innovating)	  so	  that	  they	  become	  





management	   techniques)	   strictly	   to	   comply	  with	   regulations	   (Fischer	   and	   Schot,	  
1993),	  but	  were	  not	  expected	  to	  (and	  often	  would	  not)	  move	  beyond	  compliance.	  	  
Table	  I.1:	  Schematic	  summary	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  Greening	  of	  Industry	  literature	  
 1960s-­‐1980s	   1990s	   Late	  1990s-­‐2000s	  
Main	  





Insights	   Environmental	  innovation	  
increases	  costs	  
Environmental	  innovation	  




as	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  process,	  
influenced	  by	  political	  













Firms	   Industries	   Organizational	  field	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  based	  on	  Penna	  and	  Geels	  (2012)	  
The	  second	  period	  began	  in	  the	  1990s,	  with	  new	  contributions	  coming	  from	  
business	   and	   management	   scholars,	   e.g.	   via	   the	   Greening	   of	   Industry	   Network	  
(created	  in	  1991,	  see	  Fischer	  and	  Schot,	  1993),	  and	  also	  innovation	  scholars	  (Kemp	  
and	  Soete,	  1992;	  Freeman,	  1996).	  The	  level	  of	  analysis	  changed	  from	  single	  firms	  to	  
industries	  and	  the	  perspective	  expanded	  to	  longer-­‐term	  technical	  transformations	  
and	   competitive	   dynamics	   (Fischer	   and	   Schot,	   1993;	   Roome,	   1998).	   Given	   the	  
notion	  of	  ‘resistant	  compliance’	  strategy	  from	  the	  previous	  period,	  research	  aimed	  
to	  understand	  how	  to	  motivate	  not	  individual	  firms	  but	  entire	  industries	  to	  move	  
beyond	   strict	   compliance	   and	   towards	   proactive	   environmentally-­‐friendly	  
strategies.	  This	  period	  thus	  saw	  the	  emergence	  of	  two	  central	  debates.	  The	  first	  one	  
concerned	   the	   question	   ‘does	   it	   pay	   to	   be	   green?’:	   some	   scholars	   (most	   notably,	  
Porter	   and	  Van	  der	   Linde,	   1995)	   proposed	   that	   strategies	   such	   as	   environmental	  
management	   systems,	   cleaner	   production	   processes	   and	   reduced	   material	   use	  
could	  actually	  reduce	  costs	  to	  firms	  (i.e.	  that	  it	  ‘pays	  to	  be	  green’,	  because	  corporate	  
economic	  performance	  would	  be	   improved).	   Pro-­‐active	   ‘greening’	   strategies	   thus	  
would	   represent	   a	   ‘win-­‐win-­‐win’	   solution	   (Elkington,	   1994),	   benefitting	  




the	   focus	   was	   on	   increased	   competitive	   advantage	   through	   reduced	   costs,	   the	  
debate	  was	   still	   close	   to	   the	  economic	  perspective	   from	  the	  past.	  This	  debate	  on	  
whether	   it	   ‘pays	   to	  be	  green’	   goes	  on	   to	   this	  day	   (King	  and	  Lenox,	   2001;	  Orsato,	  
2006;	   see	   Ambec	   and	   Lanoie,	   2008	   for	   a	   review	   of	   the	   debate),	   with	   many	  
researchers	   testing	   the	   connection	   between	   environmental	   and	   financial	  
performances,	   but	   without	   definitive	   answers	   (see	   Orlitzky	   et	   al.,	   2003;	   	   and	  	  
Molina-­‐Azorín	   et	   al.,	  2009	   for	   two	  reviews	  of	  studies	   that	  attempted	  to	  test	  such	  
connection).	  
The	   other	   debate	   that	   emerged	   in	   the	   second	   period	   of	   the	   greening	   of	  
industry	   literature	   was	   about	   the	   ‘antecedents’	   of	   corporate	   greening	   strategies.	  
Two	  research	  strands	  emerged	  that	  tried	  to	  identify	  such	  determinants.	  One	  strand	  
offered	  static	  lists	  of	  factors	  that	  would	  supposedly	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  firm	  
to	   promote	   greening	   strategies	   (Henriques	   and	   Sadorsky,	   1996;	   Fuchs	   and	  
Mazmanian,	  1998;	  Bansal	  and	  Roth,	  2000).	  These	  lists	  included	  determinants	  that	  
ranged	   from	   external	   factors	   –	   such	   as	   environmental	   policy,	   consumer	   demand	  
and	  media	  attention	  –	   to	  organizational	   factors	  –	  such	  as	   top	  management	  style,	  
corporate	   ethics	   and	   resources	   (technical,	   financial,	   organizational).	   This	   strand	  
was	  subsequently	  criticized	  for	  a	  “failure	  to	  attribute	  degrees	  of	  importance	  to	  the	  
identified	  influences”	  (Fuchs	  and	  Mazmanian,	  1998,	  p.	  195).	  
The	  second	  research	  strand	   took	  a	  more	  dynamic	  approach	  and	  proposed	  
stage	   models	   of	   corporate	   greening,	   in	   which	   firms	   would	   start	   with	   non-­‐
compliance	   strategies,	   then	   move	   to	   compliance,	   and	   finally	   to	   pro-­‐active	  
‘greening’	   strategies. 5 	  This	   progress	   was	   thought	   to	   depend	   on	   changes	   in	  
individual	   (CEO)	   attitudes	   and	   their	   socio-­‐psychological	   characteristics	   (Roome,	  
1992;	  Winsemius	   and	   Guntram,	   1992;	   Fischer	   and	   Schot,	   1993).	   These	   corporate	  
greening	  models	  were	   subsequently	   criticized	   for:	   (a)	   too	  much	   inward	   focus	  on	  
corporate	  characteristics	  and	  CEO	  attitudes	  (Ghobadian	  et	  al.,	  1998);	  (b)	  adhering	  
to	   a	   linear	   model	   with	   deterministic	   (teleological)	   progression	   through	   stages	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Winsemius	  and	  Guntram	  (1992),	  for	  instance,	  conceived	  four	  stages	  in	  corporate	  environmental	  
response	  (reactive,	  receptive,	  constructive	  and	  proactive).	  Roome	  (1992)	  distinguished	  five	  stages:	  
(1)	  Non-­‐compliance	  due	  to	  cost	  constraints	  or	  lack	  of	  long-­‐term	  vision;	  (2)	  Compliance	  as	  legislation	  
sets	  the	  agenda;	  (3)	  Compliance-­‐plus,	  i.e.	  proactive	  integration	  of	  environmental	  management	  systems	  
into	  business	  strategy	  (beyond	  law	  requirements);	  (4)	  Commercial	  and	  environmental	  excellence,	  when	  
the	  company	  starts	  seeing	  ‘good	  environmental	  management’	  as	  ‘good	  management’;	  (5)	  Leading	  edge,	  
when	  the	  company	  uses	  state	  of	  the	  art	  environmental	  management	  techniques.	  See	  Kolk	  and	  Mauser	  




(Schaefer	   and	   Harvey,	   1998;	   Kolk	   and	   Mauser,	   2002);	   (c)	   prescriptive	   advocacy	  
(‘normativity’)	   and	  moralistic	   bias,	   despite	   the	  difficulty	   in	  operationalizing	   such	  
models	  (Schaefer	  and	  Harvey,	  1998;	  Kolk	  and	  Mauser,	  2002;	  Kallio	  and	  Nordberg,	  
2006).	  While	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  stage	  (or	  phase)	  models,	  which	  are	  an	  important	  
way	   to	   conceptualize	   the	   temporal	   dimension	   of	   industry	   responses	   to	  
societal/environmental	   problems6,	   these	   caveats	   have	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   account	  
when	   developing	   my	   contribution.	   Recent	   debates	   in	   the	   greening	   of	   industry	  
literature	  provide	  suggestions	  as	  to	  how	  such	  limitations	  can	  be	  addressed.	  
In	   a	   review	   of	   stage	   models	   of	   corporate	   greening,	   Schaefer	   and	   Harvey	  
(1998),	   for	   instance,	   recommended	   “that	   future	   research	   use	   broader,	   multi-­‐
dimensional	   theoretical	   frameworks,	   incorporating	   more	   detailed	   study	   of	   the	  
institutional	   pressures	   and	   internal	   conditions	   and	   processes	   which	   shape	  
individual	   companies’	   environmental	   strategy”	   (p.	   119).	   These	   authors	   also	  
remarked	   that	   not	   only	   pressures	   for	   environmental	   management	   should	   be	  
considered	  by	  researchers,	  but	  also	  pressures	  against	   it.	  Thus,	   in	  the	  most	  recent	  
period	   (from	   2000	   onwards),	   greening	   of	   industry	   scholars	   aimed	   to	   address	  
previous	  criticisms	  by	  conceptualizing	   interactions	  between	   internal	  processes	  of	  
corporate	   greening	   and	   external	   contexts	   (Schaefer	   and	  Harvey,	   1998;	   Hoffman,	  
2001).	  Mobilizing	   insights	   from	  wider	   theoretical	   traditions	   such	   as	   evolutionary	  
and	   institutional	   perspectives,	   organization	   theory	   and	   innovation	   studies,	   they	  
aimed	   to	   develop	   multi-­‐dimensional	   understandings	   of	   greening	   processes	   that	  
would	   account	   for	   the	   multi-­‐dimensionality	   of	   corporate	   strategies	   towards	  
environmental	  problems	  (Roome,	  1998;	  Schaefer	  and	  Harvey,	  1998;	  Jones	  and	  Levy,	  
2007).	  	  
Hoffman	  and	  Ventresca	  (2002)	  introduced	  an	  organizational-­‐field	  approach	  
to	  conceptualize	  the	  “complex	  evolution	  of	  ideas,	  resources,	  social	  structures,	  and	  
practices	   as	   organizational	   process	   that	   takes	   shape	   in	   broader,	   increasingly	  
institutionally	   structured	   policy	   fields”	   (p.	   2).	   They	   suggested	   that	   industry	  
greening	   is	   a	   longitudinal	  process	   that	   involves	   corporate	   strategy,	   public	   debate	  
and	  dialogue,	  political	  conflict	  as	  well	  as	   technical	  and	  economic	  dimensions.	  As	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  While	  this	  literature	  has	  a	  strict	  focus	  on	  greening	  problems	  and	  related	  environmentally-­‐
friendly	  (product	  and	  process)	  innovations,	  I	  take	  the	  perspective	  that	  the	  insights	  it	  provides	  
may	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  non-­‐greening	  problems	  as	  well.	  This	  assumption	  will	  become	  clearer	  in	  





Jones	  and	  Levy	  (2007)	  put	  it,	  in	  conclusion	  to	  a	  study	  of	  climate	  change	  strategies	  
of	  big	  firms:	  “The	  position	  of	   firms	  is	  not	  merely	  for	  or	  against	  action	  on	  climate	  
change,	  nor	  even	  along	  a	  continuum	  between	  those	  two	  extremes.	  Rather,	  a	  firms	  
[sic]	   response	   to	   climate	   change	   occurs	   in	  many	  dimensions,	   including	   political,	  
technological,	  organizational,	  financial	  and	  public	  relations	  components”	  (p.	  429).	  
In	  light	  of	  these	  criticisms	  and	  advances,	  my	  contribution	  to	  the	  STI	  policy	  
research	  will	   take	   two	  key	   insights	   from	   the	  greening	  of	   industry	   literature:	   that	  	  
(a)	   environmental	   problems	   and	   industry	   response	   strategies	   progress	   through	  
stages;	  and	  (b)	  this	  is	  a	  longitudinal,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  co-­‐evolutionary	  process	  at	  
the	  organizational-­‐field	   level,	  which	  calls	   for	  an	  approach	  that	   takes	   into	  account	  
the	  relationship	  between	  corporate,	  industry	  and	  context	  dynamics.	  Here	  I	  suggest	  
that	   these	   insights	   apply	   not	   only	   to	   ‘greening’	   problems,	   but	   also	   to	   societal	  
problems	   in	  general.	  Thus,	  my	  model	  of	  societal	  problem	  evolution	  and	   industry	  
response	   strategies	   aims	   to	   be	  more	   general	   that	   strictly	   ‘greening’	  models.	   The	  
model	  I	  will	  put	  forth	  does	  not	  aim	  at	  ‘managerial	  prescription’	  but	  to	  provide	  an	  
analytical	   heuristic	   that	   can	  be	  used	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   empirical	   cases,	   based	   on	  
which	   policy	   and	   strategy	   lessons	   can	   be	   drawn.	   My	   model	   also	   aims	   to	   avoid	  
deterministic	  (teleological)	  progression	  through	  stages,	  through	  the	  incorporation	  
of	  building	  blocks	  based	  on	  dialectical	  and	  life-­‐cycle	  logics	  (Van	  de	  Ven	  and	  Poole,	  
1995).	  In	  this	  respect,	  I	  will	  incorporate	  insights	  and	  concepts	  from	  issue	   life-­‐cycle	  
models	   (developed	   by	   Business	   &	   Society	   scholars),	   which	   conceptualize	   how	  
issues	  evolve	  and	  how	   firms-­‐in-­‐industries	   respond	   to	  policy	   issues.	  Because	  early	  
models	  were	   also	   criticized	   for	   deterministic	   linearity,	   recent	   contributions	   have	  
developed	  ways	   of	   overcoming	   this	   caveat.7	  Finally,	   by	   acknowledging	   the	  multi-­‐
dimensionality	   of	   the	   process	   and	   the	   dynamic	   interaction	   between	   industry	  
strategies	  and	  contextual	  pressures	   (field-­‐level	   interactions),	  my	  model	  avoids	  an	  
inward	   focus,	  as	  well	  as	  environmental	   (contextual)	  determinism.	  To	  understand	  
the	  interaction	  between	  contextual	  pressures	  and	  endogenous	  responses,	  I	  draw	  on	  
an	  existing	  framework	  of	  industries	  in	  contexts.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Moreover,	  as	  my	  review	  will	  show,	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  literature	  offers	  insights	  into	  how	  societal	  
problems	  are	  socially	  constructed,	  thus	  helping	  to	  avoid	  reification,	  an	  issue	  that	  also	  affects	  the	  




I.3. BACKGROUND	  FRAMEWORK	  OF	  INDUSTRY	  DYNAMICS:	  THE	  TRIPLE	  
EMBEDDEDNESS	  FRAMEWORK	  (TEF)	  
The	  Triple	  Embeddedness	  Framework	  (TEF),	  developed	  by	  (Geels,	  2012a),	  is	  a	  field-­‐
level	  model	  of	  industries	  in	  contexts,	  which	  conceptualizes	  industry-­‐actors	  (firms)	  
as	   embedded	   in	   two	   external	   environments	   and	   in	   an	   ‘industry	   regime’.	  
Schematically,	  the	  TEF	  is	  represented	  in	  Figure	  I.1.	  
Figure	  I.1:	  The	  Triple	  Embeddedness	  Framework	  of	  industries	  in	  contexts	  
	  
Source:	  Geels	  (2012a)	  
Building	   on	   evolutionary	   economics,	   science	   and	   technology	   studies	   (STS)	   and	  
neo-­‐institutional	  theory,	  the	  TEF	  sees	  an	  industry	  as	  operating	  not	  only	  in	  a	  task	  
environment	   –	  where	   it	   competes	   for	  market-­‐share,	   profits	   etc.	   –	   but	   also	   in	   an	  
institutional	   environment	   (Oliver,	   1997),	   where	   competition	   is	   for	   social	   fitness	  
(Powell,	  1991).	  Hence,	  the	  industry	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘embedded’	  (Granovetter,	  1985)	  
in	  two	  environments	  that	  exert	  different	  selection	  pressures,	  which	  sometimes	  are	  
connected	  to	  societal	  problems.	  
The	  third	  embeddedness	   is	   that	  of	   industry	  actors	   in	  an	   ‘industry	  regime’,	  
which	  comprises	  industry-­‐specific	  institutions	  that	  mediate	  perceptions	  and	  actions	  
of	  firms	  in	  an	  industry	  towards	  the	  external	  environments	  (Geels,	  2012a,	  p.	  3).	  Geels	  
(2012)	   proposes	   that	   this	   industry	   regime	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   consisting	   of	   four	   ‘core	  
elements’:	   (1)	   goals,	   values	   and	   mission,	   which	   indicate	   the	   industry’s	   societal	  
purpose	   and	   business	   domain;	   (2)	   beliefs	   and	   cognitive	   frames,	   which	   mediate	  




capabilities,	   which	   represent	   key	   resources	   for	   operational	   processes	   and	  
innovation	  activities;	  and	  (4)	  industry-­‐specific	  regulations	  that	  shape	  the	  industry’s	  
incentive	   structures.	   Following	   the	   insight	   from	   Giddens’	   (1984)	   structuration	  
theory,	  Geels	   (2012)	  propose	   that	   industry	  actors’	  are	  not	  only	  determined	   by	  but	  
also	   shape	   these	   industry-­‐specific	   institutions:	   their	   response	   to	   contextual	  
pressures	  is	  both	  enabled	  and	  constrained	  by	  the	  regime’s	  core	  elements.	  
In	  an	  industry	  regime,	  all	   four	  core	  elements	  are	   interrelated,	  as	   indicated	  
by	   the	   encircling	   in	   Figure	   I.1.	  One	   advantage	   of	   the	   industry	   regime	   concept	   –	  
which	   builds	   on	   but	   is	   broader	   than	   the	   evolutionary	   economics’	   notion	   of	  
technological	  regimes	  from	  Nelson	  and	  Winter	  (1982)	  –	  is	  therefore	  that	  it	  shows	  
that	  technology	  development	  is	  related	  not	  only	  to	  knowledge	  and	  capabilities,	  but	  
also	   to	   the	   industry’s	   goals,	   values,	   mission,	   beliefs,	   cognitive	   frames	   and	  
regulations.	  Thus,	  the	  industry	  regime	  concept	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  distinguish	  and	  
explain	  different	  types	  of	  technological/industrial	  change	  (Penna	  and	  Geels,	  2012):	  
(a)	  incremental	  change	  (minor	  changes	  in	  technology	  in	  accordance	  to	  prevailing	  
knowledge	   and	   capabilities);	   (b)	   ‘strategic	   reorientation’	   which	   entails	   more	  
substantial	   (radical)	   changes	   (in	   technology	   and	   marketing	   strategy);	   and	   (3)	  
‘strategic	  recreation’,	  which	  additionally	  entails	  changes	  in	  core	  beliefs	  and	  values	  
(Tushman	   and	   Romanelli,	   1985).	   I	   expect	   that	   industry	   actors	  will	   employ	  more	  
resistant	  strategies	  towards	  societal	  problems	  that	  require	  changes	  in	  core	  beliefs	  
and	  values	  (Penna	  and	  Geels,	  2012).	  	  
Furthermore,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  TEF	  is	  a	  useful	  background	  
model	  of	  industry	  dynamics,	  because	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  multi-­‐
dimensional	   industry	   strategies	   in	   response	   to	   pressures	   connected	   to	   a	   given	  
societal	  problem	  (indicated	  in	  Figure	  I.1	  by	  the	  bidirectional	  arrows	  linking	  firms-­‐
in-­‐an-­‐industry	   to	   actors-­‐in-­‐the-­‐environments).	   For	   instance,	   towards	   pressures	  
stemming	   from	   the	   task	   environment,	   firms	   may	   employ	   economic	   positioning	  
strategies	   (supply	   chain	   management,	   operations	   management,	   marketing	   etc.)	  
(Porter,	   1980)	  and	   innovation	   strategies	   (Tidd	   et	   al.,	   2005).	  Towards	   institutional	  
pressures,	   firms	   may	   employ	   corporate	   socio-­‐political	   strategies	   (Schaffer,	   1995;	  
Mahon	  and	  McGowan,	  1996;	  Hillman	  and	  Hitt,	  1999;	  Oliver	  and	  Holzinger,	  2008).	  
These	  different	   types	  of	   response	   strategies	  will	   be	   incorporated	   to	  my	  model	  of	  




therefore	   expand	   on	   the	   TEF	   as	   a	   background	   model	   to	   conceptualize	   how	  
industry-­‐specific	  institutions	  evolve	  over	  time	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  given	  problem.	  
I.4. RESEARCH	  QUESTIONS	  AND	  RESEARCH	  STRATEGY	  
I.4.1. Research	  questions	  
The	  analytical	  puzzle	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  understand	  how,	  when,	  and	  why	  industries	  
change	  their	  strategies	  (the	  technological	  one,	   in	  particular)	   to	  address	  a	  societal	  
problem.	  This	  puzzle	  is	  disentangled	  into	  interrelated	  research	  questions	  that	  I	  will	  
address	  in	  the	  thesis:	  
A) How	   do	   societal	   issue-­‐related	   pressures	   (on	   industries),	   from	   different	  
domains	  (namely,	  civil	  society,	  science,	  political	  arena,	  economy),	  evolve?	  
B) How	  do	  industries	  respond	  to	  changing	  pressures	  around	  societal	  issues,	  in	  
terms	  of	  technological,	  political,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  strategies?	  	  
C) In	   particular,	   when	   and	   why	   do	   industry	   actors	   decide	   to	   develop	  
substantive	  technological	  responses?	  
I.4.2. Research	  strategy	  
To	  answer	   these	  questions,	   I	  develop	  a	  new	  analytical	  perspective	   that	  combines	  
(a)	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   and	   issue	  attention	   cycle	   (q.v.)	   theories	   (from	   the	   Business	  &	  
Society	  field)	  with	  (b)	  the	  Triple	  Embeddedness	  Framework	  and	  (c)	  concepts	  from	  
business	   strategies,	   innovation	   management,	   corporate	   political	   strategies,	   and	  
socio-­‐cultural	  strategies.	  My	  novel	  perspective	  proposes	  an	   ideal-­‐typical	  model	  of	  
an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   I	   will	   confront	   this	   model	   with	   three	   case	   studies	   of	   the	  
American	  automobile	  industry,	  and	  various	  societal	  problems	  (local	  air	  pollution,	  
auto	   and	   highway	   safety,	   and	   climate	   change).	   The	   case	   studies	   combine	  
qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  research	  methods	  in	  an	  original	  way,	  and	  aim	  not	  only	  
to	  test	  the	  framework,	  but	  also	  to	  enable	  further	  refinements	  and	  the	  articulation	  
of	  more	  complex	  paths	  for	  issue	  life-­‐cycles.	  
The	   first	   two	   case	   studies	   are	   historical:	   they	   investigate	   the	   American	  
automobile	  industry’s	  strategic	  responses	  (a)	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  local	  air	  pollution,	  
which	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  catalytic	  converter	  innovation	  and	  (b)	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  
auto	  and	  highway	  safety,	  which	   is	  connected	   to	  many	  safety-­‐related	   innovations,	  




investigates	   (c)	   how	   the	   American	   automobile	   industry	   is	   responding	   to	   the	  
problem	  of	  climate	  change.	  Here,	  an	  additional	  goal	   is	   to	   identify	  at	  which	   issue	  
life-­‐cycle	  stage	  this	  problem	  currently	  is.	  Chapter	  III	  will	  give	  more	  detail	  on	  case	  
selection.	  
I.5. THESIS	  OVERVIEW	  
This	   thesis	   is	   divided	   in	   seven	   chapters,	   besides	   this	   introduction.	   Chapter	   II	  
reviews	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory,	  and	  other	  literature	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  help	  address	  
some	  blind	  stops	  in	  this	  theory.	  Chapter	  III	  integrates	  the	  reviewed	  concepts	  into	  a	  
coherent	   theoretical	   framework:	   the	   Dialectic	   Issue	   Life-­‐Cycle	   (DILC)	  model.	   In	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  third	  Chapter,	  I	  offer	  tentative	  (theoretically	   informed)	  answers	  to	  
my	  research	  questions.	  Chapter	  IV	  presents	  the	  methodology	  that	  I	  will	  use	  to	  test	  
the	   DILC-­‐model.	   Due	   to	   my	   ontological	   and	   epistemological	   assumptions,	   I	  
employ	  two	  complementary	  Process	  Theory	  methods:	  the	  narrative	  approach	  and	  
the	   quantification	   approach.	   This	   Chapter	   also	   justifies	   case	   selection,	   and	  
elaborates	  a	  case	  study	  protocol	  and	  analytical	  strategies.	  Chapters	  V	  to	  VII	  apply	  
and	  test	  the	  model	  in	  three	  empirical	  cases:	  (1)	  The	  issue	  of	   local	  air	  pollution	  and	  
the	  American	  automobile	  industry	  (1940s-­‐1980s);	  (2)	  The	  issue	  of	  automobile	  safety	  
and	   the	   American	   automobile	   industry	   (1900-­‐2000);	   and	   (3)	  The	   issue	   of	   climate	  
change	  and	  the	  American	  automobile	  industry	  (1979-­‐2012).	  The	  concluding	  chapter	  
offers	  my	   cross-­‐case	   analysis,	   elaborates	   conceptual	   and	  nuanced	   answers	   to	   the	  
research	  questions,	  makes	  explicit	   this	   thesis’	  contributions,	  discusses	   limitations	  




II. LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
II.1. INTRODUCTION	  
In	   the	   introductory	   chapter,	   I	   articulated	   the	   motivation	   for	   my	   research	   and	  
presented	   a	   gap	   in	   the	   STI	   field	   that	  my	   contribution	   aims	   at	   addressing.	   I	   also	  
discussed	  the	  Greening	  of	  Industry	  literature,	  as	  a	  sub-­‐branch	  of	  the	  STI	  field,	  from	  
which	   I	   took	   two	   key	   insights:	   (a)	   greening	   (societal)	   problems	   and	   associated	  
industry	   response	   strategies	   progress	   through	   stages;	   and	   (b)	   this	   progression	  
represents	   a	   longitudinal,	   multi-­‐dimensional	   co-­‐evolutionary	   process	   at	   the	  
organizational-­‐field	   level.	   My	   contribution	   will	   develop	   a	   novel	   stage	   model	   of	  
societal	  problem	  evolution	  and	  industry	  response	  strategies	  that	  take	  these	  insights	  
as	  starting	  point.	  	  
Existing	   stage	  models	   of	   corporate	   greening	   cannot	  be	  directly	   applied	   to	  
the	   analysis	   of	   such	   processes	   of	   problem	   evolution	   and	   industry	   response	  
strategies,	  because	   they	  have	   important	  deficiencies:	   (1)	   they	  are	  prescriptive;	   (2)	  
they	   have	   an	   ‘internalistic’	   focus	   on	   firms;	   and	   (3)	   their	   stages	   are	   teleological.	  
These	  are	  caveats	  that	  must	  be	  addressed	  for	  my	  model	  to	  go	  beyond	  existing	  stage	  
models	   of	   the	   greening	   literature.	   The	   first	   deficiency	   is	   less	   of	   an	   issue	   for	   the	  
model	   I	  will	   propose,	   because	   it	   does	   not	   have	   the	   ambition	   to	   prescribe	   policy	  
measures	  to	  public	  authorities	  or	  corporate	  managers.	  Instead,	  I	  aim	  to	  develop	  a	  
conceptual	   framework	   for	   the	   analysis	   of	   historical	   and	   contemporary	   cases	   of	  
societal	   problems	   and	   industry	   responses.	   To	   avoid	   the	   internalistic	   focus	  
(deficiency	   two),	  my	  model	   draws	  upon	   the	   second	   insight	   above,	   incorporating	  
and	  building	  on	   the	   field-­‐level	   framework	  of	   industry	  dynamics	   (the	  TEF)	   that	   I	  
also	   introduced	   in	  Chapter	   I.	  The	  TEF	  should	  strengthen	   the	  analytical	  power	  of	  
my	  model,	  by	  enabling	  a	   stage	  model	   that	   is	  neither	   inwardly	  geared	  nor	  biased	  
towards	  contextual	  determinism.	  To	  address	   the	   third	   issue,	   I	  will	  build	  on	   issue	  
life-­‐cycle	   theory,	  which	   I	   review	   in	   this	  Chapter.	  My	   review	  will	   show	   that	   three	  
generations	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory	  –	  with	  increasingly	  sophisticated	  stage	  models	  
–	   have	   been	   developed.	   Drawing	   on	   insights	   from	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory,	   I	   will	  
propose	   a	   stage	   model	   of	   issue	   evolution	   and	   industry	   strategic	   responses	   that	  
avoid	  a	  teleological	  argument	  by	  building	  on	  a	  ‘dialectical	  dynamics’	  (which	  will	  be	  




The	  goal	  of	  this	  literature	  review	  is	  therefore	  to	  raise	  insights	  for	  my	  model	  
of	  societal	  problem	  evolution	  and	  industry	  response	  strategies	  from	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
theory	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   how	   technologies	   develop	   in	   response	   to	   societal	  
problems.	  Yet,	  as	  my	  review	  will	  show,	   issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory	  presents	  gaps	  of	   its	  
own;	   namely,	   it	   does	   not	   explain:	   (a)	   the	   shift	   towards	   substantive	   response	   by	  
corporate	   actors,	   particularly	   how	   innovation	   strategies	   are	   deployed	   (and	   how	  
technologies	  evolve)	  throughout	  the	   life-­‐cycle;	  (b)	  how	  to	  quantify	  and	  depict	  an	  
issue-­‐life	   cycle	   (the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   as	   a	   function	   of	   public	   concern	   or	   attention	  
remained	   unspecified);	   (c)	   the	   interplays	   between	   firm-­‐level	   and	   collective	  
(industry-­‐level)	  strategies.	  	  
To	   overcome	   these	   gaps,	   I	   propose	   bringing	   in	   conceptualizations	   from	  
other	  literatures.	  Addressing	  point	  (a)	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  in	  this	  thesis,	  and	  it	  
actually	  offers	  an	  opportunity	   to	  combine	  STI	   theory	  with	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory;	  
section	   II.3	   therefore	   reviews	   concepts	   from	   technology	   and	   innovation	  
management	   studies	   and	   from	   the	   flourishing	   literature	   on	   ‘technology-­‐forcing	  
policy’.	   Point	   (b)	   will	   be	   addressed	   with	   concepts	   from	   issue-­‐attention	   theory	  
(reviewed	  in	  section	  II.4),	  which	  also	  offer	  interesting	  qualitative	  insights	  that	  will	  
be	   incorporated	   in	   my	   model.	   The	   third	   issue	   (point	   c)	   will	   be	   addressed	   with	  
conceptualizations	   from	   the	   Organizational	   Institutionalism	   tradition	   about	  
‘interorganizational	   relationships’	   and	   ‘corporate	   political	   activities’,	   which	   are	  
reviewed	   in	   section	   II.5.	   While	   my	   goal	   is	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   STI	   field,	   the	  
conceptual	   model	   developed	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   not	   only	   an	   extension	   to	   third-­‐
generation	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	   but	   an	   original	   contribution	   to	   the	   Business	  &	  
Society	  field	  as	  well.	  
II.2. ISSUE	  LIFE-­‐CYCLE	  THEORY	  AND	  VARIOUS	  STAGE	  MODELS:	  A	  
CRITICAL	  REVIEW	  
Issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	   emerged	   in	   the	   1970s	   in	   connection	   to	   the	   debate	   about	  
Corporate	  Social	  Responsibility	  (CSR).	  The	  theory	  conceptualizes	  the	  progression	  
of	  societal	  issues	  through	  time,	  with	  some	  stage	  models	  being	  developed	  as	  an	  aid	  
to	   ‘issues	  management’,	  which	   refers	   to	   “the	  processes	  by	  which	   the	   corporation	  
can	   identify,	  evaluate	  and	  respond	  to	  those	  social	  and	  political	   issues	  which	  may	  




Corporate	   Behavior	   and	   Social	   Change	   (1978),	   James	   Post	   explained	   the	   idea	   of	  
‘issue	  life-­‐cycle’	  as	  follows:	  	  	  	  
Public	   issues	   generally	   appear	   to	   pass	   through	   a	   series	   of	   phases	   which,	  
because	  of	  their	  natural	  evolution,	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  a	   life	  cycle.	  Although	  
an	  issue	  may	  not	  become	  obvious	  to	  us	  until	  it	  is	  highly	  politicized	  and	  on	  
the	  verge	  of	  legislative	  action,	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  long	  gestation	  period	  during	  
which	  time	  much	  activity	  has	  to	  occur	  to	  make	  the	  issue	  a	  truly	  public	  one.	  
(p.	  22)	  
I	   identify	   three	   generations	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	   and	   models	   that	   were	  
developed	  since	  the	  1970s.	  Table	  II.2	  summarizes	  the	  main	  characteristics	  of	  these	  
generations,	   which	   I	   label	   ‘Emergent’,	   ‘Integrative’	   and	   ‘Expansive’,	   respectively.	  
While	   the	   first	   generation	   offered	   first	   insights	   and	   intuitions,	   the	   second	  
generation	   aimed	   at	   integrating	   these	   into	   a	   coherent	   whole,	   and	   the	   third	  
generation	   expanded	   the	   theory	   with	   the	   incorporation	   of	   concepts	   from	   other	  
disciplines.	  
Drawing	   on	   different	   academic	   disciplines,	   each	   generation	   attempted	   to	  
address	   problems	   in	   previous	   conceptualizations.	   Similarly	   to	   the	   Greening	   of	  
Industry	   literature	   (see	   Table	   I.1	   in	   Chapter	   1),	   the	   analytical	   level	   of	   these	  
succeeding	   generations	   moved	   upwards	   to	   the	   industry	   level	   with	   the	   third	  
generation	  of	  scholars.	  However,	  as	  I	  will	  show,	  the	  literature	  did	  not	  look	  at	  the	  
interplays	   between	   firm-­‐	   and	   industry-­‐level	   strategies,	   and	   neither	   has	   the	  
organizational-­‐field	   level	   been	   incorporated	   into	   the	   literature.	   This	   presents	   an	  
opportunity	  to	  analyse	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  dynamics	  within	  a	  field	  level	  framework,	  i.e.	  
the	   field-­‐level	   Triple	   Embeddedness	   Framework	   of	   industry	   dynamics.	   This	   is	  
therefore	  the	  level	  on	  which	  I	  will	  concentrate	  when	  developing	  my	  stage	  model	  in	  
Chapter	   III;	   yet,	   I	   will	   also	   conceptualize	   the	   relationship	   between	   firm-­‐level	  
strategies	  and	  industry	  dynamics.	  




Table	  II.1:	  Schematic	  summary	  of	  the	  three	  generations	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory	  
	  
1st	  Generation:	  Emergent	   2nd	  Generation:	  Integrative	   3rd	  Generation:	  Expansive	  
Period	   1970s-­‐1985	   1985-­‐1990s	   Late-­‐1990s	  onwards	  
Key	  works	  
Ackerman	  (1973);	  Sethi	  (1975,	  
1979);	  Post	  (1978);	  Buchholz	  
(1982);	  Buchholz	  et	  al.	  (1994	  
[1985])	  
Tombari	  (1984);	  Bigelow	  et	  al.	  
(1991,	  1993);	  Mahon	  &	  Waddock	  
(1992);	  Wartick	  &	  Mahon	  (1994)	  
Mahon	  &	  McGowan	  (1996);	  
Näsi	  et	  al.	  (1997);	  Bigelow	  et	  al.	  
(1997);	  Wartick	  &	  Wood	  (1998);	  
Gerde	  &	  White	  (2003);	  Lamertz	  




Political	  Science	  (Public	  Policy	  
studies);	  Strategic	  
Management	  











Integration	  of	  corporate	  
responsiveness	  with	  public	  
responsibility	  
Further	  integration,	  plus	  
multidisciplinary	  expansion	  	  
Level	  of	  
analysis	  
Firms	  (and	  their	  managers)	   Firms	   Industry	  




a)	  Stages	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  and	  
stages	  of	  corporate	  strategies	  
loosely	  coupled;	  
b)	  Little	  explanation	  of	  the	  
shift	  towards	  substantive	  
response	  (e.g.	  technological	  
strategy);	  
c)	  Contextual	  determinism:	  
managerial	  discretion	  
constrained	  throughout	  the	  
life-­‐cycle;	  
d)	  Too	  much	  emphasis	  on	  the	  
public	  policy	  process	  and	  
assumption	  that	  all	  issues	  
follow	  the	  same	  cycle.	  Not	  
clear	  about:	  how	  issues	  
emerge	  (societal	  pressures	  as	  
a	  black-­‐box),	  what	  happens	  
within	  stages	  and	  phase	  shift;	  
e)	  Lack	  of	  attention	  to	  
competing	  issues	  and	  to	  the	  
relationship	  between	  multiple	  
business	  strategies.	  
a)	  Little	  explanation	  of	  the	  shift	  
towards	  substantive	  response	  
(e.g.	  technological	  strategy);	  
b)	  ‘Lighter’	  contextual	  
determinism:	  ‘triggering	  events’	  
still	  as	  autonomous	  pressures	  
(for	  e.g.	  phase	  shift);	  
c)	  Issue	  life-­‐cycle	  as	  a	  function	  
of	  public	  concern	  or	  attention	  
unspecified	  (measurement	  
issue);	  
d)	  Little	  explanation	  of	  the	  
interplays	  between	  firm-­‐level	  
and	  collective	  (industry-­‐level)	  
strategies.	  
e)	  Lack	  of	  criteria	  for	  the	  
(conceptual	  and/or	  empirical)	  
identification	  of	  stages	  
(methodological	  issue)	  
	  
a)	  Little	  explanation	  of	  the	  shift	  
towards	  substantive	  response	  
(e.g.	  technological	  strategy);	  
b)	  Little	  explanation	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  an	  issue	  
life-­‐cycle	  and	  issue	  attention-­‐
cycles	  (measurement	  issue);	  
c)	  Little	  explanation	  of	  the	  
interplays	  between	  firm-­‐level	  
and	  collective	  (industry-­‐level)	  
strategies.	  
d)	  Lack	  of	  explicit	  criteria	  for	  the	  
(conceptual	  and/or	  empirical)	  
identification	  of	  stages	  
(methodological	  issue)	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  based	  on	  reviewed	  works8.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  These	  works	  were	  selected	  through	  a	  citation	  analysis	  (using	  both	  the	  ThomsonReuters’	  Web	  of	  
Knowledge	  and	  Google	  Scholar).	  I	  began	  with	  a	  backward	  citation	  analysis	  of	  works	  from	  the	  1990s	  
and	  2000s	  (e.g.	  Bigelow	  et	  al.,	  1991,	  Mahon	  and	  Waddock,	  1992,	  Lamertz	  et	  al.	  2003,	  Rivoli	  and	  
Waddock,	  2011)	  to	  trace	  the	  sources	  they	  refer	  to.	  These	  original	  studies	  included	  Ackerman	  (1975),	  
Post	  (1978),	  Sethi	  (1975,	  1979),	  and	  Buchholz	  (1982	  –	  or	  other	  editions	  of	  this	  book/other	  works	  by	  
Buchholz).	  I	  then	  made	  a	  forward	  citation	  analysis	  for	  these	  works	  to	  identify	  other	  relevant	  
contributions	  to	  the	  development	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory	  (e.g.	  Bigelow	  et	  al.,	  1993,	  Wartick	  and	  
Mahon,	  1994,	  Rakich	  and	  Feit,	  2011	  etc.).	  This	  method	  resulted	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  models/works	  that,	  




II.2.1. The	  1st	  generation	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory	  (1970s-­‐1985)	  
The	  first	  generation	  of	   issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory	  was	  developed	  by	  scholars	  from	  the	  
Corporate	  Social	  Responsiveness	   tradition	  (Ackerman,	  1973;	  Ackerman	  and	  Bauer,	  
1976;	   Sethi,	   1979)	   and	   from	   the	   Corporate	   Public	   Responsibility	   tradition9	  (Post,	  
1978;	   Buchholz,	   1982).	   These	   scholars	   attempted	   to	   move	   away	   from	   the	  
prescriptive	  and	  normative	  orientation	  (Lee,	  2008;	  Dentchev,	  2009)	  associated	  with	  
‘Corporate	   Social	   Responsibility’	   (CSR)	   (for	   a	   review	   of	   the	   CSR	   concept,	   see	  
Carroll,	  1999).	  It	  was	  also	  a	  reaction	  to	  criticisms	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  the	  economist	  
Milton	   Friedman,	   who	   argued	   that	   the	   ‘social	   responsibility	   of	   business’	   was	   to	  
‘increase	  its	  profits’	  and	  who	  contended	  that	  responsibilities	  other	  than	  that	  would	  
impose	  a	  costly	  burden	  on	  shareholders	  (Friedman,	  1962).	  	  
Proponents	  of	  Corporate	  Public	  Responsibility	  argued	  that	  corporations	  had	  
an	   economic	   responsibility	   and	   a	   public	   responsibility	   (Wartick	   and	   Cochran,	  
1985).	  The	  latter	  referred	  to	  a	  company’s	  responsibility	  to	  tackle	  the	  secondary	  or	  
consequential	  outcomes	  of	  its	  ‘primary	  involvement’	  activities	  (the	  ‘basic	  business	  
functions’,	  i.e.	  its	  economic	  tasks	  plus	  legal	  requirements)	  (Preston	  and	  Post,	  1975;	  
Preston	  and	  Post,	  1981).	  These	  authors	  further	  suggested	  that	  the	  market	  provided	  
direction	  for	  corporate	  decisions	  about	  primary	  involvement	  activities	  and	  that	  the	  
public	   policy	   process	   provided	   guidelines	   for	   decisions	   related	   to	   secondary	  
involvements	  (Wartick	  and	  Cochran,	  1985).10	  The	  public	  policy	  process	  covered	  the	  
formal	  and	  informal	  ‘rules	  of	  the	  game’	  (Buchholz,	  1982),	  to	  include	  “also	  the	  broad	  
pattern	  of	  social	  direction	  reflected	  in	  public	  opinion,	  emerging	  issues,	  formal	  legal	  
requirements,	   and	   enforcement	   or	   implementation	   practices”	   (Preston	   and	   Post,	  
1981,	   p.	   57).	   The	   rationale	   behind	   the	   Public	   Responsibility	   approach	   was	   that	  
secondary	   activities	  were	   important	   because	   through	   them	  a	   business	   enterprise	  
could	  change	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  (Bigelow	  et	  al.,	  1990).	  
Scholars	  in	  the	  Corporate	  Social	  Responsiveness	  tradition	  also	  “intended	  to	  
shift	  the	  emphasis	  away	  from	  social	  obligations	  and	  to	  social	  response	  processes”	  
(Wartick	   and	   Cochran,	   1985,	   p.	   762);	   they	   put	   forth	   a	   pragmatic	   argument	  
(Dentchev,	   2009)	   for	  why	   business	   should	   act	   responsibly	   and	   respond	   to	   social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  See	  Wartick	  and	  Cochran	  (1985)	  for	  this	  classification	  of	  traditions.	  
10	  This	  conceptualization	  fits	  well	  with	  the	  perspective	  of	  industries	  as	  embedded	  in	  two	  
environments,	  the	  economic/task	  and	  the	  institutional	  environment,	  which	  the	  TEF	  framework	  




demands:	  “unless	  social	   issues	  can	  be	  processed	  with	  reasonable	  speed,	  they	  may	  
pile	   up	   and	   ultimately	   put	   the	   company	   in	   a	   position	   where	   it	   cannot	   function	  
effectively	   in	   its	   traditional	   role	  as	  a	  producer	  of	  goods	  and	  services”	   (Ackerman,	  
1973,	  p.	  95).11	  In	   fact,	   firms	  already	  actively	  managed	  societal	   issues	  and	  pressures	  
stemming	   from	   them	   (Maurer,	   2007),	   so	   that	   scholars	   began	   to	   study	   strategic	  
response	   patterns	   of	   firms	   confronted	   with	   societal	   demands	   to	   develop	   a	  
practitioners-­‐oriented	  theory	  of	  corporate	  social	  responsiveness.	  
Those	  two	  approaches	  converged	  in	  their	  ambition	  to	  understand	  how	  firms	  
exercise	   their	   ‘legitimate	   right’	   to	   change	   the	   rules	  of	   the	  game	   (Buchholz	   et	   al.,	  
1994	  [1985])	  and	  effectively	  manage	  societal	  issues.	  A	  key	  tool	  developed	  were	  stage	  
models	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  and	  corporate	  response	  strategies.	  One	  of	  the	  first	  models	  
of	  this	  kind	  was	  proposed	  by	  Ackerman	  (1973),	  who	  intended	  to	  illustrate	  “how	  a	  
policy	   problem	   is	   converted	   into	   a	   managerial	   problem	   through	   the	   process	   of	  
institutionalization”	  (p.	  95).	  Ackerman	  contended	  that	  changing	  and	   increasingly	  
demanding	   environmental	   conditions	   evolved	   through	   certain	   ‘phases’	   that	  
paralleled	   corporate	   response	   patterns.	   Despite	   his	   original	   insight,	   Ackerman’s	  
model	  was	  not	  fully	  specified,	  e.g.	  it	  did	  not	  explain	  how	  societal	  issues	  emerged	  in	  
the	  first	  place	  and	  how	  they	  were	  translated	  into	  societal	  pressures	  directed	  onto	  
the	  corporation	  (Maurer,	  2007).	  More	  full-­‐fledged	  models	  from	  the	  first	  generation	  
were	  proposed	  by	  Sethi	   (1975;	   1979),	  Post	   (1978)	  and	  Buchholz	  (1982).	   It	   is	  worth	  
looking	  at	  these	  contributions	  in	  more	  detail,	  as	  they	  became	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  next	  
generation	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  models.	  
Sethi	   (1975;	   1979)	   proposed	   a	   stage	   model	   of	   issue	   evolution	   that	   divided	   “the	  
elapsed	   time	  between	   the	  emergence	  of	  a	  problem	  and	   its	   solution	  and	  ultimate	  
elimination	   into	   four	   categories	  or	   stages:	   (a)	  pre-­‐problem,	   (b)	   identification,	   (c)	  
remedy	  and	  relief,	  and	  (d)	  prevention”	  (1979,	  p.	  66).	  One	  of	  the	  important	  insights	  
of	  this	  model	  is	  its	  ‘identification	  stage’,	  during	  which	  affected	  groups	  try	  to	  define	  
(frame)	   the	   problem,	   identifying	   its	   causes	   and	   assigning	   responsibilities.	   “The	  
definition	  of	  the	  problem	  may	  also	  involve	  the	  vested	  interest	  or	  value-­‐orientation	  
of	   a	  particular	   group.	   [...]	  What	   is	   a	  problem	   to	  one	  group	  may	  appear	   to	  be	   an	  
obstruction	   to	   another”	   (Sethi,	   1979,	   p.	   69).	   The	   author	   here	   indicates	   two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




important	   phenomena	   that	   characterize	   initial	   stages	   of	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle:	   (1)	  
sense-­‐making	   efforts,	  which	   lead	   to	   a	   problem	   framing;	   and	   (2)	   the	   potential	   of	  
struggles	  between	  groups	  with	  conflicting	  interests	  regarding	  the	  problem,	  which,	  I	  
propose,	  may	  translate	  into	  a	  ‘framing	  struggle’.	  
Sethi	   (1975,	   1979)	   also	   provided	   important	   insights	   about	   how	   companies	  
respond	  to	  a	   ‘legitimacy	  gap’,	  which	  is	  “a	  gap	  between	  business	  performance	  and	  
societal	  expectations”	  (Sethi,	  1979,	  p.	  65),	  and	  forms	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  
a	   societal	   issue.	   Companies	   facing	   a	   legitimacy	   gap	   will	   first	   attempt	   to	   change	  
public	   expectations/perceptions	   through	   public	   relations	   before	   it	   attempts	   to	  
bring	  about	  substantive	  changes	  in	  business	  performance/operations	  (Sethi,	  1979).	  
Sethi	   also	   proposed	   a	   three-­‐stage	   ‘schema’	   for	   classifying	   corporate	   behaviour	  
towards	  societal	  issues,	  in	  which	  a	  firm	  moves	  from	  (a)	  ‘exploitative	  and	  defensive	  
adaptation,	   with	   maximum	   externalization	   of	   costs’,	   through	   (b)	   ‘reactive	  
adaptation’,	  with	  limited	  internalization	  of	  previous	  external	  costs	  to	  (c)	  ‘proactive	  
adaptation’,	  with	   anticipation	  of	   future	   environmental	   changes.	  The	   schema	  was	  
however	   criticized	   for	   representing	   generic	   stances	   towards	   the	   external	  
environment	  (Buchholz,	  1982),	  rather	  than	  particular	  strategies	  in	  a	  given	  stage	  of	  
an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  (Näsi	  et	  al.,	  1997;	  Maurer,	  2007).	  	  
Post	   (1978)	  proposed	  that	  a	  public	  issue	  goes	  through	  four	  distinct	  stages:	  (1)	  the	  
first	   stage	   is	   about	   the	   emergence	   of	   an	   expectational	   gap	   (similar	   to	   Sethi’s	  
‘legitimacy	   gap’);	   (2)	   in	   the	   political	   stage,	   actors	   begin	   to	   form	   coalitions	   and	  
devise	  “strategies	  to	  shape	  the	  appropriate	  legislative	  context	  for	  the	  issue”	  (Post,	  
1978,	   p.	   24);	   (3)	   in	   the	   legislative	   (and	   implementation)	   stage,	   regulations	   are	  
enacted	  and	  implemented;	  and	  (4)	  in	  the	  litigation	  stage,	  the	  regulatory	  agency	  (or	  
other	   public	   body	   responsible	   for	   implementing	   the	   policy)	   and	   regulated	   firms	  
may	  take	  legal	  action	  against	  each	  other.	  Post	  (1978)	  suggested	  that	  the	  enactment	  
of	  legislation	  in	  the	  third	  stage	  is	  the	  ‘turning	  point’	  or	  ‘high	  point’	  of	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  
process,	   because	   it	   publicly	   legitimizes	   a	   new	   set	   of	   societal	   expectations	   and	  
institutionalizes	   the	   issue.	   After	   this	   high	   point,	   the	   issue	   can	   become	   highly	  
publicized	   again	   if	   it	   reaches	   an	   implementation	  or	   litigation	   stage	  marked	  with	  
controversy	   between	   business	   and	   governmental	   agencies	   (p.	   25).	   So,	   the	  




Post	   (1978)	   also	   looked	   at	   corporate	   response	   strategies	   to	   societal	   issues	  
and	  proposed	  that	  these	  go	  through	  three	  phases	  (which	  he	  does	  not	  directly	  relate	  
to	   his	   four-­‐stage	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   model):	   (1)	   ‘awareness	   or	   cognizance	   of	   public	  
issue’	   (e.g.	   environmental	   scanning,	   sense-­‐making);	   (2)	   ‘commitment	   to	   action’;	  
and	   (3)	   ‘selection	   and	   implementation	   of	   response’.	   And	  he	   offered	   two	   insights	  
about	   corporate	   response	   to	   societal	   issues:	   (a)	   the	   second	   stage	   of	   strategic	  
response	   involves	  a	  period	  of	   technical	   learning	  about	   the	   issue	   in	  question,	  and	  
(b)	   the	  organization’s	   previous	  history	   and	   characteristics	   play	   important	   role	   in	  
determining	  current	  response	  strategies.12	  	  
Buchholz	   (1982)	   proposed	   a	   three-­‐stage	   model	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle:	   (1)	   ‘Public	  
opinion	  formation’,	  when	  the	  issue	  is	  voiced	  by	  disadvantaged	  groups	  and	  activists;	  
(2)	   ‘Public	   policy	   formulation’,	   when	   the	   initial	   ideas	   are	   translated	   into	   formal	  
policies;	   and	   (3)	   ‘Public	   policy	   implementation’,	   when	   formal	   policies	   are	  
implemented.	  This	  model	  has	  a	  similar	  logic	  as	  Post’s	  (1978),	  but	  here	  the	  political	  
and	  legislative	  stages	  are	  combined	  into	  the	  ‘public	  policy	  formulation’	  stage,	  while	  
the	   implementation	   of	   new	   laws	   is	   merged	   with	   Post’s	   litigation	   stage	   into	   the	  
‘policy	   implementation’	   stage.13	  Buchholz’	   argument	   was	   that	   policy-­‐making	   is	   a	  
political	  process	  that	  attracts	  media	  attention	  and	  is	  usually	  visible	  to	  the	  public,	  
while	   implementing	   a	   piece	   of	   legislation	   is	   a	   technical	   process	   carried	   by	  
regulatory	  agencies,	  which	  is	  less	  visible	  to	  the	  public.	  	  
Concerning	  response	  strategies,	  Buchholz	  (1982)	  and	  Buchholz	   et	   al.	  (1994	  
[1985])	  described	  four	  ‘generic	  response	  strategies	  or	  overall	  response	  patterns’:	  (1)	  
a	   generic	   strategy	   labelled	   ‘Inactive’:	   “In	   the	   inactive	   response	   pattern,	   business	  
does	  not	  treat	  a	  public	  issue	  as	  within	  the	  domain	  of	  its	  concern,	  at	  least	  as	  far	  as	  
changing	  corporate	  behaviour	   is	  concerned,	  and	  refuses	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  any	  
change	  is	  necessary”	  (Buchholz	   et	   al.,	   1994	  [1985],	  p.	  47);	  (2)	  a	   ‘Reactive’	  strategy,	  
which	   can	   be	   (a)	   negative	   (blocking	   issue	   progression)	   or	   (b)	   positive	  
(accommodating	   the	   issue);	   (3)	   a	   ‘Proactive’	   strategy	   (modifying	   external	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  To	  this	  I	  add	  that	  the	  industry	  regime	  in	  which	  the	  organization	  is	  embedded	  also	  plays	  
important	  role	  in	  determining	  response	  strategies.	  This	  insight	  will	  be	  further	  developed	  in	  
Section	  II.5	  and	  in	  Chapter	  III.	  
13	  This	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  no	  unique	  perspective	  on	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle,	  and	  the	  specification	  of	  
each	  stage	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  factors	  brought	  to	  the	  fore.	  In	  the	  model	  I	  will	  propose,	  the	  logics	  
for	  phase	  definition	  and	  transition	  will	  be	  dialectical:	  the	  interplay	  between	  issue-­‐related	  




expectations	  through	  public	  relations	  or	  modifying	  internal	  structures	  of	  business	  
performance);	   and	   (4)	   the	   ‘Interactive’	   strategy,	   which	   is	   vaguely	   specified	   by	  
Buchholz	  et	  al.	  (1994	  [1985]),	  but	  seems	  similar	  to	  the	  third	  stage	  of	  Sethi’s	  scheme.	  
Given	   the	   similarities	   between	   Sethi’s	   and	   Buchholz’	   schemes,	   it	   is	   no	  
surprise	  that	  the	  latter	  suffers	  some	  of	  the	  same	  problem	  as	  the	  former:	  it	  is	  loosely	  
coupled	  with	  the	  stages	  of	  an	  issue-­‐life	  cycle	  (and	  so	  are	  Post’s	  schemes).	  However,	  
Buchholz	  et	  al.	  (1994	  [1985])	  went	  one	  step	  further	  and	  identified	  specific	  strategies	  
(or	   tactics)	   that	   companies	   employ	   throughout	   a	   three-­‐stage	   issue	   life-­‐cycle:	   (1)	  
communications	   strategy,	   which	   targets	   the	   public	   opinion	   formation	   stage	   and	  
aims	   at	   preventing	   the	   issue	   to	  move	   along	   its	   life-­‐cycle,	   reducing	   the	   need	   for	  
substantive	  changes	  in	  business	  operations;	  (2)	  political	  strategy	  –	  such	  as	  setting-­‐
up	   trade	   associations,	   lobbying	   or	   constituency	   building	   –	   to	   influence	   policy	  
proposals;	  and	  (3)	  compliance	  strategies,	  including	  legal	  action	  or	  non-­‐compliance	  
and	   ‘creating	  a	  new	  issue’	   (Buchholz	   et	   al.,	   1994	  [1985]),	  which	  targets	  the	  public	  
policy	  implementation	  stage.	  This	  latter	  option	  of	  compliance	  strategy	  –	  ‘creating	  a	  
new	  issue’	  –	  may	  consist	  in	  reframing	  the	  issue	  or	  the	  new	  regulation	  to	  force	  the	  
life-­‐cycle	  back	  to	  the	  beginning	  (i.e.	  into	  the	  public	  opinion	  formation	  stage).	  Here	  
Buchholz	   is	  hinting	  at	   the	   interplay	  between	  multiple	   issues	   and	   the	  effects	  of	   a	  
competing	  issue	  on	  another	  issue’s	  life-­‐cycle.	  
Buchholz	   (1982)	   also	   proposed	   that	   managerial	   discretion	   over	   response	  
strategies	   diminishes	   as	   the	   issue	   progresses	   in	   its	   life-­‐cycle.	   This	   claim	   can	   be	  
criticized,	  however,	   for	   embodying	   a	   certain	   type	  of	   ‘contextual	  determinism’,	   in	  
which	  corporate	  strategic	  responses	  automatically	  followed	  from	  objective	  (reified)	  
‘pressures’	  stemming	  from	  the	  external	  environment.	  As	  Lamertz	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  put	  
it,	  
This	  objectification	  of	  issues	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  their	  evolution	  is	  modeled	  
as	  a	  function	  of	  public	  attention	  or	  public	  policy	  initiatives,	  and	  in	  the	  way	  
in	  which	  social	  actors	  are	  modeled	  to	  detect	  or	  act	  in	  response	  to	  an	  issue	  
at	   the	   various	   stages	   of	   its	   career.	   As	   a	   result,	   these	   models	   shift	   the	  
emphasis	  away	  from	  the	  complex	   institutionalized	  system	  in	  which	  actors	  
strategically	   formulate	  and	  propagate	   [and	  respond	  to]	   social	   issues...	   (p.	  
83-­‐4)	  
First	  generation	  models	  have	  also	  been	  criticized	  for	  two	  other	  reasons.	  First,	  these	  




process,	  as	  if	  all	  issues	  were	  resolved	  strictly	  in	  the	  governmental	  arena	  (Bigelow	  et	  
al.,	   1993).	   Secondly,	   with	   societal	   issues	   reified,	   underlying	   societal	   pressures	  
remained	  a	  ‘black-­‐box’,	  and	  this	  early	  theory	  did	  not	  explain	  how	  issues	  emerge	  in	  
the	   first	  place.	  Mahon	  and	  Waddock	  (1992)	  criticized	  early	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  theory	  
for	  the	  assumption	  
...that	   all	   issues	   follow	   the	   same	   cycle,	   that	   all	   issues	   are	   resolved	   in	   the	  
political-­‐legislative-­‐judicial	   [i.e.,	   the	   public	   policy]	   arena,	   and	   that	   the	  
progression	   of	   issues,	  while	   difficult	   to	   precisely	   time,	   all	   follow	   a	   similar	  
curvilinear	  path	   through	  stages.	  What	   this	  approach	   fails	   to	  provide	  us	   is	  
an	   understanding	   of	  what	   happens	  within	   each	   of	   the	   stages	   and	   how	   an	  
issue	  moves	  from	  one	  stage	  to	  another.	  (p.	  22)	  
Furthermore,	  the	  excessive	  emphasis	  on	  the	  public	  policy	  process	  means	  that	  early	  
models	   looked	   almost	   exclusively	   at	   single	   ‘focal’	   issues14	  (Bigelow	   et	   al.,	   1993),	  
despite	  Buchholz	  et	  al.	  (1994	  [1985])	  early	  insight.	  Consequently,	  interactions	  with	  
competing	   issues	   and	   the	   dynamic	   relationships	   between	   multiple	   business	  
strategies	   (including	   ‘primary	   involvements’	   strategies,	   i.e.	   economic	   and	  market	  
strategies)	  were	   ignored	   (Mahon	  and	  Waddock,	   1992).	  The	   second	  generation	  of	  
issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	   and	   stage	   models	   therefore	   aimed	   at	   addressing	   these	  
problems,	  building	  on	  key	  insights	  from	  the	  early	  generation.	  
II.2.2. The	  2nd	  generation	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory	  (1985-­‐1990s)	  
The	  problem	  of	  loose	  coupling	  of	  stages	  of	  issue	  evolution	  and	  stages	  of	  corporate	  
response	  strategies	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  key	  contributions	  concerning	  
the	   issue	   side	   had	   been	   developed	   by	   scholars	   working	   in	   the	  Corporate	   Public	  
Responsibility	  research	  stream,	  while	  corporate	  response	  strategies	  were	  the	  main	  
focus	   of	   scholars	   from	   the	  Corporate	   Social	   Responsiveness	   tradition.	   In	   the	   first	  
generation,	   these	   two	   research	   streams	   were	   loosely	   coupled	   (despite	   the	   tardy	  
contributions	   by	   Buchholz	   and	   colleagues,	   discussed	   above).	   The	   second	  
generation	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory	  aimed	  at	  combining	  them	  more	  systematically.	  	  
Most	   authors	   in	   the	   second	   generation	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  models	   worked	  
within	   the	   ‘Issues	  Management’	   tradition	   (for	  a	  brief	   review	  of	   this	   tradition,	   see	  
Wartick	   and	   Heugens,	   2003).	   One	   of	   these	   authors	   was	   Tombari,	   who	   in	   1984	  
published	  a	  textbook	  titled	  Business	  and	  Society:	  Strategies	  for	  the	  environment	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  ‘Focal’	  issue	  (or	  problem)	  is	  the	  one	  whose	  evolution	  a	  given	  analysis	  attempts	  to	  explain.	  
However,	  in	  the	  process	  of	  issue	  evolution,	  a	  focal	  issue	  will	  be	  influenced	  by	  ‘competing’	  issues.	  




public	  policy,	   in	  which	  he	  “tried	  to	  summarize	  the	  state	  of	  the	  art	  of	  the	  strategic	  
management	  process	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  socio-­‐political	  matters”	  (p.	  vi).	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  
integrate	  previous	  conceptualizations	  into	  a	  ‘strategic	  issues	  management	  system’,	  
in	  order	  to	  “recognize	  environmental	  shifts,	  plan	  responses,	  and	  implement	  them	  
effectively”	   in	   real	  world	   contexts	   (idem).	  Other	   authors	   also	   contributed	   to	   this	  
integrative	   effort:	   here,	   I	   review	   in	   some	   detail	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   models	   of	  
Tombari	  (1984),	  Bigelow	  et	  al.	  (1991;	  1993),	  and	  Mahon	  and	  Waddock	  (1992),	  which	  
form	  the	  core	  of	  the	  influential	  second	  generation	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory.	  
Tombari’s	   (1984)	   textbook	   appeared	   one	   year	   before	   Buchholz	   and	   colleagues	  
(1985)15	  published	   their	   contribution,	   but	   it	   is	   placed	   in	   the	   second	   generation	  
because	  he	  does	  not	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  the	  policy	  arena	  (Mahon	  and	  Waddock,	  
1992),	   while	   the	   latter	   does.	   The	   author	   did	   not	   discuss	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	  
extensively	  (he	  dedicated	  only	  two	  pages	  of	  his	  500-­‐page	  long	  textbook	  to	  it),	  but	  
provided	   a	   visual	   representation16	  of	   the	   life-­‐cycle	   (Figure	   II.1)	   that	   reveals	  more	  
than	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  theory. 
Figure	  II.1:	  Tombari’s	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
	  
Source:	  Tombari	  (1984,	  p.	  362)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Buchholz	  et	  al.	  (1994	  [1985]).	  
16	  Tombari	  attributes	  the	  authorship	  of	  the	  figure	  to	  William	  Royce	  of	  SRI	  International,	  who	  
assisted	  him	  by	  providing	  research	  results	  and	  other	  data	  on	  socio-­‐political	  planning	  in	  large	  




Six	   important	   insights	   can	  be	  derived	   from	  Tombari’s	   representation	   (cf.	  Mahon	  
and	  Waddock,	  1992,	  p.	  23-­‐24).	  Firstly,	  his	  representation	  does	  not	  focus	  exclusively	  
on	  the	  public	  policy	  process	  (there	  is	  no	  mention	  to	  political	  or	  legislative	  stages,	  
for	  instance).	  Secondly,	  the	  representation	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  five-­‐stage	  model	  
consisting	   of:	   (1)	   ‘Unnoticed	   or	   unattended	   need’;	   (2)	   ‘Awakened	   interest’;	  	  
(3)	   ‘Massive	  attention’;	   (4)	   ‘Trial	  period’;	  and	  (5)	   ‘Relaxation’.	  Thirdly,	   it	   indicates	  
that	   the	   transition	   from	   phase	   2	   to	   3	   is	   marked	   by	   a	   sense	   of	   crisis,	   while	   the	  
transition	  from	  3	  to	  4	  is	  marked	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  solution,	  which	  is	  the	  high	  
point	  of	   the	   life	  cycle.	  Fourthly,	   issues	   do	  not	   follow	   the	   same	   cycle,	  which	   in	  his	  
approach	   means	   that	   after	   a	   solution	   is	   introduced,	   life-­‐cycle	   dynamics	   can	  
continue	   after	   the	   ‘Relaxation’	   stage	   (Mahon	   and	  Waddock,	   1992)	   and	   the	   issue	  
may	   follow	   three	   different	   paths:	   ‘intensified	   concern’,	   when	   the	   introduced	  
solution	  is	  a	  failure;	   ‘confidence	  in	  solution’,	  when	  attention	  shifts	  away	  from	  the	  
issue;	  or	  ‘return	  to	  apathy’.	  A	  fifth	  insight	  is	  that	  multiple	  issue	  life-­‐cycles	  take	  place	  
at	   the	   same	   time	   (which	   in	   Figure	   II.1	   is	   represented	   by	   the	   ‘developing	   new	  
concern’	   dotted	   line),	   implying	   that	   firms	   (have	   to)	   devise	   strategies	   to	   tackle	  
multiple	  issues,	  each	  at	  different	  life-­‐cycle	  stages.	  Finally,	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  can	  be	  
seen	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  ‘intensity	  of	  concern’	  devoted	  to	  the	  issue	  –	  but	  ‘intensity	  of	  
concern’	  remained	  underspecified.	  	  
Although,	  Tombari	   opened	   the	  way	   towards	   tackling	   some	  of	   the	   gaps	   of	  
the	   previous	   generation,	   he	   did	   not	   develop	   his	   model	   in	   depth,	   and	   did	   not	  
explain	  how	  an	  issue	  emerges	  or	  why	  an	  issue	  returns	  to	  apathy.	  Notwithstanding,	  
Tombari’s	   insights	   provided	   the	   groundwork	   for	   the	   second	   generation	   of	   issue	  
life-­‐cycle	  theory.	  
Bigelow,	  Fahey	  and	  Mahon	  (1991).	  Despite	  his	  integrative	  efforts,	  Henry	  Tombari	  
did	  not	  examine	  how	  firms’	  response	  strategies	  interact	  with	  issue	  life-­‐cycles.	  This	  
task	  was	  done	  by	  Bigelow,	  Fahey,	  and	  Mahon	  in	  a	  1991	  article	  (Bigelow	  et	  al.,	  1991),	  
where	   they	   proposed	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   model	   that	   links	   issue	   evolution	   with	  
political	   strategies,	   thus	   addressing	   the	   criticism	   that	   this	   link	   was	   not	   well	  
specified	   in	   previous	   models.	   They	   argued	   that	   different	   kind	   of	  
factors/determinants	  mark	   each	   stage	   of	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   and	   lead	   to	   different	  




Determinants	   are	   facts,	   values,	   interests,	   and	   policies.	   Stages	   of	   issue	  
evolution	  are	  emergence,	  interpretation,	  positioning,	  and	  resolution.	  As	  an	  
issue	   evolves,	   facts	   become	   increasingly	   less	   important	   as	   the	   issue	   is	  
interpreted	   and	   positioned	   in	   the	   light	   of	   values	   and	   interests	   of	   key	  
stakeholders.	  As	   it	  nears	   resolution,	  policies	  define	   the	  means	  by	  which	   it	  
will	   be	   resolved.	   Because	   of	   these	   differences,	   the	   strategies	   for	  managing	  
issue	   evolution	   also	   change.	   The	   different	   strategies	   are	   containment,	  
control,	   bridging,	   and	   influence	   strategies.	   Power,	   defined	   from	   various	  
perspectives	   (economic,	   market,	   technological,	   political,	   individual)	   is	  
clearly	  recognized	  as	  having	  continuous	   influence	  on	  the	  entire	  process	  of	  
the	  issue	  life	  cycle.	  As	  a	  consequence	  it	  is	  placed	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  process,	  
with	   influence	  on	  all	  stages	  and	  determinants	  of	   issue	  evolution.	  (Bigelow	  
et	  al.,	  1991,	  p.	  3)	  
Their	  integrated	  conceptualization	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  II.2.	  It	  goes	  beyond	  first	  
generation	   models	   because,	   like	   Tombari’s,	   it	   is	   not	   dependant	   on	   any	   single	  
resolution	   arena.	   Secondly,	   the	  model	   recognizes	   that	   an	   issue	   evolution	   begins	  
before	  actors	  have	  established	  their	  positions,	  and	  thus	  it	  throws	  some	  light	  onto	  
the	  process	  of	  issue	  emergence	  and	  on	  the	  processes	  that	  define	  each	  stage.	  A	  third	  
key	   feature	   of	   their	  model	   is	   hence	   the	   shift	   from	   a	   conceptualization	   based	   on	  
events	  to	  one	  based	  on	  processes,	  which	  “leads	  to	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  dynamic	  
interplay	  between	  issues,	  strategies,	  and	  stakeholders”	  (p.	  22).	  Because	  this	   is	   the	  
most	  full-­‐fledged	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  stage	  model	  of	  the	  second	  generation,	  it	  is	  worth	  
examining	  it	  in	  more	  detail. 




Figure	  II.2:	  Bigelow’s	  et	  al.	  (1991)	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  with	  determinants	  and	  political	  strategies	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration	  based	  on	  Table	  1.2	  of	  Bigelow	  et	  al.	  (1991,	  p.	  11)	  
• Emergence	   stage:	   The	   key	   characteristic	   of	   this	   stage	   is	   that	   issues	   are	   ill-­‐
defined,	  fuzzy	  and	  broad,	  with	  concerned	  groups	  not	  having	  fully	  grasped	  the	  
implications	  of	   the	   facts	   that	  gave	  rise	   to	   the	   issue	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  The	  key	  
determinants	   at	   this	   stage	   are	   facts	   (or	   events),	   which,	   after	   interpreted,	   are	  
used	  in	  support	  of	  arguments	  and	  positions.	  “If	  facts	  are	  not	  known	  or	  cannot	  
be	  determined,	  positions	  and	  arguments	  will	  be	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  analogy,	  
what	   limited	   information	   is	   known,	   or	   on	   sheer	   speculation”	   (Bigelow	   et	   al.,	  
1991,	  p.	  7).	  The	  authors	   indicate	  that	   issues	  are	  socially	  constructed	  (although	  
they	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  social-­‐constructivist	   literature),	  when	  they	  argue	  that	  
facts	  are	  ‘marshalled’	  by	  stakeholders	  to	  support	  their	  positions;	  but	  this	  point	  
is	  not	  developed	   further	   and	   so	   the	  dynamics	  of	   issue	  emergence	   is	  not	   fully	  
specified.	  The	  business	  strategy	  during	  the	  emergence	  stage	  is	  ‘containment’	  of	  
the	  issue,	  to	  prevent	  or	  direct	  its	  further	  evolution,	  through	  the	  manipulation	  of	  
existing	   facts	   or	   the	   introduction	   of	   new	   facts.	   Possible	   tactics	   are	   (a)	   ‘pre-­‐
emptive	   moves’	   to	   apparently	   or	   actually	   address	   emergent	   facts;	  	  
(b)	   containment	   action	   to	   limit	   the	   number	   of	   stakeholders	   involved;	   and	  	  




• Interpretation:	   This	   stage	   is	   marked	   by	   sense-­‐making	   efforts.	   Stakeholders	  
attempt	   to	   bring	   meaning	   to	   an	   emergent	   issue	   through	   “inferences	   and	  
hypothesis	   about	   the	   source,	   cause,	   and	   solutions	   for	   an	   issue	   and	   its	   likely	  
evolution	   and	   potential	   implication	   for	   themselves,	   enemies	   and	   allies”	  
(Bigelow	  et	  al.,	  1991,	  p.	  5).	  Key	  determinants	  are	  the	  values	  hold	  by	  stakeholders	  
concerned	   with	   the	   issue,	   their	   ethical	   orientation	   and	   their	   beliefs	   of	   what	  
‘ought	   to	   be’.	   It	   is	   through	   values	   that	   facts	   are	   interpreted;	   as	   the	   life-­‐cycle	  
unfolds,	  both	  facts	  and	  values	  tend	  to	  get	  entangled	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  claims	  and	  
arguments.	  ‘Control’	  is	  the	  general	  business	  strategy	  in	  the	  interpretation	  stage,	  
and	  it	  aims	  at	  controlling	  which	  positions	  are	  to	  be	  supported	  (and	  which	  are	  to	  
be	  suppressed)	  by	  other	  stakeholders,	  because	  the	  dominant	  interpretation	  not	  
only	   impacts	  but	  often	  determines	   the	  outcome	   (resolution)	  of	   the	   issue	   life-­‐
cycle.	  Tactics	  at	  this	  stage	  may	  be:	  (a)	  discrediting	  stakeholders	  with	  different	  
interpretations	  to	  limit	  the	  number	  of	   interpretations	  and	  reduce	  the	  number	  
of	  stakeholders	  involved	  or	  (b)	  marshalling	  support	  to	  preferred	  interpretations	  
through	   the	   use	   of	   symbols	   and	   terminologies	   consistent	   with	   widely	   held	  
values	   (framing	   tactics	   to	   gain	   legitimacy).	   The	   difference	   between	   the	  
‘emergence’	  stage	  and	  the	  ‘interpretation’	  stage	  is	  a	  bit	  fuzzy,	  because	  the	  first	  
stage	  also	  contains	  interpretive	  efforts.17	  	  
• Positioning:	  “As	  stakeholders	  bring	  meaning	  to	  the	  issue,	  they	  develop	  positions	  
that	   reflect	   not	   only	   their	   interpretations	   of	   an	   issue,	   but	   also	   the	  
interpretations	   of	   competing	   stakeholders.	   Positioning,	   in	   which	   desired	  
outcomes	  are	  developed,	  is	  clearly	  linked	  to	  interpretation”	  (Bigelow	  et	  al.,	  1991,	  
p.	  5).	  Positions	  are	  also	  directly	  influenced	  by	  stakeholders’	  interests,	  which	  are	  
pragmatic	   orientations	   (i.e.	   they	   do	   not	   necessarily	   reflect	   values/normative	  
orientations)	  that	  “reflect	  what	  a	  stakeholder	  has	  to	  gain	  or	  lose”	  (p.	  9).	  While	  
previous	   strategies	   intended	   to	   prevent	   the	   issue	   to	   enter	   a	   ‘highly	   charged	  
public	  forum’	  (e.g.	  the	  governmental	  arena),	  if	  the	  issue	  enters	  the	  positioning	  
stage,	   this	   cannot	   be	   done	   anymore.	   Consequently,	   the	   character	   of	   the	  
corporate	  response	  strategy	  changes:	  it	  now	  aims	  at	  (re)directing	  the	  issue	  to	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Sense-­‐making	  is	  present	  in	  stage	  one,	  precisely	  because	  facts	  are	  meaningless	  unless	  interpreted.	  
What	  can	  be	  argued	  is	  that	  in	  the	  second	  stage,	  sense-­‐making	  and	  interpretation	  efforts	  are	  
systematically	  articulated	  into	  an	  issue	  frame	  that	  clearly	  accounts	  for	  cause,	  effects	  and	  




resolution	   arena	   where	   the	   corporation	   may	   have	   a	   ‘comparative	   edge’,	   by	  
“bridging	   the	   gaps	   of	   interests	   or	   coalignment	   of	   interests	   among	   the	   key	  
parties	  involved	  in	  the	  issue”	  (p.	  18).	  The	  ‘bridging’	  tactics	  are:	  (a)	  formation	  of	  
coalitions	   or	   political	   alliances;	   (b)	   constituency	   building;	   and	   (c)	   financial	  
contributions	  to	  attract	  supporters	  (cooptation).	  
• Resolution:	  The	  resolution	  is	  “the	  most	  political	  of	  the	  phases	  of	  the	  issue	  life	  
cycle”	  (p.	  19).	  Three	  distinct	  processes	  mark	  this	  stage:	  (1)	  the	  process	  through	  
which	   stakeholders	   press	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   their	   preferred	   solution	   (e.g.	  
lobbying);	  (2)	  the	  actual	  process	  of	  defining	  the	  solution	  (e.g.	  legislating);	  and	  
(3)	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  chosen	  solution.	  The	  resolution	  stage	  is	  greatly	  
determined	   by	   three	   components	   of	   policies:	   existing	   policies,	  which	   governs	  
what	   and	   how	   can	   something	   be	   done;	   the	   agreement	   that	   a	   new	   policy	   is	  
necessary;	   and	   the	   actual	   content	   of	   the	   new	   policy	   (including	   its	  
implementation	   procedures).	   Corporate	   strategies	  will	   aim	   at	   influencing	   the	  
latter	  two	  components:	  the	  perception	  that	  a	  new	  policy	  is	  needed	  (or	  not)	  and	  
the	  content	  and	  execution	  of	  a	  new	  policy	  (if	  its	  approval	  cannot	  be	  stopped).	  
Corporate	   political	   strategies	   that	   address	   the	   resolution	   stage	   are	   based	   on	  
‘influence’,	   “manifested	   in	  advocacy	  advertising,	  grassroots	  programs,	  planned	  
demonstrations,	   the	  ability	   to	  produce	  media	  coverage	   for	  an	   ‘event,’	  and	  the	  
ability	  to	  turn	  out	  the	  vote”	  (p.	  19).	  Strategies	  to	  influence	  the	  implementation	  
of	  the	  policy	  often	  draw	  on	  technical	  expertise	  (e.g.	  expert	  witnessing,	  release	  of	  
technical	  reports).	  
Despite	   the	  model’s	   comprehensiveness,	   some	  points	   remain	  open.	  For	   instance,	  
the	   authors	   still	   claim	   that	   corporate	   discretion	   diminishes	   throughout	   the	   life-­‐
cycle,	   based	   on	   the	   argument	   that,	   as	   the	   issue	   evolves,	   it	   gains	   in	   clarity	   and	  
specificity,	  so	  that	  in	  the	  resolution	  stage,	   it	   is	  very	  well	  defined.	  In	  earlier	  stages	  
corporate	  strategy	  can	  aim	  at	  determining	  what	  the	  issue	  is,	  but	  in	  the	  resolution	  
stage	  “[w]hat	  remains	  to	  be	  determined	  is	  how	  to	  respond”	  (Bigelow	  et	  al.,	  1991,	  p.	  
20).	  In	  my	  view,	  however,	  this	  argument	  does	  not	  always	  hold,	  since	  it	  is	  possible	  
that	  corporate	  strategies	  may	  aim	  at	  reframing	  the	  issue	  or	  the	  policy	  to	  force	  the	  
life-­‐cycle	  back	   to	   the	  beginning.	  When	  the	   issue	  reaches	   its	   resolution	  stage,	   the	  




reframe	   the	   issue.	   It	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   the	   case,	   however,	   that	   managerial	  
discretion	  is	  automatically	  constrained,	  but	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  some	  strategic	  
options	  are	  higher	  or	  lower	  depending	  on	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  stage	  (e.g.	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  
adopt	  a	  denial	  strategy	  in	  all	  phases,	  but	  in	  the	  resolution	  stage	  this	  option	  may	  not	  
be	  as	  effective	  as	  in	  the	  emergence	  stage).	  
Thus,	   Bigelow	   and	   colleagues	   still	   present	   a	   ‘light’	   form	   of	   contextual	  
determinism.	  But	   they	  explicitly	   recognize	   that	  different	   issues	  do	  not	   follow	  the	  
same	  life-­‐cycle:	  “issue	  evolution	  as	  a	  process	  may	  not	  be	  dissimilar	  to	  the	  process	  of	  
unstructured	  decision	  making	  (Mintzberg	   et	  al.,	  1976).	  The	  stages	  may	  all	  appear,	  
but	   the	   order	  may	   change	   based	   on	   a	   number	   of	   contingencies”	   (Bigelow	   et	   al.,	  
1991:	  23).	  I	  believe	  this	  is	  a	  crucial	  insight	  for	  avoiding	  a	  teleological	  construct,	  and	  
so	   I	   will	   develop	   it	   further	   in	   my	   model	   and	   case	   studies.	   Yet,	   despite	   this	  
recognition,	   and	   also	   the	   recognition	   that	   one	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   is	   influenced	   by	  
developments	  connected	  to	  another	  issue,	  the	  authors	  do	  not	  explore	  these	  points	  
further,	   nor	   do	   they	   explain	   the	   development	   of	   substantive	   responses	   (such	   as	  
technological	  change)	  to	  address	  an	  issue	  (which,	  it	  must	  be	  said,	  was	  not	  within	  
the	  scope	  of	  the	  paper).	  
In	   summary,	   Bigelow’s	   and	   colleague’s	   model	   addresses	   several	   previous	  
theoretical	   gaps:	   (a)	   it	   couples	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   stages	   with	   patterns	   of	   response	  
strategy;	  (b)	  it	  shifts	  away	  the	  exclusive	  emphasis	  on	  the	  public	  policy	  process,	  by	  
acknowledging	   that	   actors	   will	   attempt	   to	   solve	   the	   issue	   before	   it	   gets	   to	   the	  
political	  arena;	  and	  (c)	  it	  proposes	  that	  distinctive	  processes	  (or	  phenomena)	  mark	  
each	  stage	  of	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  However,	  four	  points	  remained	  unaddressed:	  (a)	  it	  
does	  not	   fully	   specify	   the	  dynamics	  of	   issue	  emergence	  and	  of	  phase	   shift;	   (b)	   it	  
does	  not	  address	  multiple-­‐issue	  interactions	  throughout	  the	   life-­‐cycle	  (which	  can	  
be	  viewed	  as	  an	  empirical	  question);	   (c)	   it	  does	  not	  examine	  the	  development	  of	  
substantive	  (e.g.	  technological)	  responses	  to	  the	  issue;	  and	  (d)	  it	  does	  not	  explore	  
alternative	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   paths	   (i.e.	   life-­‐cycles	   in	   which	   the	   phase	   order	   differs	  
from	   the	   proposed	   linear	   order	   ‘Emergence-­‐Interpretation-­‐Positioning-­‐





Mahon	   and	   Waddock	   (1992)	   explicitly	   dealt	   with	   substantive	   and	   symbolic	  
responses	   to	   societal	   issues	   by	   business,	   but	   without	   looking	   at	   innovation	   or	  
technological	   strategies.	   In	   this	   work,	   the	   integrative	   character	   of	   the	   second	  
generation	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	   is	   evident.	   The	   authors	   conceptualized	   the	  
issue	   life-­‐cycle	  by	  combining	  three	  perspectives	  of	   ‘social	   issues	  management’:	   (1)	  
the	   ‘public	  policy	  perspective’	   (i.e.,	   the	  Corporate	   Public	   Responsibility	   tradition);	  
(2)	   the	   ‘corporate	   strategy	   perspective’	   (i.e.,	   the	  Corporate	   Social	   Responsiveness	  
tradition);	   and	   (3)	   the	   ‘pressure	   group	   perspective’,	   which	   the	   authors	   associate	  
with	  the	  work	  of	  Kingdon	  (1984)	  and	  his	  multiple-­‐streams	  model	  of	  policy	  agenda-­‐
setting.	  Before	  examining	  Mahon’s	  and	  Waddock’s	   framework,	   I	   therefore	  briefly	  
explain	  Kingdon’s	  model.	  
Building	  on	  the	  ‘garbage-­‐can’	  model	  of	  decision	  making	  (Cohen	  et	  al.,	  1972),	  
Kingdon	  argued	   that	   the	  policy-­‐making	  process	  does	  not	   follow	  a	   linear	   logic	   in	  
which	   the	   emergence	  of	   a	   problem	   is	   followed	  by	   the	  development	  of	   solutions.	  
Instead,	  problems	  and	  solutions	  represent	  relatively	  independent	  dynamics	  in	  their	  
own	  ‘stream’	  of	  development.	  Kingdon’s	  model	  thus	  consists	  of	  three	  ‘streams’:	  (1)	  
the	  ‘problem’	  stream;	  (2)	  the	  ‘policy’	  (solution)	  stream;	  and	  (3)	  the	  ‘politics’	  stream.	  
The	   first	   stream	  represents	   the	   relative	  development	  of	  public	   issues	   (problems).	  
The	   second	   consists	   of	   the	   portfolio	   of	   policies	   (and	  proposals)	   to	   deal	  with	   the	  
array	   of	   problems	   in	   need	   for	   solution.	   And	   the	   third	   stream	   represents	   the	  
political	  environment,	  which	  at	  different	  points	  in	  time	  present	  a	  more	  favourable	  
climate	  for	  the	  passage	  of	  policies	  (‘policy	  windows’).	  In	  Kingdon’s	  model,	  a	  ‘policy	  
entrepreneur’	  (or	  advocate)	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  coupling	  the	  multiple	  streams	  when	  a	  
window	   of	   opportunity	   is	   opened	   either	   in	   the	   politics	   or	   the	   problems	   stream.	  
Policy	   entrepreneurs	   are	   visible	   participants	   in	   the	   agenda-­‐setting	   process	   who	  
articulate	  a	  condition	  as	  a	  problem	  and	  couple	  it	  with	  a	  solution.	  
Mahon	   and	  Waddock	   (1992)	   refer	   to	  Kingdon’s	  model	   as	   the	   ‘Pressure	   or	  
Interests	  Group	  Perspective’,	  because	  they	  see	   it	  as	  taking	  the	  perspective	  “of	  the	  
pressure	   and	   interests	   groups	   from	  which	   policy	   entrepreneurs	   operate”	   (p.	   24).	  
The	  authors	  thus	  depart	  from	  Kingdon’s	  conceptualization	  in	  that	  they	  do	  not	  see	  
policy	  entrepreneurs	  as	  independent	  agents:	  policy	  entrepreneurs	  may	  come	  from	  
government	   sectors,	   but	   also	   from	   social	  movements	   (‘pressure	   groups’)	   or	   from	  




stakeholder	  groups	  that	  will	  ultimately	  deal	  with	  business-­‐related	  social	  and	  public	  
issues”	   (p.	   25).	   A	   second	   departure	   is	   that	   they	   do	   not	   see	   the	   streams	   as	   fully	  
independent	   (for	   a	   similar	   interpretation,	   see	   Elzen	   et	   al.,	   2011),	   because	   policy	  
entrepreneurs	   and	   other	   stakeholders	   may	   actively	   work	   within	   the	   different	  
streams	   to	   promote	   or	   suppress	   an	   issue.	  With	   these	  modifications,	  Mahon	   and	  
Waddock	  (1992)	  arrive	  at	  an	   ‘Integrated	  Issue	  Life-­‐Cycle	  Model’	   (Figure	   II.3)	   that	  
combines	  the	  three	  perspectives,	  and	  which	  they	  apply	  to	  ‘the	  environmental	  issue’	  
in	  the	  USA.	  
Figure	  II.3:	  Mahon’s	  and	  Waddock’s	  (1992)	  Integrated	  Issue	  Life-­‐Cycle	  Model	  
	  
Source:	  Figure	  2	  in	  Mahon	  and	  Waddock	  (1992,	  p.	  26)	  
The	  key	  insight	  from	  this	  model	  is	  that	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  stage	  at	  which	  a	  given	  issue	  is	  
will	  depend	  on	   the	   stance	   taken	  by	   the	   stakeholders	   toward	   the	   issue18,	  which	   is	  
what	   Figure	   II.3	   depicts.	   The	  model	   “illustrates	   the	   position	   of	   each	   group	  with	  
regard	  to	  its	  degree	  of	  rejection,	  indifference,	  or	  acceptance	  of	  the	  issue	  as	  relevant	  
to	   its	   affairs”	   (Mahon	  and	  Waddock,	   1992:	   25).	  The	   integrated	   framework	  adapts	  
Barnard’s	  (1938)	  concepts	  of	  ‘zone	  of	  rejection’,	  in	  which	  an	  issue	  is	  not	  considered	  
at	   all	   by	   the	   stakeholder;	   ‘zone	   of	   indifference’,	   in	  which	   the	   issue	   begins	   to	   be	  
recognized,	  but	  no	  particular	  compulsion	  to	  act	  is	  felt,	  and	  ‘zone	  of	  acceptability’,	  
in	  which	  actions	  are	   taken.	  A	  key	   insight	   that	  comes	   from	  Mahon	  and	  Waddock	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  I	  will	  take	  this	  insight	  one	  step	  further,	  by	  proposing	  that	  the	  general	  stage	  of	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
depends	  on	  the	  interaction	  between	  those	  exerting	  pressure	  and	  the	  industry,	  i.e.	  on	  the	  




(1992)	  is	  that	  the	  acceptability	  zone	  is	  actually	  divided	  into	  two:	  a	  ‘Zone	  of	  symbolic	  
action’	  and	  a	  ‘Zone	  of	  substantive	  action’.	  	  
Symbolic	  action	  involves	  attempts	  to	  ‘frame’	  an	  issue,	  giving	  it	  meaning	  to	  
a	   group	   or	   groups	   whose	   values	   and	   ideologies	   are	   congruent	   with	   that	  
framing.	   This	   is	   fundamentally	   a	   process	   of	   reinterpretation	   of	   the	  
interpretation	   of	   events	   proposed	   by	   other	   actors.	   Substantive	   action,	   in	  
contrast,	  involves	  definitive	  moves	  that	  attempt	  to	  actually	  change	  or	  deal	  
with	   the	   existing	   situation	   in	   specific,	   identifiable	  ways.	   It	   often	   demands	  
the	   expenditure	   of	   resources	   (money,	   equipment,	   personnel,	   etc)	   to	  
minimally	   show	   progress	   in	   resolving	   the	   actual	   problem	   identified.	  
(Mahon	  and	  Waddock,	  1992,	  p.	  27)	  
These	   categories	   of	   symbolic	   and	   substantive	   action	   is	   consistent	   with	   Sethi’s	  
(1978)	  insight	  that	  companies	  facing	  a	  legitimacy	  gap	  will	   first	  attempt	  to	  change	  
public	  expectations/perceptions	   through	  public	   relations	   (i.e.	   engage	   in	   symbolic	  
action)	   before	   it	   attempts	   to	   bring	   about	   substantive	   changes	   in	   business	  
performance/operations	  (substantive	  action).	  Indeed,	  Mahon	  and	  Waddock	  (1992,	  
p.	  28)	  hypothesize	  that	  “stakeholders	  will	  tend	  first	  to	  opt	  for	  the	  agenda	  shaping	  
and	   setting	   activities	   of	   symbolic	   action.	  When	   symbolic	   action	   does	   not	   work,	  
then	   substantive	   action	   becomes	   necessary	   (or	  mandated	   or	   otherwise	   forced)”.	  
This	  insight	  throws	  light	  into	  the	  process	  of	  technology	  development	  in	  response	  
to	  a	  societal	  issue,	  as	  such	  strategy	  demands	  substantive	  ‘expenditure	  of	  resources’	  
and	  represents	  ‘progress	  in	  resolving	  the	  actual	  problem	  identified’.	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  
this	  insight	  when	  developing	  my	  model.	  
Although	  the	  description	  of	  what	  goes	  on	  within	  each	  phase	  of	  an	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	  was	  not	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  the	  paper,	  their	  conceptualization	  also	  throws	  light	  
onto	   the	   process	   of	   issue	   emergence:	   “it	   is	   the	   pressure	   groups	   and	   interest	  
networks	  that	  are	  responsible	  for	  ‘leading’	  the	  development	  of	  symbolism	  to	  which	  
management	  and	  legislators	  must	  respond.	  In	  many	  instances	  it	  is	  pressure	  groups	  
who	   are	   responsible	   for	   the	   symbolic	   or	   framing	   activities	   surrounding	   an	   issue,	  
offering	   the	   first	   interpretation	   of	   events	   that	   call	   for	   attention”	   (Mahon	   and	  
Waddock,	  1992,	  p.	  29).	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  issue	  is	  connected	  to	  
the	   role	   played	   by	   activists/pressure	   groups	   in	   articulating	   the	   issue	   through	  
symbolic	  action.	  Corporate	  and/or	  public	  policy	  actors	  will	  get	   involved	  with	  the	  
issue	  not	  because	  some	  external	  events	  or	  objective	  conditions	  force	  them	  to	  act,	  




events	   or	   because	   they	   reject	   such	   symbolism.	   Thus,	   this	   integrated	  
conceptualization	  moves	   away	   from	   contextual	   determinism,	   although	   this	   does	  
not	  stand	  out	  very	  clearly	  in	  Figure	  II.3,	  which	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  ‘trigger	  events’	  
drive	   the	   different	   stakeholders	   into	   the	   different	   action	   zones.	   A	   particular	  
problem	  with	  Figure	  II.3	  is	  that	  the	  authors	  did	  not	  specify	  how	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
can	  be	  measured,	  nor	  how	   it	   can	  be	  assessed	   that	   an	   issue	  has	  moved	   from	  one	  
‘zone’	  (stage)	  to	  the	  other.	  Although	  their	  representation	  appears	  to	  be	  objectively	  
constructed,	  the	  authors	  did	  not	  present	  the	  methodology	  behind	  it. 
A	   strength	   of	   this	   integrated	   perspective	   is	   that	   it	   rejects	   the	   notion	   of	   a	  
unique,	  linear	  life-­‐cycle,	  because	  “issues	  can	  move	  from	  ‘on	  the	  agenda’	  to	  ‘off	  the	  
agenda’”	  (Mahon	  and	  Waddock,	  1992,	  p.	  28),	  meaning	  e.g.	  that	  an	  issue	  may	  enter	  
a	   legislative	   stage	  when	   it	   is	   on	   the	   governmental	   agenda	  but	   then	   return	   to	   an	  
interpretation	   stage	   if	   a	   stakeholder	   succeeds	   in	   attaching	   new	   symbolism	   to	  
emerging	  facts	  and	  events.	  This	  idea	  was	  fuller	  explored	  by	  Mahon	  and	  colleagues	  
in	  the	  paper	  reviewed	  next.	  
Bigelow,	   Fahey	   and	   Mahon	   (1993)	   aimed	   at	   clarifying	   “what	   factors	   affect	   the	  
path	  an	  issue	  takes”	  (p.	  18)	  and	  proposed	  a	  typology	  of	  issue	  evolution.	  Because	  one	  
of	  the	  identified	  factors	  that	  affect	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  pathway	  is	  ‘competing	  issues’,	  
the	   paper	   also	   sheds	   light	   on	   multiple-­‐issue	   interaction.	   The	   analysis	   takes	   as	  
starting	   point	   the	   integrated	   model	   of	   issue-­‐life	   cycle	   and	   corporate	   political	  
strategies	  (Bigelow	   et	  al.,	  1991),	  which	  is	  characterized	  as	  the	  ‘normal’/linear	  issue	  
life-­‐cycle,	  and	  identifies	  four	  ‘forces’	  that	  may	  cause	  deviations	  from	  it:	  
1) Facts:	   The	   emergence	   of	   new	   facts	   –	   such	   as	   critical	   events,	   technological	  
breakthroughs,	   scientific	   theories,	   economic	   crises	   etc.	   –	  may	   affect	   an	   issue	  
evolution	   (through	   the	   interpretation	   ascribed	   to	   them	  by	   stakeholders).	   For	  
instance,	   facts	   “may	   diffuse	   an	   issue	   that	   has	   already	   become	   public	   by	  
recasting	   it”	   (Bigelow	   et	   al.,	   1993,	   p.	   21).	   Facts	  may	   also	   serve	   as	   triggers	   that	  
“galvanize	  public	  attention	  and	  catapult	  an	  issue	  onto	  public	  agendas,	  before	  all	  
stakeholders	  have	  interpreted	  it	  [or]	  solidified	  positions”	  (p.	  22).	  	  
2) Stakeholders:	   Stakeholders	   may	   affect	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   in	   two	   ways:	  	  




not	   get	   involved	   anymore,	   positions	   may	   change;	   and	   (b)	   through	   strategic	  
action,	  stakeholders	  may	  press	  the	  issue	  forward	  or	  stop	  its	  evolution.	  
3) Other	   issues:	   Multiple	   issues	   compete	   for	   public,	   political	   and	   corporate	  
attention.	  Thus,	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  issues	  acts	  as	  new	  facts	  that	  affect	  the	  
evolution	   of	   a	   focal	   issue.	  Moreover,	   policies	   to	   tackle	   other	   issues	  may	   also	  
affect	  the	  focal	  issue’s	  evolution,	  e.g.	  by	  ‘resolving’	  it	  before	  the	  resolution	  stage.	  	  
4) Scope	  of	  focal	   issue:	  If	  the	  issue	  has	  a	  large	  scope	  (if	   it	   is	   ‘not	  well	  bounded’),	  
then	  it	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  constant	  reinterpretations,	  so	  that	  its	   life-­‐cycle	  goes	  
back	  and	  forth,	  but	  a	  definitive	  resolution	  is	  never	  reached.	  
The	  authors	  argue	  that:	  
These	   four	   factors	   operate	   individually	   and	   collectively	   to	   influence	   an	  
issue’s	   evolution.	   Some	   issues	   do	   move	   sequentially	   through	   all	   of	   the	  
stages.	   However	   new	   facts	   and	   other	   issues	   may	   create	   a	   need	   for	  
stakeholders	  to	  reinterpret	  issues	  and	  subsequently	  redefine	  their	  positions.	  
The	   inflexibility	   of	   some	   stakeholder	   positions	   may	   stymie	   attempts	   to	  
achieve	   resolution.	   It	   may	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   ‘normal’	   path	   assumed	   by	  
most	  models	  of	  issue	  life	  cycles	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  least	  likely	  to	  occur.	  (Bigelow	  
et	  al.,	  1993,	  p.	  23)	  
Bigelow	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  propose	  five	  pathways	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  linear/normal	  cycle,	  
divided	  into	  two	  categories:	  ‘unidirectional’	  pathways	  and	  ‘recursive’	  pathways.	  The	  
unidirectional	   group	   includes	   three	   categories:	   (a)	   the	   stopped	   path,	   which	  
happens	   when	   the	   life-­‐cycle	   comes	   to	   a	   halt,	   i.e.	   the	   issue	   is	   not	   resolved	   and	  
neither	  does	  it	  re-­‐emerge	  (it	  ‘dies	  out’);	  (b)	  the	  interrupted	  path,	  when	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  
stops	  for	  a	  period,	  then	  the	  issue	  re-­‐emerges	  in	  the	  stage	  where	  it	  stopped	  until	  it	  
reaches	   resolution;	   and	   (c)	   the	   skipped	   path,	   when	   the	   issue	   skip	   stage(s)	   and	  
reaches	   resolution.	   The	   recursive	   group	   includes	   two	   categories:	   (d)	   the	   cyclical	  
path,	   when	   the	   issue	   cycles	   back	   and	   forth	   through	   stages	   until	   it	   reaches	  
resolution;	  and	  (e)	  the	  enduring	  path,	  when	  the	  issue	  cycles	  back	  and	  forth	  but	  the	  
resolution	  is	  elusive.	  Table	  II.2	  summarizes	  the	  impact	  of	  factors	  on	  the	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	  in	  this	  ‘typology	  of	  issue	  evolution’.	  
This	  typology	  represents	  an	  important	  step	  not	  only	  for	  understanding	  how	  
different	   issues	   may	   follow	   different	   life-­‐cycles	   pathways,	   but	   also	   for	  
understanding	  the	  interaction	  between	  multiple	  issues.	  The	  typology	  brings	  about	  
two	  implications	  (cf.	  Bigelow	  et	  al.,	  1993,	  p.	  26-­‐7).	  One	  (managerial)	  implication	  is	  




future/anticipated),	   which	   offers	   different	   entry	   points	   for	   intervention.	   The	  
second	   implication	   is	   that	   the	   typology	   offers	   a	   template	   for	   “studying	   how	   the	  
factors	  individually	  and	  collectively	  drive	  each	  issue	  path,	  what	  the	  differences	  are	  
across	  the	  paths...	  [...]	  Guided	  by	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  broad	  contours	  of	  these	  
paths,	  empirical	  longitudinal	  research	  can	  delineate	  and	  document	  the	  evolution	  of	  
issues”	  (Bigelow	  et	  al.,	  1993:	  27).	  This	  is	  a	  suggestion	  that,	  to	  my	  knowledge,	  has	  not	  
been	  empirically	  explored	  yet	  and,	  thus,	  I	  aim	  at	  tackling	  it	  in	  this	  thesis	  through	  a	  
longitudinal,	  historical	  case	  study.	  
Table	  II.2:	  A	  Typology	  of	  issue	  evolution:	  impact	  of	  factors	  on	  paths	  
	   Facts	   Stakeholder	   Other	  issues	   Scope	  of	  issue	  
Normal	  
Additional	  facts	  do	  
not	  interfere	  with	  
evolution	  
Stakeholder	  actions	  
do	  not	  interfere	  with	  
evolution	  





in	  some	  specific	  arena	  
Unidirectional	   	   	   	   	  
Stopped	  
New	  facts	  emerge	  
that	  render	  it	  a	  
nonissue	  
Stakeholder	  actions	  
successful	  at	  stopping	  
issue	  
Other	  issues	  usurp	  
attention	   Issue	  bounded	  
Interrupted	  
Same	  as	  stopped;	  
new	  facts	  emerge	  
that	  reintroduce	  issue	  
Same	  as	  stopped;	  
issue	  regain	  salience	  
for	  stakeholders	  
Same	  as	  stopped;	  
other	  issues	  resolved	  
or	  stopped,	  attention	  
returns	  to	  original	  
Issue	  bounded,	  
amenable	  resolution	  
in	  some	  specific	  arena	  
Skipped	  
Crisis	  occurs	  or	  new	  
facts	  emerge	  that	  
galvanize	  attention	  
New	  stakeholders	  
enter	  that	  press	  issue	  
forward	  
Outcomes	  of	  other	  
issues	  push	  issue	  
along	  path	  
Issue	  becomes	  well	  
defined	  quickly	  
Recursive	   	   	   	   	  
Cyclical	  
New	  facts	  cause	  
reinterpretation	  of	  
issue	  or	  reassessment	  
of	  positions	  
Stakeholders	  entering	  
and	  exiting	  cause	  
issue	  to	  move	  
backward	  and	  
forward	  
Other	  issues	  act	  
similarly	  to	  new	  facts	  
Issue	  is	  not	  well	  




New	  facts	  constantly	  
entering	  and	  altering	  
face	  of	  issue	  
Same	  as	  cyclical	   Same	  as	  cyclical	   Issue	  is	  not	  bounded	  
Source:	  Table	  2	  in	  Bigelow	  et	  al.	  (1993,	  p.	  25)	  
However,	  an	  important	  caveat	  that	  prevents	  the	  direct	  application	  of	  this	  typology	  
to	  empirical	  case	  studies	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  really	  explain	  the	  ‘normal’	  pathway,	  as	  if	  
an	   issue	   would	   naturally	   and	   deterministically	   follow	   a	   normal	   life-­‐cycle	   that	   is	  
‘armoured’	  against	  facts,	  stakeholders,	  other	  issues	  and	  the	  issues’	  changing	  scope.	  
Thus,	   the	   typology	   is	   based	   on	   a	   deterministic	   view	   of	   a	   normal	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	  




responses,	  the	  innovation	  process	  and	  the	  development	  of	  technological	  solutions;	  
(b)	   how	   to	   empirically	   ‘measure’	   and	   represent	   issue	   life-­‐cycles	   (methodological	  
issue);	   and	   (c)	   the	   interplays	   between	   firm-­‐level,	   industry-­‐level	   (collective)	   and	  
field-­‐level	  dynamics.	   
	   Thus,	   despite	   important	   insights,	   the	   discussion	   above	   showed	   that	   the	  
second	   generation	   left	   four	   unaddressed	   questions	   (cf.	   Table	   II.1):	   (1)	   little	  
explanation	  of	  how	  (and	  why)	  the	  shift	  towards	  substantive	  response	  takes	  place	  in	  
an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   (nor	   how	   the	   technological	   strategy	   is	   deployed	   throughout);	  	  
(2)	  a	  ‘light’	  form	  of	  contextual	  determinism	  remained,	  with	  the	  dynamics	  of	  phase	  
shift	  unspecified	  and	  the	  process	  of	  issue	  emergence	  still	  unclear	  (even	  in	  ‘normal’	  
life-­‐cycles);	   (3)	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   as	   a	   function	   of	   public	   concern	   or	   attention	  
remained	   unspecified	   (measurement	   problem);	   and	   (4)	   little	   explanation	   of	   the	  
interplays	   between	   firm-­‐level	   and	   collective	   (industry)	   strategies.	   Another	   gap,	  
which	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   related	   to	   points	   (1)	   and	   (2)	   above,	   and	   which	   was	  
particularly	  visible	  in	  the	  study	  by	  Mahon	  and	  Waddock	  (1992)	  is:	  (5)	  authors	  from	  
the	   second	   generation	   did	   not	   specify	   criteria	   for	   the	   conceptual	   and	   empirical	  
identification	  of	   stages,	  which	  can	  be	   seen	  as	   a	  methodological	   gap	   in	   issue	   life-­‐
cycle	  models.	  
II.2.3. The	  3rd	  generation	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory	  (late-­‐1990s-­‐2011)	  
The	   transition	   from	   the	   second	   to	   the	   third	   generation	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	  
(late	   1990s/early	  2000s)	  saw	  a	  proliferation	  of	  works	  that	  applied	  models	  of	   issue	  
life-­‐cycle	   to	   empirical	   case	   studies.	  While	   some	   of	   these	   studies	   just	   tested	   the	  
framework	  and	  had	  no	  theory	  development	  ambition,	  e.g.	  Gerde	  and	  White	  (2001;	  
2003)	  19,	  others	  also	  had	  theoretical	  relevance.	  Näsi	  et	  al.	  (1997)	  offered	  suggestions	  
for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   theory,	   and	   so	   I	   review	   it	   next.	   I	   also	   review	   below	  
theoretical	  works	  from	  the	  third	  generation.	  
Näsi,	   Näsi,	   Phillips	   and	   Zyglidopoulos	   (1997)	   tested	   not	   only	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  
theory,	  but	  also	  what	  the	  authors	  call	  ‘legitimacy	  theory’	  (essentially,	  the	  Corporate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Gerde	  and	  White	  (2003)	  applied	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  auditor	  independence	  and	  
the	  response	  of	  the	  auditing	  &	  accounting	  industry.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  their	  finding	  that	  a	  single	  
person	  (what	  may	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘activist’,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  pressure	  group)	  may	  act	  as	  an	  issue	  
champion	  at	  early	  stages	  of	  an	  life-­‐cycle,	  but	  trigger	  events	  seem	  to	  be	  necessary	  to	  create	  an	  





Responsiveness	   perspective	   associated	   with	   the	   work	   of	   Sethi),	   and	   stakeholder	  
theory	   (Freeman,	   1984;	   Clarkson,	   1995).	  Of	   particular	   interest	   is	   their	   discussion	  
and	   assessment	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory,	   which,	   they	   argue,	   “remains	   a	  
deterministic	  theory:	  outside	  groups	  call	  for	  change,	  and	  change	  eventually	  occurs”	  
(Näsi	  et	  al.,	  1997,	  p.	  304).	  The	  determinism	  is	  also	  implied	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  “[issue]	  
life	  cycle	   theory	   […]	  allows	   the	   least	  managerial	  agency	  of	   the	   three	   theories”	   (p.	  
305),	  because	  of	  its	  claim	  that	  managers’	  discretion	  diminishes	  over	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  of	  
an	  issue.	  The	  authors	  compare	  the	  degree	  of	  ‘issue	  specificity’	  of	  the	  three	  theories,	  
and	  conclude	  that	  source	  and	  specificity	  of	  the	  focal	  issue	  is	  taken	  as	  a	  given	  in	  life-­‐
cycle	   theory	   (i.e.	   issues	  are	   reified).	  Näsi	  et	   al.	   (1997)	   test	   the	   three	   theories	   in	  a	  
case	   study	   of	   four	   forestry	   companies’	   strategic	   response	   to	   public	   issues.	   The	  
authors	   concluded	   that	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   stage	   models	   apply	   over	   long	   periods	   of	  
time.	  Yet,	  they	  found	  that	  patterns	  of	  strategic	  response	  throughout	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  
fluctuated	   back	   and	   forth,	   from	   higher	   to	   lower	   and	   back	   to	   higher	   degree	   of	  
commitment	   to	  address	   the	   issue,	  due	   to	  moderating	  economic	   factors	   (in	  other	  
words,	  issues	  stemming	  from	  the	  task	  environment	  in	  the	  TEF).	  
Moreover,	  the	  authors	  found	  that	  managerial	  discretion	  is	  not	  automatically	  
constrained	   over	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle:	   the	   same	   portfolio	   of	   strategies	   is	   available	  
throughout	  all	  stages.	  In	  conclusion,	  Näsi	  et	  al.	  (1997)	  argued	  that	  “issues	  are	  not	  
floating	  about,	  agitating	  for	  change,	  but	  are	  connected	  to	  stakeholder	  groups	  who	  
apply	  pressure…	   If	   a	   stakeholder	   group	   can	   sustain	  pressure	  on	   the	  organization	  
over	  time,	  […]	  then	  the	  life	  cycle	  curve	  seems	  to	  generally	  apply”	  (Näsi	  et	  al.,	  1997:	  
317).	   Hence,	   in	   contrast	   with	   the	   typology	   of	   Bigelow	   et	   al.	   (1993),	   stakeholder	  
actions	  do	  interfere	  with	  issue	  evolution	  even	  in	  a	  normal	  life-­‐cycle	  –	  or,	  in	  other	  
words,	   the	  normal	   life-­‐cycle	  also	  depend	  on	  stakeholders’	   strategies.	  The	  authors	  
also	  make	  suggestions	  for	  future	  research,	  two	  of	  which	  I	  will	  follow	  in	  developing	  
my	   model	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle:	   (a)	   that	   future	   research	   should	   look	   both	   at	  
organizational	   and	   interorganizational	   political	   strategies;	   and	   (b)	   that	   a	   better	  
understanding	   of	   how	   issues	   emerge	   is	   necessary,	   requiring	   “a	   more	   developed	  
sense	   of	   institutional	   processes…	   […]	   Concepts	   such	   as	   institutional	   field	   and	  
interorganizational	  domain	  are	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  processes	  that	  produce	  issues,	  
and	   current	   research	   in	   the	   area	   would	   gain	   from	   a	   closer	   connection	   to	   these	  




ago,	  to	  my	  knowledge,	  such	  a	  connection	  has	  not	  been	  established	  yet,	  and	  thus	  I	  
aim	  to	  make	   it	  by	  drawing	  on	  concepts	   from	  the	  Organizational	   Institutionalism	  
literature	  and	  on	  the	  field-­‐level	  Triple	  Embeddedness	  Framework,	  on	  which	  I	  build	  
to	  integrate	  the	  different	  building	  blocks	  that	  I	  raise	  in	  this	  Chapter.	  
Bigelow,	   Arndt	   and	   Stone	   (1997)	   present	  an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   that	   combines	   the	  
models	  by	  Buchholz	  (1982)	  and	  by	  Post	  (1978)	  and	  applies	  it	  to	  corporate	  (political)	  
strategies	  of	  the	  health	  care	  industry.	  The	  authors	  add	  an	  ‘anticipatory’	  stage	  that	  
precedes	   issue	   emergence,	   resulting	   in	   a	   four-­‐stage	   model:	   (1)	   Anticipatory20	  (2)	  
Emergence;	   (3)	   Enactment;	   and	   (4)	   Implementation.	   They	   further	   identified	  
appropriate	  (political)	  responses	  at	  each	  stage:	  (1)	  Goodwill	  strategy	  (e.g.	  corporate	  
donations	   and	   community	   outreach,	   to	   gain	   public	   legitimacy)	   and	   assessment	  
strategy	  (e.g.	  environmental	  scanning	  and	  sense-­‐making,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  prepared	  if	  
an	   issue	   emerges);	   (2)	   Communication	   strategy	   (e.g.	   constituency	   building,	  
advocacy	  advertising,	  press	  releases,	  and	  other	  formal	  publications,	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  
presenting	  the	  organization’s	  position	  and	  influencing	  public	  opinion	  or	  to	  create	  
an	   organized	   group	   of	   people	   that	   may	   influence	   subsequent	   stages);	  	  
(3)	   Information	   strategy	   (e.g.	   expert	  witnessing	  or	   technical	   reports,	   to	   influence	  
the	  content	  of	  legislation	  being	  introduced)	  and	  ‘political’	  strategy	  (e.g.	  lobbying	  or	  
financial	   contributions,	   also	   to	   influence	   legislative	   content	   or	   to	   prevent	   the	  
enactment	   of	   legislation);	   and	   (4)	   Compliance	   strategies	   (e.g.	   negotiation	   of	  
implementation	  terms,	  litigation,	  legislative	  relief	  or	  non-­‐compliance).	  
A	   key	   difference	   with	   the	   conceptualization	   suggested	   by	   Bigelow	   et	   al.	  
(1991)	   is	   that	   this	   one	   seems	   to	   consist	   of	   general	   strategic	   categories,	  while	   the	  
latter	   appears	   to	   be	   more	   practical	   tactics.	   This	   work	   further	   advanced	   the	  
understanding	   of	   corporate	   response,	   highlighting	   aspects	   that	   take	   place	   in	  
different	   stages	   of	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   However,	   to	   systematically	   incorporate	  
corporate	  responses	  into	  my	  model,	  I	  use	  these	  more	  advanced	  conceptualizations	  
together	  with	  insights	  from	  other	  literatures	  (reviewed	  in	  Sections	  II.5	  and	  II.6).	  
Mahon	   and	  McGowan	   (1996).	  An	  alternative	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  interplay	  
between	  managerial	   strategies	   and	   tactics	   and	   the	   stages	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycles	   had	  
been	  offered	  by	  Mahon	  and	  McGowan	   (1996,	  p.	  41-­‐3).	  They	  propose	  a	   four-­‐stage	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  The	  label	  ‘anticipatory’	  seems	  appropriate	  for	  a	  stage	  in	  a	  corporate	  response	  model.	  For	  an	  




issue-­‐life	   cycle	   which	   is	   similar	   to	   Bigelow’s	   and	   colleagues	   (1997),	   despite	   the	  
different	  labels:	  (1)	  Introduction;	  (2)	  Growth;	  (3)	  Entry	  into	  a	  specific	  arena;	  and	  (4)	  
Resolution.	   Appropriate	   political	   tactics	   for	   each	   stage	   are	   respectively:	   (1)	  
Containment/Advocacy;	   (2)	   Containment/Advocacy	   (again);	   (3)	   Arena	  
manipulation;	  and	  (4)	  Policy	  adaptation.	  The	  existence	  of	  an	  ‘Entry	  into	  a	  specific	  
arena’	   stage,	   which	   is	   proposed	   as	   a	   way	   to	   avoid	   the	   focus	   on	   a	   single	   arena	  
(normally,	   the	   public	   policy	   arena,	   as	   in	   previous	   models),	   differentiates	   this	  
scheme	   from	  others.	  The	   idea	   is	   that	  corporate	  political	   response	   in	   the	   ‘growth’	  
stage	  will	   aim	  at	  directing	   the	   issue	   to	   the	  preferable	   arena21;	   and	  after	   the	   issue	  
enters	  a	  given	  arena,	  corporate	  actors	  may	  aim	  at	  influencing	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  is	  
addressed	   there.	   In	   the	   fourth	   stage,	   corporate	   actors	  may	  aim	  at	   appealing	   to	   a	  
different	  arena	  (e.g.	  appeal	  regulatory/legislative	  action	  in	  the	  judicial	  arena)	  or	  at	  
influencing	  the	  way	  the	  resolution	  is	  actually	  implemented.	  
Another	  commonality	  between	  Mahon	  and	  McGowan	  (1996)	  and	  Bigelow	  et	  
al.	   (1997)	   is	   that	   both	   indicate	   that	   firms	   are	   confronted	   with	   the	   choice	   of	  
responding	  to	  an	  issue	  alone	  or	  in	  association	  with	  other	  firms.	  Bigelow	  et	  al.	  (1997,	  
p.	   55)	   argue	   that,	  during	   the	   ‘enactment’	   (legislative)	   stage,	   individual	   firms	  may	  
deploy	   their	  own	  political	   strategies,	  but	   “collective	  action	   is	  often	  necessary	   [...]	  
for	  two	  reasons”:	  firstly,	  legislators	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  attend	  to	  arguments	  that	  are	  
voiced	   by	   a	   large	   constituency.	   Secondly,	   industry	   associations	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  
more	   effective	   in	   lobbying	   policy-­‐makers,	   because	   they	   have	   a	   more	   complete	  
knowledge	  about	  the	  public	  policy	  and	  the	  legislative	  process.	  
Despite	  this	  insight,	  the	  interplays	  between	  individual	  firms’	  strategies	  and	  
collective	  responses	  is	  not	  integrated	  in	  Bigelow’s	  and	  colleague’s	  model	  (1997).	  But	  
Mahon	   and	   McGowan	   did	   suggest	   that	   the	   decision	   of	   whether	   to	   engage	   in	  
political	  activities	  alone	  or	  with	  others	  is	  “a	  function	  of	  the	  type	  of	  impact	  that	  the	  
issue	  has	  on	  the	  organization”	  (1996:	  63).	  They	  propose	  three	  categories	  of	  issues:	  
(a)	   technical	   issues	   (which	   impact	   upon	   core	   technologies	   and	   distinctive	  
competencies);	  (b)	  administrative	  issues	  (which	  arise	  from	  the	  way	  an	  organization	  
manages	   physical	   and	   human	   resources);	   and	   (c)	   institutional	   issues	   (which	   put	  
into	  question	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  firm	  or	  industry).	  The	  authors	  propose	  that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Hilgartner	  and	  Bosk	  (1988)	  list	  a	  number	  of	  arenas	  for	  issue	  resolution,	  such	  as	  the	  media	  (TV,	  
press,	  radio,	  and,	  nowadays,	  the	  Internet),	  private	  foundations	  (e.g.	  trade	  associations),	  congress,	  




Technical	   issues	   […]	   because	   of	   their	   intimate	   tie	   to	   individual	   firm	  
distinctive	   competence,	   may	   be	   dealt	   with	   best	   on	   an	   individual	   basis,	  
unless	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  this	  competency	  is	  distributed	  industry-­‐wide.	  
[…]	  ...a	  change	  that	  affects	  the	  distinctive	  competency	  of	  the	  entire	  industry	  
as	  a	  whole	  would	  demand	  an	  industry-­‐wide	  response.	  Administrative	  issues	  
suggest	   that	   industry	   responses	   are	   more	   likely,	   with	   occasional	  
cooperation	   among	   and	   between	   several	   industries.	   Finally,	   institutional	  
issues	   can	   demand	   either	   individual	   [when	   one	   firm’s	   legitimacy	   is	  
questioned]	   or	   industry	   [when	   the	   industry’s	   legitimacy	   is	   questioned]	  
response	  dependent	  on	  the	  specific	   issue.	  (Mahon	  and	  McGowan,	  1996,	  p.	  
65-­‐6	  –	  my	  emphasis)	  
Despite	  representing	  a	  key	  advancement	  in	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory,	  in	  my	  view	  these	  
conjectures	  do	  not	  fully	  explain	  the	  corporate	  choice	  of	  acting	  alone	  or	  collectively,	  
as	   the	  authors	  argue	   that	  both	  choices	  are	  possible	   for	  all	   issues,	  and	  more	   light	  
needs	  to	  be	  shed	  on	  the	  interplays	  between	  firm-­‐level	  strategies	  and	  industry-­‐level	  
strategies.	  For	  instance,	  collective	  action	  may	  depend	  on	  the	  stage	  of	  the	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	  (Hillman	  and	  Hitt,	  1999).	  In	  order	  to	  fully	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  factors	  
that	   impact	  on	   this	  decision	  and	   incorporate	   them	  into	  my	  novel	  model,	   section	  
II.5	   will	   highlight	   key	   insights	   and	   concepts	   from	   selected	   works	   of	   the	  
Organizational	  Institutionalism	  tradition. 
Wartick	   and	   Heugens,	   2003.	   A	   new	  wave	   of	   conceptual	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	  
emerged	   in	   the	  mid-­‐2000s,	   partially	   fuelled	   by	   the	   publication	   of	   a	   2003	   special	  
issue	  (Volume	  6,	  Number	  1)	  of	  the	  journal	  Corporate	  Reputation	  Review	  on	  issues	  
management.	  The	  editors	  (Wartick	  and	  Heugens,	  2003)	  review	  the	  status	  of	  issues	  
management	   theory,	   concluding,	   rather	   gloomily,	   that	   many	   models	   of	   issues	  
management	   were	   non-­‐academic;	   that	   the	   number	   of	   academic	   publications	   on	  
the	   topic	   had	   been	   declining	   since	   the	   early	   1990s;	   and	   that	   the	   research	  
community	   was	   diminishing,	   because	   scholars	   were	   moving	   to	   stakeholder	  
management	   theory.	  To	   revive	   the	   issues	  management	   tradition,	   they	   suggested,	  
among	   other	   things,	   “infusing	   orthodox	   issues	   life	   cycle	   research	   with	   theories	  
from	  other	  social	  sciences”	  (p.	  13),	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  its	  shortcomings.	  Let	  me	  
elaborate	  on	  this	  suggestion,	  which	  I	  aim	  at	  following.	  
The	   editors	   firstly	   recognize	   the	   lack	   of	   agency	   in	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  
conceptualizations	  and	  its	  failure	  to	  show	  how	  various	  actors	  actively	  shape	  issue	  
evolution	  –	  what	  I	  have	  been	  referring	  to	  as	   ‘contextual	  determinism’.	  To	  address	  




models	   –	   my	   model	   will	   make	   use	   of	   this	   suggestion	   and	   draw	   on	   the	  
Organizational	   Institutionalism	   literature	   and	   the	   TEF.	   Secondly,	   “[a]nother	  
problem	   that	  has	  haunted	   the	   issue	   life	   cycle	   literature	   for	  decades	   is	   that	   these	  
models	  have	  been	  silent	  about	  the	  underlying	  mechanisms	  that	  cause	  the	  sudden	  
upswings	   and	   gradual	   downturns	   in	   the	   amount	   of	   public	   attention	   a	   particular	  
issue	   receives”	   (Wartick	   and	   Heugens,	   2003:	   14	   –	   emphasis	   in	   the	   original).	   To	  
address	   this	   issue,	   I	   propose	   that	   a	   more	   systematic	   integration	   of	   qualitative	  
aspects	   of	   issue-­‐attention	   cycle	   theory	   into	   a	   stage	   model	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	  
following	   the	   insights	   of	   Lamertz	   et	   al.	   (2003).	   This	   theory	   will	   be	   examined	   in	  
section	  II.4,	  revealing	  insights	  also	  for	  tackling	  what	  I	  have	  been	  referring	  to	  as	  the	  
‘measurement	  issue’	  (how	  to	  quantitatively	  measure	  and	  depict	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle). 
Lamertz	  et	  al.	   (2003),	  in	  the	  same	  special	  issue,	  develop	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  model	  
that	  takes	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  contextual	  determinism,	  
offering	  many	   relevant	   insights	   into	   an	   issue	   evolution	   process.	   Particularly,	   the	  
authors	  give	  more	  attention	  to	  framing	  and	  interpretive	  processes	  in	  emergence	  of	  
issues,	  a	  topic	  previously	  under-­‐addressed.	  They	  criticize	  ‘orthodox’	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
frameworks	   for	   their	   tendency	   “to	   reify	   social	   problems	   by	   granting	   them	   an	  
existence	  that	  is	  quasi-­‐independent	  from	  actors	  [...]	  and	  [...]	  cultural	   institutions”	  
(Lamertz	  et	  al.,	  2003,	  p.	  83)	  and	  for	  the	  ‘linearity’	  of	  such	  frameworks:	  “The	  main	  
source	  of	  discontent	  is	  that	  issues	  often	  fail	  to	  progress	  along	  predictable	  lines,	  and	  
deviate	   frequently	   from	   the	   linear,	   sequential	   path	   suggested	   by	   evolutionary	  
frameworks”	   (ibid.).	   To	   tackle	   these	   caveats,	   the	   authors	   draw	   on	   Symbolic	  
Interactionism	  (or	   ‘Constructivist’	  theory)	  and	  on	  natural	  history	  models	  of	  social	  
problems	   (Blumer,	   1971;	   Spector	   and	   Kitsuse,	   1973).	   Their	   model	   aims	   at	  
“understanding	  [...]	  how	  the	  behavior	  of	  social	  actors	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  context	  and	  
constraints	   of	   their	   social	   environment,	   while	   simultaneously	   illustrating	   how	  
these	  actors	  can	  shape	  their	  social	  environment	  through	  strategic	  communication	  
and	  interest	  advocacy”	  (Lamertz	  et	  al.,	  2003,	  p.	  90).	  The	  authors	  take	  a	  key	  premise	  
from	  these	  sociological	  works:	  “social	  problem	  exists	  primarily	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  it	  is	  
defined	  and	  conceived	  in	  society”	  (Blumer,	  1971,	  p.	  300).	  	  
Although	   their	   objective	   was	   to	   avoid	   the	   ‘linearity’	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  




(linear)	  stage	  model	  (cf.	  Lamertz	  et	  al.,	  2003,	  p.	  84)	  affected	  by	  mediating	  factors	  
(‘attention’	   and	   ‘identity’),	   consisting	   of	   five	   stages	   (see	   Figure	   II.4):	   (1)	  
accumulation	   of	   pressure	   on	   the	   ‘enacted	   structure’;	   leading	   to	   (2)	   a	   ‘structural	  
failure’	   of	   the	   ‘enacted	   structure’;	   then	   to	   (3)	   ‘issue	   definition’;	   followed	   by	   (4)	  
‘institutional	  redesign’;	  and	  finally	  reaching	  (5)	  a	  ‘Re-­‐enactment’	  stage	  (either	  ‘Issue	  
resolution’	  or	   ‘Issue	  perpetuation’).	  It	  is	  worth	  explaining	  this	  framework	  in	  some	  
detail.	  
Figure	  II.4:	  A	  Symbolic	  interactionist	  framework	  of	  issue	  evolution	  
	  
Source:	  Figure	  1	  in	  Lamertz	  et	  al.	  (2003,	  p.	  85)	  
In	  their	  framework,	  an	  issue	  emerges	  when	  a	  ‘structural	  failure’	  (or	  ‘sense-­‐making	  
crisis’)	  of	  the	  enacted	  social	  structure	  takes	  place.	  	  
A	  core	  assumption	  of	  this	  framework	  is	  that	  social	   interaction	  requires	  an	  
enacted	  social	  structure...	  [...]	  [that]	  include[s]	  the	  rules	  of	  conduct	  and	  the	  
role	  expectations	  for	  participants	  in	  the	  social	  structure.	  Rules	  and	  roles	  do	  
not	  determine	  behavior	  but	  act	  as	   interpretive	   frames	   that	  are	  a	  basis	   for	  
sense-­‐making.	  (Lamertz	  et	  al.,	  p.	  2003:	  84)	  
A	   failure	   of	   the	   enacted	   social	   structure	   occurs	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	  
accumulation	  of	  non-­‐routine	  situations	  (environmental/contextual	  pressures),	   for	  
which	   social	   actors	   are	   not	   prepared,	   because	   the	   existing	   interpretive	   frames	  
cannot	   explain	   these	   non-­‐routine	   situations	   (or	   events).	   While	   the	   structural	  
failure	   per	   se	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   an	   issue	   (i.e.	   the	   failure	   is	   a	  
necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  condition),	   it	  may	  be	  created	  because	  of	  variation	   in	  





One	   source	   of	   cognitive	   variability	   is	   the	   different	   domains	   from	   which	  
actors	  borrow	  concepts	   to	  make	   sense	  of	   these	  non-­‐routine	  events.	  Thus,	   “social	  
actors	  in	  a	  field	  compete	  to	  assert	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  sense-­‐making	  failure	  –	  
an	   issue	   definition	   –	   that	   is	   consistent	  with	   their	   private	   interests”	   (ibid.,	   p.	   86	   –	  
emphasis	   in	   the	   original).	   The	   authors	   propose	   that	   two	   variables	  moderate	   the	  
emergence	   of	   competing	   interpretive	   frames:	   (1)	   level	   of	   public	   attention	   to	   the	  
issue	  (higher	  levels	  of	  public	  attention	  lead	  to	  higher	  levels	  of	  private	  attention	  and	  
thus	  to	  deliberate	  issue	  definitions	  consistent	  with	  each	  actor’s	  interests);	  and	  (2)	  
the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   structural	   failure	   implies	   an	   identity	   threat	   to	   the	   social	  
actor,	   especially	   if	   other	   actors’	   interpretations	   threaten	   another	   actor’s	   identity	  
(the	   threatened	   actor	   will	   reaffirm	   its	   identity	   by	   promoting	   a	   competing	  
interpretive	  frame).	  
As	   a	   consequence	   of	   this	   conceptualization	   of	   how	   an	   issue	   emerges,	   an	  
issue	  will	  evolve	  by	  means	  of	  (what	  I	  call)	  a	  ‘dialectical	  process’	  of	  shifting	  balance	  
of	  power	  amongst	  actors	  concerned	  with	  the	  failed	  structure.	  Power	  and	  framing	  
struggles	   over	   the	  meaning	   of	   external	   events	   will	   happen	   until	   an	   institutional	  
redesign	  takes	  place.	  This	  may	  happen	  either	  (a)	  through	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  dominant	  
actor	   who	   persuades	   or	   coerces	   “its	   peers	   into	   adopting	   its	   solution	   preference”	  
(ibid.,	  p.	  88)	  or	  (b)	  via	  appellation	  to	  an	  external	  (public	  or	  private)	  authority.	  The	  
issue	   moves	   to	   the	   institutional	   redesign	   stage	   because	   of	   actors’	   mobilization:	  
different	   actors	   will	   actively	   raise	   attention	   to	   the	   issue	   and	   their	   preferred	  
definition	  (‘attention	  advocacy’)	  to	  receive	  support	  from	  others	  (peers	  or	  external	  
authorities);	  or	  they	  will	  engage	  in	   ‘identity	  advocacy’,	   i.e.	  appeal	  to	  “like-­‐minded	  
advocates	  that	  that	  can	  help	  them	  exercise	  control	  over	  the	  other	  parties	  in	  their	  
environment”	  (Lamertz	  et	  al.,	  2003,	  p.	  89).	  Through	  mobilization,	  negotiation	  and	  
advocacy	   an	   ‘institutional	   redesign’	   plan	   is	   proposed.	   If	   actors	   misinterpret	   the	  
meaning	  of	  the	  redesign	  plan,	  or	  if	  it	  fails	  to	  restablish	  an	  ‘enacted	  structure’,	  then	  
the	  issue	  will	  be	  perpetuated	  (i.e.	  a	  structural	  failure	  persists,	  actors	  engage	  in	  issue	  
redefinition	  etc.).	  
While	   the	   model	   may	   still	   be	   understood	   as	   ‘linear’	   (which	   is	   a	   real	  
possibility	  for	  issue	  evolution,	  as	  proposed	  by	  Bigelow	  et	  al.,	   1993),	  Lamertz	  et	  al.	  
(2003)	  do	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  contextual	  determinism	  (or	  teleology)	  of	  previous	  




actors	   are	   not	   triggered	   to	   action	   through	   critical	   events:	   “key	   social	   actors	  
construct	  a	  social	  issue	  through	  interpretation	  of	  key	  events.	  [...]	  In	  this	  [symbolic	  
interactionist]	   framework,	   issue	   evolution	   is	   therefore	   less	   a	   natural	   process	   of	  
fluctuating	   public	   attention	   and	   more	   a	   social	   process	   of	   constructing	   and	  
negotiating	  meaning	   in	   a	   context	   of	   ongoing	   social	   relations	   and	   transactions...”	  
(Lamertz	   et	   al.,	   2003,	   p.	   84).	   Public	   attention	   is	   not	   just	   out	   there,	   but	   actors	  
actively	  engage	  in	  the	  manipulation	  of	  public	  attention	  to	  advocate	  their	  preferred	  
issue	   framing.	  The	   relevance	  of	   the	   ‘symbolic	   interactionist	   framework’	   is	   not	   so	  
much	   its	   “superior	   explanatory	   power”	   (ibid.,	   p.	   91),	   but	   its	   highlighting	   of	   the	  
importance,	  for	  evolution	  of	  issues,	  of	  (a)	  framing	  and	  social-­‐construction	  of	  issues;	  
and	  (b)	  public	  attention.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  latter,	  it	  seems	  therefore	  appropriate	  to	  
take	  stock	  of	  issue-­‐attention	  theory	  (see	  section	  II.4).	  
Rivoli	   and	   Waddock	   (2011)	   show	   however	   that	   the	   ‘natural	   history’	   models	  
(which	   Lamertz	   and	   colleagues	   criticize)	   are	   alive	   and	   well,	   and	   still	   being	  
improved	   upon.	   The	   authors	   use	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	   to	   explain	   why	   the	  
substance	   of	   responsible	   corporate	   behaviour	   changes	   over	   time.	   Their	  
conceptualization	   of	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   (Figure	   II.5),	   which	   clearly	   resembles	  
Tombari’s	  (1984	  –	  cf.	  Figure	  II.1),	  consists	  of	  four	  phases:	  (1)	  Gap;	  (2)	  Political;	  (3)	  
Legislative;	  and	  (4)	  Litigation/coping.	  While	  the	  labels	  are	  similar	  to	  stage	  models	  
from	  previous	  generations,	  the	  actual	  discussion	  reveals	  important	  insights,	  which	  




Figure	  II.5:	  Rivoli’s	  and	  Waddock’s	  (2011)	  Public	  Issue	  Life	  Cycle	  Model	  
	  
Source:	  Figure	  1	  in	  Rivoli	  and	  Waddock	  (2011,	  p.	  91)	  
• The	   role	   of	   triggering	   events	   in	   starting	   the	   life-­‐cycle:	   “The	   trigger	   event	   (or	  
institutional	   ‘jolt’)	   is	   an	   event	   that	   draws	   public	   attention	   to	   a	   given	   issue,	  
thereby	  activating	  the	  issue	  life	  cycle”	  (Rivoli	  and	  Waddock,	  2011,	  p.	  90).	  [From	  
Lamertz	  et	   al.	   (2003)	  one	   could	   add	   that	   framing	   struggles	   and	  disagreement	  
over	  the	  meaning	  of	  triggering	  events	  is	  also	  necessary	  for	  issue	  evolution.]	  
• The	  role	  of	  ‘pioneering	  activists’	  –	  or	  ‘opinion	  leaders’	  –	  in	  raising	  the	  issue	  (gap	  
phase):	   “...the	   initial	   stage	  of	   the	   evolution	  of	   a	  public	   issue	   involves	   early	  or	  
pioneering	  activists	  seeing	  a	  gap	  between	  desired	  and	  actual	  practice”	  (p.	  90).	  
[At	   this	   stage,	   the	   expectational	   gap	   is	   held	   privately	   by	   a	   few	   concerned	  
individuals.]	  
• ‘Activists	  become	  active’:	  The	  advocacy	  of	  pioneering	  activists	  attract	  attention	  
and	  support	  from	  the	  public	  and	  other	  stakeholders,	  so	  that	  ‘ignoring’	  the	  issue	  
is	  no	   longer	  a	  viable	   response	  by	  concerned	  organizations	   (ibid.,	  p.	  91).	  Thus,	  
the	   expectational	   gap	   becomes	   public	   when	   activists	   enter	   the	   process	  
(transition	   from	   first	   to	   second	   stage).	   [This	   advocacy	   activity	   is	   akin	   to	   the	  
process	  of	   ‘transforming	  private	  troubles	  into	  public	  issues’	  that	  constructivist	  
authors	   Spector	   and	   Kitsuse	   (1973)	   proposed	   as	   characteristic	   of	   the	   second	  




• Media	  and	  public	  interest:	  if	  media	  and	  public	  concern	  is	  sufficiently	  raised	  and	  
reach	  a	   ‘threshold’,	   legislative	   interest	  may	  be	  attracted	   to	   the	   issue	   [i.e.	  high	  
media	  and	  public	  attention	  –	  an	  indicator	  for	  public	  concern	  (see	  Section	  II.4)	  –	  
marks	  phase	  shifts].	  
• Issue	  framing	  process:	  The	  negotiation	  for	  a	  dominant	  issue	  framing	  takes	  place	  
during	  the	  political	  and	  the	  legislative	  stages	  (the	  latter	  being	  marked	  by	  debate	  
and	   compromise).	   “Framing	   is	   an	   important	   part	   of	   the	   process	   of	  
institutionalization,	   [...]	   because	   ideas	   facilitate	   or	   constrain	   the	   policy	   and	  
other	  behavioral	  choices	  that	  are	  later	  made	  by	  providing	  rationales	  for	  action	  
(or	   inaction).	   [Some	   authors]	   characterize	   this	   interactive	   framing	   process	   as	  
‘theorization,’	  a	  process	  that	  helps	  explain	  the	  causes	  and	  effects,	  as	  well	  as	  why	  
an	   issue	   has	   taken	   the	   shape	   that	   it	   has”	   (ibid.,	   p.	   92).	   [Science	  may	   play	   an	  
important	   role	   in	   the	   framing	   process,	   because	   different	   stakeholders	   and	  
organization	  draw	  on	  “scientific	  research	  […]	  to	  establish	  the	  viability	  of	   their	  
claims”	  (Schneider,	  1985,	  p.	  220)22.]	  
• Move	  from	  individual	  to	  collective	  action:	  when	  the	  issue	  enters	  the	  legislative	  
stage,	   firms	   [that	  may	  previously	  be	  acting	  collectively	   to	  defend	  their	   shared	  
interests]	   begin	   to	   ‘move	   at	   different	   speeds’	   regarding	   the	   issue	   at	   hand,	  
because	  “early	  movers	  can	  take	  strategic	  initiatives	  that	  distinguish	  themselves	  
from	  other	  companies”	  (Rivoli	  and	  Waddock,	  2011,	  p.	  94).	   [This	  move	  may	  be	  
understood	   as	   one	   of	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   implementation	   stage:	   as	   the	  
issue	   becomes	   institutionalized,	   it	   begins	   to	   affect	   the	   competitive	  
environment,	   so	   that	   firms	   tend	   to	   compete	   with	   one	   another	   for	   a	   better	  
position.]	  
• The	   issue	  may	   be	   resolved	   in	   two	  ways:	   “First,	   the	   behavior	  may	   spread	   and	  
become	  common	  or	  accepted	  practice,	  even	   though	   it	   is	  not	   legally	   required.	  
Second,	  the	  new	  behavior	  may	  become	  compulsory	  through	  a	  change	  in	  laws	  or	  
regulations.	   Often,	   a	   behavior	   first	   becomes	   accepted	   practice,	   and	   then	  
become	   legally	   required”	   (Rivoli	   and	  Waddock,	   2011,	   p.	   94	   –	   emphasis	   in	   the	  
original).	   [This	   is	   similar	   to	  Kingdon	   (1984)	   idea	   that	  problems	  and	   solutions	  
develop	  in	  semi-­‐independent	  streams,	  so	  that	  the	  appearance	  of	  solutions	  may	  
actually	   elevate	   a	   problem	   to	   the	   top	   of	   the	   decision	   agenda.	   In	   Ravoli	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Waddock	   (2011),	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   practices	   (solutions)	   makes	   the	  
enactment	   of	   a	   new	   legislation	   more	   feasible	   “especially	   because	   companies	  
incurring	  extra	  costs	   to	  adopt	  progressive	  practices	  have	  an	   incentive	   to	  have	  
these	  costs	  applied	  to	  their	  competitors”	  (p.	  101).	  This	  insight	  is	  also	  explored	  by	  
the	  technology-­‐forcing	  policy	  literature,	  which	  I	  briefly	  review	  in	  section	  II.3.]	  	  
• Issue	   institutionalization	   and	   public	   attention:	   if	   the	   issue	   does	   not	   attract	  
sufficient	  public	   attention,	   it	   is	   less	   likely	   to	  become	   institutionalized.	   (Rivoli	  
and	  Waddock,	  2011,	  p.	  95).	  
While	  Rivoli’s	  and	  Waddock’s	  conceptualization	  provides	  interesting	  insights	  into	  
processes	  occurring	  within	  different	   stages	  and	   into	  phase	   shifts,	   the	   reliance	  on	  
the	   level	   of	   public	   attention	   sometimes	   appear	   to	   camouflage	   the	  processes	   that	  
lead	  to	  surges	  in	  public	  attention	  (i.e.	  purposive	  action	  by	  different	  stakeholders),	  
so	  that	  the	  model	  returns	  to	  some	  light	  form	  of	  contextual	  determinism.	  Thus,	  as	  
my	   comments	   between	   brackets	   above	   already	   indicated,	   and	   agreeing	  with	   the	  
contention	  by	  Lamertz	  et	  al.	  (2003,	  p.	  91)	  that	  “no	  single	  model	  of	  issue	  evolution”	  
has	   yet	   fully	   captured	   the	   complexities	   of	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	   I	   argue	   that	   it	   is	  
through	  the	  combination	  of	  insights	  from	  different	  stage	  models	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
and	  corporate	  responses	  –	  plus	  the	  incorporation	  of	  elements	  from	  other	  theories	  –	  
that	  a	  ‘big	  picture’	  model	  of	  the	  overall	  process	  may	  be	  built.	  Furthermore,	  neither	  
Rivoli	  and	  Waddock	  (2011),	  nor	  other	  authors	  contributing	  to	  the	  third	  generation	  
of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory	  explicitly	  defined	  criteria	  for	  the	  (conceptual	  or	  empirical)	  
identification	   of	   different	   stages.	   One	   could	   interpret	   elements	   in	   Figure	   II.5	   as	  
qualitative	   indicators	   that	   a	   given	   stage	   has	   started,	   e.g.	   the	   opening	   of	   an	  
‘expectational	  gap’	   and	  actions	  by	   ‘opinion	   leaders’	  would	   indicate	   that	   the	   issue	  
has	  emerged	  (first	  stage,	  or	  ‘gap	  stage’,	  as	  labelled	  by	  Rivoli	  and	  Waddock);	  the	  fact	  
that	  ‘activists	  become	  active’	  would	  indicate	  that	  the	  issue	  has	  moved	  to	  a	  ‘political	  
stage’;	   increasing	   ‘media	   and	   public	   interest’	   would	   then	   ensue	   and	   precede	   the	  
move	   to	   the	   ‘legislative	   stage’	   etc.	  Nevertheless,	   this	   is	  a	  possible	  conjecture	   that	  
can	  only	  be	  implied	  from	  the	  figure,	  and	  therefore	  a	  methodological	  issue	  remains,	  
because	   no	   author	   from	   the	   third	   generation	   proposed	   criteria	   for	   the	  
identification	  of	  stages.	  
Taking	  on	   the	  challenge	  of	  developing	  a	  big	  picture	  model,	   and	   following	  




other	   theories	   in	   order	   to	   overcome	   three	   gaps	   that	   remain	   open	   in	   the	   third	  
generation	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory:	  (a)	  the	  shift	  towards	  substantive	  response	  by	  
corporate	   actors,	   particularly	   how	   innovation	   strategies	   are	   deployed	   (and	   how	  
technologies	   evolve)	   throughout	   the	   life-­‐cycle	   (section	   II.3);	   (b)	   how	   to	   quantify	  
and	  depict	  an	  issue-­‐life	  cycle	  (i.e.	  the	  relationship	  between	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  and	  
issue-­‐attention	  cycles)	  and	  the	  incorporation	  of	  attention	  dynamics	  in	  an	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	  model	  (section	  II.4);	  and	  (c)	  the	  interplays	  between	  firm-­‐level	  and	  collective	  
(industry-­‐level)	   strategies,	   including	   the	   systematization	   of	   types	   of	   political	  
activities	  in	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  (section	  II.5).	  The	  final	  gap	  that	  I	  aim	  to	  tackle,	  namely,	  
(d)	  the	  lack	  of	  explicit	  criteria	  for	  the	  (conceptual	  and/or	  empirical)	  identification	  
of	   stages	   (methodological	   issue)	   will	   be	   dealt	   with	   in	   Chapter	   III,	   where	   I	   will	  
propose	  conceptual	  (qualitative)	  criteria	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  phase	  shifts,	  and	  
in	  Chapter	  IV,	  where	  I	  will	  propose	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  methodology	  that	  makes	  use	  
of	   both	   qualitative	   and	   quantitative	   approaches	   to	   identify	   empirical	   stages	   (the	  
qualitative	   approaches	   will	   focus	   on	   attention	   indicators	   and	   draw	   on	   the	  
discussion	  in	  section	  II.4	  about	  attention	  dynamics).	  
II.3. INNOVATION	  MANAGEMENT	  AND	  THE	  STRATEGIC	  USE	  OF	  
TECHNOLOGY	  
II.3.1. Introduction	  
The	   previous	   section	   highlighted	   important	   insights	   for	   understanding	   how	  
societal	  issues	  evolve,	  but	  also	  revealed	  gaps	  in	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  literature,	  which	  
need	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  how	  incumbent	  industries	  
respond	  to	  societal	  issues.	  One	  gap	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  given	  my	  goal	  of	  making	  
a	  contribution	   to	   the	  STI	   research	   field:	  namely,	   that	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	  have	  
not	   fully	   explained	  why	   incumbent	   industries	   shift	   from	   symbolic	   to	   substantive	  
responses	  to	  a	  societal	  issue.	  In	  particular,	  innovation	  strategies	  and	  technological	  
developments	  remain	  a	  blind	  spot	  in	  the	  theory.	  
An	  important	  reason	  why	  this	  topic	  remained	  under-­‐addressed	  is	  that	  issue	  
life-­‐cycle	  theory	  covers	  many	  different	  types	  of	  issues:	  ‘social’	  issues	  (e.g.	  marriage	  
and	   divorce),	   ethical	   issues	   (e.g.	   drug	   testing	   in	   animals),	   health	   issues	   (e.g.	  
smoking,	  alcohol),	  consumer	  issues	  (e.g.	  product	  safety),	  environmental	  issues	  (e.g.	  




among	   others.	   No	   issue	   is	   technological	   in	   itself;	   technology	   and	   innovation	  
strategies	   are	   important	   types	   of	   substantive	   response	   to	   societal	   issues	   that	  are	  
framed	   as	   needing	   a	   technological	   fix.	   Particularly,	   consumer	   issues	   (product-­‐
related)	   and	   environmental	   issues	   (product-­‐	   and	   process-­‐related)	   are	   prone	   to	   a	  
technological	  frame	  (although,	  in	  theory,	  one	  could	  conceive	  technological	  fixes	  for	  
any	  other	  type	  of	  issue	  as	  well).	  The	  model	  that	  I	  propose	  in	  the	  next	  Chapter	  will	  
therefore	  account	  for	  the	  genesis	  process	  that	  frames	  problems	  as	  technological	  (or	  
otherwise),	   in	   order	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   development	   of	   technologies	   and	  
innovations	  in	  relation	  to	  societal	  problems.	  	  
To	  be	  sure,	  a	  few	  authors	  in	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  tradition	  have	  touched	  upon	  
‘technical’	   issues	   (but)	   without	   theorizing	   about	   their	   particular	   life-­‐cycle.	   Post	  
(1978)	  dedicated	  a	  chapter	  to	  ‘The	  Promise	  of	  Technology’,	  where	  he	  examined	  the	  
case	   of	   fluorocarbons	   and	   the	   ozone	   layer.	   Although	   the	   author	  did	   look	   at	   the	  
scientific	   research	   that	   lead	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   ozone	   layer	   depletion	  
problem,	   his	   account	   takes	   the	   issue	   as	   a	   scientific	   (objective)	   fact	   and	   not	   as	  
something	   socially	  constructed	   (i.e.	  Post	  did	  not	   look	  at	   the	  process	  of	  voicing	  a	  
‘scientific	   trouble’	   as	   a	   public	   issue).	   Moreover,	   technology	   strategies	   were	   not	  
conceptually	  embedded	  in	  his	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  model.	  From	  the	  second	  generation,	  
Tombari	   (1984)	   listed	   a	   range	   of	   ‘Strategic	   issues	   in	   the	   external	   environment’	  
(chapter	  4	   in	  his	   textbook),	  amongst	  which	   figure	   ‘technological	   innovation’	  as	  a	  
particular	   type	   of	   ‘issues	   to	   the	   public’	   (i.e.	   business	   externalities)	   that	   is	   closely	  
linked	  to	  environmental	  issues,	  quality	  of	  life	  and	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  of	  a	  nation.	  
However,	   Tombari	   did	   not	   delve	   deeply	   into	   what	   implications	   those	   kinds	   of	  
issues	   have	   for	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   Also	   contributing	   to	   the	   second	   generation,	  
Mahon	   and	   Waddock	   (1992)	   defined	   ‘symbolic’	   and	   ‘substantive’	   responses,	  
without	   relating	   them	   to	   or	   looking	   at	   technological	   innovation.	   In	   the	   third	  
generation,	  Mahon	  and	  McGowan	  (1996)	  defined	  technical	  issues	  and	  related	  them	  
to	  the	  choice	  of	  responding	  to	  them	  alone	  or	  collectively	  –	  but	  the	  authors	  also	  did	  
not	  look	  at	  innovation	  processes.	  
This	   lack	   of	   attention	   to	   technological	   development	   and	   the	   innovation	  
process	  should	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  barrier	  for	  utilizing	  insights	  and	  concepts	  from	  
this	   literature	   in	  my	   research.	   In	   fact,	   this	   presents	   an	  opportunity	   to	   enrich	   the	  




in	   the	   Introduction	   chapter)	   and	   contributes	   to	   the	   development	   of	   the	   third	  
generation	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory:	   STI	   theory	   and	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	   can	  
fruitfully	   complement	   each	   other.	   To	   do	   so,	   I	   review	   next	   some	   useful	   concepts	  
from	   STI	   studies.	   I	   will	   relate	   these	   concepts	   to	   the	   Triple	   Embeddedness	  
Framework	   (see	   Introduction),	  which	   is	   the	  background	   framework	   that	   I	  use	   to	  
integrate	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory	  with	  STI.	  
II.3.2. A	  Basic	  view	  of	  innovations	  and	  innovation	  management	  
Concepts	  from	  STI	  research	  field	  can	  fruitfully	  be	  used	  to	  enrich	  a	  model	  of	  issue	  
life-­‐cycle	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  the	  research	  questions	  of	  this	  thesis.	  A	  starting	  point	  
is	   to	   look	   at	   how	   businesses	   manage	   innovation:	   firms	   in	   an	   industry	   deploy	  
innovation	   strategies	   to	   create	   or	   secure	   competitive	   advantage	   (market	   shares,	  
profitability)	   mainly	   in	   response	   or	   in	   anticipation	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   task	  
(economic)	   environment	   (Tidd	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   By	   innovating,	   a	   firm	  may	   convert	  
environmental	  challenges	  into	  opportunities	  (Francis	  and	  Bessant,	  2005).	  However,	  
the	  innovation	  process	  is	  neither	  straightforward	  nor	  easy	  to	  accomplish,	  as	  it	  takes	  
place	   under	   highly	   uncertain	   conditions	   (Tidd	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Lazonick	   and	  
Mazzucato,	   2013)	   related	   to	   what	   is	   technical	   feasible,	   economically	   profitable,	  
socially	  acceptable	  or	  legally	  allowed	  (Tushman	  and	  Anderson,	  1986;	  Nelson,	  1994;	  
Geels,	  2002).	  
There	   are	  many	   ways	   to	   classify	   types	   of	   innovation	   (e.g.	   Abernathy	   and	  
Clark,	   1985;	   Freeman	   and	   Perez,	   1988;	   Henderson	   and	   Clark,	   1990;	   Francis	   and	  
Bessant,	   2005;	   for	   a	   review	   of	   product	   innovation	   typologies,	   see	   Garcia	   and	  
Calantone,	   2002).	   A	   common	   denominator	   of	   many	   of	   these	   typologies	   is	   the	  
classification	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  novelty	  of	  innovations	  (Tidd	  et	  al.,	  2005):	  innovations	  
may	  range	  from	  being	  incremental	  to	  radical:	  
• ‘Incremental	  innovation’	  are	  minor,	  continuous	  (Freeman	  and	  Perez,	  1988),	  
‘evolutionary’	   (Abernathy	   and	   Clark,	   1985)	   improvements	   in	   existing	  
products	   and	   processes.	   Incremental	   innovation	   is	   often	   the	   result	   of	  
existing	   knowledge	   derived	   from	   experience	   (Tidd	   et	   al.,	   2005)	   and	   thus	  
draws	   on	   and	   reinforces	   the	   core	   elements	   of	   an	   industry	   regime	  
(knowledge/capabilities	  and	  the	  technical	  regime,	  but	  also	  cognitive	  frames,	  




model,	   I	   will	   portray	   incremental	   innovations	   as	   symbolic	   strategies	   in	  
response	  to	  a	  societal	  issue.	  
• ‘Radical	   innovation’	   represents	  major,	  discontinuous	  events	   (Freeman	  and	  
Perez,	   1988),	   ‘revolutionary’	   changes	   of	   products	   and/or	   processes	   that	  
departs	   from	   and	   disrupts	   core	   elements	   of	   an	   industry	   regime.	   Radical	  
innovation	  is	  often	  the	  result	  of	  active,	  deliberate	  research	  and	  development	  
processes	  (Freeman	  and	  Perez,	  1988;	  Tidd	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  In	  my	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
model,	  I	  will	  portray	  radical	  innovations	  as	  substantive	  strategies	  in	  response	  
to	  a	  societal	  issue.23	  
No	  matter	  the	  degree	  of	  novelty,	  developing	  innovations	  will	  always	  be	  uncertain	  
(Lazonick	   and	  Mazzucato,	   2013),	   because	   the	  probability	  of	   succeeding	  or	   failing	  
cannot	  be	  calculated	  in	  advance.	  However,	  engaging	  in	  incremental	  innovation	  is	  a	  
less	   risky	   enterprise	   than	   to	   engage	   in	   radical	   innovation,	   because	   development	  
starts	   from	   something	   already	   known,	   whilst	   in	   the	   case	   of	   radical	   innovations,	  
development	   involves	   the	   exploration	   of	   unknown	   areas	   (Tidd	   et	   al.,	   2005).	  
Incumbent	  firms	  in	  an	  industry	  will	  thus	  tend	  to	  favour	  an	  incremental	  technology	  
and	  innovation	  strategy,	  sticking	  to	  technical	  products	  and	  processes	  they	  already	  
know.	   Geels	   (2002,	   p.	   50-­‐1)	   lists	   the	   reasons	   behind	   this	   path	   dependence	   and	  
inertia	  at	  the	  firm	  level,	  which	  I	  expand	  to	  lock-­‐in	  mechanisms	  at	  the	  industry	  level	  
by	  relating	  them	  to	  the	  industry	  regime:	  
• In	   an	   industry	   regime	   characterized	   by	   an	   overarching	  mission	   of	   profit	  
maximization,	   sunk	   investments	   –	   associated	   with	   the	   established	  
technology	   (e.g.	   assembly	   lines,	   process	   technologies,	   skills)	   –	   represent	   a	  
key	  reason	  for	  why	  incumbents	  tend	  to	  resist	  engaging	  in	  disruptive/radical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  To	  be	  sure,	  incremental	  innovations	  may	  also	  contribute	  to	  demonstrating	  ‘progress	  in	  
resolving	  the	  actual	  problem’,	  which	  is	  part	  of	  	  Mahon’s	  and	  Waddock’s	  (1992)	  definition	  of	  what	  
substantive	  action	  is;	  while	  radical	  innovations	  may	  also	  be	  used	  to	  ‘frame’	  the	  problem,	  which	  is	  
part	  of	  these	  authors’	  definition	  of	  what	  symbolic	  action	  is	  (see	  quote	  on	  page	  32).	  Key	  reasons	  for	  
equating	  incremental	  innovations	  with	  symbolic	  action	  is	  that	  they	  reinforce	  the	  status	  quo	  (i.e.	  
the	  technical	  element	  of	  an	  industry	  regime),	  are	  less	  risky,	  and	  require	  fewer	  resources,	  while	  
radical	  innovations	  disrupts	  the	  regime,	  is	  riskier	  and	  require	  more	  resources.	  Another	  reason	  is	  
methodological:	  equating	  incremental	  (radical)	  innovation	  with	  symbolic	  (substantive)	  action	  will	  
allow	  me	  to	  operationalize	  and	  apply	  the	  model	  that	  I	  will	  develop	  in	  Chapter	  III	  to	  empirical	  
cases,	  providing	  a	  concrete	  indicator	  for	  me	  to	  identify	  symbolic	  and	  substantive	  actions.	  Despite	  
these	  rationales,	  I	  do	  recognize	  that	  equating	  incremental	  (radical)	  innovation	  with	  symbolic	  
(substantive)	  action	  does	  not	  always	  hold	  in	  reality,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  caveat	  that	  I	  shall	  bear	  in	  mind	  




innovation	   that	   would	   ultimately	   destroy	   those	   sunk	   investments	   and	  
damage	  profit	  margins	  (Geels,	  2002).	  
• Belief	   systems	   lead	   to	   institutionalized	   search	   routines	   for	   technology	  
development	   –	   the	   ‘technological	   regime’	   (Nelson	   and	   Winter,	   1982)	   –	  
“which	   make	   engineers	   look	   in	   particular	   directions	   and	   not	   in	   others”	  
(Geels,	   2002,	   p.	   50-­‐1).	   Such	   cognitive	   frames	   may	   ‘blind’	   actors	   to	  
developments	  outside	  their	  core	  focus;	  
• A	   third	   reason	   is	   the	   industry-­‐specific	   technological	   regime	   itself.	  
“Organizations	   build	   capabilities	   around	   a	   particular	   trajectory	   [the	  
industry	   technological	   regime]	   and	   those	   who	   may	   be	   strong	   in	   [...]	   an	  
established	  trajectory	  often	  find	  it	  hard	  to	  move	  into	  the	  new	  one”	  (Tidd	  et	  
al.,	   2005,	   p.	   25).	   In	   other	   words,	   as	   time	   goes	   by,	   industry-­‐wide	   core	  
technical	   competencies	   (Prahalad	   and	   Hamel,	   1990)	   may	   turn	   into	   core	  
rigidities	   (Leonard-­‐Barton,	   1992),	   limiting	  what	   firms	   can	   (and	   are	  willing	  
to)	  do.	   Incumbents	  are	   thus	   less	  able	   to	  build	  up	  knowledge	  to	  cope	  with	  
radical	   breakthroughs	   (or	   external	   shocks),	   and	   will	   tend	   to	   engage	   in	  
competence	  enhancing,	  incremental	  innovations	  (Tushman	  and	  Anderson,	  
1986;	   Christensen,	   1997;	   Geels,	   2002)	   that	   exploit	   existing	   technological	  
capabilities	  (March,	  1991).	  
• A	  fourth	   reason	  relates	   to	   the	   incumbent	   industry	  orientation	   to	  markets,	  
i.e.	  the	  aggregate	  economic	  positioning	  strategies	  of	  individual	  firms:	  	  
...firms	   tend	   to	   stay	   close	   to	   their	   main	   customers...	   Even	   if	   established	  
firms	   notice	   newly	   emerging	   technologies,	   they	   may	   evaluate	   them	  
negatively	   on	   a	   rational	   financial	   basis.	   First,	   disruptive	   technologies	  
typically	  are	  first	  used	  in	  small	  and	  (relatively)	  insignificant	  market	  niches.	  
The	  potential	  revenues	  from	  the	  discernible	  markets	  are	  small.	  [...]	  Second,	  
the	   firms’	   most	   profitable	   customers	   generally	   do	   not	   want,	   and	   initially	  
cannot	  use,	  products	  based	  on	  disruptive	  technologies.	  The	  market	  signals	  
from	  the	  main	  customers	  point	  to	  incremental	  rather	  than	  radical	  changes.	  
(Geels,	  2002,	  p.	  51)	  	  
• A	  final	   reason	  are	   industry	  specific	  regulations	   (and	  other	  policies	  such	  as	  
taxes,	   subsidies,	   intellectual	   property	   laws,	   R&D	   programs,	   etc.),	   which	  
influence	   markets	   and	   consumer	   choices,	   innovation	   processes,	   and	  
business	   strategies	   (Geels,	   2012a).	  Technologies	  and	  policy	   institutions	  co-­‐




regulations	   and	   other	   policies	   supporting	   certain	   established	   technologies	  
and	   not	   others.	   Regulations	   therefore	   represent	   a	   form	   of	   ‘lock	   in’	   (cf.	  
Arthur,	   1989;	   Unruh,	   2000),	   which	   may	   ultimately	   prevent	   incumbent	  
industry	  actors	  from	  developing	  radical	  new	  technologies.	  
An	   important	   corollary	   of	   these	   lock	   in	  mechanisms,	   which	   lead	   incumbents	   to	  
follow	  an	   incremental	  path	   to	   technology	  development,	   is	   that	  more	   radical	   and	  
disruptive	  innovations	  will	  tend	  to	  come	  from	  outsiders	  to	  the	  industry	  regime:	  (1)	  
relative	   industry	   outsiders	   are	   not	   locked	   into	   the	   existing	   regime	   through	   sunk	  
investments	   in	   core	   technologies;	   (2)	   outsiders	   have	   a	   different	   cognitive	   frame	  
that	   allow	   them	   to	   look	   into	   different	   directions	   to	   develop	   technologies	   that	  
appear	  radical	   relatively	   to	  the	   industry’s	   technological	   regime;	  (3)	  outsiders	  may	  
thus	  attempt	  to	  enter	  a	  new	  domain	  (secure	  a	  competitive	  advantage)	  precisely	  by	  
developing	   radical	   innovations	   that	   destroy	   the	   competencies	   of	   the	   incumbent	  
industry;	   (4)	   relatively	   insignificant	   market	   niches	   for	   more	   radical/disruptive	  
technologies	  will	  be	  firstly	  seized	  by	  outsiders	  who	  do	  not	  have	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  
existing	   market	   linkages	   and	   customers	   (or,	   in	   other	   words,	   market	   niches	  
represent	  an	  opportunity	  for	  outsiders	  to	  get	  a	  foothold	  in	  new	  domains);	  and	  (5)	  
new	   regulations	   may	   provide	   a	   competitive	   edge	   to	   new	   entrant’s	   products	   or	  
processes.	   This	   is	   why	   radical,	   ‘competence	   destroying’	   innovations	   are	   usually	  
developed	   by	   firms	   new	   to	   an	   industry:	   “the	   source	   of	   the	   technology	   which	  
destabilizes	  an	  industry	  [regime]	  often	  comes	  from	  outside	  that	  industry”	  (Tidd	  et	  
al.,	  2005,	  p.	  24).	  
For	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  model,	  those	  stylized	  facts	  imply	  that	  incumbents	  will	  
firstly	   try	   to	   address	   the	   issue	   with	   minor	   changes	   in	   technology	   according	   to	  
prevailing	   knowledge	   and	   capabilities	   (incremental	   innovation),	   while	   also	  
employing	   resistant	   strategies	   to	   avoid	   higher-­‐level	   changes	   in	   core	   beliefs	   and	  
values.	  Given	  both	  the	  uncertainties	  involved	  in	  technology	  development	  and	  the	  
regime’s	   restrictive	   cognitive	   frame,	   incumbent	   firms	   will	   also	   find	   it	   hard	   to	  
predict	   accurately	   development	   costs,	   time	   periods,	   markets	   and	   profits	   of	   new	  
R&D	  projects	  that	  may	  be	  required	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  societal	  issue	  (Tidd	   et	  
al.,	   2005).	   Thus,	   if	   the	   societal	   issue	   calls	   for	   radical	   and	   disruptive	   innovations	  
(and	  related	  changes	  in	  core	  regime	  elements),	  then	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  issue	  will	  be	  




opportunity	   to	  enter	  a	  new	  domain.	   If	  and	  whenever	  the	  societal	   issue	  translates	  
into	   “new	   performance	   dimensions	   to	   be	   resolved	   by	   the	   engineers”	   (Abernathy	  
and	  Utterback,	  1978,	  p.	  45),	  either	  via	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  consumer	  preferences	  
(new	  market	  niche)	  or	   initial	   (weak)	   regulations,	   then	   the	   first	   to	   (re)act	  will	   be	  
relative	   outsiders	   to	   the	   industry	   regime,	   which	   develop	   new	   technological	  
solutions.	  
When	   this	   happens,	   the	   costs	   of	   not	   mastering	   the	   new	   technological	  
solution	  begins	  to	  rise	  to	  industry	  incumbents,	  so	  that	  they	  will	  attempt	  to	  defend	  
their	   market	   domain,	   hedging	   against	   spillovers	   to	   mainstream	  markets	   and/or	  
against	   stricter	   industry	   regulations.	   They	   will	   thus	   start	   to	   monitor	   outside	  
developments	  and	  engage	  in	  knowledge	  building	  and	  exploration	  (March,	  1991)	  of	  
new	  technical	  solution	  via	  e.g.	  basic	  research,	  which	  may	  require	  the	  establishment	  
of	  dedicated	  departments,	   if	   the	   field	  of	  knowledge	   falls	  outside	   the	   incumbent’s	  
(background	   or	   core)	   competency	   (Prencipe,	   1997;	   apud	   Tidd	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   If	  
incumbents	   are	   not	   yet	   able	   to	   transform	   technical	   competence	   into	   profitable	  
investment	   (Tidd	   et	   al.,	   2005),	   when	   the	   new	   performance	   dimensions	   become	  
mainstream,	  then	  cooperation	  with	  new	  entrants	  (Dyerson	  and	  Pilkington,	  2005)	  is	  
a	  possibility	  for	  technological	  catching	  up24.	  Meeting	  the	  mainstream	  demand	  will	  
require	   large-­‐scale	   financial	   commitments,	   so	   that	   competing	   firms	   have	   at	   this	  
point	  an	  incentive	  to	  attempt	  to	  raise	  rivals’	  costs	  with	  e.g.	  exclusive	  patent	  rights	  
or	  by	  lobbying	  policy-­‐makers	  for	  enactment	  of	  regulations	  (Salop	  and	  Scheffman,	  
1983;	   Hackett,	   1995;	   Puller,	   2006	   –	   see	   section	   II.3.3.2	   for	   a	   review	   of	   the	  
technology-­‐forcing	  policy	   literature,	  which	  offer	   insights	   into	   the	   strategic	  use	  of	  
technologies	  in	  response	  to	  regulation).	  	  
In	  summary,	  while	   the	  development	  of	  radical	   innovations	  by	   incumbents	  
in	  response	  to	  societal	  issues	  is	  a	  risky	  and	  costly	  process,	  incumbents	  can	  reorient	  
their	   strategies	   and	   contribute	   to	   addressing	   the	   issue.	  Reorientation	  of	   industry	  
regimes	   is	  however	  a	  gradual	   long-­‐term	  process	  that	   is	   likely	  to	  proceed	  through	  
stages,	  just	  like	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle,	  and,	  thus,	  both	  co-­‐evolve.	  Changes	  in	  the	  regime	  
are	   likely	   to	   begin	   with	   incremental	   adjustments	   in	   its	   technical	   element,	   but	  
complete	   ‘recreation’	   (Tushman	   and	   Romanelli,	   1985),	   which	   entails	   changes	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  In	  fact,	  this	  may	  be	  a	  necessity,	  particularly	  in	  industries	  with	  complex	  product	  systems	  (like	  
automobiles)	  that	  require	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  background	  technological	  competencies	  (Tidd	  et	  al.,	  




beliefs	  and	  mission,	  are	  likely	  to	  follow	  only	  if	  changes	  in	  regulation	  take	  place	  or	  if	  
it	   makes	   economic	   sense	   (i.e.	   mainstream	   consumers	   demand	   the	   technical	  
solution).	  
This	   first	   approach	   to	   how	   technology	   development	   and	   innovation	  
strategies	  may	   impact	   on	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   take	   the	   ‘basic’	   Neo-­‐Schumpeterian	  
perspective	  of	  technological	  innovation	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  market	  competition	  (see	  e.g.	  
Nelson	   and	   Winter,	   1982;	   Fagerberg	   et	   al.,	   2005):	   firms	   seek	   technological	  
innovation	   to	   get	   strategic	   competitive	   advantage	   and	   secure	   ‘monopoly	   rents’.	  
While	   incumbents	   aim	   at	   raising	   barriers	   to	   entry	   by	   reinforcing	   their	  
competencies,	  new	  entrants	  aim	  at	  changing	  the	  ‘rules	  of	  the	  game’	  by	  engaging	  in	  
innovation	   that	  will	  disrupt	   incumbents’	   competencies	   (Tidd	  et	   al.,	   2005).	   If	  one	  
follows	   this	   perspective,	  when	   technology	   is	   developed	   in	   response	   to	   a	   societal	  
issue	  and	  brought	  to	  market,	  it	  is	  undoubtedly	  a	  kind	  of	  substantive	  response,	  i.e.	  a	  
‘definitive	  move’	   (Mahon	   and	  Waddock,	   1992)	   that	   demands	   the	   expenditure	   of	  
significant	   amounts	   of	   resources	   (financial/productive/human	   capital	   etc.)	   and	  
attempts	   to	   actually	   address	   the	   issue.	   In	   this	   view,	   technology	   and	   innovation	  
strategies	   target	   the	   economic	   task	   environment.	   With	   the	   case	   studies,	   I	   aim	  
however	   to	   investigate	  whether	   technologies	   strategies	  may	  also	  be	  aimed	  at	   the	  
institutional	  environment.	  Some	  insights	  about	  this	  alternative	  use	  of	  technologies	  
will	  therefore	  be	  incorporated	  in	  the	  model	  I	  will	  propose	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  so	  
that	  I	  review	  these	  concepts	  in	  the	  next	  subsection.	  
II.3.3. Technological	  innovation	  and	  the	  institutional	  environment:	  the	  
strategic	  use	  of	  technologies	  
II.3.3.1. The	  use	  of	  technologies	  as	  part	  of	  a	  legitimation	  process	  
Technology	   strategy	   can	   be	   used	   for	   socio-­‐cultural	   (and	   politico-­‐regulatory)	  
reasons	  as	  well,	  that	  is,	  in	  response	  to	  pressures	  from	  the	  institutional	  environment.	  
Technologies	  are	  devices	   that	  also	  “express	  overarching	  cultural	  values”	   (Hughes,	  
1995,	   p.	   452),	   and	   thus	   a	   technology	   strategy	   can	   be	   deployed	   as	   part	   of	   a	  
(re)legitimation	   process.	   To	   symbolically	   conform	   to	   pressures	   and	   expectations	  
stemming	   from	   the	   institutional	   environment,	   “carefully	   chosen	   displays	   of	  
symbolism	   may	   circumvent	   the	   need	   for	   substantive	   change	   entirely...	   Outputs	  




organization	   labors	   on	   the	   side	   of	   the	   angels	   [i.e.	   those	   demanding	   changes	   to	  
address	  a	  given	  societal	  issue]	  –	  even	  if	  these	  supposed	  indicators	  amount	  to	  little	  
more	  than	  face	  work...”	  (Suchman,	  1995,	  p.	  588).25	  
One	  example	  of	  such	  strategic	  use	  of	  technologies	  is	  a	  prototype,	  which	  is	  
“best	  described	  as	  [...]	  tangible	  slices	  not	  only	  of	  technology	  and	  technique	  but	  of	  
the	  corporation’s	  own	  interpretation	  of	  market	  and	  cultural	  forces”	  and	  thus	  “says	  
a	   lot	   about	   an	   organization,	   both	   internally	   to	   its	  workers,	   and	   to	   its	   customers	  
[and	   other	   external	   stakeholders]”	   (Schrage,	   1993,	   p.	   56).	   For	   example,	   an	  
environmentally-­‐friendly	   prototype	   could	   be	   used	   as	   a	   much	   nuanced	   type	   of	  
‘greenwashing’	   (Laufer,	   2003;	   Delmas	   and	   Burbano,	   2011)	   to	   signal	   to	   external	  
stakeholders	   that	   the	   firm	   is	   committed	   to	   solving	   the	   issue	   and	   pre-­‐empt	  
governmental	   action	   (Maxwell	   et	   al.,	   2000)	   –	   even	   if	   the	   firm	   has	   actually	   no	  
interest	   in	   bringing	   the	   prototype	   to	   market.	   Another	   possibility	   is	   the	   use	   of	  
prototypes	  to	  ‘frame’	  (Mahon	  and	  Waddock,	  1992)	  the	  issue,	  bringing	  legitimacy	  to	  
a	   preferred	   technological	   solution	   (in	   detriment	   to	   alternative	   technologies).	   In	  
both	  examples,	   technology	  strategies	  are	  deployed	   for	  symbolic	   reasons:	   they	  are	  
either	  an	  attempt	   to	  cynically	  display	   ‘social	   fitness’	   (DiMaggio	  and	  Powell,	   1983;	  
Oliver,	  1991),	  build	  up	  goodwill	  and	  avoid	  more	  substantive	  actions	  or	  to	  make	  the	  
issue	  frame	  congruent	  with	  core	  elements	  of	  the	  industry	  regime	  (values,	  interests,	  
mission,	  beliefs,	  technical	  capabilities)	  of	  the	  organization	  deploying	  the	  strategy.	  
II.3.3.2. Technological	  innovation	  in	  response	  to	  regulatory	  pressures	  
The	   strategic	   use	   of	   technologies	   is	   also	   examined	   by	   the	   ‘technology-­‐forcing	  
policy’	   (TFP)	   literature26	  (e.g.	   Miller,	   1995;	   Kemp,	   1997;	   Gerard	   and	   Lave,	   2005;	  
Puller,	  2006;	  Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2007;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Tao	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  
which	   looks	  at	   the	   interplay	  between	   the	   task	  environment	  and	   the	   institutional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Suchman	  (1995)	  however	  cautions	  that	  such	  a	  symbolic	  strategy	  can	  have	  unintended	  
consequences	  and	  may	  lead	  to	  cognitive	  dissonance	  at	  the	  industry	  level,	  gradually	  resulting	  in	  
substantive	  responses.	  
26	  This	  is	  another	  literature	  related	  to	  the	  STI	  research	  field	  (besides	  the	  Greening	  of	  Industry	  
literature,	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  I)	  that	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  theorized	  about	  the	  development	  of	  
technologies	  in	  response	  to	  societal	  issues,	  but	  with	  the	  restrictive	  focus	  on	  the	  ‘implementation	  
stage’	  of	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  Thus,	  in	  this	  literature	  it	  appears	  that	  technological	  solutions	  emerge	  
only	  after	  a	  regulatory	  piece	  is	  approved,	  as	  if	  no	  technological	  development	  happened	  before	  –	  or	  
influenced	  the	  content	  of	  –	  the	  policy.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  literature	  overlooks	  how	  issues	  impact	  
on	  technological	  developments,	  and	  how	  technologies	  may	  also	  shape	  policies	  (an	  
understandable	  gap	  given	  its	  goal	  of	  examining	  how	  technologies	  and	  innovations	  may	  be	  ‘forced’	  
by	  policies).	  As	  Kemp	  (2005)	  noted:	  “problems	  [influence]	  political	  agendas	  that	  in	  turn	  influence	  
technology	  solutions	  that	  influence	  perceptions”	  (p.	  184).	  The	  model	  I	  develop	  in	  this	  thesis	  




environment.	   Besides	   leading	   to	   strategic	   games	   between	   firms	   in	   the	   regulated	  
industry	  and	  regulators	  (Yao,	  1988;	  Puller,	  2006),	  technology-­‐forcing	  policies	  may	  
also	  trigger	  competitive	  struggles	  between	  business	  rivals	  in	  the	  task	  environment	  
(Hackett,	   1995;	   Puller,	   2006;	   Gerard	   and	   Lave,	   2007).	   The	   conceptualization	   of	  
those	   dynamics	   provides	   important	   insights	   for	   a	   comprehensive	  model	   of	   issue	  
life-­‐cycle,	  so	  that	  I	  discuss	  them	  next.	  
Technology-­‐forcing	  policies	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  “those	  that	  mandate	  firms	  to	  
meet	  performance	  standards	  that	  go	  beyond	  the	  existing	  technical	  capabilities	  of	  
the	  industry	  or	  to	  adopt	  specific	  technologies	  that	  have	  not	  been	  fully	  developed...”	  
(Lee	   et	   al.,	   2010,	   p.	   249).	   Technology-­‐forcing	   regulations	   therefore	   take	   different	  
forms	   (Gerard	   and	   Lave,	   2007):	   they	   may	   specify	   a	   performance	   standard	   or	   a	  
technology	   standard.	   In	   the	   former	   case,	   the	   standard	   specifies	   a	   performance	  
target	  (e.g.	  maximum	  CO2	  emission	  levels,	  minimum	  fuel	  economy	  levels)	  but	  does	  
not	  mandate	  the	  use	  of	  any	  particular	  technology	  (i.e.	  any	  technology	  may	  be	  used	  
to	  comply	  with	  the	  standard	  as	   long	  as	   it	  meets	  the	  performance	  criteria);	   in	  the	  
latter	   case,	   regulation	   mandates	   the	   development	   and	   adoption	   of	   a	   specific	  
technology	  that	  may	  exist	  but	  is	  not	  yet	  marketed.	  Moreover,	  the	  establishment	  of	  
these	  standards	  may	  be	  delegated	   to	  a	   regulatory	  agency	  or	  embedded	   in	   the	   law27	  
(Gerard	   and	   Lave,	   2007):	   in	   the	   former	   case,	   the	   regulatory	   agency	   has	   the	  
discretion	   to	  modify	   performance	   levels	   or	   to	   require	   different	   technologies,	   but	  
when	  established	  by	   law,	  standards	  may	  only	  be	  modified	  by	  the	   legislative	  body	  
(e.g.	   congress	   or	   parliament).	   No	  matter	   the	   particular	   shape	   a	   TFP	   takes,	   they	  
represent	  an	  attempt	  by	  regulators	  to	  open	  up	  the	  ‘regulatory	  lock-­‐in’	  and	  promote	  
the	   adoption	   of	   a	   technological	   solution	   that	   diverts	   from	   the	   incumbent	  
technological	  regime.	  
Although	  some	  scholars	  question	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  economic	  efficiency	  
(cost-­‐benefit)	  of	  technology-­‐forcing	  policies	  (see	  e.g.	   Jaffe	   et	   al.,	  2003;	  Bansal	  and	  
Gangopadhyay,	  2005),	  the	  justification	  behind	  their	  adoption	  is	  the	  perceived	  lack	  
of	   demand	   for	   technical	   attributes	   (or	   whole	   products)	   that	   address	   a	   societal	  
problem,	  and	  thus	  the	  technology	  that	  would	  have	  those	  attributes	  (and/or	  meet	  
performance	   criteria)	   are	   not	   supplied	   by	   the	   industry:	   “consumers	   might	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Note	  that,	  even	  if	  established	  by	  law,	  a	  regulatory	  agency	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  enforcement	  and	  




systematically	   underestimate	   the	   effectiveness	   or	   value	   of	   these	   attributes	   [or	  
products]...	  [...]	  The	  rationale	  for	  instituting	  a	  technology-­‐forcing	  policy	  is	  that	  the	  
preferred	   outcome	   of	   the	   government/regulator	   is	   a	   technological	   fix	   of	   the	  
problem	  that	  can	  only	  be	  brought	  about	  by	  applying	  regulatory	  pressure	  on	  firms”	  
(Gerard	   and	   Lave,	   2007,	   p.	   3).	   In	   other	   words,	   regulations	   are	   enacted	   as	   a	  
substitute	  for	  effective	  consumer	  demand	  that	  could	  induce	  R&D	  investments	  for	  
the	  development	  of	  technological	  solutions	  to	  societal	  issues.	  
However,	   the	   link	   between	   technology-­‐forcing	   regulation,	   increased	   R&D	  
investments	   and	   technological	   innovation	   is	   not	   clear-­‐cut:	   “The	   implementation	  
phase	   of	   the	   technology-­‐forcing	   process	   is	   murkier	   than	   the	   theory	   suggests”	  
(Gerard	   and	   Lave,	   2005,	   p.	   765).	   Countervailing	   forces	  mediate	   this	   relationship	  
and	   lead	   to	   dynamic	   games	   between	   competing	   firms	   in	   an	   industry,	   between	  
these	  and	  outside	  firms,	  and	  between	  the	  whole	  industry	  and	  the	  regulatory	  body:	  
1) Regulated	  incumbent	  firms	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  increase	  R&D	  investments	  and	  
innovate	   in	   order	   to	   reduce	   compliance	   costs:	   The	   cost	   of	   R&D	   is	   in	   itself	   a	  
disincentive	   to	   innovate28,	   so	   that	   “[f]irms	  will	  have	   lower	   costs	   if	   regulations	  
are	   not	   enforced...	   Therefore,	   it	  might	   be	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   firm	   (or	   the	  
industry	  collectively)	  to	  lobby	  the	  regulators	  to	  delay	  or	  rescind	  the	  standard”	  
(Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2005,	  p.	  764).	  This	  could	  be	  expected	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  an	  
issue	   life-­‐cycle.	  However,	   if	   regulation	  cannot	  be	  prevented,	   then	   to	   invest	   in	  
R&D	  in	  anticipation	  of	  a	  TFP	  may	  speed	  up	  a	   firm’s	   learning	  process	  and	  cut	  
the	   financial	   and	   technical	   uncertainties	   surrounding	   the	   technological	  
innovation	   development,	   ultimately	   reducing	   compliance	   costs	   (Lee	   et	   al.,	  
2010).	   One	   could	   expect	   (some)	   incumbents	   to	   start	   hedging	   against	  
‘undesirable’	   policy	   outcomes	   during	   the	   policy-­‐making	   process	   and	   to	  
accelerate	   the	   development	   of	   more	   radical	   technologies	   during	  
implementation	  stage.	  
2) For	   incumbent	   firms	   (in	   particular),	   the	   risk	   of	   liability	   claims	   represent	   a	  
disincentive	  to	  invest	   in	  R&D	  and	  innovate:	  given	  the	  uncertainties	  concerning	  
reliability,	   effectiveness	   and	   unintended	   consequences	   of	   adopting	   a	   new	  
technology,	   the	   risk	   of	   facing	   liability	   claims	   in	   case	   of	   technological	   failures	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  possibility	  that	  knowledge	  and	  technological	  breakthroughs	  may	  spillover	  to	  competitors	  





provide	  a	  disincentive	  for	  firms	  to	  innovate	  (Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2007).	  Firms	  in	  a	  
regulated	  industry	  may	  thus	  decide	  to	  take	  legal	  action	  and	  contest	  the	  TFP	  in	  
court	   if	   they	   believe	   that	   no	   technology	   can	  meet	   the	   regulation	   or	   that	   the	  
policy	   requires	   an	   unproven	   and	   risky	   technology.	   Such	   strategy	   can	   be	  
expected	  during	  the	  implementation	  stage	  of	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  
3) The	   possibility	   of	   entering	   a	   new	   domain	   provides	   an	   incentive	   for	   relative	  
industry	  regime	  outsiders	  to	   increase	  R&D	   investments	  and	  innovate:	  the	  TFP	  
provides	   an	   entry	   point	   for	   relative	   industry	   outsiders,	   such	   as	   suppliers	   and	  
foreign	  competitors	  (Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2007;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  that	  may	  want	  to	  
diversify	   their	   market	   domain.	   Even	   before	   a	   technology-­‐forcing	   policy	   is	  
enacted,	  one	  could	  expect	  those	  outside	  actors	  to	  already	  increase	  R&D	  efforts	  
(Lee	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  to	  demonstrate	  technological	  viability	  and	  thus	  influence	  the	  
policy-­‐making	  process.	  Thus,	  strategic	  action	  by	  relative	  regime	  outsiders	  can	  
be	  expected	  to	  take	  place	  early	  on	  in	  the	  policy-­‐making	  stage	  of	  an	  issue	   life-­‐
cycle.	   However,	   because	   “[n]ew	   ideas	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   succeed	   with	   the	  
support	   and	   leadership	   of	   one	   or	   more	   of	   the	   major	   players”	   (Dyerson	   and	  
Pilkington,	  2005,	  p.	  406),	   later	   in	   the	  TFP	   implementation	  process	   those	  new	  
entrants	   have	   an	   incentive	   to	   seek	   partnership	   with	   incumbents.	   Equally,	  
incumbents	  may	  be	  willing	  to	  establish	  such	  a	  partnership	  with	  new	  entrants	  if	  
they	   anticipate	   synergic	   benefits	   for	   themselves.	   Cooperation	   is	   therefore	  
expected	  as	  the	  implementation	  process	  advances.	  
4) The	   possibility	   of	   raising	   rivals’	   costs	   represents	   an	   incentive	   for	   individual	  
incumbent	  firms	  to	  increase	  R&D	  investments	  and	  innovate:	  an	  individual	  firm	  
may	   innovate	   and	   ultimately	   encourage	   regulation	   if	   it	   believes	   to	   have	   a	  
technical	   and	   cost	   advantage	   over	   competitors	   in	   complying	   with	   the	   TFP.	  
“[I]ncumbent	  firms	  can	  benefit	  from	  [...]	  regulations	  that	  prevent	  entry	  or	  [that	  
raise]	   some	   firms’	   costs	   more	   than	   others”	   (Puller,	   2006,	   p.	   692).	   Thus,	  
regulated	  firms	  are	  not	  simply	  ‘regulation-­‐takers’:	  by	  complying	  with	  a	  TFP	  an	  
individual	   firm	  may	  be	  able	   to	   influence	   its	  content	   (Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2007),	  
especially	  when	  the	  detailed	  content	  of	  the	  TFP	  has	  not	  been	  established	  by	  law	  
and	   is	   delegated	   to	   a	   regulatory	   agency.	   Such	   incumbent	   strategy	   seeks	   to	  
secure	  a	  first-­‐mover	  advantage	  over	  its	  rivals,	  by	  e.g.	  transforming	  a	  technology	  




Raising	   rivals’	   costs,	   influencing	   the	   implementation	   process	   and	   securing	   a	  
first-­‐mover	   advantage	   can	   be	   expected	   in	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   implementation	  
stage.	  
5) Finally,	   the	   possibility	   of	   pre-­‐empting	   the	   regulation	   (or	   ‘ratcheting	   the	  
regulators	   credibility’)	   provides	   an	   incentive	   for	   all	   incumbent	   firms	   in	   an	  
industry	   not	   to	   invest	   in	   R&D	   and	   innovate:	   for	   the	   TFP	   to	   be	   effective,	  
sanctions	   must	   exist	   in	   case	   of	   non-­‐compliance	   and,	   more	   importantly,	  
regulated	  firms	  must	  believe	  that	  these	  will	  be	  enforced	  (Lee	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Gerard	  
and	  Lave,	  2007).	  But	  even	  if	  the	  incumbent	  industry	  believes	  that	  the	  policy	  will	  
be	  enforced,	  it	  may	  have	  an	  incentive	  not	  to	  develop	  a	  technology	  and	  claim	  it	  
is	  not	  feasible	  to	  meet	  the	  regulation,	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  sunk	  investments	  and	  
complementary	  assets:	  the	  development	  of	  a	  technology	  is	  not	  a	  deterministic	  
process,	  and	  it	  may	  happen	  that	  no	  technological	  solution	  is	  established	  even	  if	  
the	  industry	  invests	  in	  R&D.	  Therefore,	  TFPs	  usually	  include	  a	  clause	  that	  pre-­‐
empts	   the	   legislation	   in	   case	   no	   technological	   breakthrough	   is	   reached	   even	  
after	   ‘good-­‐faith’	  efforts	  to	  establish	  it.	  The	  industry	  may	  strategically	  withhold	  
investments	   in	  R&D	  to	  ‘ratchet	  regulation’	  (Puller,	  2006)	  and	  force	  a	  review	  of	  
the	   technology-­‐forcing	   policy.	   It	   is	   up	   to	   the	   regulatory	   agency	   (or	   to	  
legislators)	   to	   determine	   whether	   a	   good-­‐faith	   effort	   was	   made	   or	   not.	   The	  
implementation	   of	   a	   TFP	   is	   thus	   complicated	   because	   of	   information	  
asymmetries	   between	   firms	   and	   regulators	   concerning	   technological	  
developments:	  	  
When	   an	   information	   asymmetry	   exists,	   firms	   can	   attempt	   to	   force	   a	  
regulatory	  delay	  by	  deliberately	  missing	   the	   standard...	  Active	  collusion	   is	  
not	   necessary	   to	   achieve	   this	   result.	   For	   example,	   a	   firm	   that	   believes	   no	  
other	  firm	  (or	  potential	  entrant)	  can	  meet	  the	  standards	  will	  autonomously	  
reduce	   its	   R&D	   effort.	   If	   each	   firm	   has	   such	   an	   expectation,	   then	   the	  
expectations	  will	  be	  self-­‐fulfilling.	  (Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2005,	  p.	  764)	  
To	   assess	   whether	   performance	   or	   technological	   standards	   are	   feasible,	   the	  
regulatory	   agency	   may	   invest	   in	   building	   up	   sufficient	   in-­‐house	   technical	  
expertise	  to	  diminish	  information	  asymmetries	  (Lee	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  or	  it	  may	  rely	  
on	  external	  sources	  of	  information	  (Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2007):	  industry	  outsiders	  
and	  individual	  firms	  seeking	  to	  raise	  costs	  for	  competitors	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  




effectively	   implemented,	   so	   that	   the	   raising	   rivals’	   costs	   effect	   and	   the	  
ratcheting	  credibility	  effect	  interact	  (Puller,	  2006).	  During	  the	  implementation	  
stage,	  there	  is	  therefore	  a	  contradictory	  dynamics	  between	  raising	  rivals’	  costs	  
(acting	  alone)	  and	  (collectively)	  pre-­‐empting	  the	  regulation.	  
For	   a	   comprehensive	   model	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	   those	   aspects	   imply	   that:	  	  
(a)	   incumbent	   firms	   in	   an	   industry	   will	   first	   lobby	   against	   a	   TFP,	   given	   their	  
resistance	  to	  engage	  in	  radical	   innovation	  and	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  technology	  
required	   by	   the	   policy	   will	   destroy	   their	   competencies;	   (b)	   industry	   regime	  
outsiders	  will	  attempt	  to	  seize	  the	  opportunity	  that	  a	  TFP	  creates	  (establishment	  of	  
a	   new	   market	   domain),	   and	   thus	   try	   to	   influence	   the	   regulatory	   process	   by	  
lobbying	  and	  collaborating	  with	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  regulators	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  TFP;	  
(c)	   if	   the	   TFP	   is	   enacted,	   incumbent	   firms	  may	   seek	   legal	   action	   to	   contest	   the	  
legislation	  in	  court,	  given	  the	  risk	  of	  liability	  claims;	  (d)	  if	  the	  judicial	  avenue	  fails,	  
incumbents	   will	   have	   to	   catch	   up	   with	   technological	   developments	   by	   outside	  
firms	   and	   thus	  may	   aim	   to	   delay	   implementation	   of	   the	   TFP	   or	   to	   pre-­‐empt	   it	  
altogether	   by	  withholding	   information	   from	   regulators;	   (e)	   at	   some	   point	   in	   the	  
implementation	   process,	   individual	   incumbents	   (or	   coalition	   of	   incumbents	   or	  
incumbent-­‐outsider	  partnerships)	  may	  attempt	  to	  depart	  from	  the	  industry	  regime	  
and	  develop	  a	  more	  radical	  technological	  solution	  of	  their	  own	  to	  raise	  rivals	  costs	  
or	   to	   block	   the	   entry	   of	   regime	   outsiders,	   thus	   speeding	   up	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	  
innovation.	  These	  stylized	  facts	  are	  to	  be	  incorporated	  in	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  model	  
that	  I	  will	  develop	  in	  the	  next	  Chapter,	  and	  will	  be	  empirically	  investigated	  in	  the	  
case	  studies.	  
II.4. The	  dynamics	  of	  attention:	  issue-­‐attention	  cycles	  and	  technology	  
hype-­‐cycles	  
II.4.1. Issue-­‐attention	  cycles	  	  
Since	   the	   second	  generation	  of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory,	   the	  dynamics	   of	   attention	  
devoted	  to	  an	  issue	  has	  been	  used	  to	  graphically	  depict	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle:	  public	  
attention	  was	   suggested	   (Wartick	   and	  Mahon,	   1994)	   as	   a	   surrogate	  measure	   for	  
‘intensity	  of	  concern’	  (Tombari,	   1984)	  with	  an	   issue.	  For	  some	  authors	  (Graves	   et	  
al.,	   2001;	  Wartick	   and	  Heugens,	   2003;	   Zyglidopoulos,	   2003),	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘issue-­‐




identity	   is	  however	  unwarranted,	   and	   stems	   from	  an	  unsystematic	   integration	  of	  
both	  concepts.	  Issue-­‐attention	  cycle	  theory	  in	  fact	  offers	  a	  possible	  explanation	  for	  
the	  dynamics	  of	  public	  and	  political	  agenda-­‐setting	  (Howlett,	  1997)	  and	  should	  be	  
considered	   as	   such.	   Here	   I	   highlight	   some	   aspects	   (and	   caveats)	   of	   the	   issue-­‐
attention	  cycle	  theory.	  
Proposed	  by	  Downs	  (1972),	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  issue-­‐attention	  cycle	  suggests	  
that	   public	   attention	   towards	   a	   problematic	   condition	   (issue)	   would	   follow	  
discernible	  –	   “almost	  predictable”	   (Newig,	   2004,	  p.	   150)	  –	  patterns	   through	   time,	  
rising	  and	  falling	  independently	  of	  material	  aspects	  and	  objective	  developments	  of	  
the	  condition	  itself.	  The	  underlying	  idea	  is	  that	  public	  attention	  is	  a	  scarce	  resource	  
(Newig,	   2004),	   which	   has	   to	   be	   allocated	   to	   competing	   issues.	   When	   the	  
complexity	   of	   addressing	   a	   given	   issue	   is	   realized	   by	   public	   opinion,	   attention	  
devoted	  to	  it	  would	  inevitably	  decline	  (Downs,	  1972).	  
Based	  on	  this	  intuition,	  Downs	  (1972)	  proposed	  a	  five-­‐stage	  model	  of	  issue-­‐
attention	   cycle	   (Figure	   II.6):	   (1)	   the	   ‘pre-­‐problem’	   stage,	   when	   only	   experts	   or	   a	  
minority	  perceives	  a	  given	  condition	  as	  problematic	  (low	  attention	   level);	   (2)	   the	  
‘discovery	  and	  enthusiasm’	  stage	  (increasing	  attention),	  when	  the	  public	  suddenly	  
‘discovers’	   the	   issue	   (normally	   in	   reaction	   to	   a	   dramatic	   and/or	   evident	   event),	  
becoming	  enthusiastic	  with	  possible	  fixes;	  (3)	  the	  ‘realizing	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  solution’	  
stage,	  which	  normally	  would	  occur	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  attention	  cycle,	  substituting	  
the	  previous	  enthusiasm;	  (4)	  the	  ‘gradual	  decline	  of	  interest’	  stage,	  when	  attention	  
shifts	  towards	  other	  issues,	  because	  the	  public	  becomes	  discouraged	  and/or	  ‘bored’	  
with	  the	  issue;	  and	  (5)	  the	  ‘post-­‐problem’	  stage,	  when	  the	  issue	  further	  fades	  away.	  
Yet,	  after	  the	  completion	  of	  such	  cycle,	  and	  despite	  the	  decline	  in	  public	  attention,	  
Downs	   suggest	   that	   the	   issue	   might	   be	   easily	   reactivated,	   due	   to	   the	   public’s	  
familiarity	  with	  it	  and	  to	  the	  institutions	  created	  along	  the	  process.	  Assuming	  that	  
the	   government	   would	   react	   to	   increased	   public	   attention	   to	   an	   issue,	   one	  
implication	   of	   the	   Downsian	   issue-­‐attention	   cycle	   is	   that	   “public	   interest	   in	   a	  
particular	   issue	   would	   peak	   [third	   stage]	   and	   be	   followed	   by	   governmental	  
attention.	  Public	  interest	  would	  then	  tend	  to	  fall	  off,	  as	  would	  government	  activity”	  
(Howlett,	   1997,	   p.	   10).	   Another	   implication	   is	   that	   public	   attention	   has	   to	   be	  
constantly	  drawn	  to	  a	  given	  issue	  by	  e.g.	  activists	  or	  the	  media	  (in	  Lamertz	  et	  al.,	  




Figure	  II.6:	  The	  Downsian	  issue-­‐attention	  cycle	  
	  
Source:	  Adapted	  from	  Kirkwood	  (1994)	  
Downs’	  theory	  was	  subsequently	  tested	  by	  many	  authors,	  not	  just	  for	  issues	  faced	  
by	  the	  American	  public	  (e.g.	  Peters	  and	  Hogwood,	  1985;	  Neuman,	  1990),	  but	  also	  in	  
other	   countries	   such	   as	   Canada	   (Howlett,	   1997)	   or	   Germany	   (Newig,	   2004).	  
Empirical	   validity	  of	   the	  Downsian	   issue-­‐attention	   cycle	   and	   the	   ‘spillover	   effect’	  
(the	  issue	  moving	  from	  public	  to	  governmental	  agenda)	  has	  been	  considered	  ‘weak	  
at	   best’	   by	   some	   authors	   (Howlett,	   1997;	   Peters	   and	  Hogwood,	   1985),	   but	   others	  
claim	   that	   empirical	   tests	   had	   been	   affected	   by	   problems	   with	   the	   quantitative	  
methodology	   applied	   (Henry	   and	   Gordon,	   2001)	   or	   with	   the	   definition	   of	   key	  
concepts	   (Newig,	   2004),	   e.g.	  mixing	   public	   attention	  with	   public	   opinion	   (while	  
attention	  is	  a	  scarce	  resource	  and	  volatile,	  opinion	  is	  not	  scarce	  and	  presents	  more	  
temporal	   stability).	   These	  more	   recent	   studies	   (Henry	   and	  Gordon,	   2001;	  Newig,	  
2004),	  using	  sophisticated	  statistical	  methods,	  did	  find	  evidence	  of	  attention	  cycles	  
and	  spillover	  effects.	  
Newig	   (2004)	   also	   suggested	   that	   problems	  with	   identifying	   an	   attention-­‐
cycle	  could	  be	  related	  with	  the	   level	  of	  aggregation:	   large-­‐scale	  problems	  such	  as	  
‘the	   environment’	   would	   “serve	   as	   categories	   comprising	   and	   thereby	   classifying	  
the	  multitude	  of	  different	  [smaller-­‐scale]	  issues”	  (p.	  155),	  such	  as	  local	  air	  pollution	  
(smog),	   deforestation	   or	   ozone	   depletion.	   Attention	   to	   those	   broad	   categories	  




dynamics	  of	  public	  attention	  towards	  a	  broad	  problem	  area	  would	  be	  composed	  by	  
the	  sum	  of	  attention-­‐cycles	  of	  single,	  small-­‐scale	  issues	  (Figure	  II.7).	  
Figure	  II.7:	  Public	  attention	  to	  broad	  problems	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  single	  issue-­‐attention	  cycles	  
	  
Source:	  Figure	  2	  in	  Newig	  (2004,	  p.	  156)	  
Issue-­‐attention	  cycle	   theory	  has	  however	  been	  criticized	   conceptually.	  Three	  key	  
issues	  have	  been	  raised	  regarding	  this	  theory:	  (1)	  Lack	  of	  agency	  –	  issue-­‐attention	  
cycle	   theory	   tends	   to	   ignore	   that	   issues	   are	   socially	   constructed,	   downplaying	  
interpretive	   disagreements	   about	   the	   definition	   of	   ‘problematic’	   conditions	  
(Hilgartner	   and	   Bosk,	   1988);	   (2)	   Spillover	   mechanisms	   are	   underspecified	   –	   in	  
Downs’	  (1972)	  original	  formulation,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  which	  are	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  
makes	   an	   issue	   spillover	   from	   the	   public	   agenda	   to	   the	   political	   agenda,	   nor	  
whether	  there	  is	  a	  two-­‐way	  causality	  between	  public	  and	  political	  agendas	  (Liu	   et	  
al.,	   2011).	   This	   second	   issue	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   (3)	   the	   choice	   of	  media	   attention	  
(e.g.	   number	   of	   newspaper	   articles	   on	   a	   particular	   issue)	   as	   a	   proxy	   variable	   for	  
public	  attention,	  which	  raises	  the	  question	  about	  whether	  media	  follows	  or	   leads	  
the	  public.	  
Because	   of	   these	   conceptual	   caveats,	   issue-­‐attention	   theory	   should	   be	  
incorporated	   with	   caution	   into	   my	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   mode.	   Criticism	   one	   can	   be	  
addressed	   by	   considering	   the	  work	   by	   Lamertz	   et	   al.	   (2003,	   reviewed	   in	   section	  
II.2.3),	   who	   incorporated	   social	   constructivist	   theory	   into	   their	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  
model.	   In	   fact,	   the	  model	   I	  will	  propose	  draws	  on	  dialectical	   logics,	   in	  which	  the	  
issue	   life-­‐cycle	   advances	   through	   struggles	   between	   antagonistic	   actors	   (those	  
pushing	   the	   issue	   onto	   the	   agenda	   and	   exerting	   pressure	   on	   the	   incumbent	  
industry,	   and	   incumbent	   industry	   actors).	   Public	   attention	   is	   galvanized	   not	  




the	   ‘minority’	  or	   ‘experts’	   from	  the	   first	   stage	   in	  Downs’	  model)	  who	  purposively	  
draw	  attention	  to	  those	  events	  and	  voice	  them	  as	  problematic	  and	  dramatic	  (cf.	  the	  
discussion	  of	  Kingdon’s	  model	  above).	  Attention	  does	  not	  drive	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle:	  
the	  perspective	  I	  take	  is	  that	  issue-­‐attention	  cycles	  reflect	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  dynamics;	  
I	  propose	  that	  attention	  indicators	  can	  fruitfully	  be	  used	  as	  part	  of	  a	  methodology	  
that	   links	   issue	   life-­‐cycles	   and	   empirical	   case	   studies.	  One	   solution	   to	   problems	  
two	  and	  three	  is	  to	  consider	  –	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  different	  authors	  –	  that	  media,	  
public	   and	   political	   attention	   (amongst	   other	   types	   of	   attention	   indicators)	   co-­‐
evolve	  and	  reinforce	  each	  other	  (Liu	  et	   al.,	  2011;	  Newig,	  2004)	  and	  that	  spillovers	  
from	  one	  arena	  to	  another	  requires	  the	  achievement	  of	  certain	  attention	  thresholds	  
(Neuman,	  1990).	  These	  attention	  thresholds	  therefore	  serve	  as	  indicators	  for	  phase	  
shift	  in	  historical	  case	  studies.	  
Thus,	  my	  model	  will	  consider	   the	   following	  qualitative	   insights	  offered	  by	  
issue-­‐attention	  theory:	  
• Attention	   devoted	   to	   an	   issue	   by	   different	   actors	   –	   e.g.	   the	   public,	   the	   news	  
media,	   politicians	   and	   policy-­‐makers,	   also	   experts	   (Molitor,	   1977)	   and	   the	  
industry	   (Hoffman	   and	   Ocasio,	   2001)	   –	   fluctuate	   and	   co-­‐evolve	   overtime	  
(Downs,	  1972);	  
• Events	  are	  purposively	  constructed	  as	  dramatic	  to	  attract	  attention	  to	  what	   is	  
perceived	  as	  a	  problematic	  condition	  (Hilgartner	  and	  Bosk,	  1988;	  Lamertz	  et	  al.,	  
2003);	  
• Different	  issues	  compete	  for	  attention	  from	  the	  different	  actors	  (Hilgartner	  and	  
Bosk,	  1988;	  Hoffman	  and	  Ocasio,	  2001);	  
• Attention	   devoted	   to	   an	   issue	   by	   actors	   in	   one	   arena	   co-­‐evolves	   with	   the	  
attention	   in	  other	   arenas	   (Hilgartner	   and	  Bosk,	   1988;	  Newig,	   2004;	  Liu	   et	   al.,	  
2011);	  
• Key	   spillover	   mechanisms	   are	   media	   attention	   to	   an	   issue	   and	   the	   work	   of	  
activists,	  both	  of	  which	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  issue	  (Lamertz	  et	  al.,	  2003,	  Rivoli	  
and	  Waddock,	  2011);	  	  
• An	  issue	  may	  also	  spillover	  from	  arena	  A	  to	  arena	  B	  when	  attention	  is	  high	  in	  
arena	  A	  (Neuman,	  1990);	  
• Action	   in	   response	   to	   an	   issue	   is	   more	   likely	   at	   certain	   times	   when	   many	  




• An	   issue	   that	   has	   attracted	   attention	   in	   the	   past	  may	   attract	   attention	  more	  
easily	  than	  a	  new	  issue	  (Downs,	  1972).	  
Some	   of	   these	   qualitative	   insights	   will	   be	   explored	   also	   through	   quantitative	  
methods	   (see	   Chapter	   IV);	   for	   instance,	   I	   will	   try	   to	   explore	   the	   notion	   that	  
‘attention	  devoted	  to	  an	  issue	  by	  actors	  in	  one	  arena	  co-­‐evolves	  with	  the	  attention	  
in	   other	   arenas’	   with	   the	   aid	   of	   statistical	   methods	   (meta-­‐correlation	   analysis).	  
Furthermore,	  the	  idea	  that	   issue	  attention	  cycles	  reflect	  qualitative	  developments	  
of	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycles	  provides	  a	  clue	  as	  to	  how	  to	  objectively	  delineate	  the	  different	  
life-­‐cycle	   stages,	   something	   that	   I	   also	   aim	   to	   explore	   with	   the	   mixed-­‐methods	  
methodology	  (and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  use	  of	  statistical	  tests	  for	  unknown	  structural	  
breaks	  –	  see	  section	  IV.2.2.3).	  
II.4.2. Technology	  hype-­‐cycles	  	  
A	  second	  type	  of	  attention	  dynamics	  is	  associated	  with	  new	  technologies.	  So-­‐called	  
‘technology	  hypes’	   “are	  characterised	  by	  an	  upsurge	  of	  public	  attention	  and	  high	  
rising	  expectations	  about	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  innovation.	  Hypes	  are,	  per	  definition,	  
followed	  by	  a	  considerable	  decline	  of	  attention	  that	  may	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  a	  
disappointment	  of	  the	  hyped	  expectations”	  (Ruef	  and	  Markard,	  2010,	  p.	  317).	  
In	   common	   parlance,	   ‘hype’	   has	   a	   negative	   connotation,	   implying	  
unrealistic	   expectation	   regarding	   the	   technology	   that	   went	   through	   a	   hype-­‐
disappointment	   cycle	   (Bakker,	   2010).	   However,	   some	   scholars	   have	   argued	   that	  
upsurge	  of	  expectations	  fulfils	  a	  performative	  role	  (van	  Lente,	  1993),	  as	  it	  leads	  to	  
cultural	   enthusiasm	   that	  helps	   foster	  public	   acceptance	   (‘societal	   embedding’)	   of	  
the	  new	  technology	  (Geels	  et	  al.,	  2007);	  triggers	  institutionalization	  processes	  that	  
help	  legitimize	  technologies	  (Ruef	  and	  Markard,	  2010)	  and	  thus	  breaks	  up	  with	  the	  
‘liability	  of	  newness’	   syndrome29	  (Stinchcombe,	   1965);	   attracts	   sponsors	   –	   such	  as	  
venture	  capitalists	  (Geels	  and	  Smit,	  2000)	  –	  that	  promote	  a	  fast	  development	  of	  the	  
technology	   (Bakker,	   2010);	   and	   act	   as	   a	   coordinating	   device	   (Ruef	   and	  Markard,	  
2010).	   However,	   after	   the	   hype,	   when	   the	   technology	   goes	   through	   a	   phase	   of	  
disillusionment,	   resource	  mobilization	  may	   become	  more	   difficult,	   sponsors	   and	  
other	  actors	  may	  withdraw	  from	  development	  activities,	  and	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  The	  ‘liability	  of	  newness’	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  according	  to	  which	  entities	  (organizations,	  
technologies	  etc.)	  have	  higher	  probability	  to	  die	  in	  the	  earlier	  stages	  of	  their	  existence,	  due	  to	  




technology	  may	  crucially	  be	  impaired	  before	  consumers,	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  other	  
stakeholders	  (Bakker,	  2010;	  Ruef	  and	  Markard,	  2010).	  
Technology	  hype-­‐cycles	   has	   also	   been	  used	   as	   a	  market	   research	   tools	   by	  
Gartner	   Consulting	   Group,	   which	   developed	   a	   ‘technology	   hype-­‐cycle	   research	  
methodology’	  (Gartner	  Research,	  2013).	  Many	  academic	  studies	  (Geels	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  
Bakker,	   2010;	   Ruef	   and	   Markard,	   2010)	   have	   drawn	   on	   the	   five-­‐phase	   Gartner	  
Technology	   Hype-­‐cycle	   (Figure	   II.8),	   which	   bears	   some	   resemblance	   to	   the	  
Downsian	  attention	  cycle	  (cf.	  Figure	  II.6).	  The	  cycle	  begins	  with	  (1)	  a	   ‘technology	  
trigger’,	  an	  event	  (e.g.	  technology	  breakthrough,	  scientific	  discoveries)	  that	  lead	  to	  
a	   surge	   in	   (e.g.	  media,	   public,	   political,	   industry)	   interest	   and	   attention;	   (2)	   this	  
surge	   in	   interest	   is	   accompanied	   by	   growing	   positive	   expectations	   about	   the	  
technologies,	  which	  results	  in	  a	  hype	  (‘peak	  of	  inflated	  expectations’);	  however,	  as	  
the	   technological	   developments	   fail	   to	   meet	   the	   inflated	   expectations,	   the	  
technology	  (3)	  passes	  through	  a	  ‘through	  of	  disillusionment’,	  	  which	  may	  even	  lead	  
to	   its	   ‘shelving’	   (Geels	   et	   al.,	   2007);	   despite	   the	   disillusionment	   of	   the	  majority,	  
some	  continue	  to	  work	  on	  the	  technology,	  leading	  to	  (4)	  greater	  understanding	  of	  
barriers	  and	  potentials	  of	  the	  technology	  (‘slope	  of	  enlightenment’)	  and	  (5)	  gradual	  
productivity	   increases	   (‘productivity	   plateau’,	   which	   is	   accompanied	   by	   lower	  
expectations	  and	  a	  relatively	  stable	  devotion	  of	  attention).	  During	  the	  fifth	  stage,	  
“the	  technology	  might	  make	  its	  way	  to	  the	  market	  after	  all”	  (Bakker,	  2010).	  
Figure	  II.8:	  The	  Gartner	  hype-­‐cycle	  
	  




This	   discussion	   reveals	   a	   very	   important	   point	   about	   issue	   life-­‐cycles:	   they	   are	  
accompanied	  by	  cycles	  of	   attention	   to	   the	   issue	   itself	  (and	  the	  different	  ways	  it	   is	  
framed)	  and	  cycles	   of	   attention	   to	   the	   solution	   (such	  as	  a	  technology).	  When	  the	  
issue	  is	  framed	  as	  technical,	  the	  cycles	  of	  attention	  to	  the	  solution	  takes	  the	  shape	  
of	   a	   technology	   hype-­‐cycle.	   While	   the	   qualitative	   insights	   from	   issue-­‐attention	  
theory	  (which	  I	  have	  pointed	  out	  in	  Section	  II.4.1)	  can	  be	  theoretically	  incorporated	  
in	  an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  model,	   the	  question	  of	  how	  an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   is	  affected	  by	  
technology	   hype-­‐cycles	   remains	   open.	   Another	   open	   question	   is:	   how	   do	   issue-­‐
attention	   cycles	   and	   technology	   hype-­‐cycles	   co-­‐evolve?	   Rather	   than	   trying	   to	   a	  
priori	   incorporate	   technology	   hype-­‐cycle	   theory	   in	  my	  model,	   the	   strategy	   I	  will	  
adopt	   is	  to	   investigate	  these	  questions	  empirically	  through	  case	  study.	  Therefore,	  
part	  of	  the	  selection	  criteria	  for	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  cases	  should	  be	  the	  existence	  of	  
identifiable	  technology	  hype-­‐cycle(s)	  throughout	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  I	  will	  address	  
these	  questions	  by	  employing	  a	  ‘mixed	  methods’	  analytical	  approach	  (see	  Chapter	  
IV):	   issue-­‐attention	   cycle	   and	   technology	   hype-­‐cycle	   theory	   allows	   for	   a	  
quantitative	   assessment	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycles,	   which	   complements	   the	   proposed	  
qualitative	  model	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycles.	  
II.5. ORGANIZATIONAL	  INSTITUTIONALISM:	  CORPORATE	  POLITICAL	  
ACTIVITIES,	  SOCIAL	  LEGITIMIZING	  STRATEGIC	  ALLIANCES	  AND	  REASONS	  
FOR	  ESTABLISHING	  VOLUNTARY	  INTERORGANIZATIONAL	  RELATIONSHIPS	  	  
The	  review	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  literature	  revealed	  attempts	  to	  link	  political	  strategies	  
by	  incumbent	  industries	  to	  phases	  of	  the	  issue-­‐life	  cycle.	  The	  most	  developed	  view	  
of	  political	  strategies	  throughout	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  has	  been	  developed	  by	  Bigelow	  
et	   al.	   (1991)	   who	   argued	   that	   political	   strategies	   move	   sequentially	   from	  
‘containment’,	   to	   ‘control’,	   to	   ‘bridging’	  and	  to	   ‘influence’.	  While	  this	  represented	  
an	  important	  advance	  in	  early	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory,	  the	  third	  generation	  did	  not	  
move	   this	   conceptualization	   further.	   However,	   the	   flourishing	   literature	   on	  
Corporate	  Political	  Activities	  (CPA)	  (Oliver,	  1991;	  Schaffer,	  1995;	  Hillman	  and	  Hitt,	  
1999;	  Ansolabehere	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Schuler	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Hillman	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Oliver	  and	  
Holzinger,	   2008)	   offers	   an	   opportunity	   to	   further	   systematize	   corporate	   political	  




II.5.1. Corporate	  Political	  Activities:	  political	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  in	  
response	  to	  a	  societal	  issue	  
A	   good	   starting	   point	   is	   the	   model	   of	   corporate	   political	   activity	   formulation	  
developed	  by	  Hillman	  and	  Hitt	  (1999).	  They	  argue	  that	  “firms	  that	  have	  decided	  to	  
be	   politically	   active	   face	   three	   sequential	   decisions:	   (1)	   approach	   to	   political	  
strategy,	  (2)	  participation	  level,	  and	  (3)	  specific	  strategy	  choices”	  (p.	  825).	  The	  first	  
decision	  depends	  on	  whether	  CPA	   focus	  on	  a	   single,	   focal	   issue	   (a	   ‘transactional	  
approach’)	   or	   on	   a	   continuous	   relationship	   with	   e.g.	   congressmen	   (a	   ‘relational	  
approach’).	  Given	  my	  interest	  in	  issue	  life-­‐cycles,	  I	  will	  consider	  this	  decision	  as	  a	  
given:	  firms-­‐in-­‐industries	  will	  chose	  a	  ‘transactional’	  approach	  to	  CPA.	  
The	   second	   decision	   concerns	   the	   choice	   of	   engaging	   in	   political	   action	  
individually	  (i.e.	  the	  firm	  acts	  alone	  to	  affect	  public	  policy)	  or	  collectively	  (through	  
collaboration	   of	   cooperation	   between	   one	   or	   more	   firms).	   This	   is	   a	   rather	  
important	  choice,	  which	  I	  will	  look	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  
The	   third	   decision	   concerns	   the	   choice	   of	   general	   strategies	   and	   specific	  
tactics.	   Drawing	   on	   the	   works	   of	   Hillman	   and	   Hitt	   (1999),	   Schuler	   (2002)	   and	  
Oliver	  and	  Holzinger	  (2008),	  plus	  the	  political	  strategies	  discussed	  in	  the	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	  literature,	  I	  distinguish	  five	  types	  of	  political	  strategies	  and	  associated	  tactics	  
(Geels	  and	  Penna,	  2013):	  
a) Constituency-­‐building	   strategies,	   covering	   grassroots	   mobilization	   (of	  
employees,	   suppliers,	   customers	   etc.),	   advocacy	   advertising,	   public	   relations,	  
press	  conferences,	  political	  education	  programmes	  etc.	  These	  strategies	  aim	  at	  
forming	  a	  coalition	  around	  a	   favourable	   issue-­‐framing	   (which	  may	   include	  or	  
take	  the	  form	  of	  denying	  the	  issue).	  
b) Public	   information	   strategies,	  which	  comprises	   tactics	   such	  as	   commissioning	  
research	   projects	   or	   setting	   up	   research	   institutes	   to	   investigate	   the	   problem	  
and	   reporting	   results,	   testifying	   as	   expert	   witnesses	   to	   frame	   the	   problem	   in	  
favourable	   ways	   in	   official	   political	   forum	   (e.g.	   policy	   hearings	   in	   congress),	  
supplying	  technical	  reports	  etc.	  This	  strategies	  also	  aims	  at	   framing	  the	   issue,	  
but	   focus	   on	   technicalities	   of	   the	   issue	   (i.e.	   it	   involves	   the	   recognition	   of	   an	  
issue	  as	  such)	  and	  aims	  at	  influence	  ‘official’	  framings;	  	  
c) Direct	   lobbying	  strategies,	  e.g.	  hiring	  lobbyists;	  mobilizing	  CEOs	  to	  speak	  with	  




however,	  the	  content	  of	  the	  information	  is	  less	  technical,	  and	  it	  often	  happens	  
behind	   closed	   doors,	   e.g.	   ‘green	   room	   meetings’ 30 .	   Therefore,	   I	   separate	  
lobbying	  from	  other	  information	  strategies.	  
d) Financial	   incentives	   strategies,	   covering	   tactics	   such	   as	   contributions	   to	  
politicians	   or	   parties	   (e.g.	   Political	   Action	  Committees/PAC	   contributions,	   in	  
the	  US),	  paying	  honoraria	  for	  politicians/policy-­‐makers	  (e.g.	  for	  their	  speech	  in	  
events),	  hiring	  politicians	  who	  formerly	  occupied	  public	  positions	  etc.	  
e) Confrontational	  strategies,	  e.g.	  opposing	  laws	  through	  litigation;	  ‘blackmailing’	  
(e.g.	  threatening	  policy-­‐makers	  with	  plant	  closures,	  layoffs,	  or	  relocation);	  non-­‐
compliance	  (e.g.	  drawing	  on	  economic	  power)	  to	  create	  stalemates.	  
While	   nothing	   prevents	   firms	   and	   industries	   to	   engage	   in	   all	   kinds	   of	   political	  
strategies	  during	  all	  phases	  of	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle,	  I	  propose	  that:	  
• Constituency	  building	  strategies	  are	  more	  likely	  in	  early	  stages	  of	  an	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle,	  when	  the	  issue	  framing	  is	  still	  ill-­‐defined.	  These	  strategies	  seek	  to	  counter	  
claims	  by	  activists	  and	  organized	  social	  movements.	  Indeed,	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  
organized	  social	  movement	  is	  an	  important	  event	  in	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle,	  for	  they	  
mobilize	  resources	  (finance,	  personnel	  etc.)	  and	  draw	  attention	  to	  problematic	  
conditions	  (through	  demonstrations,	  campaigns,	  boycotts,	  petitions	  etc.),	  with	  
the	   aim	  of	   creating	   drama	   and	   a	   shared	   sense	   of	   urgency.	   Social	  movements	  
thus	   are	   also	   active	   in	   framing	   and	   political	   strategies,	   thus	   giving	   rise	   to	  
framing	  and	  political	  struggles	  with	  firms	  and	  industry	  associations.	  
• Information,	  direct	  lobbying	  and	  financial	  incentives	  strategies	  are	  likely	  when	  
the	  issue	  starts	  to	  spill	  over	  to	  the	  political	  arena	  and	  begin	  to	  influence	  ‘macro-­‐
politics’,	   i.e.	   the	   workings	   of	   Parliament,	   Congress,	   and	   the	   executive	  
government	   (True	   et	   al.,	   1999).	   If	   this	   leads	   to	   hearings	   and	   investigations,	  
which	   usually	   accompany	   policy-­‐making	   processes,	   the	   release	   of	   technical	  
information	   becomes	   a	   key	   political	   strategy	   to	   prevent	   or	   influence	   the	  
content	  of	  regulations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  The	  term	  ‘green	  room’	  originates	  in	  British	  theatre	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  waiting	  room	  where	  
performers	  would	  wait	  until	  their	  time	  to	  go	  on	  stage.	  The	  expression	  became	  jargon	  in	  
international	  trade	  negotiations,	  referring	  to	  an	  informal,	  restrictive	  process	  to	  settle	  ‘sensitive	  
issues’	  by	  consensus	  amongst	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  delegations	  (see	  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/meet08_org_e.htm#green_room,	  accessed	  on	  July	  




• Finally,	   confrontational	   strategies	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   employed	   during	   the	  
implementation	   process	   of	   regulation.	   Moreover,	   firms	   and	   industry	  
associations	   may	   continue	   with	   information	   strategies,	   now	   targeting	  
regulators	   (e.g.	   in	   regulatory	   agencies),	   drawing	   on	   legal	   ambiguities	   and	  
loopholes.	  This	  may	   lead	   to	  delays,	  gridlocks	  and	  stalemates	   in	   the	   issue	   life-­‐
cycle.	  
These	   strategies	   and	   tactics	   are	   not	   mutually	   exclusive,	   but	   rather	   part	   of	   a	  
portfolio	  of	  options	  that	  may	  be	  deployed	  in	  combination,	  too.	  Moreover,	  they	  may	  
be	  deployed	  individually	  or	  collectively,	  so	  an	  important	  question	  is	  whether	  and	  
when	   firms	   will	   form	   alliances	   and	   act	   through	   industry	   associations	   and	   other	  
types	  of	  coalitions.	  
II.5.2. Social	  legitimizing	  strategic	  alliances	  and	  reasons	  for	  establishing	  
voluntary	  interorganizational	  relationships	  
Although	   some	   authors	   that	   proposed	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   models	   (e.g.	   Mahon	   and	  
McGowan,	  1996;	  Rivoli	  and	  Waddock,	  2011)	  recognized	  that	  the	  corporate	  decision	  
to	   respond	   to	   societal	   issues	   alone	   or	   collectively	   is	   important	   for	   the	   issue’s	  
evolutionary	   dynamics,	   none	   has	   systematically	   incorporated	   this	   factor	   in	   their	  
models.	  Following	  the	  suggestion	  by	  Näsi	  et	   al.	   (1997)	  and	  Wartick	  and	  Heugens	  
(2003)	   that	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	   could	  be	   fruitfully	   enriched	  with	   insights	   from	  
Institutional	   Theory,	   I	   here	   review	   specific	   studies	   from	   Organizational	  
Institutionalism	   that	   have	   theorized	   about	   interorganizational	  
relationships/strategic	  alliances,	   in	  order	  to	  incorporate	  this	  dynamic	  interplay	  in	  
my	  novel	  model.	  	  
Dacin	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  proposed	  that	  firms	  may	  enter	  into	  a	  strategic	  alliance	  to	  gain	  
different	  types	  of	  legitimacy.	  For	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  model,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  look	  
at	   the	   factors	   affecting	   the	   establishment	   of	   an	   interorganizational	   relationship	  
(IOR)	  for	  conformity	  with	  societal	  rules	  and	  expectations	  (i.e.	  for	  social	  legitimacy):	  
A	   firm	   will	   be	   more	   likely	   to	   enter	   a	   strategic	   alliance	   to	   gain	   social	  
legitimacy	   when	   it	   (a)	   is	   closely	   monitored	   by	   institutional	   constituents,	  	  
(b)	   depends	   on	   a	   socially	   responsible	   image	   for	   success,	   (c)	   engages	   in	  
activities	  or	  produces	  outputs	  that	  are	  highly	  visible	  and	  controversial,	  and	  




All	  this	  factors	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  of	  an	  issue	  that	  concerns	  an	  industry.	  I	  
take	  however	  point	  (d)	  as	  a	  starting	  point:	  as	  other	  authors	  suggested	  (see	  below),	  
when	   industry	   members	   perceive	   that	   their	   collective	   ‘responsible	   image’	   (or,	  
better,	   responsible	   ‘reputation’)	   is	   being	   questioned,	   they	  may	   decide	   to	   engage	  
with	   the	   issue	   collectively.	   Thus,	   the	   relevant	   question	   is:	   in	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	  
when	  does	  the	  industry’s	  responsible	  reputation	  begin	  to	  be	  damaged?	  	  	  
Hoffman	   and	   Ocasio	   (2001)	   suggested	   that	   collective	   industry	   attention	   to	   a	  
given	   issue	   depends	   on	  whether	   the	   industry	   is	   publicly	   held	   accountable	   for	   it:	  
industry	  members	  “are	  concerned	  about	  whether	  others	  hold	  them	  accountable	  for	  
specific	   actions	   or	   events	   [issues]”	   (Hoffman	   and	   Ocasio,	   2001,	   p.	   422),	   because	  
such	  accountability	  poses	  a	  threat	  to	  their	   ‘shared	  identity’	   (a	  core	  element	  of	  an	  
industry	  regime).	  Accountability	  for	  an	  issue	  affects	  the	  industry’s	  reputation	  and	  
may	   ultimately	   put	   into	   question	   individual	   firms’	   ‘license	   to	   operate’	  
(goodwill/social	   legitimacy).	   The	   industry	   may	   feel	   a	   threat	   to	   their	   ‘identity’	  
depending	   on	   the	   issue	   frame	   (Lamertz	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   “The	   ideal-­‐typical	   social	  
problem	  claim	  [framing]	  asserts	   that	  a	  problem	  exists	  and	   is	   important,	   includes	  
ideas	   of	   causal	   responsibility	   and	   normative	   (political	   or	   moral)	   responsibility	  
[accountability],	   and	   proposes	   solutions	   to	   address	   the	   problem	   or	   redress	   the	  
harm”	  (Hilgartner	  and	  Bosk,	  1988,	  p.	  62,	  ft.	  10).	  
Therefore,	  whether	  a	  societal	  issue	  will	  trigger	  collective	  action	  depends	  on	  
the	  issue’s	  underlying	  frame.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  shared	  identity	  may	  be	  
posed	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  depending	  on	  which	  regime	  element	  (see	  Figure	  I.1)	  is	  
questioned.	  The	  direct	  threat	  happens	  when	  the	  industry’s	  mission	  and	  behavioural	  
norms	   or	   informal	   internal	   regulations	   are	  put	   into	  question.	  The	   indirect	   threat	  
happens	   when	   their	   belief	   systems	   or	   technical	   regime	   is	   questioned.	   Logically,	  
because	   regime	   elements	   are	   interrelated,	   questioning	   one	   element	   may	   raise	  
questions	   about	  other	   element(s),	   e.g.	   often,	   the	   industry’s	  mission	  encompasses	  
production	  and	  sale	  of	  a	  particular	  technology,	  so	  that	  questioning	  the	  mission	  is	  
questioning	  the	  technical	  regime	  and	  vice-­‐versa.	  
This	  thesis	  is	  particularly	  concerned	  with	  threats	  to	  industry’s	  identity	  due	  
to	  issue	  framings	  that	  relate	  to	  technical	   regimes.	  So,	  to	  be	  more	  specific,	  I	  argue	  




competency	  of	  the	  entire	  industry,	  it	  becomes	  an	  institutional	  issue	  demanding	  an	  
industry-­‐wide	   response,	   because	   it	   poses	   an	   indirect	   threat	   to	   the	   industry’s	  
identity	   –	   shared	   interests	   of	   all	   firms-­‐in-­‐industry	   are	   then	   at	   stake	   (Geels	   and	  
Penna,	  2013).	  Thus,	  after	  the	  issue	  receives	  such	  negative	  (to	  the	  industry)	  framing,	  
individual	   firms	   are	   likely	   either	   to	   establish	   a	   new	   industry-­‐wide	  
‘interorganizational	  relationship’	  (IOR)	  or	  to	  make	  use	  of	  existing	  (industry-­‐wide)	  
trade	   associations	   to	   contest	   the	   threatening	   issue	   frame	   (leading	   to	   a	   framing	  
struggle).	   These	   ‘closed	   industry	   fronts’	   or	   ‘political	   coalitions’	   work	   as	  
coordinating	  devices	  to	  defend	  the	  status	  quo	  during	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  
Oliver	   (1990)	   identified	   five	   reasons	   (‘critical	   contingencies’	   or	   causes)	   for	  
establishing	   voluntary	   interorganizational	   relationships	   (a	   sixth	   contingency,	  
‘necessity’,	  leads	  to	  an	  IOR	  mandated	  by	  law,	  i.e.	  not	  voluntary):	  (1)	  Asymmetry;	  (2)	  
Reciprocity;	  (3)	  Efficiency;	  (4)	  Stability;	  and	  (5)	  Legitimacy:	  
1) Asymmetry:	  when	  the	  IOR	  is	  established	  to	  exert	  power	  over	  a	  third	  party.	  This	  
IOR	  is	  triggered	  when	  the	  organizational	  partners	  are	  threatened	  with	  “the	  loss	  
of	  decision-­‐making	  latitude	  and	  discretion”	  (Oliver,	  1990,	  p.	  244);	  
2) Reciprocity,	  when	  an	  IOR	  is	  established	  because	  it	  promotes	  mutual	  benefits	  for	  
the	   partners.	   This	   contingency	   emphasizes	   collaboration,	   cooperation	   and	  
coordination	   between	   organizations.	   Note	   that	   an	   asymmetric	   IOR	   may	   be	  
disguised	  as	  reciprocal	  to	  avoid	  indictments	  of	  collusion	  (Oliver,	  1990,	  p.	  254).	  	  
3) Efficiency,	   when	   the	   IOR	   aims	   at	   obtaining	   an	   economic	   advantage	   through	  
lowering	  transaction	  costs.	  	  
4) Stability	   or	   predictability,	   when	   the	   IOR	   is	   an	   adaptive	   response	   to	  
environmental	   uncertainty.	   The	   IOR	   serves	   “as	   coping	   strategies	   to	   forestall,	  
forecast,	  or	  absorb	  uncertainty	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  an	  orderly,	  reliable	  pattern	  of	  
resource	  flows	  and	  exchanges”	  (Oliver,	  1990,	  p.	  246);	  
5) Legitimacy,	   when	   the	   IOR	   is	   established	   “to	   demonstrate	   or	   improve	  
[members’]	  reputation,	  image,	  prestige,	  or	  congruence	  with	  prevailing	  norms	  in	  
its	   institutional	   environment”	   (Oliver,	   1990,	  p.	   246),	   e.g.	   by	  publicizing	   social	  
responsibility.	  “Most	  associations	  attempt	  to	  increase	  members’	  legitimacy,	  and	  
public	  relations	  campaigns	  to	  enhance	  the	  image	  of	  the	  trade	  are	  commonly	  a	  




form	   for	   legitimacy	   reasons	   in	   response	   to	   explicit	   institutional	   and	   public	  
criticism”	  (Oliver,	  1990,	  p.	  252).	  
Initially	   (i.e.	   after	   the	   issue	   is	   framed),	   firms	   are	   likely	   to	   establish	   an	   IOR	   for	  
reasons	  of	  legitimacy.	  But	  IORs	  may	  be	  established	  or	  maintained	  for	  other	  reasons	  
as	   well.	   For	   instance,	   when	   there	   is	   threat	   of	   governmental	   intervention	   in	   an	  
industry	   (an	   asymmetrical	   relation),	   the	   industry	   can	   make	   use	   of	   a	   trade	  
association	   to	   lobby	   against	   regulation	   (preempt	   regulatory	   action)	   and	  promote	  
the	   interests	   of	   its	   members.	   The	   association	   is	   also	   important	   to	   coordinate	  
individual	   members’	   actions	   (reciprocity)	   and	   avoid	   duplication	   of	   efforts	  
(efficiency).	   The	   IOR	   may	   also	   reduce	   legislative	   uncertainty	   through	   the	  
dissemination	   of	   information	   about	   political	   developments	   to	   its	  members,	   or	   it	  
may	  promote	  voluntary	  standards	  and	  guidelines	  (e.g.	  for	  products)	  to	  forestall	  the	  
unpredictability	  of	  governmental	  regulation	  (Oliver,	  1990)	  –	  in	  both	  cases,	  the	  IOR	  
is	  used	  to	  keep	  stability	  and	  predictability.	  
Oliver’s	  analysis	  thus	  offers	  insights	  into	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  strategic	  alliance	  
in	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   When	   an	   individual	   member	   perceives	   that	   the	   cost	   of	  
maintaining	  an	  IOR	  does	  not	  translate	  into	  increased	  benefits	  for	  itself	  (i.e.	  the	  IOR	  
is	  not	  perceived	  as	  reciprocal	  anymore	  or	   is	  perceived	  as	   inefficient)	  or	  when	  the	  
member	   anticipates	   strategic	   economic	   advantages	   (i.e.	   more	   efficiency	   and	  
legitimacy)	   by	   acting	   alone,	   then	   it	   may	   decide	   to	   depart	   from	   the	   alliance.	  
Furthermore,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  review	  of	  the	  technology-­‐forcing	  policy	  literature,	  a	  
technology-­‐forcing	   regulation	   provides	   contradictory	   incentives	   for	   firms	   in	   an	  
industry:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  firms	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  collectively	  avoid	  innovation	  
to	  ratchet	   the	  regulator’s	  credibility;	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   individual	   firms	  have	  an	  
incentive	  to	  innovate	  alone	  to	  raise	  rivals	  costs	  (or	  decrease	  its	  own	  costs).	  Thus,	  it	  
seems	  plausible	   that	  an	   industry-­‐wide	   IOR	  will	  be	  dissolved	  at	   some	  point	   in	   the	  
implementation	   stage	   of	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	   particularly	   when	   uncertainties	  
concerning	   the	   actual	   contents	   of	   the	   technology-­‐forcing	   regulation	   are	   reduced	  
(i.e.	  individual	  firms	  do	  not	  need	  an	  IOR	  to	  maintain	  stability	  anymore).31	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  However,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  section	  above	  on	  innovation	  management,	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  
more	  ‘restricted’	  IOR	  between	  an	  individual	  incumbent	  firm	  and	  a	  new	  entrant	  that	  holds	  




II.6. CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  
The	   aim	   of	   this	   chapter	   was	   to	   look	   for	   relevant	   insights,	   which	   I	   could	   use	   to	  
address	   the	   puzzle	   of	   understanding	   how,	   when,	   and	   why	   incumbent	   actors	  
change	  their	  technological	  strategy	  to	  address	  a	  societal	  problem.	  The	  next	  Chapter	  
will	  provide	  a	  conceptual	  answer	  to	  these	  questions,	  by	  using	  the	  relevant	  insights	  
as	  building	  blocks	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  model	  of	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   that	  captures	  
pressures,	   responses	   and	   technological	   developments	   and	   will	   thus	   allow	  




III. CONCEPTUAL	  FRAMEWORK:	  THE	  DIALECTIC	  ISSUE	  LIFE-­‐
CYCLE	  MODEL	  
III.1. INTRODUCTION	  
This	  Chapter	  integrates	  the	  insights	  (or	  building	  blocks)	  raised	  in	  Chapter	  II	  into	  a	  
coherent	   conceptual	   framework	   (or	   heuristic	   model),	   which	   will	   allow	   me	   to	  
address	   the	  main	   research	  questions	   in	   this	   thesis:	  How	  do	   societal	   issue-­‐related	  
pressures	   (on	   industries),	   from	   different	   domains	   (e.g.	   civil	   society,	   science,	  
political	   arena,	   economy),	   evolve?	   How	   do	   industries	   respond	   to	   changing	  
pressures	  around	  societal	   issues,	   in	   terms	  of	   technological,	  political,	   cultural	   and	  
economic	   strategies?	   In	   particular,	   when	   and	   why	   do	   industry	   actors	   decide	   to	  
develop	  substantial	  technological	  responses?	  	  
	   To	   integrate	   those	   insights,	   I	   will	   build	   on	   the	   field-­‐level	   ‘Triple	  
Embeddedness	  Framework’	  (see	  section	  I.3).	  This	  synthetic	  framework	  of	  industry	  
dynamics	   has	   three	   characteristics	   that	   facilitate	   the	   integration	   of	   the	   building	  
blocks	   into	   a	   coherent	  whole	   for	   explaining	   the	   research	   questions:	   (a)	   it	   posits	  
interactions	   between	   industry	   and	   environment,	   which	   will	   allow	   me	   to	  
conceptualize	  how	  the	  industry	  regime	  co-­‐evolve	  over	  time	  with	  pressures	  related	  
to	   societal	   problems;	   (b)	   it	   shows	   that	   industry	   strategies	   in	   response	   to	  
environmental	   pressures	   are	   multi-­‐dimensional;	   and	   (c)	   it	   provides	   a	   frame	   of	  
reference,	   based	   on	   the	   core	   elements	   of	   industry	   regimes,	   that	   help	   explain	  
different	   types	  of	   technological/industrial	  change.	  The	  TEF	  will	   thus	  allow	  me	  to	  
tackle,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  issues	  identified	  within	  the	  Greening	  of	  Industry	  literature	  
(see	   section	   I.2),	  namely	   the	   ‘inward	   focus’	   and	   ‘determinism’	  of	   stage	  models	  of	  
greening,	   and,	   on	   the	   other,	   issues	   that	   remain	   open	   in	   the	   third	   generation	   of	  
issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory:	   lack	   of	   explanation	   about	   the	   shift	   towards	   substantive	  
response	   (e.g.	   technological	   development)	   and	   about	   the	   interplays	   between	   the	  
firm-­‐level	  and	  the	  industry-­‐level.32	  
	   This	  Chapter	  is	  structured	  as	  following:	  next	  section	  (III.2)	  is	  divided	  in	  two;	  
it	  firstly	  (subsection	  III.2.1)	  discusses	  the	  main	  criteria	  for	  integrating	  the	  building	  
blocks	  and	  then	  (subsection	  III.2.2)	  develops	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  based	  on	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  The	  third	  issue,	  of	  how	  to	  measure	  issue	  life-­‐cycles	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  methodology,	  




meta-­‐analytical	  analysis	  of	  existing	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  models.	  I	  call	  my	  framework	  the	  
‘Dialectic-­‐Issue	   Life-­‐Cycle’	   (DILC)	   model.	   The	   Chapter	   finish	   with	   concluding	  
remarks	   (section	   III.3)	   that	   raise	   initial	   limitations	   to	   the	   model,	   which	   will	   be	  
explored	  in	  the	  empirical	  chapters.	  
III.2. CONCEPTUAL	  FRAMEWORK	  
III.2.1. Criteria	  for	  integrating	  the	  building	  blocks	  
Geels	  (2010)	  distinguishes	  four	  positions	  regarding	  inter-­‐theoretical	  combinations:	  	  
(a)	   complete	   integration	   into	   an	   all-­‐encompassing	   synthesis;	  	  
(b)	  incommensurability,	  due	  to	  fundamental	  ontological	  differences;	  (c)	  eclecticism,	  
pragmatic	  integration	  of	  bits	  and	  pieces	  without	  attention	  to	  compatibility	  issues;	  
and	   (d)	   crossovers,	   which	   draws	   on	   interplays	   and	   complementarities	   between	  
different	  theories.	  The	  ‘crossover	  approach’	  was	  the	  criterion	  adopted	  in	  choosing	  
TEF	   as	   a	   background	   framework,	   because,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   enables	   me	   to	  
position	   my	   contribution	   in	   the	   organizational	   field-­‐level,	   a	   need	   identified	   in	  
recent	  developments	  in	  the	  Greening	  of	  Industry	  literature.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  
provides	   a	   ‘map’,	   a	   guiding	   template	   for	   crossover	   integration	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  
theory	  with	  the	  other	  relevant	  literatures	  reviewed	  in	  Chapter	  II.	  Furthermore,	  in	  
the	   review	   itself,	   I	   attempted	   to	  mobilize	   different	   theories	   in	   a	   complementary	  
way,	   to	   address	   each	   other’s	   shortcomings.	   Therefore,	   the	   first	   criterion	   for	  
integration	   of	   the	   different	   building	   blocks	   is	   to	   aim	   for	   theoretical	   crossovers	  
(position	   ‘d’	  above),	   that	   is,	   I	  use	  concepts	   from	  different	  theories	  and	  literatures	  
that	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  complementary	  (or	  at	  least	  not	  incompatible,	  in	  that	  they	  
are	  not	  based	  on	  opposing	  ontologies	  and	  epistemologies).	  	  
	   A	   second	   criterion,	   connected	   to	   this	   crossover	   approach,	   is	   provided	   by	  
Poole	   and	   Van	   de	   Ven	   (1989),	   who	   suggest	   four	   ways	   of	   integrating	   different	  
theories	  (‘theory-­‐building	  strategies’):	  (a)	  opposition	  of	  theories,	  in	  order	  to	  reveal	  
insights	   about	   same	   phenomena;	   (b)	   spatial	   separation,	   which	   situates	   different	  
theories	   (or	   theoretical	   insights)	   at	   different	   levels	   or	   positions	   in	   a	   framework	  
(Geels,	   2010);	   (c)	   temporal	   separation,	  which	  posits	  different	   theories	   in	  different	  
moments	  in	  time;	  and	  (d)	  synthesis,	  which	  introduces	  new	  elements	  to	  make	  two	  
or	  more	   theories	   compatible.	  My	   integration	   effort	  will	   draw	  on	   the	   second	   and	  




reference	   (e.g.	   firm-­‐level	   or	   industry-­‐level),	   on	   the	  other,	   I	  will	   use	   the	  TEF	   as	   a	  
background	  framework	  and	  position	  insights	  from	  the	  different	  theories	  in	  it	  (e.g.	  
STI	  theory	  will	  be	  used	  to	  conceptualize	  technology	  strategies	  in	  response	  to	  issue-­‐
related	   pressures,	   insights	   from	   Organizational	   Institutionalism	   will	   be	   used	   to	  
conceptualize	   political	   strategies	   etc.).	   I	   will	   also	   draw	   on	   different	   theoretical	  
concepts	   for	  each	  phase,	   to	   logically	  account	   for	   ‘what	  goes	  on	   inside	  them’	  (e.g.	  
some	  of	  the	  insights	  from	  technology-­‐forcing	  policy	  theory	  apply	  to	  pre-­‐enactment	  
of	  regulation,	  others	  to	  the	  implementation	  phase).	  
	   	  The	   third	   criterion	   is	   that	   the	  model	   avoids	   a	   key	   short-­‐coming	   of	   stage	  
models:	  the	  determinism	  of	  life-­‐cycle	  logics.	  Van	  de	  Ven	  and	  Poole	  (1995,	  p.	  520-­‐1)	  
identified	   four	   ‘pure	   types’	   (or	   ideal	   types)	   of	  models33	  that	   explain	   development	  
and	  change	  in	  organizations:	  
1.	   A	   life-­‐cycle	   model	   depicts	   the	   process	   of	   change	   in	   an	   entity	   as	  
progressing	   through	   a	   necessary	   sequence	   of	   stages.	   [...]	  2.	   A	   teleological	  
model	   views	   development	   as	   a	   cycle	   of	   goal	   formulation,	   implementation,	  
evaluation,	   and	   modification	   of	   goals	   based	   on	   what	   was	   learned	   by	   the	  
entity.	   [...]	   3.	   In	   dialectical	   models	   of	   development,	   conflicts	   emerge	  
between	   entities	   espousing	   opposing	   thesis	   and	   antithesis	   that	   collide	   to	  
produce	  a	  synthesis,	  which	  in	  time	  becomes	  the	  thesis	  for	  the	  next	  cycle	  of	  a	  
dialectical	   progression.	   [...]	   4.	   An	   evolutionary	   model	   of	   development	  
consists	  of	  a	  repetitive	  sequence	  of	  variation,	  selection,	  and	  retention	  events	  
among	  entities	  in	  a	  designated	  population.	  [...]	  
Van	  de	  Ven	  and	  Poole	  (1995)	  argue	  that	  each	  model	  posits	  a	  distinctive	  logic	  that	  
accounts	   for	   different	   change	   aspects.	   They	   are	   thus	   incomplete,	   for	   they	   leave	  
certain	  factors	  out	  of	  the	  model.	  Through	  the	  combination	  of	  two	  or	  more	  models,	  
one	   can	   address	   individual	   deficiencies.	   To	   avoid	   the	   determinism	   of	   life-­‐cycle	  
models,	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  a	  dialectical	  metaphor	  for	  what	  goes	  inside	  each	  phase	  and	  
between	  phases.	  My	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  shift	   from	  one	  phase	  to	  the	  next	   is	  not	  
automatic	  or	  natural,	  but	  depends	  on	  conflict	  between	  those	  espousing	  change	  to	  
address	  societal	  issues	  and	  those	  resisting	  changing.	  I	  therefore	  play	  on	  the	  notion	  
of	   thesis	   and	   antithesis:	   some	   actors	   call	   for	   changes	   (‘the	   antithesis’)	   in	   the	  
industry	   regime	   (‘the	   thesis’).	   However,	   instead	   of	   reaching	   an	   immediate	  
‘synthesis’,	   in	   my	   model	   this	   dialectical	   process	   may	   escalate	   and	   spillover	   to	  
different	  arenas	  during	  different	  phases,	  with	  more	  actors	  getting	  involved	  before	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  In	  the	  organizational	  literature,	  models	  are	  rarely	  ‘pure’,	  as	  they	  often	  combine	  principles	  from	  




substantive	  changes	  in	  the	  industry	  regime	  takes	  place	  and	  a	  ‘synthesis’	  emerge.	  In	  
this	  sense,	  in	  each	  phase	  my	  model	  has	  to	  account	  to:	  (1)	  problem-­‐related	  pressures;	  
and	   (2)	   industry	   response	   strategies.	   It	  will	   also	   account	   for	   (3)	   drivers	   of	   phase	  
shift.	  
	   I	   believe	   that	   these	   three	   criteria	   will	   allow	   me	   to	   build	   a	   coherent	   and	  
consistent	   model	   that,	   together	   with	   my	   methodology,	   is	   able	   to	   address	   my	  
research	  questions	  and	  thus	  make	  an	  original	  contribution	  to	  the	  field	  of	  STI	  policy	  
research.	  
III.2.2. 	  Towards	  the	  Dialectic	  Issue	  Life-­‐Cycle	  (DILC)	  Model	  
III.2.2.1. Defining	  the	  number	  of	  stages	  
The	   first	   choice	   in	   building	   a	   new	   stage	  model	   of	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   is	   defining	   the	  
number	  of	   stages.	  As	  we	  saw	   in	  Chapter	   II,	  existing	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  models	   range	  
from	  three	  to	  five	  stages.	   In	  order	  to	  define	  the	  number	  of	  stages	  that	  my	  model	  
will	   have,	   I	   will	   carry	   out	   a	  meta-­‐analysis	   by	   plotting	   in	   parallel	   on	   a	   table	   the	  
different	   stage	  models,	  with	  each	  one’s	   similar	   stages	  aligned	   (Table	   III.1).	  While	  
this	  meta-­‐analytical	  exercise	  contains	  some	  dose	  of	  subjective	  interpretation,	  I	  took	  
the	   approach	   of	   selecting	   as	   meta-­‐stages	   those	   that	   (a)	   represent	   distinctive	  
processes	  and	  (b)	  appear	  in	  most	  number	  of	  models.	  This	  analysis	  resulted	  in	  five	  
meta-­‐stages,	   which	   ‘labels’	   (first	   column	   in	   Table	   III.1)	   are	   still	   very	   much	  
connected	   to	   the	   issue	   evolution	   process,	   and	   therefore	   will	   be	   refined	   when	   I	  
specify	  what	  goes	  within	  each	  stage:	  (1)	  Emergence;	  (2)	  Rising	  public	  concern;	  (3)	  
Political	   debates;	   (4)	   Formation	   and	   implementation	   of	   policy;	   (5)	   Policy	  
outcomes34.	  
• The	  first	  stage	  is	  present	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Sethi	  (1975,	  1979)	  and	  all	  works	  from	  the	  
second	  (although	  Bigelow	  et	  al.	  (1991,	  1993)	  merge	  emergence	  and	  interpretation	  
into	   a	   single	   stage)	   and	   third	   generation,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   Rivoli	   and	  
Waddock	  (2011).	  
• The	   second	   stage	   is	   present	   in	   the	   works	   of	   Buchholz	   (1982),	   all	   works	   of	   the	  
second	  generation,	  and	  Lamertz	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  (the	  models	  by	  Post	  (1978)	  and	  Rivoli	  
and	  Waddock	  (2011)	  merge	  meta-­‐stages	  1	  and	  2).	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  I	  thank	  Prof.	  Ben	  Martin	  for	  suggesting	  that	  the	  ‘Outcomes’	  meta-­‐stage	  would	  be	  better	  labelled	  




• The	  third	  stage	  is	  present	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Post	  (1978),	  Bigelow	  et	  al.	  (1991,	  1993),	  
Mahon	  and	  Waddock	  (1992),	  Lamertz	  et	  al.	  (2003),	  and	  Rivoli	  and	  Waddock	  (2011)	  
(the	  models	  by	  Sethi	  (1975,	  1979),	  Bigelow	  et	  al.	  (1997),	  and	  Mahon	  and	  McGowan	  
(1996)	  merge	  meta-­‐stages	  2	  and	  3).	  
• The	  fourth	  stage35	  is	  present	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Sethi	  (1975,	  1979),	  Bigelow	  et	  al.	  (1991,	  
1993),	   and	  Mahon	   and	  Waddock	   (1992),	   and,	   I	   argue,	   also	   in	   the	  works	   of	   Post	  
(1978)	   and	   Rivoli	   and	  Waddock	   (2011),	   considering	   that	   litigation	   is	   part	   of	   the	  
implementation	  process	  (Buccholz	  (1982)	  merges	  the	  policy	  formulation	  with	  the	  
political	  debate	  stage).	  
• The	  fifth	  meta-­‐stage	  is	  only	  mentioned	  by	  Sethi	  (1975,	  1979),	  and	  Tombari	  (1984),	  
and	   to	   some	   extent	   by	   Lamertz	   et	   al.	   (2003),	   who	   lump	   it	   together	   with	   the	  
implementation	  stage.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  a	  fifth	  meta	  stage	  is	  a	  logical	  consequence:	  
after	  the	  implementation	  process,	  it	  follows	  a	  certain	  outcome,	  which	  in	  a	  ‘normal’	  
issue	  life-­‐cycle	  that	  progresses	  in	  the	  ‘right’	  direction	  (towards	  addressing	  the	  issue	  
in	  the	  ‘synthesis’)	  is	  the	  reorientation	  of	  the	  industry	  regime	  due	  to	  spill-­‐overs	  to	  
the	   task	   environment	   (via	   consumer	   demand	   or	   strict	   regulations).	   This	  
characterization	  of	   the	   fifth	  stage	  anticipates	   the	  elaboration	  of	  what	  goes	  on	   in	  
each	  stage	  and	  how	  the	  issue	  moves	  from	  on	  stage	  to	  the	  other,	  to	  which	  I	  turn	  
next.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  I	  decided	  to	  attribute	  formation	  and	  implementation	  to	  a	  single	  phase	  because	  formation	  
(enactment)	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  macro-­‐political	  arena	  and	  happens	  after	  issues	  become	  ‘hot’	  (Geels	  
and	  Penna,	  2013),	  representing	  –	  more	  than	  the	  culmination	  of	  the	  previous	  process	  of	  political	  
debate	  –	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  phase,	  where	  an	  official	  framing	  has	  been	  articulated.	  This	  official	  





Table	  III.1:	  Summary	  of	  stage	  models	  of	  issue	  progression,	  with	  stages	  aligned	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  underlying	  characteristics 
Meta-­‐stage	   1st	  Generation	   2nd	  Generation	   3rd	  Generation	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III.2.2.2. Specifying	  the	  model:	  within-­‐stage	  dynamics	  and	  phase	  shifts	  
The	   specification	  of	   the	  model	   is	   based	  on	   the	   three	   criteria	   outlined	   in	   Section	  
III.2.1,	  namely:	   (a)	   the	  TEF,	   a	   guiding	   template	   for	   crossovers	  between	   issue	   life-­‐
cycle	   theory	   and	   insights	   from	   other	   literatures;	   (b)	   spatial	   and	   temporal	  
separation	  of	   theoretical	   insights;	   and	   (c)	   the	  dialectics	  metaphor,	  which	   is	  both	  
key	   for	   within-­‐stage	   dynamics	   and	   phase	   shifts.	   Figure	   III.1	   represents	   the	   five	  
stages/phases	  of	  the	  Dialectic	  Issue	  Life-­‐Cycle	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  TEF	  (cf.	  Figure	  I.1).	  	  
Figure	  III.1:	  Phases	  of	  the	  Dialectic	  Issue	  Life-­‐Cycle	  model	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Triple	  
Embeddedness	  Framework	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  elaboration36	  based	  on	  the	  Triple	  Embeddedness	  Framework	  by	  Geels	  (2012a).	  
Obs.:	  Light-­‐grey	  arrows	  indicate	  weak	  interactions	  or	  struggles,	  dark-­‐grey	  arrows	  indicate	  moderate	  interactions	  
or	   struggles,	   and	  black	  arrows	   indicate	   strong	   interactions	  or	   struggles.	  Underlined	   regime	  elements	   indicate	  
changes	  in	  industry	  specific	  institutions.	  
The	  Figure	  indicates	  multi-­‐dimensional	  interactions	  (‘dialectics’)	  between	  firms-­‐in-­‐
industry	  and	  external	  stakeholders,	  which	  escalate	  as	  the	  issue	  evolves	  (light-­‐/dark-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  A	  similar	  figure	  appears	  in	  Penna	  and	  Geels	  (2012),	  which	  however	  does	  not	  include	  the	  




grey/black	  arrows),	   leading	  to	  changes	   in	  regime	  specific	   institutions	  (underlined	  
core	  elements),	  beginning	  in	  Phase	  4.	  The	  underlying	  logics	  is	  that	  societal	  issues	  
first	   emerge	   in	   civil	   society	   via	   activists	   and	   then	   spill	   over	   to	   public	   opinion,	  
creating	  some	  early	  credibility	  pressures	  on	  policy-­‐makers	  who	  engage	  in	  symbolic	  
action.	   Later	   on,	   these	   pressures	   lead	   to	   political	   debates,	   if	   the	   issue	   is	   still	  
supported	   by	   activists,	   social	  movements	   and	   public	   opinion.	   So,	   the	   first	   three	  
phases	  mainly	   take	  place	   in	   the	   socio-­‐political	  arena	   (institutional	  environment),	  
albeit	  in	  the	  third	  stage	  pressure	  starts	  to	  come	  from	  the	  task	  environment	  as	  well	  
(through	  the	  actions	  of	  outsiders,	  new	  entrants	  and	  suppliers	  that	  respond	  to	  small	  
demand	  by	  ‘moral	  consumers’).	  
In	   the	   first	   three	  phases,	   industry	  actors	  are	  reluctant	   to	  make	  substantial	  
changes	  to	  address	  the	   issue,	  because	  they	  are	   ‘locked	  in’	   to	  the	   industry	  regime.	  
They	  therefore	  collectively	  respond	  with	  various	  defensive	  activities	  to	  protect	  the	  
existing	   regime.	   When	   (forced	   to)	   acknowledge	   social	   problems	   (due	   to	   public	  
pressures),	   individual	   firms-­‐in-­‐industry	  may	  move	   towards	   incremental	   solutions	  
but	  will	  publicly	  resist	  substantial	  reorientation	  (and	  more	  radical	  innovation).	  In	  
later	   phases,	  when	   the	   issue	   spills	   over	   to	   the	   task	   environment,	   industry	   actors	  
gradually	  and	  individually	  move	  to	  more	  substantive	  responses	  to	  address	  the	  issue.	  
In	   phase	   4,	   action	  moves	   to	   the	  macro	   political	   arena,	   due	   to	   escalating	   public	  
concern	   (attention),	   and	   politicians	   enact	   radical	   legislation	   that	   substantially	  
changes	   the	   economic	   frame	   conditions	   (e.g.	   taxes,	   regulations,	   standards,	  
subsidies,	   investments).	   The	   implementation	   process	   in	   phase	   4	   leads	   to	   the	  
dynamic	  games	  between	  industry,	  outsiders	  and	  regulators	  (insights	  raised	  by	  the	  
review	  of	  the	  technology-­‐forcing	  policy	  literature).	  In	  phase	  5,	  the	  problem	  affects	  
mass	   markets	   (because	   of	   changing	   consumer	   preferences	   and/or	   because	   of	  
regulation),	  which	  creates	  demand	  for	  radically	  new	  technologies.	  What	  follows	  is	  
a	  complete	  reorientation	  (or	  ‘recreation’)	  of	  the	  industry	  regime:	  a	  synthesis	  of	  the	  
whole	  dialectical	  process.	  
As	  mentioned,	  I	  propose	  that	  this	  is	  the	  ‘normal’	  (Bigelow	  et	  al.,	  1993)	  issue	  
life-­‐cycle:	   it	   represents	   an	   ideal-­‐typical	   process	   in	   which	   dialectic	   struggles	   are	  
accentuated,	   and	   the	   issue	   progresses	   in	   the	   ‘right’	   direction,	   i.e.	   towards	  




into	   specific	   dialectic	   dynamics	   for	   each	   phase	   and	   specify	   phase	   shifts.37	  The	  
inclusion	  of	  industry	  response	  elements	  leads	  me	  to	  a	  new	  labelling	  for	  each	  stage.	  
I	  also	  note	  the	  novelty	  of	  including	  an	  explicit	  discussion	  of	  processes	  that	  would	  
indicate	   phase	   shifts:	   this	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   address	   the	   lack	   of	   criteria	   for	   the	  
delineation	  of	  phases,	  which	   is	   a	  gap	   that	   I	   identified	   in	   the	   review	  of	   issue	   life-­‐
cycle	   theory.	   Such	   ‘phase	   shift	   processes’	   conceptually	   delineate	   the	   different	  
phases	  of	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle,	  and	  therefore	  represent	  ex-­‐ante	  qualitative	  criteria	  (or	  
indicators)	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  phases	  in	  an	  empirical	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  
Phase	  1:	  Problem	  emergence	  and	  industry	  neglect	  
Problem-­‐related	   pressures:	   The	   initial	   stage	   is	   about	   changing	   expectations	   by	  
some	  individuals,	  who	  begin	  to	  recognize	  the	  issue	  as	  such	  (Blumer,	  1971;	  Post,	  1978;	  
Tombari,	   1984;	  Bigelow	   et	   al.,	   1991;	  Lamertz	   et	   al.,	  2003).	  Affected	  groups,	  citizens,	  
and	   other	   activists	   (Gerde	   and	   White,	   2001),	   feeling	   a	   sense	   of	   urgency,	   first	  
articulate	  concerns	  about	  a	  critical	  situation	  and	  frame	  it	  as	  a	  problematic	  condition.	  
Issues	  are	   initially	   ill-­‐defined	  and	   fuzzy;	   concerned	  activists	  do	  not	   fully	  grasp	   the	  
implications	  of	  the	  facts	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  issue:	  there	  is	  much	  uncertainty	  about	  
causes	  and	  consequences,	  so	  that	  these	  groups	  engage	  in	  sense-­‐making	  (Sethi,	  1979;	  
Bigelow	   et	  al.,	  1991;	  Lamertz	   et	  al.,	  2003).	  Yet,	  sense-­‐making	  is	  affected	  not	  only	  by	  
facts,	  but	  also	  by	  common	  sense,	  values,	  beliefs	  and	  interests	  (Bigelow	  et	  al.,	  1991).	  
Because	  the	  wider	  public	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  are	  unaware	  or	  indifferent	  to	  the	  issue,	  
those	   activists	   continuously	   engage	   in	   transforming	   their	   ‘private	   troubles’	   into	  
public	   and	   policy	   (societal)	   issues	   (Spector	   and	   Kitsuse,	   1973)	   through	   symbolic	  
activities	   imbued	  with	  drama,	   such	  as	  demonstrations,	   campaigns	   etc.	   (Hilgartner	  
and	  Bosk,	  1988).	  Their	  goal	  is	  to	  engage	  the	  wider	  public	  and	  policy-­‐makers,	  who	  at	  
this	  stage	  are	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  issue.	  
Industry	   responses:	  As	  activists	  are	  scattered	  and	  relatively	  powerless38,	   firms-­‐in-­‐
industries	  will	  initially	  downplay	  their	  demands	  and	  stay	  in	  their	  ‘zone	  of	  rejection’	  
(Buchholz	  et	  al.,	  1994	  [1985];	  Mahon	  and	  Waddock,	  1992;	  Rivoli	  and	  Waddock,	  2011).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Somewhat	  different	  descriptions	  of	  the	  similar	  model	  specification	  appear	  in	  Penna	  and	  Geels	  
(2012),	  Geels	  and	  Penna	  (2013)	  and	  Penna	  and	  Geels	  (2013).	  I	  here	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  
specification	  based	  on	  the	  building	  blocks	  of	  the	  literature	  review,	  which	  goes	  beyond	  and	  differs	  
from	  the	  descriptions	  in	  these	  articles.	  
38	  Mitchell	  et	  al.	  (1997,	  p.	  875)	  suggest	  that,	  in	  this	  stage,	  activists	  “are	  the	  ‘mosquitoes	  buzzing	  in	  





If	   activist’s	   claims	   become	   ‘louder’,	   the	   industry	   may	   attempt	   to	   change	   public	  
expectations/perceptions	  (Sethi,	  1975,	  1979,	  Post,	  1978)	  through	  public	  relations	  and	  
other	   communication	   tactics	   that	   fall	   under	   the	   ‘constituency	   building	   strategy’.	  
However,	   the	   industry	   is	   unlikely	   to	   move	   beyond	   their	   ‘zone	   of	   indifference’	  
(Mahon	  and	  Waddock,	  1992).	  	  	  
Phase	   shift:	   When	   activists	   coalesce	   into	   an	   organized	   social	   movement	  
organization	   (SMO)	   (maybe	   after	   a	   ‘crisis’	   or	   critical	   event	   –	   Tombari,	   1984),	   the	  
issue	   gains	   a	   new	   pace,	   due	   to	   the	  mobilization	   of	   resources	   around	   a	   particular	  
issue-­‐framing	  that	  spreads	  a	  public	  sense	  of	  urgency	  (Bigelow	   et	  al.,	  1991;	  Greening	  
and	  Gray,	  1994;	  Lamertz	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Elzen	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  The	  framing	  usually	  question	  
the	   industry’s	   institutions	   (e.g.	   their	   product	   or	   process	   technologies,	   or	   other	  
regime	   elements),	   thus	   making	   it	   clearly	   accountable	   for	   the	   problem	   and	  
questioning	  its	  identity	  (Hoffman	  and	  Ocasio,	  2001;	  Lamertz	  et	  al.,	  2003),	  triggering	  
the	  dialectic	  process.	  This	   forces	   industry	  actors	  out	  of	   their	  zone	  of	   rejection	  and	  
indifference,	   because	   the	   framing	  poses	   a	   threat	   to	   their	   ‘shared	   identity’	   (Mahon	  
and	  Waddock,	  1992):	  antagonistic	  positions	  therefore	  start	  to	  be	  taken.	  Two	  factors	  
therefore	   indicate	   phase	   shift:	   (a)	   emergence	   of	   a	   SMO	   that	   articulates	   (b)	   a	  
particular	   issue	   framing	   that	   makes	   industry	   actors	   accountable	   for	   the	   societal	  
problem.	  	  
Phase	  2:	  Rising	  public	  concerns	  and	  defensive	  industry	  responses	  
Problem-­‐related	   pressures:	  This	  is	  the	  stage	  of	  collective	  and	  organized	  pressure	  
(Blumer,	   1971;	  Bigelow	  et	   al.,	   1991),	  whilst	   in	   the	  previous	   stage	   sense-­‐making	   and	  
campaigning	   activities	   were	   carried	   out	   by	   unorganized	   activists.	   SMOs	   organize	  
demonstrations,	   educational	   campaigns	   and	   protests,	   and	   promote	   other	   framing	  
strategies	  that	  add	  ‘drama’	  to	  the	  issue	  (Hilgartner	  and	  Bosk,	  1988).	  They	  may	  play	  
on	  new	  scientific	  findings	  (Schneider,	  1985)	  or	  issue-­‐related	  shock-­‐events	  that	  trigger	  
wider	  public	  attention	  (Downs,	   1972;	  Tombari,	   1984)	  and	  lead	  to	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  
urgency.	  “In	  this	  phase,	  activists	  begin	  to	  attract	  the	  support	  of	  more	   ‘mainstream’	  
citizens	  and	  organizations,	  and	  these	  voices	  become	  too	  loud	  to	  ignore”	  (Rivoli	  and	  
Waddock,	   2011,	   p.	   91).	   Public	   support	   adds	   ‘legitimacy’	   (Mitchell	   et	   al.,	   1997)	   to	  
activists’	   demands,	   which	   creates	   reputation	   pressure	   on	   industry	   actors.	   A	  




practices	  –	  opens	  up	  (Sethi,	  1975;	  Post,	  1978;	  Sethi,	  1979;	  Mahon	  and	  Waddock,	  1992).	  
In	   response	   to	   public	   attention,	   policy-­‐makers	   may	   start	   to	   engage	   in	   symbolic	  
action	   (Mahon	   and	   Waddock,	   1992),	   e.g.	   express	   concerns	   or	   promote	   public	  
campaigns	  and	  conferences	  to	  discuss	  the	  issue.	  This	  action	  is	  however	  not	  sufficient	  
to	  address	  the	  problematic	  condition	  or	  force	  the	  industry	  to	  do	  so.	  
Industry	   responses:	   Firms-­‐in-­‐industries	   move	   out	   of	   their	   zone	   of	  
rejection/indifference	  and	  into	  the	  zone	  of	  symbolic	  action	  (Mahon	  and	  Waddock,	  
1992),	  which	  represent	  defensive	  strategies	   to	  defend	  themselves	  against	  criticisms	  
and	   pressures	   stemming	   from	   the	   institutional	   environment.	   They	   may	   use	   “de-­‐
dramatizing	   strategies”	   (Hillgartner	   and	   Bosk,	   1988,	   p.	   62)	   and	   promote	   advocacy	  
advertising,	  public	   relations,	  press	   conferences,	  or	  political	   education	  programmes	  
(Hillman	  and	  Hitt,	  1999)	  that	  aim	  at	  reframing	  the	  problem	  (Mahon	  and	  Waddock,	  
1992).	   Therefore,	   an	   early	   ‘framing	   struggle’	   opens	   up	  when	   firms	   in	   the	   industry	  
position	  themselves	  around	  an	  alternative	  issue	  framing	  (Lamertz	  et	  al.,	  2003)	  that	  
favours	   the	   status	   quo.	  Which	   framing	   “comes	   to	   dominate	   public	   discourse	   has	  
profound	   implications	   for	   the	   future	   of	   the	   social	   problem,	   for	   interest	   groups	  
involved,	  and	  for	  policy”	  (Hilgartner	  and	  Bosk,	  1988,	  p.	  57-­‐8).	  Due	  to	  the	  reputation	  
threat	  posed	  over	  the	  entire	  industry,	  firms	  will	  likely	  form	  an	  Inter-­‐Organizational	  
Relationship	   for	   reasons	   of	   legitimacy	   (Oliver,	   1990):	   a	   closed	   industry	   front	   to	  
protect	  collective	  interests	  against	  issue-­‐related	  pressures.	  
At	  this	  stage,	  if	  further	  denial	  damages	  their	  credibility,	  individual	  firms	  may	  
start	   to	   perceive	   a	   need	   to	   allocate	   some	   R&D	   resources	   towards	   incremental	  
innovations	  (Freeman	  and	  Perez,	   1988)	  that	  stay	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  existing	  
industry	   (technical)	   regime,	   thus	   allowing	   them	   to	   exploit	   existing	   competencies	  
(March,	   1991).	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   this	   is	   a	   defensive	   strategy	   that	   promotes	   a	  
favourable	   (technical)	   issue-­‐framing	   to	  prevent	  deeper	   changes	   in	   the	   regime.	  On	  
the	  other,	   it	  plays	  a	  symbolic	  role,	  as	   it	  signalizes	  the	   ‘industry	   is	  working	  towards	  
solution’	   and	   thus	   no	   forced	   (political)	  mandate	   shall	   be	   needed	   (Maxwell	   et	   al.,	  
2000).	   In	   other	   words,	   ‘greenwashing’	   and	   display	   of	   incremental	   technical	  
prototypes	  is	  a	  possible	  strategy	  at	  this	  point	  (Schrage,	  1993;	  Laufer,	  2003).	  
Phase	  shift:	  The	  move	  to	  the	  next	  stage	  is	  marked	  by	  public	  issue-­‐attention	  moving	  
above	  a	  certain	  threshold,	  indicating	  shared	  public	  concern	  that	  creates	  pressures	  on	  




domain	   (Neuman,	   1990).	   Key	   mechanisms	   leading	   to	   rising	   public	   attention	   are	  
framing	  struggles,	  organized	  action	  by	  SMOs	  and	  reportage	  by	  the	  media	  (Lamertz	  et	  
al.,	  2003;	  Rivoli	  and	  Waddock,	  2011):	  “As	  activism	  continues,	  the	  media	  tends	  to	  take	  
more	   notice,	   raising	   it	   in	   public	   awareness	   and	   increasing	   the	   likelihood	   that	  
institutional	  processes	  will	  be	  set	  in	  place.	  (…)	  Thus,	  the	  issue	  is	  propelled	  into	  the	  
next	  phase”	  (Rivoli	  and	  Waddock,	  2011,	  p.	  92).	  
Phase	  3:	  Political	  debates,	  controversies	  and	  defensive	  hedging	  
Problem-­‐related	   pressures:	   With	   positions	   established	   around	   alternative	  
framings,	   the	   struggle	  becomes	  one	  of	   influencing	   the	  official	   framing	  adopted	  by	  
policy-­‐makers.	   These	   struggles	   take	   place	   in	   policy	   debates,	   inquiries	   and	   public	  
hearings	  to	  investigate	  causes	  and	  possible	  solutions.	  Activists,	  SMOs,	  scientists	  and	  
other	   concerned	   actors	   (including	   industry	   representatives)	   all	   take	   part	   in	   this	  
political	   debate	   process,	   deploying	   information,	   direct	   lobbying	   and	   financial	  
incentives	   strategies	   (Hillman	   and	   Hitt,	   1999).	   Political	   debates	   in	   investigative	  
hearings	   represent	   heated	   framing	   struggles	   (Blumer,	   1971)	   that	   reflect	  
interpretations	  based	  on	  values,	  beliefs	  and	  interests	  as	  much	  as	  facts	  (Bigelow	  et	  al.,	  
1991;	   Lamertz	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   The	   visibility	   of	   this	   debate	   leads	   to	   escalating	   public	  
attention	  (Downs,	  1972).	  
Another	  (yet	  incipient)	  source	  of	  pressure	  on	  the	  industry	  begins	  to	  appear	  in	  
the	  task	  environment,	  as	  public	  concerns	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  small	  lead	  
markets	   for	   radical	   alternatives	   –	   constituted	   by	   what	   may	   be	   called	   ‘moral	  
consumers’	  –	  which	  will	  initially	  be	  seized	  by	  industry	  outsiders	  (including	  suppliers	  
attempting	  to	  expand	  their	  own	  markets)	  (Geels,	  2002;	  Tidd	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Gerard	  and	  
Lave,	  2007;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
Industry	   responses:	  Although	  the	  industry	  front	  is	  active	  in	  defending	  the	  regime,	  
individual	  firms	  accelerates	  their	  technical	  learning	  activities	  during	  this	  stage.	  They	  
thus	   adopt	   ‘hedging	   strategies’:	   collective	   political	   strategies	   take	   the	   form	   of	  
releasing	   technical	   information	   (e.g.	   testifying	   as	   expert	   witness	   in	   hearings)	   to	  
influence	   the	   official	   framing;	   this	   may	   include	   withholding	   relevant	   (technical)	  
information	   from	   policy-­‐makers,	   with	   the	   industry	   thus	   playing	   on	   ‘information	  
asymmetry’	  between	  the	  industry	  and	  policy-­‐makers	  (Puller,	  2006).	  It	  also	  includes	  




task	  environment,	  these	  activities	  draw	  on	  the	  alternative	  issue	  framing	  as	  much	  as	  
on	   economic	   factors,	   e.g.	   supposedly	   high	   costs	   and	   infeasibility	   of	   technical	  
solutions	   that	  go	  beyond	   incremental	   innovations.	  As	   industry	  outsiders	  have	  also	  
started	   to	   work	   on	   alternative	   solutions	   (in	   response	   to	   the	   initial	   consumer	  
demand),	  cost	  or	  feasibility	  arguments	  may	  be	  contested	  by	  outside	  specialists	  who	  
also	   take	   part	   in	   the	   debate,	   because	   these	   outsiders	   have	   interest	   in	   seeing	   a	  
regulatory	  mandate	  approved	  (Lee	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  
	   Individual	   firms	  may	  also	  engage	  in	  more	  substantive	  strategies	  through	  the	  
exploration	  (March,	  1991)	  of	  radical	  technical	  alternatives.	  They	  can	  promote	  internal	  
R&D	   investments	   (e.g.	   creation	   of	   specialized	   departments)	   or	   seek	   partnerships	  
(‘joint-­‐ventures’)	  with	  specialist	  firms	  if	  the	  field	  of	  knowledge	  necessary	  to	  promote	  
a	  radical	  solution	   falls	  outside	  the	   incumbent’s	   (background	  or	  core)	  competences	  
(Prencipe,	  1997;	  Dyerson	  and	  Pilkington,	  2005).	  This	  is	  still	  hedging	  though,	  aimed	  at	  
preparation	  for	  future	  eventualities.	  As	  the	  closed	  industry	  front	  is	  still	  maintained	  
for	   reasons	   of	   asymmetry 39 	  (between	   the	   industry	   and	   policy-­‐makers),	   such	  
individual	  initiatives	  are	  expected	  not	  to	  be	  as	  visible	  as	  outsiders’	  developments.	  	  
Phase	  shift:	  The	  shift	  to	  the	  next	  phase	  entails	  the	  problem	  moving	  onto	  the	  macro-­‐
political	  agenda	  (True	  et	  al.,	  1999),	  which	  requires	  the	  problem	  to	  further	  ‘heat	  up’,	  
with	   public	   attention	   approaching	   a	   peak	   (Post,	   1978;	   Tombari,	   1984).	   	   The	   same	  
mechanisms	  of	   ‘attention	  advocacy’	   (Lamertz	  et	   al.,	   2003)	  make	   the	   issue	  hot	  and	  
lead	  to	  surges	  in	  attention:	  activists	  and	  SMOs	  playing	  on	  scandals	  and	  shock	  events,	  
visible	   dialectic	   struggles,	   and	   the	   media	   publicizing	   all	   of	   these.	   High	   public	  
attention	  attracts	  policy	  entrepreneurs	  (Kingdon,	  1984)	  and	  high-­‐level	  politicians	  to	  
the	  process:	  proposing	  and	  leading	  the	  enactment	  of	  substantive	  policies	  to	  tackle	  a	  
hot	   issue	   is	  often	  a	  source	  of	  positive	  popularity	  and	  an	  advantage	  during	  election	  
cycles.	   A	   second	   indicator	   of	   phase	   shift	   is	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   (technical)	   solution	  
(usually	  the	  result	  of	  outsiders’	  work),	  which	  also	  promotes	  the	  issue	  to	  the	  top	  of	  
the	   macro-­‐political	   agenda	   (Kingdon,	   1984).	   In	   fact,	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   radical	  
technical	  solution	  (even	  in	  theory)	  which	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  brought	  to	  markets	  is	  a	  key	  
motivation	  for	  developing	  substantive	  regulations,	  e.g.	  technology-­‐forcing	  policies.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  The	  IOR	  is	  also	  maintained	  for	  reasons	  of	  (Oliver,	  1990):	  reciprocity	  (between	  industry	  actors,	  
e.g.	  to	  prevent	  a	  single	  firm	  to	  gain	  economic	  advantage	  based	  on	  the	  issue),	  efficiency	  (to	  avoid	  
duplication	  of	  political	  strategy	  efforts)	  or	  for	  stability	  and	  predictability	  of	  future	  outcomes	  (in	  




Phase	  4:	  Formation	  and	   implementation	  of	  substantive	  policy	  and	   industry	  
diversification	  
Problem-­‐related	   pressures:	   Macro-­‐politicians	   get	   involved	   during	   the	   peak	   of	  
public	  attention	  to	  the	  issue,	  in	  a	  self-­‐reinforcing	  ‘me-­‐too’	  process:	  increasing	  public	  
attention	  leads	  politicians	  to	  act,	  which	  leads	  to	  more	  public	  (and	  media)	  attention.	  
The	  political	  debate	  gets	  more	  evident	  when	  media	  become	  interested	  in	  technical	  
hearings	  and	  investigative	  committees,	  leading	  to	  a	  highly	  visible	  struggle	  to	  shape	  
the	  policy	  plans	  (Blumer,	  1971).	  The	  combination	  of	  the	  issue	  acquiring	  a	   ‘celebrity	  
status’	  (Geels	  and	  Penna,	  2013)	  and	  a	  high	  sense	  of	  urgency	  (e.g.	  public	  outrage	  and	  
convergence	   of	   attention)	   help	   to	   create	   the	   political	   will	   to	   enact	   radical	   policy	  
(Molitor,	  1977).	  
The	  symbolism	  of	  enacting	  a	  radical	  piece	  of	  regulation	  “may	  cool	  down	  the	  
controversy	  and	  make	  the	  issue	  less	  visible	  in	  the	  mass	  media”	  (Spector	  and	  Kitsuse,	  
1973,	  p.	  153).	  This	  is	  the	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  process	  (Post,	  1978;	  Tombari,	  1984;	  Rivoli	  
and	  Waddock,	   2011),	   when	   public	   attention	   diminishes	   as	   the	   issue	  moves	   to	   the	  
backstage	   of	   administrative	   agencies.	   In	   qualitative	   terms,	   the	   issue	   becomes	  
institutionalized	  through	  the	  new	  legislation,	  so	  that	  attention	  can	  be	  easily	  redrawn	  
in	  case	  new	  controversies	  arise	   (Downs,	   1972;	  Spector	  and	  Kitsuse,	   1973).	  And	  yet,	  
even	   if	  a	   radical	  piece	  of	   legislation	  has	  been	  enacted,	   “the	  matter	   is	  by	  no	  means	  
settled”	   (Post,	   1978,	   p.	   24),	   because	   the	   mandate	   still	   has	   to	   be	   interpreted	   and	  
implemented.	   In	   the	   task	   environment,	   the	   new	   market	   niche	   starts	   to	   gain	  
momentum,	  with	  demand	  from	  concerned	  consumers	  spilling	  over	  to	  mainstream	  
markets,	  which	  represent	  important	  entry	  or	  leverage	  point	  for	  firms.	  
Industry	   responses:	  This	  stage	  sees	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  new	  struggle	  between	  individual	  
firms’	   strategies	  and	   the	  collective	   industry	   strategy.	   Initial	   tensions	   from	  the	  past	  
stage	  lead	  to	  several	  types	  of	  strategic	  games	  in	  the	  industry’s	  environments.	  Existing	  
industry	  association	   (IOR)	  may	  continue	   to	  deploy	  political	   strategies	   towards	   the	  
institutional	  environment,	  to	  delay	  or	  prevent	  implementation	  of	  regulations,	  and	  to	  
ratchet	   down	   the	   regulator’s	   credibility	   (Puller,	   2006):	   this	   is	   the	   time	   of	  
confrontational	   strategies,	   which	   include	   non-­‐compliance,	   blackmailing	   and	  
litigation	  (e.g.	  to	  contest	  the	  legislation	  that	  might	  be	  mandating	  a	  technology	  still	  




Yet,	   individual	   firms’	   technological	   strategies	   are	   likely	   to	   move	   beyond	  
hedging	   and	   towards	   diversification,	   with	   increased	   R&D	   investments	   in	   radical	  
alternatives,	   to	   seize	   the	   growing	   consumer	   market	   for	   the	   ‘technical	   solutions’.	  
Individual	  firms	  start	  to	  ‘jockey	  for	  position’	  –	  to	  secure	  a	  first-­‐mover	  advantage	  over	  
its	   rivals	   –	   and	   attempt	   to	   transform	   their	   own	   radical	   technology	   into	   de	   facto	  
standard	  (Puller,	  2006;	  Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2007).	  Permanent	  cracks	  start	  to	  appear	  in	  
the	  industry	  front,	  possibly	  leading	  to	  the	  complete	  dissolution	  of	  the	  issue-­‐specific	  
IOR	  towards	   the	  end	  of	   this	   stage.	  The	   industry	   regime’s	   technical	  and	   regulatory	  
elements	  are	  at	  this	  point	  substantially	  changed.	  
Phase	   shift:	   The	   permanent	   crack	   in	   the	   industry	   front	   (resulting	   from	   the	   new	  
dialectical	   struggle)	   is	   a	   first	   indicator	   of	   phase	   shift,	   revealing	   that	   the	   issue	   has	  
crucially	   spilled	   over	   to	   the	   task	   environment.	   Another	   indicator	   is	   the	   end	   of	   a	  
period	   of	   regulatory	   (Lee	   et	   al.,	   2010)	   and	   technical	   uncertainties,	   i.e.	   when	   the	  
radical	   policy	   is	   effectively	   implemented	   and	   there	   is	   a	   single	   technical	   solution	  
towards	  which	   firms	   reorient.	  This	   regulatory	   and	   technological	   convergence	  may	  
result	   in	   innovation	   races.	   Competitive	   struggles,	   mandated	   markets	   (through	  
regulation)	   and	   spillover	   from	  niche	  markets	   lead	   to	  more	   substantive	   changes	   in	  
mainstream	   consumer	   preferences	   and	   higher	   demand	   for	   radical	   technological	  
alternatives.	  So,	  a	  third	  indicator	  is	  the	  visible	  acceleration	  of	  market	  demand.	  
Phase	  5:	  Spillovers	  to	  the	  task	  environment	  and	  industry	  ‘recreation’	  
Problem-­‐related	   pressures:	  This	   is	  the	  outcome	  stage,	  when	  radical	  technologies	  
diffuse	   to	   mainstream	   markets,	   either	   (a)	   through	   a	   strict	   policy	   (regulation)	   or	  	  
(b)	   through	   changes	   in	   consumer	   preferences.	   Socio-­‐political	   pressure	   diminishes	  
considerably,	   and	   attention	   declines.	   With	   the	   social	   and	   political	  
institutionalization	   of	   the	   issue,	   new	   behaviours	   and	   cultural	   ideologies	   (e.g.	  
environmentalism)	   affect	   consumer	   preferences.	   These	   also	   change	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
marketing	  positioning	  efforts	  by	  the	  industry	  and	  price/performance	  improvements	  
that	  make	  new	  technologies	  more	  attractive	  (Geels	  and	  Penna,	  2013).	  
Industry	   responses:	  Industry	  regime	  reorientation	  is	  the	  result	  of	  individual	  firms	  
perceiving	  a	  new	  issue-­‐related	  market	  opportunity,	  which	  incentivizes	  them	  to	  enact	  
new	  institutions	  and	  strategies.	  Firms	  change	  economic	  positioning	  strategies,	  which	  




full	  speed.	  On	  top	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  technical	  and	  regulatory	  elements,	  the	  regime’s	  
core	   beliefs	   and	   mission	   are	   now	   substantially	   transformed	   (e.g.	   there	   is	   a	  
widespread	  belief	  that	  addressing	  the	  issue	  is	  economically	  and	  technically	  feasible,	  
so	  that	  it	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  industry’s	  mission	  to	  do	  so).	  The	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  thus	  
results	  in	  the	  ‘strategic	  recreation’	  (Tushman	  and	  Romanelli,	  1985)	  of	  the	  incumbent	  
industry	  regime.	  
III.3. CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  
The	  Dialectic	  Issue	  Life-­‐Cycle	  model	  specified	  above	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  a	  gap	  in	  
the	   STI	   field	   of	   research	   so	   as	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   ‘Grand	   Societal	   Challenges’	  
agenda.	  The	  gap	  concerned	  how	  societal	  issues	  co-­‐evolve	  with	  technology	  and	  how	  
the	   incumbent	   industry	   may	   contribute	   to	   addressing	   these	   issues.	   I	   used	   the	  
Greening	  of	  Industry	  literature	  as	  an	  inspiration,	  which	  suggested	  that	  issues	  and	  
responses	   progress	   through	   stages	   at	   the	   organizational	   field	   level.	   Due	   to	  
shortcomings	   in	   this	   literature,	   I	   reviewed	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory,	  which	  however	  
presented	   three	   shortcomings	   of	   its	   own.	   Through	   the	   mobilization	   of	   insights	  
from	  additional	  works	  (from	  STI	  studies	  and	  Organizational	  Institutionalism),	  the	  
DILC-­‐model	   manages	   to	   address	   these	   three	   shortcomings:	   it	   explains	   the	   shift	  
towards	  substantive	  response	  (e.g.	  technological	  strategy)	  by	  incumbents;	  it	  relates	  
the	  dynamics	  of	  issue	  attention	  to	  patterns	  (stages	  and	  shifts)	  of	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
(a	  point	  further	  explored	  empirically);	  it	  explains	  the	  interplays	  between	  firm-­‐level	  
and	  collective	  (industry-­‐level)	  strategies;	  and	  it	  proposes	  qualitative	  criteria	  (‘phase	  
shift	   processes’)	   for	   the	   identification	   of	   stages	   (which	   will	   be	   further	   explored	  
methodologically	   and	   empirically).	   The	  DILC-­‐model	   therefore	   represents	   a	   first-­‐
round	  –	  conceptual	  –	  answer	  to	  this	  thesis’	  research	  questions.	  
While	   the	   ideal	   type	   DILC-­‐model	   offers	   an	   important	   (conceptual)	  
approximation	   to	   answering	   the	   research	   questions,	   it	   also	   has	   two	   explicit	  
shortcomings:	  (1)	  it	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  influence	  of	  wider	  contexts	  and	  
competing	   issues	   on	   a	   given	   issue	   life-­‐cycle;	   and	   (2)	   it	   posits	   a	   linear	   (‘normal’)	  
pathway	   to	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   Both	   shortcomings	   will	   therefore	   be	   tackled	  
empirically:	   these	   tentative	   answers	   to	  my	   research	   questions	  will	   be	   tested	   and	  
refined	  through	  the	  application	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  to	  empirical	  cases,	  which	  will	  




The	   latter	   therefore	   represents	   an	   important	   criterion	   for	   case	   selection.	   Next	  
Chapter	  will	  outline	  the	  methodology	  that	  I	  will	  use	  to	  test	  the	  model,	  in	  order	  to	  
arrive	  at	  more	  nuanced	  answers	  to	  the	  research	  questions.	  	  
A	   possible	   criticism	   to	   the	  DILC-­‐model	   regards	   its	   complexity:	   the	  model	  
builds	   upon	   the	   Triple	   Embeddedness	   Framework	   and	   combines	   insights	   and	  
concepts	  from	  multiple	  fields,	  literatures	  and	  theories.	  To	  be	  useful,	  a	  model	  (just	  
like	   a	   map)	   should	   simplify	   the	   complex	   reality	   (territory)	   by	   identifying	   key	  
concepts,	   possible	   mechanisms,	   and	   their	   relationships.	   The	   importance	   of	  
simplicity	  is	  particularly	  important	  for	   ‘grand	  theories’	  that	  aim	  to	  explain	  a	  wide	  
range	   of	   phenomena	   (for	   instance,	   neoclassical	   economics,	   which	   explains	  
economic	   phenomena	   based	   on	   a	   few	   assumptions	   about	   individual	   and	  
corporative	   behaviour).	   This	   is	   not	   the	   ambition	   ascribed	   to	   the	   DILC-­‐model,	  
which	   aims	   at	   middle-­‐range	   theorizing 40 :	   it	   addresses	   a	   particular	   type	   of	  
phenomena	   –	   issue	   life-­‐cycles	   and	   the	   strategic	   responses	   of	   industries,	   with	  
particular	   attention	   to	   technological	   development,	   and	   it	   does	   so	  by	  defining	   an	  
interrelated	   set	   of	   propositions	   that	   relates	   different	   concepts	   into	   a	   coherent	  
whole.	  At	  this	  point	  of	  theoretical	  development,	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  is	  more	  complex	  
than	  what	  would	  be	  expected	   from	  middle-­‐range	   theories,	  which	  are	  based	  on	  a	  
limited	  number	  of	  related	  concepts	  and	  stylised	  facts	  (Geels,	  2007,	  p.	  635).	  While	  
the	  model	  scores	   low	  on	  simplicity,	   it	  aims	  to	  score	  high	  on	  accuracy,	  so	  that	   its	  
use	  in	  combination	  with	  an	  appropriate	  methodology	  (which	  I	  will	  develop	  in	  the	  
next	   Chapter)	   shall	   enable	   a	   clear	   link	   to	   empirical	   cases	   and	   its	   testing.	   This	  
empirical	   analysis	   shall	   enable	   the	   identification	   of	   patterns,	   regularities,	   and	  
mechanisms	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  further	  refine	  and	  simplify	  the	  model.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  The	  notion	  of	  ‘middle-­‐range	  theory’	  was	  introduced	  by	  Merton	  (1949)	  and	  became	  an	  important	  
theoretical	  avenue	  for	  the	  development	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  studies	  (STS)	  (on	  middle-­‐range	  





This	  chapter	  presents	  the	  methodology	  for	  application,	  testing	  and	  refinement	  of	  
the	   DILC-­‐model.	   It	   starts	   with	   an	   outline	   of	   my	   ontological	   commitments	   and	  
epistemological	  assumptions,	  which	  result	   in	  a	  choice	  of	  utilizing	  Process	  Theory	  
methods.	   I	  will	   apply	   the	  DILC-­‐model	   through	   a	   narrative	  method	   and	   through	  
quantitative	   methods	   (or	   ‘quantification	   approach’).	   In	   particular,	   the	  
quantification	  approach	   seeks	   to	   investigate	   a	  gap	   in	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory:	  how	  
attention	   to	   an	   issue	   fluctuates	   throughout	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   As	   this	   is	   an	  
underdeveloped	   topic	   in	   existing	   theory,	   I	   propose	   the	   utilization	   of	   three	  
quantification	   methods	   to	   investigate	   the	   relationship	   between	   issue-­‐attention	  
cycles	   (including	   technology	   hype-­‐cycles)	   and	   issue	   life-­‐cycles.	   The	   new	  
methodology	  represents	  a	  potential	  original	  contribution.	  The	  Chapter	  ends	  with	  a	  
presentation	   and	   discussion	   of	   the	   case	   study	   design,	   including	   case	   selection,	  
protocol	  and	  analytical	  strategies.	  
IV.1. ONTOLOGICAL	  COMMITMENTS	  AND	  EPISTEMOLOGICAL	  
ASSUMPTIONS	  
Any	   theory-­‐building	   and	   research	   enterprise	   rests	   on	   ontological	   commitments	  
and	  epistemological	  assumptions	  on	  part	  of	  the	  theorist	  and	  researcher.	  Therefore,	  
this	  section	  spells	  out	  my	  commitments	  and	  assumptions,	  which	  allow	  me	  to	  link	  
the	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  the	  methodology	  that	  I	  will	  use	  to	  analyse	  empirical	  
cases	  and	  test	  the	  theory.	  
	   Bennett	   and	   Elman	   (2006a,	   p.	   250)	   argue	   that	  methodologies	   “must	   take	  
into	  account	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  phenomena	  we	  seek	  to	  understand”,	  which	  
implies,	  at	  least,	  certain	  ‘ontological	  commitments’	  (Hofweber,	  2013)	  on	  part	  of	  the	  
researcher.41	  “[S]cholars	   have	   beliefs	   about	  what	   the	   social	  world	   is	  made	   of	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  I	  say	  ‘at	  least’,	  because	  ontology	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  four	  parts:	  “(O1)	  the	  study	  of	  ontological	  
commitment,	  i.e.	  what	  we	  or	  others	  are	  committed	  to,	  (O2)	  the	  study	  of	  what	  there	  is,	  (O3)	  the	  
study	  of	  the	  most	  general	  features	  of	  what	  there	  is,	  and	  how	  the	  things	  there	  are	  relate	  to	  each	  
other	  in	  the	  metaphysically	  most	  general	  ways,	  (O4)	  the	  study	  of	  meta-­‐ontology,	  i.e.	  saying	  what	  
task	  it	  is	  that	  the	  discipline	  of	  ontology	  should	  aim	  to	  accomplish,	  if	  any,	  how	  the	  questions	  it	  
aims	  to	  answer	  should	  be	  understood,	  and	  with	  what	  methodology	  they	  can	  be	  answered”	  
(Hofweber,	  2013,	  online).	  The	  importance	  of	  spelling	  out	  one’s	  own	  ontological	  commitment	  is	  
that	  it	  brings	  with	  it	  implications	  for	  how	  to	  proceed	  when	  answering	  non-­‐ontological	  questions,	  
i.e.	  ontological	  commitments	  have	  epistemological	  implications.	  While	  the	  other	  definitions	  (O2-­‐
O4)	  certainly	  bring	  about	  similar	  implications,	  these	  are	  concerns	  of	  deep	  philosophical	  and	  





how	  it	  operates,	  and	  these	  beliefs	   influence	  their	  choices	  about	  how	  to	  construct	  
and	  verify	  knowledge	  statements	  about	  that	  world”	  (Bennett	  and	  Elman,	  2006b,	  p.	  
456-­‐7).	  The	  key	  ontological	  commitment	   is	  about	  what	  constitutes	  the	   ‘nature	  of	  
reality’.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis,	  which	  is	  concerned	  with	  institutional	  (i.e.	  the	  
industry	   regime),	   organizational	   (i.e.	   firms-­‐in-­‐industries)	   and	   technological	  
changes	  in	  response	  to	  societal	  problems,	  it	  is	  therefore	  sufficient	  to	  digress	  about	  
the	  nature	  of	  institutions,	  organizations,	  technologies	  and	  problems.	  
	   Van	   de	   Ven	   and	   Poole	   (2005)	   identify	   two	   foundational	   ontological	  
positions:	   one	   that	   sees	   the	  nature	  of	   reality	   as	   consisting	  of	   things	   and	   another	  
that	  sees	  it	  as	  consisting	  of	  processes.	  In	  fact,	  both	  things	  and	  processes	  form	  part	  
of	   the	   reality,	   but	   assumptions	   regarding	   how	   they	   interact	   result	   in	   quite	  
contrasting	   views	   of	   the	   world:	   	   in	   one	   view,	   the	   “world	   [is]	   made	   of	   things	   in	  
which	  processes	  represent	  change	  in	  things”,	  in	  the	  other	  view,	  the	  “world	  [is	  made]	  
of	  processes	  in	  which	  things	  are	  reifications	  of	  processes”	  (Van	  de	  Ven	  and	  Poole,	  
2005,	  p.	  1379).	  Van	  de	  Ven	  and	  Poole	  (2005,	  based	  on	  Chia	  and	  Langley	  (2004)	  and	  
Tsoukas	  (2005))	  call	  the	  first	  view	  the	  ‘weak’	  form	  of	  a	  ‘process	  approach’;	  while	  the	  
second	  view	   represents	   the	   ‘strong’	   form	  of	   a	   ‘process	   approach’.	   In	   this	   thesis,	   I	  
adopt	  the	  weak	  form	  of	  a	  process	  approach.	  Indeed,	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  is	  a	  process-­‐
based	   explanation	   of	   changes	   through	   which	   the	   relevant	   entities	   or	   ‘things’	  
(institutions,	  organizations,	  technologies	  and	  problems)	  go	  over	  time.	  
My	  ontological	  commitment	  therefore	   is	   to	  this	  process-­‐based	  view	  of	   the	  
world,	   but	   my	   epistemological	   assumptions	   are	   based	   on	   ‘Critical	   Realism’ 42	  
(Bhaskar,	  1978;	  Lloyd,	  1989;	  Reed	  and	  Harvey,	  1992;	  	  see	  also	  Mutch,	  2005):	  while	  I	  
see	  ‘things’	  as	  the	  result	  of	  socially	  constructed	  ‘processes’,	  I	  do	  not	  subscribe	  to	  a	  
worldview	   in	   which	   ‘everything	   is	   a	   social	   construction’	   (Burnes,	   2009)	   that	  
can/should	  only	  be	  analysed	  as	  such.	  That	  perspective	  can	  be	  exemplified	  	  
...in	   terms	  of	   the	   structure	   and	  operation	  of	   organisations.	  Realists	   argue	  
that	  a	  structure	  is	  a	  set	  of	  simultaneously	  enabling	  and	  constraining	  rules	  
and	  resources	  which	  shape	  the	  interactions	  of	  those	  who	  work	  in	  or	  have	  to	  
deal	  with	  the	  organization.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  structure	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  
a	  causal	  mechanism	  which	  has	  the	  potential	  and	  capability	  to	  act	  in	  certain	  
ways,	  i.e.	  it	  has	  causal	  powers	  (Burnes,	  2009,	  p.	  181)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





In	  other	  words,	  in	  this	  critical-­‐realist	  perspective,	  structures	  possess	  a	  causal	  power	  
that	   condition	   but	   do	   not	   determine	   social	   interaction	   and	   processes	   (Mutch,	  
2005).	   But	   “structures	   cannot	   produce	   and	   reproduce	   themselves”	   (Lloyd,	   1989):	  
this	  requires	  individual	  and	  collective	  human	  action.	  Bhaskar	  (1989,	  p.	  76)	  gives	  the	  
example	  of	  societies,	  which	  are	  not	  created	  by	  individuals,	  “[f]or	  it	  always	  pre-­‐exists	  
them	   and	   is	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	   their	   activity.	   Rather	   society	   must	   be	  
regarded	  as	  an	  ensemble	  of	  structures,	  practices	  and	  conventions	  which	  individuals	  
reproduce	  and/or	  transform.	  But	  which	  would	  not	  exist	  unless	  they	  did	  so.	  Society	  
does	  not	  exist	  independently	  of	  human	  activity...	  But	  it	  is	  not	  the	  product	  of	  it...”.	  
Society	  is	  a	  thing	  that	  exists	  when	  reproduced	  or	  transformed	  through	  processes.	  
In	  my	   approach,	   I	   assume	   there	   is	   a	   ‘reality’	   out	   there	   to	   be	   analysed	   in	  
terms	  of	   causal	  mechanisms	   (process).	   	   Yet,	   this	   analysis	   is	   dependant	  upon	   the	  
observer’s	  (my)	  point	  of	  view	  (including	  knowledge,	  understanding,	  experience	  etc.)	  
–	  therefore,	  it	  is	  a	  ‘critical’	  analysis.	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  critical	  realist	  
view	  for	  institutions,	  organizations,	  technologies	  and	  problems?	  First	  of	  all,	  they	  all	  
can	  be	  seen	  as	  entities	  or	  structures	  –	  socially	  constructed	  through	  processes	  –	  that	  
enable	   and	   constrain	   action,	   but	   which	   need	   constant	   enactment	   through	  
individual	   or	   collective	   human	   action	   to	   exist.	   Industry	   regimes	   (a	   set	   of	  
institutions),	   for	   example,	   enable	   and	   constrain	   individual	   organizations’	   (firms’)	  
strategic	   action;	   but	   strategic	   action	   by	   individual	   firms	   is	   what	   produces,	  
reproduces	   or	   transforms	   the	   industry	   regime.	   Technologies	   (and	   technical	  
regimes)	  are	  socially	  constructed	  (Bijker	   et	  al.,	   1987)	  in	  similar	  fashion,	  and,	  once	  
constructed,	   enable	   and	   constrain	  –	  but	  not	  determine	  –	   action.	  They	   thus	  have	  
causal	  power	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  constantly	  actualized.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  societal	  
problems	  or	  issues:	  	  they	  are	  socially	  constructed	  in	  certain	  ways	  that	  frame	  a	  given	  
condition	   as	   problematic,	   and	   ascertain	   causes	   and	   effects	   to	   this	   problematic	  
condition	  (Hilgartner	  and	  Bosk,	  1988).	  A	  condition	  can	  be	  framed	  as	  problematic	  
in	   many	   ways,	   and	   therefore	   any	   particular	   framing	   needs	   to	   be	   constantly	  
actualized	  and	  reaffirmed	  in	  light	  of	  competing	  framings.	  
Secondly,	   once	   created	   or	   constructed,	   an	   institution,	   organization,	  
technology	  or	  problem	  become	  an	  entity	  “that	  retains	  its	   identity	  while	  changing	  
from	  one	  state	  to	  another	  over	  time”	  (Van	  de	  Ven	  and	  Poole,	  2005,	  p.	  1380).	  This	  is	  




‘life-­‐cycles’	   and	   assign	   them	   certain	   capabilities.	   Therefore,	   my	   ontological	  
commitment	  brings	  about	  an	  epistemological	  consequence:	  the	  task	  of	  the	  ‘realist	  
researcher’	  becomes	  one	  of	  identifying	  (a)	  the	  real	  capabilities	  or	  causal	  powers	  or	  
entities	  under	  analysis	  (i.e.	  institutions,	  organizations	  etc);	  and	  (b)	  the	  generative	  
structures	  and	  processes	  –	  causal	  mechanisms	  –	  underlying	  these	  entities	  (Burnes,	  
2009).	  This	   social	   scientific	   enterprise	   “takes	  place	  within	   frameworks	   [...]	  which	  
help	  conceptualize	  objects	  of	  inquiry	  and	  the	  form	  of	  explanations”	  (Lloyd,	  1989,	  p.	  
465).	  	  	  
	   Which	   epistemological	   position	   allows	   for	   the	   identification	   of	   causal	  
mechanisms	   and	   causal	   powers	   underlying	   change	   processes	   in	   institutions,	  
organizations,	   technologies	   and	   issues?	   It	   is	   useful	   to	   distinguish	   between	   two	  
epistemologies	   (Abbott,	   1992;	   Van	   de	   Ven	   and	   Poole,	   2005),	   which	   are	   clearly	  
linked	  to	  different	  ontological	  assumptions:	  (1)	  change	  can	  be	  understood	  through	  
the	  lenses	  of	   ‘Variance	  Theory’;	  or	  (2)	   it	  can	  be	  understood	  through	  the	  lenses	  of	  
‘Process	   Theory’.	   The	   first	   one	   represents	   change	   as	   a	   dependent	   variable	   to	   be	  
explained	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  set	  of	  independent	  variables.	  The	  second	  view	  takes	  change	  
as	   an	   unfolding	   process	   composed	   of	   a	   sequence	   of	   events	   that	   happen	   in	   an	  
institutional	  arrangement	  and	  result	   in	  a	  given	  outcome	  (Van	  de	  Ven	  and	  Poole,	  
2005).	  Table	  IV.1	  compares	  both	  theoretical	  approaches	  in	  terms	  of	  epistemological	  
assumptions	  (focus,	  types	  of	  explanation,	  criteria	  for	  generalizations,	  importance	  of	  
time	  and	  time-­‐related	  factors	  etc.)	  (Poole	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Van	  de	  Ven	  and	  Poole,	  2005):	  
Table	  IV.1:	  Comparison	  of	  Variance	  and	  Process	  Approaches	  
Variance	  Approach	   Process	  Approach	  
Fixed	  entities	  with	  varying	  attributes	   Entities	  participate	  in	  events	  and	  may	  change	  over	  time	  
Explanation	  based	  on	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  
causality	   Explanation	  based	  on	  necessary	  causality	  
Explanations	  based	  on	  efficient	  causality	  
Explanations	  based	  on	  final,	  formal,	  and	  efficient	  
causality	  
Generality	  depends	  on	  uniformity	  across	  
contexts	  [cases]	  
Generality	  depends	  on	  versatility	  across	  cases	  
[contexts]	  
Time	  ordering	  among	  independent	  variables	  is	  
immaterial	  
Time	  ordering	  of	  independent	  events	  is	  critical	  
Emphasis	  on	  immediate	  causation	   Explanations	  are	  layered	  and	  incorporate	  both	  immediate	  and	  distal	  causation	  
Attributes	  [variables]	  have	  a	  single	  meaning	  over	  
time	  
Entities,	  attributes,	  events	  [variables]	  may	  
change	  in	  meaning	  over	  time	  




• The	  Variance	  Approach	  assumes	  that	  all	  significant	  change	  can	  be	  captured	  
by	  variables.	  It	  focuses	  on	  fixed	  entities	  with	  varying	  attributes,	  and	  therefore	  
those	   variables	   have	   persistent	   meanings	   throughout	   the	   period	   under	  
study.	   Explanations	   take	   the	   form	   of	   deterministic	   causal	   statements	   or	  
(linear)	  models	  (e.g.	  ‘X	  causes	  Y’,	  or	  ‘Y	  =	  α	  +	  βX	  +	  ε’)	  that	  aim	  at	  establishing	  
necessary	  and	  sufficient	  conditions	  for	  the	  (change)	  outcome.	  Studies	  based	  
on	  variance	  method	  are	  interested	  in	  finding	   ‘efficient	  causes’:	  what	  or	  who	  
(which	   independent	   variable)	   caused	   the	   outcome	   (dependent	   variable).	  
Because	   the	   focus	   is	   on	   immediate	   causality	   and	   stable	   attributes	   and	  
relationships,	   time	   and	   chronological	   ordering	   of	   factors	   (variables)	   do	   not	  
affect	   results.	   Given	   the	   precision	  with	  which	   statements	   and	  models	   are	  
constructed,	   generality	   is	   dependent	   upon	   uniformity	   across	   context	   and	  
cases,	   and	   therefore	   a	  main	   criterion	   for	   assessing	   the	   value	  of	   a	   variance	  
model	  is	  its	  predictive	  power.	  	  
• The	  Process	   Approach	   sees	   change	   as	   a	   sequence	   of	   events,	   which	   is	   best	  
captured	  by	  ‘narrative	  histories’	  or	  stories	  rather	  than	  variables	  (Van	  de	  Ven,	  
2007).	   These	   account	   for	   temporal	   connections	   among	   entities,	   attributes	  
and	  events,	  which	  may	  change	  in	  meaning	  over	  time.	  Time	  and	  chronological	  
ordering	   of	   events	   is	   crucial	   in	   the	   process	   approach	   (Pettigrew,	   1997).	   “A	  
process	   theory	  needs	   to	  go	  beyond	  a	   surface	  description,	   to	  penetrate	   the	  
logic	   behind	   observed	   temporal	   progressions.	   This	   explanation	   should	  
identify	  the	  generative	  mechanisms	  that	  cause	  observed	  events	  to	  happen	  in	  
the	   real	   world,	   and	   the	   particular	   circumstances	   or	   contingencies	   when	  
these	  causal	  mechanisms	  operate...”	  (Van	  de	  Ven	  and	  Poole,	  2005,	  p.	  1385).	  
Explanations	   “may	   incorporate	   several	   different	   types	   of	   effects	   [...],	  
including	  critical	  events	  and	  turning	  points,	  contextual	  influence,	  formative	  
patterns	   that	   give	   overall	   direction	   to	   the	   change,	   and	   causal	   factors	   that	  
influence	  the	  sequencing	  of	  events”	  (idem,	  p.	  1384).	  Causal	  explanations	  thus	  
account	   for	   ‘efficient	   causes’,	   plus	   formal	   causes	   (‘formative	   patterns’)	   and	  
final	   causes	   (‘overall	   directions’). 43 	  Here,	   generality	   depends	   not	   on	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uniformity	  and	  predictability	  but	  on	  versatility:	  “the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	  can	  
encompass	  a	  broad	  domain	  of	  developmental	  patterns	  without	  modification	  
of	  its	  essential	  character”	  (Poole	  et	  al.,	  2000,	  p.	  43).	  	  
From	   the	   above	   description,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   epistemological	   approach	   most	  
suitable	  to	  my	  ontological	  commitments	  and	  research	  enterprise	  is	  Process	  Theory.	  
My	   research	   is	   interested	   in	   how	   industries	   and	   technology	   change	   (or	   not)	   in	  
response	   to	  societal	   issues.	  The	  co-­‐evolution	  of	   societal	  problems	  with	   industries	  
and	   technologies	   is	   complex	   and	  multi-­‐dimensional	   phenomena	   that	   operate	   in	  
long	   timeframes.	   More	   than	   aiming	   at	   the	   identification	   of	   antecedent	   and	  
consequent	  factors	  (variables)	  of	  such	  change	  processes,	  I	  want	  to	  understand	  how	  
this	  process	  unfolds	  and	  its	  generative	  mechanisms.	  To	  understand	  the	  dynamics	  of	  
change	  over	   time,	   ‘process	   theory’	   is	  more	  appropriate	   than	  methods	  that	  aim	  at	  
testing	  causality	  between	  variables	   (Abbott,	   1992;	  Pettigrew,	   1997;	  Langley,	   1999).	  
Process	   theory	   “offers	   an	   explanation	   of	   the	   development	   and	   change	   that	  
encompasses	   continuous	   and	   discontinuous	   causation,	   critical	   incidents,	  
contextual	  effects,	  and	  effects	  of	  formative	  patterns”	  (Poole	  et	  al.,	  2000,	  p.	  4).	  
I	   thus	  arrive	  at	  an	  epistemological	  criterion	   for	  accessing	  the	  suitability	  of	  
the	   DILC-­‐model:	   it	   shall	   be	   suitable	   for	   carrying	   processual	   research.	   Pettigrew	  
(1997,	   p.	   340)	   proposes	   five	   guiding	   principles	   (or	   assumptions)	   for	   conducting	  
processual	  analysis:	  	  
1.	  embeddedness,	  studying	  processes	  across	  a	  number	  of	   levels	  of	  analysis;	  
2.	   temporal	   interconnectedness,	   studying	   processes	   in	   past,	   present	   and	  
future	  time;	  
3.	  a	  role	  in	  explanation	  for	  context	  and	  action;	  
4.	  a	  search	  for	  holistic	  rather	  than	  linear	  explanations	  of	  process;	  and	  
5.	   a	   need	   to	   link	   process	   analysis	   to	   the	   location	   and	   explanation	   of	  
outcomes.	  
The	  Dialectic	  Issue	  Life-­‐Cycle	  meets	  all	  five	  principles:	  
1) Drawing	  on	  the	  TEF,	  the	  model	  shows	  that	  the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  societal	  issues,	  
industry	   and	   technologies	   is	   a	   multi-­‐dimensional	   process	   embedded	   in	   two	  
environments.	  The	  DILC-­‐model	  also	  accounts	   for	  processes	  at	  different	   levels	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cause:	  ‘that	  out	  of	  which’,	  e.g.,	  the	  bronze	  of	  a	  statue.	  The	  formal	  cause:	  ‘the	  form’,	  ‘the	  account	  of	  
what-­‐it-­‐is-­‐to-­‐be’,	  e.g.,	  the	  shape	  [and	  e.g.	  proportions]	  of	  a	  statue.	  The	  efficient	  cause:	  ‘the	  
primary	  source	  of	  the	  change	  or	  rest’,	  e.g.,	  the	  artisan,	  the	  art	  of	  bronze-­‐casting	  the	  statue,	  the	  
man	  who	  gives	  advice,	  the	  father	  of	  the	  child.	  The	  final	  cause:	  ‘the	  end,	  that	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  which	  
a	  thing	  is	  done’,	  e.g.,	  health	  is	  the	  end	  of	  walking,	  losing	  weight,	  purging,	  drugs,	  and	  surgical	  tools”	  




(e.g.	   individual/collective;	  organizational/industry),	   thus	  allowing	   for	   a	  multi-­‐
level	  analytical	  approach.	  
2) The	  DILC-­‐model	   shows	   that	   the	   co-­‐evolution	   of	   societal	   issues,	   industry	   and	  
technologies	  is	  a	  long-­‐term	  process	  that	  unfolds	  in	  stages,	  so	  that	  changes	  have	  
distal	  and	  immediate	  causes.	  
3) By	   drawing	   on	   the	   TEF,	   the	   DILC-­‐model	   recognizes	   multiple	   environments,	  
levels	  and	  entities,	  showing	  that	  the	  co-­‐evolutionary	  process	  under	  analysis	   is	  
the	  result	  of	  contextual	  and	  enacted	  causes.	  
4) The	   factors	   above	   together	   makes	   the	   DILC-­‐model	   a	   ‘big	   picture’	   holistic	  
framework	   (or	   ‘ideal	   type’)	   for	   the	   study	   of	   how	   societal	   issues,	   industry	   and	  
technologies	  co-­‐evolve.	  
5) The	  model	   is	   geared	   towards	   outcomes:	   outcomes	   of	   dialectic	   process	  within	  
stages	  and	  of	  the	  whole	  dialectic	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  process.	  
Establishing	  point	  (5)	  –	  linking	  the	  processual	  analysis	  to	  outcomes	  –	  requires	  the	  
development	  of	   suitable	  methodology	  based	  on	  specific	  methods.	  This	  will	   allow	  
me	   to	   apply	   and	   test	   the	   DILC-­‐model	   in	   empirical	   cases.	   I	   now	   turn	   to	   the	  
specification	  of	  these	  ‘process	  theory	  methods’.	  
IV.2. PROCESS	  THEORY	  METHODS	  
Process	  theory	  represents	  an	  epistemological	  approach	  in	  the	  Social	  Sciences	  that	  
may	  be	  applied	  to	  empirical	  analysis	   through	  an	  array	  of	  methods,	  which	  can	  be	  
referred	   as	   ‘process	   theory	   methods’.	   Langley	   (1999)	   identifies	   seven	   process	  
methods	  –	  or	  what	  she	  calls	  ‘strategies	  for	  sense-­‐making’	  of	  process	  data:	  ‘narrative	  
strategy’;	   ‘quantification	  strategy’;	   ‘alternate	   templates	  strategy’;	   ‘grounded	  theory	  
strategy’;	   ‘visual	  mapping	   strategy’;	   ‘temporal	   bracketing	   strategy’;	   and	   ‘synthetic	  
strategy’.	  Each	  of	  these	   is	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	   ‘key	  anchor	  point’,	   ‘fit	  with	  process	  
data	  complexity’,	  ‘specific	  data	  needs’,	  and	  key	  ‘form	  of	  sense-­‐making’	  (see	  below).	  
In	  fact,	  Langley	  (1999)	  argues	  that	  these	  strategies	  are	  suitable	  for	  developing	  new	  
process	  theories	  or	  frameworks,	  but	  each	  has	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  depending	  
on	   their	   level	   of	   ‘accuracy’,	   ‘simplicity’	   and	   ‘generality’.	   The	   combination	   of	  
multiple	   methods	   therefore	   has	   the	   potential	   of	   diminishing	   weaknesses	   by	  




therefore	  will	  use	  two	  methods	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  complementary:	  the	  ‘Narrative	  
Approach’	  and	  the	  ‘Quantification	  Approach’.44	  
IV.2.1. The	  Narrative	  approach	  
The	   narrative	   method	   entails	   the	   construction	   of	   a	   detailed	   story	   based	   on	  
(primary	   and	   secondary)	   data	   collected.	   Poole	   et	   al.	   (2000,	   p.	   12)	   eloquently	  
explains	  key	   steps	   in	   a	   research	   enterprise	  based	  on	  process	   theory	   and	   the	   role	  
played	  by	  the	  ‘narrative’	  in	  a	  processual	  analysis:	  
...investigators	  gather	  data	  that	  indicate	  how	  the	  process	  unfolds	  over	  time.	  
Some	  of	  this	  data	  could	  be	  in	  the	  form	  of	  quantitative	  measurements	  of	  key	  
variables,	  but	  other	  data	  would	  consist	  of	  detailed	  descriptions	  of	  the	  events	  
that	  constituted	  change	  and	  development	  of	  the	  entity	  under	  study.	  Based	  
on	  these	  descriptions,	  researchers	  construct	  a	  timeline	  of	  events	  that	  were	  
significant	   in	   the	   development	   and	   change	   process.	   Each	   case	  will	   have	   a	  
unique	  timeline,	  and	  real	  or	  apparent	  differences	  among	  cases	  are	  a	  major	  
focus	  of	  the	  study.	  Instead	  of	  treating	  unique	  features	  of	  a	  case	  as	  sampling	  
error,	  a	  process	  study	  attempts	   to	   identify	   the	  circumstances	   that	  created	  
the	   particular	   twists	   and	   turns	   in	   each	   ease.	   The	   flow	   of	   events	   and	   the	  
conjunctions	   of	   causal	   forces	   that	  move	   the	   developing	   entity	   through	   its	  
sequence	  are	  captured	  in	  a	  narrative	  that	  explains	  the	  case.	  (my	  emphasis)	  
The	  narrative	  does	  not	  consist	  of	  a	  descriptive	  story	  void	  of	  explanatory	  content	  –	  a	  
mere	   ‘sequence	  of	   events’.	   It	   is	   rather	  an	   ‘analytical	   chronology’,	  which	  explicitly	  
and	  purposively	  interprets	  the	  process	  data	  (Pettigrew,	  1990)	  in	  order	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  
‘mechanism-­‐based’	  explanation.	  The	  narrative	  approach	  therefore	  “does	  not	  aim	  at	  
an	  exhaustive	  account	  of	  all	  details	  but	  seeks	  to	  capture	  the	  crucial	  elements	  of	  the	  
process	  by	  abstracting	  away	  the	  irrelevant	  details”	  (Hedström	  	  and	  Ylikoski,	  2010,	  
p.	  53).	  The	  researcher	  thus	  uses	  the	  narrative	  to	  identify	  generative	  structures	  and	  
mechanisms	   that	   enable	   and	   constrain	   action	   and	   results	   in	   certain	   –	   but	   not	  
unique	   –	   outcomes,	   depending	   on	   the	   chronology	   of	   events	   and	   ordering	   of	  
processes	  (Verhees,	  2011).	  	  
The	   narrative	   approach	   is	   a	   type	   of	   ‘process	   tracing’	   method	   that	   tests	   a	  
mechanism-­‐based	  theory	  (Hedström	  and	  Ylikoski,	  2010):	  the	  method	  consists	  of	  (1)	  
reconstructing	  the	  development	  of	  empirical	  process(es)	  over	  time	  and	  identifying	  
its	   (their)	   chain	   of	   causal	   mechanisms	   (Kern,	   2009);	   and	   (2)	   comparing	   this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  My	  methodology	  also	  draws	  on	  ‘visual	  mapping’,	  as	  it	  will	  analyse	  the	  ordering	  of	  factors	  
(namely,	  ‘attention’	  indicators)	  through	  time;	  and	  ‘temporal	  bracketing’,	  as	  it	  anchors	  core	  part	  of	  
the	  analysis	  on	  ‘phases/stages’.	  However,	  I	  embed	  the	  latter	  in	  both	  the	  narrative	  and	  




empirical	   result	   with	   the	   process	   theory	   or	   framework.	   “In	   process	   tracing,	   the	  
researcher	  examines	  histories,	  archival	  documents,	  interview	  transcripts,	  and	  other	  
sources	  to	  see	  whether	  the	  causal	  process	  a	  theory	  hypothesizes	  or	  implies	  in	  a	  case	  
is	   in	   fact	   evident	   in	   the	   sequence	  and	  values	  of	   the	   intervening	  variables	   in	   that	  
case”	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005,	  p.	  6).	  Most	  of	  the	  time	  process	  tracing	  through	  a	  
narrative	   takes	   the	   form	  of	   an	   ‘in-­‐depth	   case	   study’	   (Pettigrew,	   1990;	   Yin,	   2003),	  
which	  requires	  a	  case	  study	  ‘template’	  or	  ‘protocol’	  (see	  section	  IV.3)	  based	  on	  the	  
theoretical	   framework	   which	   is	   being	   tested	   (the	   DILC-­‐model,	   which	   is	   a	  
‘theoretical	  narrative’).	   It	   is	   this	  protocol	   that	   enables	  pattern-­‐matching	  between	  
empirical	  case	  and	  theory	  and	  cross-­‐case	  comparisons	  (see	  section	  IV.3.3).	  	  
In	   terms	   of	   Langley’s	   (1999)	   typological	   assessment	   of	   process	   theory	  
methods,	   the	   narrative	   approach	   can	   be	   characterized	   as	   following:	   given	   the	  
importance	  of	   ‘chronology’,	   its	   key	   anchor	   is	   ‘time’.	   Because	   the	  narrative	   allows	  
the	   researcher	   to	   account	   for	  distal	   and	   ambiguous	   causes,	   the	  method	  presents	  
good	   fit	   with	   ‘ambiguous	   boundaries’	   and	   ‘variable	   temporal	   embeddedness’.	  
Moreover,	   the	   application	   (and	   testing)	   of	   theory	   through	   the	   narrative	  method	  
requires	   one	   or	   few	   rich	   (‘in-­‐depth’)	   cases	   that	   allow	   theory-­‐testing	   through	  
comparison.	   In	   terms	   of	   ‘sense-­‐making	   forms’,	   the	   narrative	   method	   draws	   on	  
‘stories’,	   ‘meanings’	   and	   ‘mechanisms’.	  While	   the	   strength	   of	   narrative	   approach	  
lies	   in	   its	   accuracy,	   it	   is	   weak	   in	   simplicity	   and	   generality	   (in	   the	   sense	   of	  
‘uniformity	   across	   contexts’).	   The	   use	   of	   a	   ‘quantification	   approach’	   helps	   to	  
address	  some	  of	  these	  weaknesses:	  “[t]he	  two	  strategies	  [...]	  lie	  at	  the	  two	  ends	  of	  a	  
continuum	  that	  opposes	  empirical	  accuracy	  and	  theoretical	  parsimony”	  (Langley,	  
1999,	  p.	  698).	  	  
IV.2.2. The	  Quantification	  approach	  
In	  Langley’s	  (1999)	  typology,	  a	  ‘quantification	  strategy’	  is	  anchored	  on	  ‘events’	  and	  
‘outcomes’:	   by	   presenting	   good	   fit	   with	   –	   and	   focusing	   on	   –	   ‘events	   and	   their	  
characteristics’,	   it	   ‘eschews	  ambiguity’.	  This	  method	  requires	  many	  similar	  events	  
(or	   relatively	   long	   time	   series)	   for	   statistical	   analysis,	   and	   therefore	   one	   or	   few	  
dense	   cases	   are	   suitable	   for	   theory	   development	   and	   testing.	   Sense-­‐making	  




mechanisms.	   By	   eschewing	   ambiguity	   and	   abstracting	   from	   original	   data,	   this	  
method	  scores	  high	  on	  simplicity	  and	  generality,	  but	  low	  on	  accuracy.	  
The	  quantification	  strategy	  is	  often	  used	  as	  a	  ‘variance	  theory	  method’.	  Yet,	  
it	  may	  also	  be	  used	  within	  a	  process	  epistemology	  and	  methodology.	  For	  instance,	  
Van	   de	   Ven	   and	   Poole	   (2005)	  mentions	   the	   use	   of	   ‘agent-­‐based	  models’	   to	   test	  
process	   theories;	   and	  Langley	   (1999)	   refers	   to	  methods	  based	  on	   ‘coding’	   (e.g.	   of	  
events	   or	   words),	   which	   result	   in	   time	   series	   of	   similar	   factors	   that	   can	   be	  
statistically	  analysed.	  She	  notes,	  however,	  that	  “despite	  the	  conversion	  of	  the	  data	  
to	   quantitative	   form,	   the	   types	   of	   statistical	   analysis	   appropriate	   to	   process	  
theorizing	   are	   somewhat	   different	   from	   those	   used	   in	   most	   variance	   research”	  
(Langley,	   1999,	   p.	   687).	   While	   variance	   theory	   relies	   on	   standard	   statistical	  
methods	  –	  such	  as	  ANOVA	  (ANalysis	  Of	  VAriance)	  or	  linear	  regressions	  –	  that	  seek	  
to	  test	  and	  generalize	  an	  uniform	  theory	  across	  cases,	  process	  theory	  quantification	  
methods	   use	   time-­‐series	   and	   experimental	   statistical	   methods	   –	   such	   as	   lagged	  
regression,	  log-­‐linear	  models,	  non-­‐parametric	  statistics,	  autoregressive	  models,	  and	  
dynamic	   simulation	   such	   as	   agent-­‐based	  models	   –	  within	   a	   single	   case	   (Langley,	  
1999).	  
However,	  “[t]he	  quantification	  strategy	  will	  be	  much	  more	  convincing	  if	  it	  is	  
used	   in	   combination	   with	   other	   approaches	   that	   allow	   contextualization	   of	   the	  
abstract	  data,	  adding	  nuances	  of	   interpretation	  and	  confirming	   the	  mechanics	  of	  
the	  mathematical	  model	  with	  direct	  evidence”	  (Langley,	  1999,	  p.	  698).	  Accordingly,	  
in	   this	   thesis,	   I	  will	   use	   the	  quantification	   approach	   as	  part	   of	  my	   in-­‐depth	   case	  
study	  methodology:	  it	  will	  be	  used	  to	  examine	  initial	  relationships	  and	  patterns	  to	  
be	  further	  explored	  with	  the	  narrative	  method.	  
The	  main	  goal	  of	  using	  these	  mixed	  (qualitative-­‐quantitative)	  methods	  is	  to	  
address	  two	  gaps	  in	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory,	  identified	  in	  Chapter	  II:	  the	  relationship	  
between	   issue	   life-­‐cycles	   and	   issue-­‐attention	   cycles	   (including	   technology	   hype-­‐
cycles);	   and	   criteria	   for	   the	   identification	   of	   empirical	   phases.	   Because	   these	   are	  
gaps	   in	   existing	   theory,	   I	   will	   develop	   an	   original	   methodology	   based	   on	   three	  
increasingly	  sophisticated	  quantification	  methods:	  (1)	  visual	  analysis	  of	  time	  series;	  
(2)	   meta-­‐correlation	   analysis	   within	   a	   temporal	   bracketing	   framework;	   and	   (3)	  
testing	  for	  unknown	  structural	  breaks	  in	  the	  time	  series.	  To	  my	  best	  of	  knowledge,	  




cycle	  framework	  has	  not	  been	  attempted	  before,	  and	  thus	  this	  novel	  methodology	  
can	  potentially	  represent	  an	  original	  contribution	  of	  this	  thesis,	  as	   it	  may	  help	  to	  
establish	   the	   relationship	  between	   issue-­‐attention	  cycles	   and	   issue	  attention	   life-­‐
cycles,	  while	  also	  providing	  a	  method	  to	  objectively	  identify	  stages	  in	  an	  empirical	  
issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   In	  order	   to	   test	   the	   feasibility	  and	  usefulness	  of	   these	  methods,	   I	  
will	  select	  cases	  that	  allow	  their	  application	  (see	  section	  IV.3.1).	  	  
IV.2.2.1. Visual	  analysis	  of	  time	  series	  
Issue-­‐attention	   theory	   has	   usually	   employed	   a	   restricted	   number	   of	   (public	   and	  
political)	  attention	  indicators,	  namely:	  
• The	  standard	  indicator	  for	  public	  attention	  to	  an	  issue	  is	  the	  count	  number	  
of	   newspaper	   articles	   on	   the	   given	   issue	   (see	   e.g.	   Downs,	   1972;	   Neuman,	  
1990;	   Mazur	   and	   Lee,	   1993;	   McComas	   and	   Shanahan,	   1999;	   Henry	   and	  
Gordon,	  2001;	  Newig,	  2004;	  Liu	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  
• The	   standard	   indicator	   for	   political	   attention	   to	   an	   issue	   is	   the	   count	  
number	   of	   parliamentary	   or	   congressional	   outputs	   on	   the	  given	   issue	   (i.e.	  
bill	   proposals,	   legislation,	   speeches,	   enquiries,	   hearings,	   reports	   etc.),	  
usually	  published	   in	  governmental	   records	   (see	  e.g.	  Mazur	  and	  Lee,	   1993;	  
Bailey,	  1998;	  Newig,	  2004;	  Liu	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  
Molitor	  (1977)	  identified	  several	  other	  indicators,	  not	  only	  for	  public	  attention	  (e.g.	  
artistic	   outputs,	   or	   fiction/non-­‐fiction	   books	   that	   mention	   a	   given	   issue)	   and	  
political	  attention	  (e.g.	  political	  speeches	  and	  reports	  outside	  congress/parliament),	  
but	  also	  for	  e.g.	  scientific	  and	  professional	  attention	  (e.g.	  scientific	  journals,	  trade	  
journals,	  academic	  theses).	  As	  we	  saw	  (section	  II.4.2),	  the	  literature	  on	  technology	  
hype-­‐cycles	  also	  draw	  on	  indicators	  of	  (industry	  and	  other	  stakeholder’s)	  attention	  
to	  particular	  technologies,	  including:	  number	  of	  technological	  prototypes	  featuring	  
a	   given	   technology	   (indicator	   of	   industry/firm	   attention	   used	   by	   Bakker	   (2010));	  
articles	  in	  specialized	  magazines	  about	  the	  technology	  (indicator	  of	  organizational-­‐
field/industry	  attention	  used	  by	  Bakker	  et	  al.	  (2012));	  number	  of	  patents	  related	  to	  
the	  technology	  (industry/firm	  attention	  used	  by	  Jun	  (2012)).	  	  
In	   issue-­‐attention	   theory	   studies,	   these	   indicators	   are	   collected	   in	   regular	  
intervals	   (e.g.	   monthly	   or	   annually)	   and	   plotted	   over	   time,	   revealing	   an	   overall	  




instance,	  Newig	  (2004)	  collected	  monthly	  data	  for	  public	  and	  political	  attention	  to	  
BSE	   (‘Bovine	   Spongiform	   Encephalopathy’	   aka	   ‘mad	   cow	   disease’)	   in	   Germany	  
(Figure	   IV.1).	   However,	   the	   visual	   depiction	   of	   the	   time	   series	   data	   does	   not	  
represent	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	   the	  methodology	  employed	  by	  those	  authors,	  who	  are	  
mostly	   interested	   in	   testing	   issue-­‐attention	   cycles	   as	   an	   agenda	   setting	   theory.	  
They	  therefore	  draw	  on	  standard	  (or,	  sometimes,	  more	  sophisticated45)	  statistical	  
methods	  to	   infer	  the	  relationship	  between	  public	  (media)	  and	  political	  attention.	  
This	   is	   the	   approach	   adopted	   by	   Newig	   (2004);	   or	   by	   Jun	   (2012),	   who	   tests	   for	  
causality	  between	  media,	  public	  and	  industry	  attention	  to	  vehicle	  technology.	  
Figure	  IV.1:	  Public	  and	  political	  attention	  to	  BSE	  in	  Germany	  
	  
Source:	  Figure	  8	  in	  Newig	  (2004,	  p.	  177).	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  however,	  the	  visual	  representation	  of	  time	  series	  data	  is	  part	  of	  the	  
core	   –	   albeit	   preliminary	   –	   method	   of	   analysis.	   Here,	   I	   propose	   that	   the	   visual	  
representation	  of	   issue-­‐attention	  data	   through	   time	   indicates	  distinctive	  periods	   in	  
the	   overall	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   In	   other	   words,	   in	   my	   methodology,	   the	   visual	  
representation	   of	   issue-­‐attention	   indicators	   is	   a	   first	   attempt	   of	   ‘temporal	  
bracketing’:	   of	   dividing	   the	  whole	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   into	   sub-­‐periods.	   This	   division	  
will	  allow	  me	  to	  structure	  the	  case	  study	  narrative	  in	  sub-­‐periods,	  which	  I	  will	  later	  
compare	  with	  the	  theoretical	  stages	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  (in	  the	  ‘pattern-­‐matching’	  
exercise	  –	  see	  section	  IV.3.3).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




	   This	   kind	   of	  method	   is	   usually	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘visual	   data	  mining’	   (Keim,	  
2002)	  or	   ‘data	  visualization	  technique’	   (Marghescu,	  2007),	  and	  aims	  at	  producing	  
initial	   insights	   about	   broad	   patterns	   and	   apparent	   relationships	   between	   time	  
series	  data.	   In	   the	  STI	   field,	   (sophisticated)	   ‘visualization’	   techniques	  are	  used	   in	  
scientometrics	  research	  (see	  e.g.	  Yang	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Rafols	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Leydesdorff	  et	  
al.,	  2012;	  Leydesdorff	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  see	  also	  the	  Scientometrics	  journal).	  In	  this	  thesis,	  
I	  will	  use	  simpler	  technique	  similar	  to	  the	  ‘multiple	  line	  graphs’	  approach	  described	  
by	  Marghescu	  (2007),	  in	  which	  the	  attention	  indicators	  are	  displayed	  in	  line,	  bar	  or	  
area	  charts	  and	  synchronized	  by	  the	  use	  of	  same	  time	  intervals	  (see	  also	  Wainer,	  
1984,	  who	  shows	  what	  should	  be	  avoided	  when	  displaying	  quantitative	  data).	  
This	  exploratory	   visual	   examination	   I	  propose	  consists	   in	  establishing	  sub-­‐
periods	  in	  the	  data	  plots	  through	  the	  visual	  identification	  of	  e.g.	  periods	  between	  
attention	  peaks	  or	  attention	  valleys	  (which	  are	  indicative	  of	  ‘attention	  thresholds’),	  
or	  periods	  of	   steady	   increase/decrease	   in	   attention,	  or	  periods	  of	   convergence	  of	  
attention	  from	  different	  actors.	  However,	  I	  will	  not	  take	  the	  resulting	  periodization	  
as	   final:	   to	   establish	   each	   case	   study’s	   sub-­‐periods,	   I	   will	   triangulate	   the	   visual	  
examination	  with	  my	  knowledge	  of	  key	  events	  and	  processes	  during	  each	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	  under	  analysis	  (and	  compare	  these	  with	  the	  ‘phase	  shift	  processes’	  defined	  in	  
Chapter	   III),	   in	  order	   to	  establish	  a	  more	  nuanced	  and	  objective	  periodization	  of	  
each	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  This	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  address	  a	  caveat	  of	  this	  method,	  which	  is	  
that	   it	   rests	   on	   subjective	   judgement.	   The	   appropriateness	   of	   this	   method	   to	  
identify	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  stages	  shall	  be	  corroborated	  or	  overruled	  by	  the	  statistical	  
tests	  for	  unknown	  structural	  breaks	  (see	  section	  IV.2.2.3).	  
Because	   this	   method	   presents	   little	   requirements	   and	   does	   not	   rest	   on	  
strong	  statistical	  assumptions46,	  it	  will	  be	  used	  in	  all	  three	  case	  studies	  (see	  section	  
IV.3.1	   for	   case	   selection).	  Yet,	   the	  number	  of	   attention	   indicators	  will	  depend	  on	  
availability	   for	   each	   case.	   Here	   is	   a	   list	   of	   indicators	   used	   in	   one	   or	   more	   case	  
studies:	  
• For	   public	   attention,	   I	   use	   the	   number	   of	   newspaper	   articles	   on	   the	  
particular	  issue	  as	  proxy	  indicator.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





• For	   political	   attention,	   I	   employ	   two	   qualitatively	   distinct	   indicators:	   for	  
policy-­‐making	   activities	   (congressional	   attention)	   and	   policy-­‐
implementation	   activities	   (executive	   branch	   attention),	   respectively,	   I	   use	  
issue-­‐related	  entries	  in	  the	  Congressional	  Record	  and	  the	  Federal	  Register.47	  
• For	   organizational-­‐field	   attention,	   I	   use	   as	   indicator	   the	   count	   number	   of	  
articles	   in	   the	  Automotive	   News	   (American	   edition)	   on	   a	   given	   issue	   (to	  
depict	   issue-­‐attention	   cycles)	   and	   on	   different	   technologies	   (to	   depict	  
technology	  hype-­‐cycles).	  
• For	  industry	  and	  firm	  attention	  to	  a	  given	  technology,	  I	  use	  as	  indicator	  the	  
count	  number	  of	  patents	   filed	   in	   the	  United	  States	  Patent	  and	  Trademark	  
Office	  (USPTO).	  
While	   the	   use	   of	   attention	   indicators	   may	   provide	   important	   insights	   into	   the	  
dynamics	  of	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle,	  it	  is	  crucial	  not	  to	  take	  them	  ‘at	  face	  value’,	  and,	  as	  
with	  any	  STI	  indicator,	  “they	  must	  be	  used	  with	  great	  care	  and	  in	  full	  awareness	  of	  
their	   limitations”	   (Freeman	   and	   Soete,	   2009,	   p.	   584).	   Any	   indicator	   will	   capture	  
only	   some	   aspects	   of	   the	  phenomenon	   it	   is	   related	   to	   and/or	  provide	   a	   ‘blurred’	  
insight	  into	  the	  phenomenon.	  Indicators	  may	  present	  problems	  of	  definition	  and	  of	  
measurement	  (method).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  indicators	  that	  I	  will	  use	  in	  this	  thesis,	  
issues	   of	   the	   first	   type	   include	   the	   debate	   on	   whether	   newspaper	   coverage	   of	   a	  
given	   issue	   reflects	   or	   is	   reflected	   by	   public	   attention.	  While	   I	   acknowledge	   this	  
issue,	  studies	  (e.g.	  Liu	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Newig,	  2004)	  have	  shown	  that	  media	  and	  public	  
co-­‐evolve	  and	  reflect	  each	  other,	  so	  that	  the	  use	  of	  media	  attention	  (count	  number	  
of	  news	  paper	  articles	  on	  a	  given	  issue)	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  public	  attention	   seems	  
acceptable.	  
A	  measurement/method	  problem	  of	  attention	  indicators	  is	  related	  to	  their	  
collection	   through	   a	   fixed	   set	   of	   keywords:	   the	   indicator	   does	   not	   account	   for	  
changes	   in	   meanings,	   interpretations	   and	   framings	   of	   the	   issue.	   Moreover,	   this	  
kind	   of	   indicator	   and	   data	   collection	   strategy	   does	   not	   account	   for	   changes	   in	  
length	  of	  newspapers	  or	  articles	  (however,	  by	  using	  more	  than	  one	  newspaper	  as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  All	  case	  studies	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  US	  car	  industry	  (see	  section	  IV.3.1	  for	  case	  selection).	  
Therefore,	  here	  I	  am	  listing	  the	  indicators	  for	  political	  attention	  in	  the	  United	  States:	  the	  
Congressional	  Record	  publishes	  transcripts	  of	  hearings,	  debates	  and	  speeches	  and	  bill	  proposals,	  
indicating	  evolving	  attention	  to	  issues.	  The	  Federal	  Register	  publishes	  regulatory	  agency’s	  
notifications	  and	  rules	  and	  (presidential)	  executive	  orders,	  two	  key	  types	  of	  policy-­‐




source,	   this	   issue	   is	   less	   of	   a	   concern).	   While	   a	   strategy	   could	   be	   devised	   to	  
methodologically	   tackle	   the	   first	   issue	   (of	   meanings,	   interpretations,	   and	  
framings),	  in	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  tackle	  it	  through	  the	  narrative	  approach.	  However,	  I	  
will	  carry	  out	  ‘robustness	  checks’	  when	  collecting	  data	  on	  the	  attention	  indicators,	  
by	   testing	   different	   sets	   of	   keywords	   to	   maximize	   the	   relevance	   of	   the	   results	  
(indicators).	  In	  particular,	  the	  robustness	  checks	  will	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  trade-­‐off	  
between	  inclusion	  of	  relevant	  articles	  and	  exclusion	  of	  irrelevant	  articles.48	  
	   Particular	  care	  should	  also	  be	  used	  when	  adopting	  patents	  as	  indicators	  of	  
R&D	   outcomes,	   technologies,	   and	   innovation	   strategies.	   The	   STI	   literature	   on	  
patents	  is	  well	  established	  and	  vast	  (see	  e.g.	  Pavitt,	   1985;	  Basberg,	  1987;	  Griliches,	  
1998;	  De	  Rassenfosse	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  and	  has	  identified	  many	  problems	  with	  the	  use	  of	  
patents	  statistics	  as	  technology	  indicators;	  these	  include:	  differences	  in	  propensity	  
to	  innovate	  between	  firms,	  sectors	  and	  countries;	  the	  content	  value	  (or	  quality)	  of	  
different	  patents;	  the	  (often	  lack	  of)	  relationship	  between	  patenting	  a	  technology	  
and	   commercializing	   it;	   the	   strategic	   use	   of	   patent	   portfolios	   (e.g.	   patents	   as	  
barriers	  to	  entry).	  These	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  definition	  problems.	  Patent	  statistics,	  if	  
collected	   through	  keyword	   searches,	   can	   also	  be	   affected	  by	   similar	   problems	   as	  
the	  attention	  indicators	  discussed	  above.	  
As	  will	  become	  clearer	  in	  each	  case	  study,	  in	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  adopt	  different	  
strategies	   to	  collect	  patent	  data,	   in	  order	   to	  minimize	  methodological	   issues	  (see	  
discussion	  of	  case	  selection	  in	  section	  IV.3.1):	  in	  the	  air	  pollution	  case	  study,	  I	  will	  
collect	  patents	  on	  emission	  control	   technologies	  based	  on	  keyword	  searches	  that	  
include	  words	  related	  to	  the	  automobile	  industry	  (because	  these	  technologies	  are	  
based	  on	  multiple	  scientific	  and	  technological	  fields,	  they	  are	  classified	  in	  multiple	  
classes,	  sometimes	  unrelated	  to	  the	  car	  industry);	  in	  the	  car	  safety	  case	  study,	  I	  will	  
collect	  patent	  data	  based	  on	  a	  class	  search	  in	  the	  US	  Patent	  and	  Trademark	  Office	  
(due	  to	  limitations	  in	  the	  database,	  that	  prevents	  keyword	  searches	  for	  old	  patents,	  
but	  also	  because	  car	  safety	  technologies	  are	  classified	  in	  well	  defined	  classes);	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  There	  are	  two	  key	  issues	  that	  affect	  the	  collection	  of	  articles	  based	  on	  keyword	  searches:	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  relevant	  articles	  (‘false	  negatives’)	  and	  the	  inclusion	  of	  irrelevant	  articles	  (‘false	  
positives’).	  By	  modifying	  a	  search	  string	  to	  include	  more	  and	  more	  terms,	  one	  will	  reach	  a	  limit	  
where	  more	  terms	  result	  in	  too	  many	  false	  positives,	  whilst	  it	  does	  not	  result	  in	  the	  inclusion	  of	  
any	  (previously)	  false	  negative	  articles.	  To	  tackle	  these	  issues,	  one	  needs	  to	  try	  out	  different	  
search	  strings	  and	  scan	  through	  the	  results	  to	  ascertain	  their	  relevance.	  This	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  




in	  the	  climate	  change	  case	  study	  I	  will	  adopt	  a	  mixed	  strategy	  based	  on	  keywords	  
and	  classes	  (based	  on	  the	  methodology	  of	  Oltra	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  In	  the	  climate	  change	  
case,	   I	   will	   also	   look	   at	   patent	   portfolios	   of	   alternative-­‐fuel	   vehicle	   technologies	  
(the	  percentage	  of	  AFV	  patents	  in	  the	  total	  number	  of	  patents	  by	  each	  firm);	  this	  
should	   minimize	   the	   issue	   with	   different	   propensities	   to	   innovate.	   While	   these	  
strategies	  will	  not	  completely	  eliminate	  the	  problems	  with	  patent	  statistics	  that	  I	  
flagged	   above,	   in	   all	   case	   studies,	   the	   narrative	   approach	  will	   help	  me	  minimize	  
them,	   particularly	   	   the	   qualitative	   issues,	   like	   different	   propensities	   to	   innovate,	  
commercialization	  of	  technologies,	  strategic	  use	  of	  patents,	  etc.	  
The	  case	  studies	  will	  also	  draw	  on	  non-­‐attention	  indicators	  such	  as	  product	  
sales	   (technology	   diffusion	   indicators),	   firms’	   financial	   results,	   governmental	  
funding	  for	  technology	  R&D,	  market-­‐shares	  (of	  companies	  and	  technologies),	  and	  
others.	   Each	   case	   study	   (chapters	   V	   to	   VII)	   will	   detail	   the	   data	   used	   for	   the	  
quantification	  method	  (see	  case	  study	  protocol).	  
IV.2.2.2. Meta-­‐analysis	  of	  correlations	  within	  a	  temporal	  bracketing	  
framework	  
A	   second	   quantification	   method	   to	   be	   employed	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	   calculate	  
correlation	   coefficients	   between	   paired	   time	   series,	   e.g.	   between	   political	   and	  
public	   attention;	   or	   between	   industry	   (patenting)	   attention	   and	   regulatory	  
attention.	   These	   correlations	   can	   be	   calculated	   for	   the	   overall	   period	   of	   interest	  
(the	  whole	   issue	   life-­‐cycle)	  and	  sub-­‐periods	   (e.g.	   correlations	  before	  and	  after	  an	  
identified	  ‘turning	  point’	  in	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle).	  The	  resulting	  set	  of	  correlations	  for	  
each	  paired	  time	  series	  in	  the	  whole	  and	  sub-­‐periods	  can	  be	  compared	  through	  a	  
meta-­‐analysis	   based	   on	   well-­‐established	   statistical	   procedures	   (Kenny,	   1987;	  
Walker,	  2003).	  
In	   this	   thesis,	   I	   use	   a	   statistical	   test	   to	   verify	   the	   significance	   of	   the	  
difference	  between	  two	   independent	  correlation	  coefficients	   (e.g.	   to	   test	  whether	  
correlations	   between	   political	   and	   public	   attention	   is	   equal	   before	   and	   after	   a	  
‘turning	  point’,	  or	  to	  test	  whether	  industry	  attention	  is	  more	  correlated	  with	  public	  
or	  political	  attention)	  (Kenny,	  1987).49	  Because	  the	  proxy	  variables	  are	  not	  normally	  
distributed,	  as	  required	  for	  the	  calculation	  of	  Pearson’s	  correlation	  coefficient,	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  The	  test	  takes	  into	  account	  sample	  sizes	  for	  each	  period.	  I	  assume	  correlation	  independence	  in	  
different	  periods	  due	  to	  ‘structural	  breaks’	  in	  the	  series	  (visually,	  statistically	  or	  qualitatively	  




meta-­‐analysis	  will	  be	  based	  on	  the	  Spearman’s	  rho	  correlation	  coefficient,	  which	  is	  
more	  appropriate	  for	  non-­‐parametric/non-­‐normally	  distributed	  data	  and	  for	  small-­‐
sized	  samples	  (Gibbons	  and	  Chakraborti,	  2003).	  Because	  I	  will	  use	  Spearman’s	  rho,	  
when	  performing	   the	   statistical	   test,	   I	  have	   to	   transform	  Spearman’s	   rho	   into	  an	  
equivalent	   value	   of	   Pearson’s	   r	   (Gilpin,	   1993),	   and	   perform	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Fisher	  
transformation’	  of	  the	  latter	  (Kenny,	  1987).	  
As	  I	  will	  be	  using	  a	  non-­‐parametric	  statistic,	  this	  method	  does	  not	  require	  
strong	   assumptions	   about	   the	   distribution	   of	   the	   data	   (e.g.	   that	   the	   data	   is	  
normally	   distributed).	   It	   does	   however	   require	   availability	   of	   appropriately	   sized	  
series	  of	  attention	  indicators;	  hence,	  this	  represents	  one	  technical	  criterion	  for	  case	  
selection	  (see	  section	  IV.3.1).	  Moreover,	  it	  requires	  ‘good	  quality’	  data,	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  I	  will	  assume	  that	  a	  quantitative	  indicator	  represents	  qualitative	  aspects	  of	  an	  
issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  If	  successful,	  this	  analysis	  can	  offer	  important	  insights	  into	  within-­‐
phase	   relationships.	   Yet,	   because	   correlation	   does	   not	   imply	   causality50,	   these	  
insights	  shall	  be	  further	  explored	  through	  an	  in-­‐depth	  narrative	  method.	  	  
IV.2.2.3. Testing	  for	  unknown	  ‘structural	  breaks’	  in	  the	  time	  series	  
In	   time	   series	   statistics,	   a	   so-­‐called	   ‘structural	   break’	   occurs	   when	   the	   implicit	  
population	   function	   changes	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   sample	   under	   consideration	  
(Stock	  and	  Watson,	  2006).	  A	  classical	  example	  of	  a	  break	  in	  economic	  time	  series	  
data	   is	   a	   peak	   in	   unemployment	   following	   the	   outbreak	   of	   a	   financial	   crisis.	   In	  
terms	  of	  attention	  data	  indicators,	  a	  structural	  break	  can	  be	  hypothesized	  to	  also	  
happen	   after	   ‘trigger	   events’	   (such	   as	   a	   ‘financial	   crisis’	   in	   the	   unemployment	  
example):	  before	  the	  event,	  attention	  would	  be	  fluctuating	  around	  an	  average	  level;	  
after	   the	   event,	   attention	  would	   start	   to	   increase	   fast.	   Structural	   breaks	   can	   also	  
happen	  after	  attention	  reaches	  certain	  levels,	  and	  then	  decreases	  fast.	  
There	   are	   two	   main	   methods	   (statistical	   tests)	   for	   detecting	   such	   breaks	  
from	  time	  series	  data51,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  usually	  employed	  in	  macro-­‐	  and	  financial	  
economics	  analysis.	  In	  one	  method	  (the	  ‘Chow	  Test’),	  the	  break	  date	  (in	  the	  same	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Spearman’s	  rho	  correlation	  coefficient	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  generic	  measure	  of	  association	  
(Noether,	  1981).	  Its	  calculation	  is	  based	  on	  the	  ranking	  order	  of	  sample	  values:	  let’s	  say	  two	  
samples	  of	  interest	  (e.g.	  political	  and	  public	  attention)	  consist	  of	  ten	  yearly	  observations	  each.	  
The	  procedure	  is	  based	  on	  attributing	  a	  rank	  order	  (1st-­‐10th)	  to	  the	  values	  according	  to	  their	  size	  
and	  calculating	  the	  correlation	  between	  rankings.	  An	  interpretation	  for	  a	  high	  correlation	  
coefficient,	  in	  this	  example,	  would	  be:	  high/low	  level	  of	  public	  attention	  in	  one	  year	  is	  associated	  
with	  high/low	  level	  of	  political	  attention	  in	  this	  same	  year.	  




unit	  of	  time	  as	  the	  data	  has	  been	  collected,	  e.g.	  month,	  quarter	  or	  year)	  is	  known	  
(or	   hypothesized)	   in	   advance	   (Torres-­‐Reyna,	   2013).	   The	   second	   method	   is	   a	  
modified	  Chow	  Test,	  called	  the	  Quandt	  Likelihood	  Ratio	  (QLR)	  test	  (after	  Quandt,	  
1960),	   which	   tests	   for	   unknown	   break	   dates.	   “The	   QLR	   test	   can	   detect	   a	   single	  
discrete	   break,	  multiple	   discrete	   breaks,	   and/or	   slow	   evolution	   of	   the	   regression	  
function”	  (Stock	  and	  Watson,	  2006,	  p.	  569).	  
The	  QLR	  test	  therefore	  seems	  appropriate	  for	  a-­‐priori	  analysis	  of	  attention	  
indicators,	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   sub-­‐periods	   (or	   temporal	   bracketing	   in	   phases)	  
through	   the	   use	   of	   statistics.52	  To	   get	   a	  more	   precise	   picture,	   I	  will	   compare	   the	  
results	   from	  the	  QLR	  tests	  with	  the	  visual	  examination	  of	  the	  plotted	  time	  series	  
and	  my	  initial	  knowledge	  of	  key	  events	  in	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  This	  shall	  also	  reveal	  
the	   appropriateness	   or	   otherwise	   of	   the	   visual	   examination	   of	   time	   series	   as	   a	  
method	   for	   identification	   of	   stages.	   Given	   the	   exploratory	   nature	   of	   this	   thesis’	  
methodology,	   I	   will	   restrict	   the	   use	   of	   this	   more	   sophisticated	   method	   to	   the	  
contemporary	  case	  (see	  next	  section),	  which	  offers	  richer	  sources	  of	  data	  (attention	  
indicators)	  for	  a	  relatively	  long	  period.	  
IV.3. CASE	  SELECTION,	  CASE	  STUDY	  PROTOCOL,	  PATTERN	  MATCHING	  
AND	  CROSS-­‐CASE	  COMPARISON	  	  
As	  explained	  in	  section	  IV.2,	  the	  narrative	  and	  quantification	  strategies	  are	  part	  of	  a	  
case	   study	   approach	   to	   test	   the	  DILC-­‐model	   against	   empirical	   examples	   of	   issue	  
life-­‐cycles.	  Case	  studies	  are	  an	  adequate	  research	  strategy	  “[1]	  when	  ‘how’	  or	  ‘why’	  
questions	  are	  being	  posed,	  [2]	  when	  the	  investigator	  has	  little	  control	  over	  events,	  
and	   [3]	   when	   the	   focus	   is	   on	   contemporary	   [but	   also	   historical]	   phenomenon	  
within	  some	  real-­‐life	  context”	  (Yin,	  2003,	  p.	  1).	  Moreover,	  case	  studies	  are	  suitable	  
for	  understanding	  complex	  causal	  mechanisms	  (George	  and	  Bennett,	  2005),	  being	  
therefore	   appropriate	   for	   the	   proposed	   research.	   This	   section	   will	   explain	   key	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  The	  test	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  model	  errors	  (estimated	  by	  the	  QLR	  test)	  are	  
independent	  and	  identically	  distributed,	  and	  this	  will	  be	  tested	  in	  this	  research.	  The	  reader	  is	  
referred	  to	  Stock	  and	  Watson	  (2006,	  p.	  567-­‐571)	  for	  the	  technical	  description	  of	  the	  statistical	  test.	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  modified	  procedure	  (based	  on	  Stock’s	  and	  Watson’s)	  explained	  in	  
Torres-­‐Reyna	  (2013),	  who	  also	  makes	  available	  a	  ‘do-­‐file’	  for	  running	  the	  test	  in	  STATA.	  As	  I	  will	  
be	  using	  annual	  data,	  my	  tests	  will	  include	  up	  to	  four	  lags	  (five	  restrictions)	  to	  account	  for	  
autocorrelations	  and	  distal	  breaks	  (due	  to	  e.g.	  election	  cycles);	  the	  tests	  will	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  





factors	   in	   case	   study	  design:	   the	   case	   selection,	   the	   case	   study	  protocol,	   and	   the	  
method	  of	  analysis	  (pattern-­‐matching	  and	  cross-­‐case	  comparison).	  
IV.3.1. Case	  selection	  
A	  common	  criticism	  to	  case	  studies	  is	  that	  they	  would	  not	  allow	  for	  generalizations	  
and,	   therefore,	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   contribute	   to	   ‘scientific’	   development.	  
Flyvbjerg	   (2006)	  has	   convincingly	   argued	   that	   this	   criticism	   is	   incorrect,	  because	  
generalization	   “depend	   on	   the	   case	   one	   is	   speaking”	   (p.	   225).	   Therefore,	   case	  
selection	  is	  crucial	  for	  theory	  development:	  instead	  of	  ‘random	  sampling’	  (as	  used	  
e.g.	  to	  test	  variance	  theories	  that	  aim	  at	  uniformity	  across	  cases),	   in	  case	  studies,	  
selection	  is	  purposively	  undertaken	  based	  on	  the	  potential	  information	  content	  of	  
the	  cases.	  	  
Case-­‐selection	   decisions	   stem	   from	   the	   research	   hypothesis.	   Specifically,	  
each	  case	  should	  serve	  a	  unique	  purpose	  within	  the	  overall	  scope	  of	  enquiry.	  
Each	  case	  must	  be	  chosen	  to	  complement	  others,	  e.g.	  because	  theoretically	  
interesting	  patterns	  are	  expected.	  (Johnston	  et	  al.,	  1999,	  p.	  206)	  
In	  other	  words,	  in	  case	  study	  research,	  cases	  should	  be	  selected	  due	  to	  theoretical	  
or	  methodological	  reasons	  (Yin,	  2003).	  In	  light	  of	  this	  thesis’	  research	  purposes,	  the	  
main	   theoretical	   criterion	   for	   selecting	   cases	   is	   that	   they	   must	   involve	   the	  
development	   of	   technologies	   by	   an	   incumbent	   industry	   in	   response	   to	   a	   societal	  
issue.	  Moreover,	  the	  thesis	  aims	  at	  contributing	  to	  the	  ‘Grand	  Societal	  Challenges’	  
agenda,	   and	   therefore	   the	   issues	   studied	   should	   indeed	   represent	   societal	  
challenges.	  On	   top	   of	   these	  my	   theoretical	   framework	   –	   the	  DILC-­‐model	   –	   also	  
informs	  case	  selection:	  
• Cases	   should	   span	   many	   decades,	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   investigate	   the	  
processes	   in	   full,	   from	   issue	   emergence	   to	   resolution	   (or	   otherwise).	  
Therefore,	  historical	  case(s)	  shall	  be	  included	  in	  the	  case	  sample.	  	  
• The	  DILC-­‐model	  identifies	  two	  processes	  (or	  routes)	  for	  industry	  recreation:	  
through	  changes	  in	  consumer	  preferences	  and	  enactment	  of	  strict	  regulation	  
(e.g.	  technology-­‐forcing	  policies).	  Therefore,	  two	  historical	  cases	  should	  be	  




• Lessons	   from	   historical	   case(s)	   should	   be	   relevant	   for	   the	   contemporary	  
agenda	  of	   ‘Great	   Societal	  Challenges’.	   Therefore,	   the	  DILC-­‐model	   shall	   be	  
further	  tested	  with	  a	  contemporary	  case.	  	  
In	  previous	  chapters,	  I	  have	  also	  outlined	  other	  case	  selection	  criteria:	  	  
• At	   least	   one	   of	   the	   cases	   should	   include	   technology	   hype-­‐cycle(s)	  
throughout	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle;	  
• Cases	   should	   allow	   the	   application	  and	   testing	  of	   the	  novel	  methodology:	  
(a)	   data	   series	   of	   attention	   indicators	   should	   be	   available	   for	   all	   cases,	   in	  
order	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   use	   of	   the	   exploratory	   visual	   examination	  method;	  	  
(b)	  sufficiently	  long	  time	  series	  for	  attention	  indicators	  should	  be	  available	  
for	   at	   least	   one	   case,	   so	   that	   the	   meta-­‐analysis	   of	   correlations	   can	   be	  
applied;	  (c)	  at	  least	  one	  case	  should	  have	  ‘good	  quality’	  attention	  indicators	  
for	   a	   sufficiently	   long	   period,	   in	   order	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   use	   of	   both	   the	  
correlation	  analysis	  and	  the	  QLR	  test.	  
• Moreover,	  my	  selection	  of	  cases	  shall	  also	  take	  into	  account	  that	  the	  DILC-­‐
model	   represents	   the	   ‘normal’	   pathway	   of	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	   i.e.	   the	  
standard	  sequence	  of	  phases,	  from	  1	  to	  5.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  select	  
at	  least	  one	  case	  that	  seems	  to	  deviated	  from	  this	  pattern.	  	  
These	   research-­‐specific	  criteria	   result	   in	  a	   three-­‐case	  sample:	   two	  historical	  cases	  
and	   one	   contemporary.	   These	   cases	   shall	   cover	   the	   response	   of	   incumbent	  
industries	   to	   problems	   that	   represent(ed)	   societal	   challenges.	   My	   case	   selection	  
choices	  operate	  at	  two	  levels:	   the	  choice	  of	   industry	  or	   industries	  to	  be	  analysed,	  
and	  the	  choices	  of	  cases	  (issues)	  affecting	  this	  industry.	  Which	  industry(ies)	  shall	  
be	   chosen?	   Flyvbjerg	   (2006)	   suggests	   four	   (non-­‐mutually	   exclusive)	   generic	  
strategies	   for	  selecting	  cases,	  which	  I	  will	  apply	  to	  select	  the	   industry	  on	  which	  I	  
will	  focus:	  selecting	  (a)	  extreme	  or	  deviant	  cases;	  (b)	  maximum	  variation	  cases;	  (c)	  
critical	  cases;	  or	  (d)	  paradigmatic	  cases.	  An	  extreme	  case	  is	  one	  that	  is	  unusual	  or	  
clearly	  (‘extremely’)	  illustrates	  the	  theory	  being	  tested.	  A	  maximum	  variation	  case	  
strategy	  aims	  at	  choosing	  two	  opposing	  cases	  in	  one	  dimension,	  holding	  constant	  
another	  dimension.	  A	  critical	  case	  is	  the	  one	  that	  has	  crucial	  importance	  in	  relation	  
to	  the	  topic	  under	  study	  and	  allows	  for	  inferences	  of	  the	  kind	  ‘If	  this	  is	  (not)	  valid	  
for	  this	  case,	  then	  it	  applies	  to	  all	  (no)	  cases’:	  it	  is	  a	  ‘least	  likely’	  or	  ‘most	  likely’	  case.	  




phenomenon	  under	   study	  and	   so	  develops	  a	  new	  metaphor	  or	  a	  new	   theoretical	  
line	  of	  enquire.	  	  
Regarding	   the	   first	   choice,	   I	  will	   aim	  at	   choosing	   an	   industry	   that	   can	  be	  
regarded	   as	   extreme	   case:	   the	   American	   automobile	   industry,	   which	   has	   been	  
historically	   and	   contemporarily	   associated	   with	   many	   societal	   issues.	   Amongst	  
those	  issues	  are	  (Parry	  et	  al.,	  2007):	  local	  air	  pollution;	  global	  air	  pollution	  (‘climate	  
change’);	  oil	  dependency;	  traffic	  congestion;	  and	  traffic	  accidents	  (‘car	  safety’)	  –	  all	  
of	  which	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  ‘societal	  challenges’	  on	  their	  own53.	  Because	  of	  (a)	  the	  
scope	   of	   the	   issues	   associated	  with	   it	   (spawning	   the	  whole	   country)	   and	   (b)	   the	  
confrontational	   approach	   towards	   institutional	   demands	   (Luger,	   2000),	   the	  
American	   automobile	   industry’s	   response	   to	   societal	   issues	   also	   represents	   an	  
extreme	  case.	  Analysing	  this	  industry	  can	  thus	  potentially	  “reveal	  more	  information	  
because	   they	   activate	   more	   actors	   and	  more	   basic	   mechanisms	   in	   the	   situation	  
studied”	   (Flyvbjerg,	   2006,	   p.	   229).	   Furthermore,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   automobile	  
industry’s	  strategic	  response	  to	  issue-­‐related	  pressures	  attends	  practical	  concerns,	  
because	  this	  industry	  is	  still	  associated	  with	  present-­‐day	  Grand	  Societal	  Challenges,	  
such	  as	  climate	  change.	  
One	   issue	  when	   selecting	   extreme	   cases	   is	   generalization:	   they	   can	   be	   so	  
unusual,	  that	  the	  analysis	  results	  in	  biased	  conclusions,	  distorting	  the	  portrayal	  of	  
the	   phenomenon	   under	   analysis	   (Verhees,	   2011).	   Instead	   of	   aiming	   at	   complete	  
‘versatility	   across	   cases’,	   I	   will	   aim	   at	   middle-­‐range	   generalizations	   (see	   section	  
IV.4).	  
Choosing	  one	  single	  context	  (the	  USA)	  also	  presents	  practical	  and	  analytical	  
benefits.	  Given	  the	  historical	   importance	  of	   the	  American	  automobile	   industry,	  a	  
vast	  amount	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	  data	  sources	   is	  available.	  By	  studying	  this	  
single	   industry,	   I	   can	   draw	   on	   these	   sources	   for	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   cases	  
through	  triangulation	  of	  evidence.	  This	  also	  allows	  me	   to	  accumulate	  knowledge	  
about	  the	  industry	  throughout	  this	  thesis’	  research	  enterprise.	  Moreover,	  amongst	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Whether	  they	  represent	  ‘Grand’	  challenges	  can	  be	  debated.	  Yet,	  they	  are	  all	  persistent	  problems	  
that	  pose	  formidable	  challenges	  to	  societies,	  and	  present	  characteristics	  similar	  to	  new	  challenges	  
(or	  ‘missions’)	  as	  outlined	  by	  Soete	  and	  Arundel	  (1993),	  such	  as	  the	  need	  for	  complementary	  
policies,	  and	  direction	  of	  change	  (solutions)	  influenced	  by	  many	  stakeholders,	  competition	  
between	  old	  and	  new	  technologies.	  In	  any	  case,	  my	  position	  is	  that	  the	  way	  the	  automobile	  
industry	  responded	  to	  those	  challenges	  can	  provide	  invaluable	  lessons	  as	  to	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  




data	   readily	   available	   are	   attention	   indicators,	   which	   are	   crucial	   for	   testing	   my	  
proposed	  methodology.	  	  
On	   the	   downside,	   choosing	   the	   American	   car	   industry	   has	   limitations	  
(Geels	   and	   Penna,	   2013)	   associated	   with	   geographical	   boundaries	   and	   the	  
globalization	   process:	   (1)	   foreign-­‐owned	   automakers	   operate	   and	   produce	   in	   the	  
US	  market;	  (2)	  American	  car	  companies	  operate	  abroad.	  These	  limitations	  will	  be	  
addressed	  with	  a	  research	  protocol	  (see	  next	  section)	  that	  includes	  the	  discussion	  
of	   (a)	   foreign	   carmakers’	   strategies	   as	   (economic)	   pressures	   on	   the	   American	  
industry;	  and	  (b)	  global	  developments	  (e.g.	  other	  national	  and	  global	  policies)	  as	  
(institutional)	  pressures	  on	  the	  American	  car	  industry.	  
So,	  given	  that	  the	  American	  car	  industry	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  multiple	  
issues,	  which	  one	  shall	  I	  select	  for	  my	  analysis?	  This	  second	  choice	  will	  be	  informed	  
by	  the	  criteria	  outlined	  above.	  The	  historical	   issues	  I	  chose	  are	   local	   air	   pollution	  
and	  car	   safety.	  These	   issues	  meet	   the	  criteria	  of	   representing	   societal	   challenges,	  
and	  they	  have	  a	   long	  history	  of	  developments,	  so	  that	  they	  can	  potentially	  reveal	  
insights	  about	  all	  phases	  of	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  Moreover,	  they	  meet	  the	  variation	  
criteria:	   on	   the	   one	  hand,	   local	   air	   pollution	   lead	   to	  partial	   regime	   reorientation	  
(changes	   in	   the	   technical	   regime)	   through	   technology-­‐forcing	   regulation	   (the	  
Clean	  Air	  Act,	  which	  resulted	  in	  catalytic	  converters	  being	  brought	  to	  markets);	  on	  
the	  other	  hand,	  car	  safety	  became	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  consumer’s	  preferences,	  
so	  that	  regime	  reorientation	  around	  car	  safety	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  followed	  the	  
‘changes	   in	   consumer	   preferences’	   route.	   The	   contemporary	   issue	   I	   choose	   is	  
climate	  change,	  because	  it	  represents	  a	  key	  –	  if	  not	  the	  foremost	  –	  Grand	  Societal	  
Challenge	  of	  our	  time.	   It	  also	  meets	  the	   ‘technology	  hype-­‐cycle’	  criteria,	  as	  many	  
technologies	  (e.g.	  electric	  vehicles;	  biofuels;	  hydrogen	  fuel-­‐cell	  etc.)	  have	  received	  
hypes	   of	   attention	   as	   ‘solutions’	   to	   the	   car	   industry’s	   contribution	   to	   climate	  
change.	  	  
These	   cases	   also	   appear	   to	   differ	   on	   one	   important	   aspect:	   an	   initial	  
assessment	   of	   these	   case	   stories	   and	   attention	   indicators	   (see	   below)	   seem	   to	  
indicate	   that	   local	   air	   pollution	   followed	   a	   ‘normal’	   issue	   life-­‐cycle;	   car	   safety	  
appears	   to	   have	   followed	   a	  more	   complex	   life-­‐cycle	   on	   the	   problem	   side;	   while	  
climate	  change	  seems	  to	  be	  following	  a	  complex	  life-­‐cycle	  both	  on	  the	  problem	  and	  




standard	  sequence	  of	  phases	  posited	  by	  the	  DILC-­‐model.54	  Altogether,	  these	  three	  
cases	   meet	   the	   ‘maximum	   variation’	   criteria	   and	   shall	   allow	   me	   to	   assess	   the	  
versatility	   of	   the	  DILC-­‐model	   and	   to	   improve	   it	   according	   to	   empirical	   findings.	  
The	  three	  cases	  also	  allow	  for	  the	  application	  of	  my	  novel	  methodology.	  There	  is	  an	  
array	   of	   attention	   indicators	   available	   for	   all	   three	   issues;	   the	   safety	   case	   is	  
particularly	   long	   for	   testing	   the	   meta-­‐analysis	   of	   correlations	   method;	   and	   the	  
contemporary	  case	  present	  rich	  and	  sufficiently	  long	  data	  series,	  which	  allows	  for	  
the	   application	   of	   both	   the	   correlation	   analysis	   and	   the	   structural	   break	   testing	  
method.	  Here	  I	  present	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  three	  cases	  to	  be	  studied	  for	  testing	  and	  
elaborating	  the	  DILC-­‐model:	  
1) The	   issue	   of	   local	   air	   pollution	   and	   the	   American	   automobile	   industry	  
(1940s-­‐1980s).	   This	   is	   a	   well-­‐documented	   case55	  that	   seems	   to	   follow	   a	  
trajectory	   very	   close	   to	   the	   normal	   path:	   in	   the	   1940s,	   social	   groups	  
voiced	  concerns	  about	  an	  unusual	   ‘smog’	  in	  Los	  Angeles,	  and	  the	  issue	  
life-­‐cycle	   began.	   In	   the	   early	   fifties	   the	   issue	   was	   framed	   as	   caused	  
mostly	   by	   cars	   (and	   some	   stationary	   sources).	   The	   car	   industry	  
acknowledged	   the	   problem	   and	   promised	   solutions	   (mostly	  
incremental).	   In	   the	   1960s,	   the	   environmental	   movement,	   which	  
emerged	   the	   decade	   before,	   succeeded	   in	   influencing	   public	   opinion,	  
and	   soon	  politicians	   joined	   the	  debate.	  The	  process	   culminated	   in	   the	  
Clean	   Air	   Act	   of	   1970,	  which	   restricted	   emissions	   from	  new	   light-­‐duty	  
vehicles	   and	   forced	   the	   adoption	   of	   improved	   emission-­‐control	  
technologies	  (i.e.	  catalytic	  converters)	  that	  could	  meet	  these	  restrictive	  
standards.	   A	   complicated	   implementation	   process	   began.	   In	   the	   early	  
1980s,	   three-­‐way	  catalytic	   converters	  became	  mandatory	   technology	   in	  
new	  automobiles	  sold	  in	  the	  US.	  Figure	  IV.2	  shows	  how	  public	  attention	  
to	   air	   pollution	   fluctuated	   in	   the	   US	   from	   1940	   to	   1990	   (note	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  These	  differences	  may	  be	  related	  to	  the	  ‘size’	  (or	  scope)	  of	  these	  challenges,	  with	  climate	  change	  
being	  the	  classic	  example	  of	  ‘Grand’	  Societal	  Challenge,	  and	  therefore	  requiring	  more	  complicated	  
changes	  than	  safety	  and	  air	  pollution	  (in	  principle,	  the	  simplest	  issue	  in	  terms	  of	  technological	  
fix).	  While	  these	  hypothesized	  differences	  are	  not	  criteria	  for	  case	  selection,	  they	  also	  contribute	  
to	  testing	  the	  versatility	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model.	  
55	  Although	  many	  authors	  have	  investigated	  this	  case	  (e.g.	  Krier	  &	  Ursin,	  1977;	  Doyle,	  2000;	  Luger,	  
2000;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2005),	  their	  analysis	  tells	  only	  part	  of	  the	  story,	  e.g.	  either	  
focusing	  on	  policy	  processes	  or	  the	  effects	  of	  regulations	  on	  innovative	  activities,	  or	  covering	  just	  




attention	  in	  California,	  indicated	  by	  articles	  published	  in	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  
Times,	  presented	  a	  different	  dynamics):	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  curve	  –	  with	  a	  
peak	  in	  1970	  –	  is	  another	  indicator	  that	  the	  air	  pollution	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
followed	  a	  path	  similar	  to	  the	  hypothesized	  by	  the	  DILC-­‐model.	  By	  the	  
mid-­‐1980s,	   attention	   to	  air	  pollution	  decreased	   to	  pre-­‐1965	   levels,	  only	  
starting	  to	  increase	  again	  in	  1987	  (1986	  in	  California),	  but	  in	  connection	  
to	   new	   environmental	   issues	   such	   as	   acid	   rain,	   which	   resulted	   in	   a	  
revision	  of	  the	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  in	  199056	  (a	  complete	  visual	  analysis	  of	  this	  
and	  other	  attention	  indicators	  will	  be	  exposed	  in	  the	  empirical	  chapter).	  
Figure	  IV.2:	  The	  air	  pollution	  public	  attention	  cycle	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  construction	  (methodology	  to	  be	  detailed	  in	  the	  empirical	  chapter).	  	  
Obs.:	  The	  chart	  shows	  the	  standardized	  values	  of	  the	  yearly	  average	  of	  count	  numbers	  of	  articles	  on	  air	  pollution	  
published	  in	  the	  four	  newspapers:	  negative	  values	  indicate	  years	  when	  the	  number	  of	  articles	  stayed	  below	  the	  
average	  for	   the	  whole	  period	  (1940-­‐1990),	  positive	  values	   indicate	  years	  when	  number	  of	  articles	  were	  above	  
the	  whole	  period	  average.	  
2) The	   issue	   of	   automobile	   safety	   and	   the	   American	   automobile	   industry	  
(1900-­‐2000).	  This	   issue	  represents	  an	   important	  and	   long	   challenge	   for	  
the	  American	  society,	  and	  I	  expect	  all	  DILC-­‐model	  phases	  to	  be	  present	  
in	  this	  case	  –	  albeit	  the	  chart	  of	  public	  attention	  to	  car	  safety	  in	  the	  US	  
(Figure	  IV.3)	  indicates	  escalating	  attention:	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  likely	  did	  
not	  follow	  a	  ‘normal’	  path.	  It	  emerged	  slowly,	  together	  with	  the	  diffusion	  
of	  cars.	  Early	  on	  (1916)	   it	  received	  a	  behavioural	   framing	  –	   ‘road	  safety’	  
was	   framed	   as	   a	   triple	   ‘E’	   (3E’s)	   problem:	   driver	   Education;	   road	  
Engineering;	  and	  law	  Enforcement	  (Luger,	  2000)	  –	  the	  car	  itself	  was	  not	  
part	  of	  the	  equation.	  The	  industry	  therefore	  was	  happy	  to	  embrace	  the	  
3E’s.	   In	   the	   1930s,	   some	   individual	   activists	   began	   to	   advocate	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




technological	  framing.	  Yet,	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  Second	  World	  War,	  the	  
issue	   life-­‐cycle	  was	  apparently	   interrupted.	  Only	   in	   the	   1950s,	  with	   the	  
continuous	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   road	   fatalities,	   the	   issue	   re-­‐
emerged	   in	  the	   institutional	  environment,	   leading	  to	   framing	  struggles	  
between	  defendants	  of	  the	  behavioural	  framing	  and	  those	  who	  defended	  
the	  technological	  one.	  In	  1966,	  a	  strong	  piece	  of	  legislation	  was	  enacted	  
by	   Congress,	   which	   adopted	   the	   technological	   framing. 57	  
Notwithstanding,	   implementation	   was	   long	   and	   complicated,	   and,	   in	  
the	  1980s,	  safety	  innovations	  were	  mainly	  incorporated	  in	  cars	  not	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  policy,	  but	  of	  consumer	  demand.	  
Figure	  IV.3:	  The	  car	  safety	  public	  attention	  cycle	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  construction	  (methodology	  to	  be	  detailed	  in	  the	  empirical	  chapter).	  
3) The	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  the	  American	  automobile	  industry	  (1979-­‐
2012).	   The	   science	   behind	   global	   warming/climate	   change	   has	   a	   long	  
history.	  But	  it	  is	  in	  late	  1980s	  that	  it	  became	  a	  public	  concern	  in	  the	  US,	  
through	   the	   action	   of	   activists	   and	   already	   institutionalized	   pressure	  
groups.	   As	   shown	   in	   Figure	   IV.4,	   the	   automobile	   industry	   has	   always	  
been	  implicated	  in	  the	  issue,	  and	  increasingly	  so	  since	  the	  2000s.	  As	  this	  
is	   a	   contemporary	   issue,	   the	  case	   study	  will	   seek	   to	  establish	  at	  which	  
stage	   in	   the	  Dialectic	   Issue	  Life-­‐Cycle	   is	   climate	   change,	   regarding	   the	  
American	   auto	   industry.	  With	   the	   help	   of	   insights	   from	   the	   previous	  
cases,	   I	  will	  also	  seek	  to	  indicate	  what	  can	  be	  expected	  in	  this	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	  in	  the	  medium-­‐run.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  The	  possibility	  of	  an	  issue	  changing	  meaning	  (‘framing’)	  has	  not	  been	  incorporated	  in	  the	  DILC-­‐
model.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  safety	  case,	  which	  I	  believe	  can	  provide	  important	  








Figure	  IV.4:	  The	  climate	  change	  public	  attention	  cycle	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  construction	  (methodology	  to	  be	  detailed	  in	  the	  empirical	  chapter).	  
Because	   those	   issues	   partly	   run	   concomitantly	   during	   their	   life-­‐cycles,	   the	   cases	  
studies	  will	  likely	  bring	  about	  insights	  into	  how	  these	  issues	  affected	  each	  other	  in	  
terms	  of	  pressures	  (e.g.	  do	  they	  reinforce	  or	  undermine	  each	  other?)	  and	  industry	  
response	  (e.g.	  does	  the	  industry	  play	  out	  on	  trade-­‐offs	  between	  the	  issues?).	  
Building	   on	   Tushman	   and	   Romanelli	   (1985),	   the	   three	   cases	   can	   also	   be	  
categorized	  in	  light	  of	  their	  differences	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  kind	  of	  changes	  were/are	  
required	   in	   the	   industry	   regime	   to	   address	   the	   issue.	  While	   air	   pollution	   can	  be	  
seen	  as	   the	   easiest	  problem	   to	  be	   addressed	  within	   the	  bounds	  of	   the	  prevailing	  
regime	   (i.e.	   the	   ‘solution’	   only	   required	   the	   development	   of	   emission	   control	  
technologies,	   which	   are	   add-­‐on	   innovations	   and	   can	   be	   conceptualized	   as	  
incremental	   change	   from	   a	   technological	   regime	   point	   of	   view),	   safety	   already	  
entailed	  changes	  in	  more	  elements	  of	  the	  regime	  (e.g.	  it	  also	  required	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  
industry’s	   ‘mindset’,	  because	  of	  the	  overall	  belief	   that	   ‘safety	  doesn’t	  sell,	  big	  cars	  
sell’	  –	  therefore,	  it	  required	  ‘strategic	  reorientation’).	  Climate	  change	  appears	  to	  be	  
the	   most	   challenging	   issue,	   because	   it	   may	   require	   the	   ‘recreation’	   of	   the	   car	  
industry:	   changes	   in	   the	   four	   core	   elements	   of	   the	   regime.	   These	   differences	  
highlight	  how	  the	  case	   sample	  adheres	   to	  a	  maximum	  variation	   rationale	  also	   in	  
terms	  of	  outcome,	  which	  can	  potentially	  provide	   further	   insights	   to	   improve	   the	  
DILC-­‐model.	  
IV.3.2. Case	  study	  protocol	  
The	  case	  study	  protocol	  (or	  plan)	  “stipulates	  what	   information	  is	  to	  be	  sought	  to	  
fully	  investigate	  the	  research	  hypothesis	  and	  how	  it	  is	  to	  be	  obtained”	  (Johnston	  et	  




guide	  the	  case	  study	  investigation,	  which	  can	  be	  labelled	  as	  ‘working	  questions’	  (as	  
opposed	   to	   the	   core	   ‘research	   questions’).	   Part	   of	   the	   protocol	   is	   to	   specify	   data	  
sources	  used	  in	  the	  case	  study,	  and	  “in	  every	  case,	  evidence	  from	  multiple	  sources	  
must	  be	  collected	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  for	  triangulation”	  (Johnston	  et	  al.,	  1999,	  p.	  207).	  
I	   here	   specify	   the	   case	   study	   protocol,	   which	   is	   based	   on	   the	   DILC-­‐model	  
conceptualization.	  This	  protocol	   represents	   the	  structure	   that	   I	  will	   follow	   in	   the	  
empirical	  chapters	  (V-­‐VII):	  
1) Introduction:	   the	   introduction	   to	   each	   empirical	   chapter	   explains	  
particularities	  of	  the	  case	  that	  may	  result	   in	  important	  insights	  for	  this	  
thesis’	  research	  focus.	  It	  also	  explains	  particular	  roles	  the	  case	  play	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model.	  
2) Data	  sources:	  the	  second	  section	  of	  each	  empirical	  chapter	  will	  present	  
primary	  and	  secondary	  data	  sources	  for	  the	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  
data,	  including	  the	  description	  of	  data	  collection	  procedures	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  attention	  indicators.	  
3) Quantification	   approach	   –	   attention	   dynamics:	   the	   third	   section	   will	  
apply	   the	  quantitative	  method(s)	   to	   the	   case	   (according	   to	   the	  quality	  
and	   availability	   of	   data).	   This	   quantification	   approach	   will	   result	   in	   a	  
first	   sub-­‐periodization	   of	   the	   overall	   period	   of	   interest,	   which	   will	   be	  
triangulated	   with	   my	   qualitative	   knowledge	   of	   key	   events.	   The	  
quantification	  approach	  may	  reveal	  first	  insights	  about	  mechanisms	  and	  
dynamic	   interactions,	  which	  will	  be	   further	  explored	   in	   the	  qualitative	  
(narrative)	  approach.	  
4) Qualitative	   approach	   –	   in-­‐depth	   narrative:	   The	   fourth	   part	   of	   each	  
empirical	   case	   study	   will	   consist	   of	   an	   in-­‐depth	   narrative	   aimed	   at	  
identifying	   deeper	   causal	   mechanisms	   though	   analysis	   of	   the	  
interactions	   and	   processes	   in	   the	   institutional	   and	   task	   environments.	  
This	   longitudinal	   case	   narrative	   will	   be	   divided	   in	   the	   sub-­‐periods	  
resulting	  from	  point	  (2)	  above.	  Each	  sub-­‐period	  will	  be	  further	  divided	  
into58:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  This	  subdivision	  reflects	  the	  linearity	  of	  every	  narrative	  (Geels,	  2002).	  However,	  the	  DILC-­‐
model	  highlights	  the	  multidimensionality	  and	  dialectics	  of	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  process,	  so	  that	  at	  





a. Pressures	   around	   the	   issue:	   which	   institutional	   and	   economic	  
pressures	   connected	   to	   the	   focal	   issue	  were	   present	   in	   the	   period?	  
Depending	   on	   which	   pressures	   were	   present,	   a	   sub-­‐period	   may	  
contain	   reference	   to	   socio-­‐cultural	   pressures;	   and/or	   political	  
pressures;	   and/or	   pressures	   from	   consumers,	   suppliers	   and	   other	  
regime	  outsiders	  (including	  foreign	  manufacturers)	  etc.	  
b. Incumbent	   industry	   issue	   responses:	   what	   were	   the	   strategies	  
deployed	   by	   the	   incumbent	   industry	   in	   response	   to	   issue-­‐related	  
pressures?	   Depending	   on	   which	   strategies	   were	   deployed59,	   a	   sub-­‐
period	   may	   contain	   reference	   to	   socio-­‐cultural	   strategies;	   and/or	  
political	   strategies;	   and/or	   economic	   positioning	   strategies;	   and/or	  
innovation	  strategies.	  
c. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle:	  which	  other	  
non-­‐issue-­‐related	  factors	  were	  present	   in	  the	  period	  and	  influenced	  
the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle?	   This	   working	   question	   seeks	   to	   identify	  
interactions	   with	   broader	   industry	   contexts	   (i.e.	   other	   strategic	  
issues	   faced	   by	   the	   industry,	   like	   shrinking	   profits)	   and	   external	  
developments	   (such	  as	   the	  outbreak	  of	  an	  economic	   recession	  or	  a	  
war),	  which	  is	  an	  aspect	  not	  conceptually	  incorporated	  in	  the	  DILC-­‐
model.	  
5) Analysis:	  Each	  case	  study	  will	  end	  with	  a	  pattern-­‐matching	  analysis	  (see	  
next	  section)	  between	  the	  empirical	  study	  and	  the	  DILC-­‐model,	  which	  
aim	  at	  answering	  the	  question:	  has	  the	  case	  followed	  the	  hypothesized	  
DILC-­‐model	  phases?	   If	  not,	  what	  were	   the	  major	  deviations?	  How	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  The	  notion	  of	  ‘strategy’	  that	  I	  adopt	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  is	  based	  on	  a	  post	  hoc	  assessment	  of	  
what	  firms	  and	  the	  industry	  actually	  did,	  and	  not	  on	  their	  ex	  ante	  ‘strategic	  plan’	  (supposing	  they	  
existed).	  However,	  in	  the	  narrative,	  I	  do	  take	  note	  of	  what	  firms	  and	  the	  industry	  declared	  to	  be	  
their	  strategy	  and	  discuss	  it	  in	  light	  of	  what	  they	  in	  fact	  did	  (based	  on	  the	  observed	  strategies	  as	  
reported	  in	  secondary	  accounts	  that	  present	  primary	  material	  such	  as	  interviews	  with	  key	  
decision-­‐makers).	  In	  this	  sense,	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  analysis,	  I	  do	  not	  explicitly	  partake	  in	  any	  single	  
schools	  of	  strategic	  management;	  yet,	  in	  my	  view,	  strategy	  formation	  is	  less	  of	  a	  rational	  strategic	  
planning	  or	  designing	  process	  than	  it	  is	  a	  process	  of	  cognition,	  learning,	  positioning,	  and	  
negotiating	  that	  depends	  on	  internal	  and	  external	  institutions	  (see	  Mintzberg	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  
Therefore,	  in	  line	  with	  my	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  assumptions,	  I	  see	  strategies	  as	  an	  
emergent	  process	  that	  enacts	  and	  reacts	  to	  internal/external	  developments,	  and	  that	  change	  
overtime.	  While	  a	  key	  caveat	  of	  adopting	  a	  post	  hoc	  view	  on	  strategies	  is	  that	  the	  assessment	  is	  
based	  on	  a	  subjective	  analysis,	  I	  attempt	  to	  minimize	  this	  issue	  by	  drawing	  on	  multiple	  sources	  




these	   be	   explained?	   The	   analysis	   section	   also	   includes	   an	   ‘explanation	  
building’	  (Yin,	  2003)	  exercise,	  which	  will	  look	  at	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  
case	  (outlined	  in	  its	  introductory	  section).	  	  
6) Concluding	   remarks:	   The	   concluding	   section	   shall	   address	   and	  discuss	  
how	  suitable	  and	  compatible	  (with	  the	  narrative	  explanation)	  were	  the	  
quantitative	  method(s)	  employed	  in	  case.	  It	  will	  also	  draw	  implications	  
for	  this	  thesis’	  research	  focus	  and	  questions	  
IV.3.3. Analytical	  strategies:	  Pattern-­‐matching,	  explanation	  building	  and	  
cross-­‐case	  comparison	  
IV.3.3.1. Pattern-­‐matching	  and	  explanation	  building	  
Yin	   (2003,	  p.	   116)	   suggests	   that	   in	  case	   study	  analysis,	   “one	  of	   the	  most	  desirable	  
techniques	  is	  using	  a	  pattern-­‐matching	  logic	  [...]	  [which]	  compares	  an	  empirically	  
based	  pattern	  with	  a	  predicted	  one...	  If	  the	  pattern	  coincides,	  the	  results	  can	  help	  a	  
case	   study	   to	   strengthen	   its	   internal	   validity.”	   Pattern-­‐matching	   consists	   in	  
accessing	  whether	  the	  empirical	  case	  study	  has	  a	   ‘good	  fit’	  (Geels,	  2002)	  with	  the	  
DILC-­‐model.	   In	   the	   analysis,	   I	   will	   also	   triangulate	   and	   discuss	   the	   results	   from	  
pattern-­‐matching	  with	  the	  quantitative	  results.	  
I	  regard	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  as	  an	  ideal-­‐type,	  which	  highlights	  certain	  (relevant)	  
aspects	   that	   characterize	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   interest	   and	   differentiate	   it	   from	  
others.	  An	  ideal-­‐type	  therefore	  does	  not	  encompass	  all	  possibilities,	  characteristics	  
and	  factors	  that	  affect	  a	  given	  phenomenon,	  in	  the	  case,	  issue-­‐life	  cycles.	  Empirical	  
cases	   are	   richer	   and	   more	   complex	   than	   the	   ideal	   type,	   so	   that	   deviations	   are	  
beforehand	  expected.	  However,	  the	  analyst	  should	  strive	  to	  explain	  the	  deviations	  
with	  resource	  to	  conceptualizations	   from	  the	  model.	   In	  case	  this	   is	  achieved,	   the	  
internal	  validity	  of	  the	  model	  is	  maintained.	  
Deviations	   between	   the	   empirical	   case	   and	   theory	   will	   be	   further	   looked	  
upon	   through	   an	   ‘explanation	   building’60	  exercise	   (Yin,	   2003),	  which	  will	   seek	   to	  
draw	   implications	   to	   the	  DILC-­‐model.	   The	   goal	   here	   is	   not	   to	   further	   check	   the	  
internal	   validity	   of	   the	  model,	   but	   to	   develop	   new	   propositions	   to	   improve	   the	  
model.	  Each	  case	  study	  will	  thus	  result	  in	  specific	  lessons	  and	  insights	  that	  will	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




compared	   and,	   if	   possible,	   combined,	   in	   order	   to	   help	   addressing	   the	   thesis’	  
research	  questions	  and	  gaps	  in	  existing	  literatures.	  	  
IV.3.3.2. Cross-­‐case	  comparison	  
This	  thesis	  adopts	  a	  multiple-­‐case	  design	  (Yin,	  2003),	  which	  is	  usually	  regarded	  as	  
more	   robust	   than	   single	   case	   studies,	   for	   it	   tends	   to	   result	   in	   more	   compelling	  
evidence	   for	   confirmation	   or	   rejection	   of	   theoretical	   constructs.	   In	   the	  multiple-­‐
case	   design,	   with	   each	   case	   serving	   a	   specific	   purpose	   in	   the	   research	   effort,	   “a	  
major	   insight	   is	   to	   consider	   multiple	   cases	   as	   one	   would	   consider	   multiple	  
experiments	   –	   that	   is,	   to	   follow	   a	   ‘replication’	   logic”	   (Yin,	   2003,	   p.	   47	   –	   original	  
emphasis).	   Replication	   depends	   on	   case	   selection	   based	   on	   specific	   theoretical	  
criteria,	   so	   that	  each	  case	   study	  shall	   reveal	  particular	  patterns	  and	  mechanisms.	  
Thus,	  from	  the	  replication	  approach	  follows	  a	  cross-­‐case	  comparison	  exercise,	  i.e.	  
the	  analysis	  and	  comparison	  of	  results	  from	  the	  multiple	  cases.	  As	  Turnheim	  (2012)	  
suggests,	  comparing	  explanatory	  narratives	  of	  the	  multiple	  case	  studies	  is	  akin	  to	  
Weick’s	  argument	  about	  the	  comparison	  of	  events:	  “what	  any	  event	  means,	  what	  is	  
significant	  in	  its	  unfolding,	  may	  become	  clearer	  when	  it	  is	  compared	  with	  another	  
event,	  and	  the	  observer	  looks	  for	  similarities	  and	  differences”	  (Weick,	  2007,	  p.	  17,	  
apud	  Turnheim,	  2012).	  
This	  cross-­‐case	  analysis	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  explanation	  building	  exercise,	  but	  it	  
draws	  on	  the	  comparison	  of	  multiple	  cases	  and	  of	  these	  with	  the	  DILC-­‐model.	  In	  
summary,	   the	   comparison	   of	   cases	   allows	   the	   researcher	   to	   identify	   whether	  
certain	  patterns	  or	  mechanisms	  depend	  on	  idiosyncrasies	  or	  whether	  they	  may	  be	  
generalized.	   This	   cross-­‐case	   comparison	   analysis	   will	   be	   carried	   out	   in	   the	  
concluding	  Chapter	  (VIII).	  
IV.4. CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  
This	  chapter	  has	  outlined	  the	  methodology	  based	  on	  which	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  will	  
be	   applied	   and	   tested	   against	   empirical	   cases.	   If	   successful,	   the	   mixed-­‐methods	  
methodology	  can	   represent	  an	  original	   contribution	  of	   this	   thesis.	  Yet,	  because	   I	  
adopt	   a	   case	   study	   methodology,	   a	   question	   that	   may	   arise	   is:	   how	   versatile	  
(‘generalizable’)	  will	  the	  findings	  be?	  
Even	   when	   a	   case	   is	   carefully	   and	   strategically	   chosen,	   generalizations	  




This	  is	  why	  ‘middle-­‐range	  theory’	  development	  is	  a	  more	  feasible	  goal	  than	  broad	  
generalization	  when	  building	  theory	  from	  case	  studies.	  Middle-­‐range	  (typological)	  
theories	   “identify	   recurring	   conjunctions	   of	  mechanisms	   and	  provide	  hypotheses	  
on	  the	  pathways	  through	  which	  they	  produce	  results,	  provide	  more	  contingent	  and	  
specific	   generalizations	   for	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   allow	   researchers	   to	   contribute	   to	  
more	  nuanced	  theories”	  (George	  and	  Bennett	  2005,	  p.	  8).	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  aim	  at	  middle-­‐range	  theorization,	  so	  that	  generalization	  
out	  of	  my	  research	  may	  be	  limited	  to	  industries	  that	  present	  similar	  characteristics	  
to	  the	  automobile	  industry.	  This	  industry	  is	  (a)	  economically	  big	  and	  concentrated	  
on	   few	   large	   firms	   (oligopoly);	   (b)	   politically	   powerful;	   and	   (c)	   culturally	   visible.	  
Moreover,	  (d)	  the	  industry	  supplies	  differentiated	  products	  (‘innovations’)	  directly	  
to	  the	  final	  consumer.	  Some	  industries	  that	  match	  these	  criteria	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  
are:	  food	  industry;	  pharmaceuticals;	  ICT	  industry	  (especially	  computer	  and	  mobile	  
hardware,	  but	  increasingly	  the	  Internet	  industry).	  Although	  utilities	  and	  integrated	  
oil	  companies	  do	  not	  fully	  match	  the	  fourth	  criteria	  (e.g.	  their	  products	  are	  almost	  
undifferentiated),	  I	  expect	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  to	  be	  versatile	  enough	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  
cases	  in	  these	  industries.	  




V. LOCAL	  AIR	  POLLUTION	  AND	  THE	  AMERICAN	  
AUTOMOBILE	  INDUSTRY	  (1940S-­‐1980S)	  
V.1. INTRODUCTION	  
This	  first	  case	  study61	  aims	  at	  testing	  the	  overall	  specification	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  by	  
applying	   it	   to	   a	   well-­‐documented	   case:	   the	   issue	   of	   local	   air	   pollution	   and	   the	  
responses	  from	  the	  American	  car	  industry,	  from	  the	  1940s	  to	  the	  1980s.	  Although	  
many	  authors	  have	  studied	  the	  case,	  they	  did	  so	  from	  a	  limited	  point	  of	  view,	  either	  
not	   looking	   at	   the	   whole	   period	   or	   taking	   a	   disciplinary	   approach	   (see	   the	  
discussion	   of	   secondary	   sources	   in	   section	   V.2.2).	   Many	   previous	   studies	   (e.g.	  
Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2005;	  Nill	  and	  Tiessen,	  2005;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  start	  their	  analysis	  in	  
1970,	  when	  strict	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  amendments	  were	  enacted.	  By	  beginning	  in	  1940,	  
instead,	  I	  am	  able	  to	  address	  struggles	  over	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  air	  pollution	  issue	  
(and	  thus	  its	  emergence),	  the	  mobilization	  of	  activists	  and	  social	  groups	  (‘attention	  
advocacy’),	  and	  early	  industry	  strategies.	  
Moreover,	   the	   existence	   of	  many	   disciplinary	   studies	   about	   the	  American	  
car	  industry	  (on	  air	  pollution,	  but	  also	  on	  other	  strategic	  issues)	  also	  allows	  me	  to	  
triangulate	   sources	   and	   build	   a	   comprehensive	   picture	   for	   a	   multi-­‐dimensional	  
analysis	   that	   addresses	   one	   shortcoming	   of	   empirical	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   and	   indeed	  
greening	  of	   industry	   studies:	   the	   strict	  emphasis	  on	   the	   ‘focal’	   issue	   (Mahon	  and	  
Waddock,	   1992;	  Bigelow	   et	   al.,	   1993;	  Schaefer	  and	  Harvey,	   1998).	  With	   the	  aid	  of	  
the	   DILC-­‐model	   and	   the	   TEF	   conceptualization,	   I	   will	   investigate	   how	   other	  
strategic	  issues	  interfered	  (or	  not)	  with	  the	  local	  air	  pollution	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.62	  	  
Thirdly,	   although	   the	   innovation	   that	   was	   framed	   as	   a	   solution	   to	   car	  
emissions	   (the	   catalytic	   converter)	  was	   an	   ‘end-­‐of-­‐pipe’	   technology,	   it	  was	   not	   a	  
simple	   (incremental)	   ‘add-­‐on	   innovation’:	   my	   case	   study	   will	   show	   that	   the	  
development	   of	   the	   more	   advanced	   ‘three-­‐way	   catalytic	   converter’	   required	  
acquisition	  of	  external	  (chemical	  and	  eletronic)	  competencies	  and	  entailed	  further	  
reconfigurations	   of	   engine	   technology	   that	   amounted	   to	   costly	   architectural	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  A	  shorter	  version	  of	  this	  case	  study	  appears	  in	  Penna	  and	  Geels	  (2012).	  While	  I	  use	  part	  of	  the	  
material	  in	  this	  Chapter,	  the	  present	  case	  study	  differs	  and	  goes	  beyond	  the	  published	  case	  study.	  
Firstly,	  it	  draws	  on	  more	  sources	  and	  highlights	  additional	  evidence	  for	  the	  analysis.	  Secondly,	  
due	  to	  a	  more	  specific	  quantification	  (visual	  analysis)	  approach,	  my	  periodization	  here	  differs	  
slightly	  from	  Penna	  and	  Geels	  (using	  1963	  instead	  of	  1960	  as	  a	  breaking	  point).	  Finally,	  I	  include	  in	  
the	  analysis	  developments	  up	  to	  1990	  (instead	  of	  ending	  the	  discussion	  in	  1985).	  




change	   (Henderson	   and	   Clark,	   1990).	   This	   resulted	   in	   tensions	   and	   defensive	  
strategies	  by	  automobile	  makers.	  The	  case	  study	  thus	  investigates	  and	  reveals	  the	  
sources	  of	  this	  industry	  inertia	  and	  resistance.	  
Fourthly,	   several	   studies	   from	   the	   technology-­‐forcing	   policy	   literature	   are	  
centred	  on	   this	  case	   (Yao,	   1988;	  Leone,	   1999;	  Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2005;	  Gerard	  and	  
Lave,	  2007;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Tao	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Indeed,	  the	  American	  
automobile	   industry	   reoriented	   and	   innovated	   with	   the	   catalytic	   converter	   to	  
address	   local	   air	   pollution	   because	   of	   policy:	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   followed	   the	  
‘changes	  via	  regulation’	  route.	  My	  approach	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  investigate	  why	  and	  
how	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  resulted	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  this	  route.	  I	  will	  also	  investigate	  
whether	  the	  50-­‐year-­‐long	  process	  was	  accompanied	  with	  changes	  in	  other	  regime	  
elements,	   besides	   industry	   specific	   regulations	   (i.e.	   the	   industry’s	   identity	   and	  
mission	  and/or	  its	  belief	  system).	  63	  
I	  end	  the	  case	  study	  in	  the	  1980s	  (1990)	  for	  three	  reasons:	  firstly,	  because,	  as	  
shown	   in	   the	   public	   attention	   chart	   (Figure	   IV.2),	   in	   the	   1980s,	   attention	   to	   air	  
pollution	   (‘LA-­‐type	   smog’ 64 )	   went	   to	   pre-­‐1965	   levels. 65 	  By	   then,	   automobile	  
emissions	   of	   pollutant	   gases	   that	   form	   LA-­‐type	   smog	   (henceforth	   referred	   to	  
simply	  as	  ‘smog’)	  had	  been	  reduced	  to	  pre-­‐1960s	  levels	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  NOx),	  
despite	  the	  constant	   increase	   in	  the	  number	  of	  vehicles	  registered	   in	  the	  US	  (see	  
Figure	  V.1).	  By	  1990,	  virtually	  all	  cars	  in	  circulation	  had	  emission	  control	  systems,	  
most	  of	  which	  (88%)	  included	  a	  catalytic	  converter	  (see	  Figure	  V.2).	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  The	  third	  and	  fourth	  points	  will	  also	  be	  tackled	  in	  the	  analysis	  section.	  
64	  The	  Los	  Angeles	  type	  of	  ‘smog’	  differs	  from	  smog	  that	  results	  from	  smoke	  and	  fumes	  produced	  
by	  industries,	  power	  plants,	  refuse	  burning	  and	  household	  heating	  systems.	  This	  latter	  ‘London-­‐
type	  smog’	  is	  formed	  by	  suspended	  carbon	  particulates	  and	  sulphur	  dioxide.	  While	  “[t]he	  
automobile	  contributes	  very	  little	  to	  this	  particular	  type	  of	  air	  pollution”	  (Mondt,	  2000,	  p.	  8),	  it	  is	  
the	  major	  source	  of	  air	  pollutants	  that	  result	  in	  LA-­‐type	  smog:	  oxides	  of	  nitrogen	  (NOx),	  
unburned	  hydrocarbons	  (HC),	  and	  volatile	  organic	  compounds	  (VOCs),	  which	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  
sunlight	  reacts	  into	  ozone	  (O3).	  
65	  Attention	  to	  ‘air	  pollution’	  started	  to	  increase	  again	  in	  1988,	  but	  in	  connection	  to	  new	  
environmental	  issues	  such	  as	  acid	  rain	  (Dunlap	  and	  Mertig,	  1992),	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  revision	  of	  




Figure	  V.1:	  Emissions	  from	  light-­‐duty	  vehicles	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  1940-­‐1990	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	   construction	   based	   on	   data	   from	   USDT	   Federal	   Highway	   Administration	   (registrations)	   and	  
USEPA	  (emissions)	  
Figure	  V.2:	  Diffusion	  of	  light-­‐duty	  vehicle	  emission	  control	  technologies	  in	  the	  US,	  1940-­‐1988	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  construction	  based	  on	  data	  from	  Ward's	  Automotive	  Yearbook	  (several	  issues).	  
Obs.:	  Missing	  values	  between	  1964	  and	  1988	  (1966,	  1968-­‐70,	  1973-­‐4,	  1985,	  and	  1987)	  were	  interpolated.	  
V.2. DATA	  SOURCES	  &	  DATA	  COLLECTION	  PROCEDURES	  
The	  case	   study	   is	  not	   intended	   to	  unveil	  new	  historical	   evidence,	  but	   to	   test	   the	  
overall	   logic	  of	   the	  phase-­‐based	  DILC-­‐model	  and	   to	  generate	   insights	   for	   further	  
conceptualization.	   Thus,	   although	   I	   draw	   on	   primary	   sources	   for	   quantitative	  
indicators,	   the	  qualitative	  case	   study	   is	   a	   triangulation	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	  
accounts:	   mostly	   academic,	   but	   also	   from	   e.g.	   the	   press	   (mass	   and	   specialized	  
media)	  and	  governmental	  sources.	  
V.2.1. Sources	  for	  quantitative	  indicators	  and	  data	  collection	  procedures	  
In	  this	  case	  study,	   I	  apply	  only	  the	  experimental	  visual	  examination	  method	  that	  
aims	  at	  dividing	  the	  whole	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  in	  sub-­‐periods.	  These	  will	  structure	  the	  




model.	  The	  visual	  examination	  also	  looks	  for	  initial	  insights	  about	  broad	  patterns	  
and	   apparent	   relationships	   between	   (indicators	   of)	   attention	   from	   different	  
domains,	   in	   order	   to	   examine	   the	   dynamic	   relationship	   between	   issue-­‐attention	  
cycles	  and	  issue	  life-­‐cycles.	  	  
In	  this	  case,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  following	  attention	  indicators:66	  
1) Public	   attention:	   As	   a	   proxy	   indicator	   to	   public	   attention	   I	   use	   the	  
number	  of	  articles	  on	  air	  pollution/smog	  in	  mass-­‐circulation	  newspapers	  
per	   year:	   Chicago	   Tribune	   (CT),	   Los	   Angeles	   Times	   (LAT),	  New	   York	  
Times	   (NYT),	  Washington	   Post	   (WP)	   and	  Wall	   Street	   Journal	   (WSJ)	  
(Figure	   IV.2	   and	   Figure	   V.3.a).	   Because	   smog	   is	   an	   issue	   that	   severely	  
affected	   Los	   Angeles	   (California),	   the	   public	   attention	   dynamics	  
indicated	  by	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  (LAT)	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  rest	  
of	   the	   Nation67,	   so	   that	   the	   visual	   representation	   shows	   the	   average	  
number	  of	  articles	  per	  year	  in	  the	  CT,	  NYT,	  WP	  and	  WSJ,	  and	  the	  yearly	  
number	  of	   articles	   in	   the	  LAT.	   In	  order	   to	  allow	  an	  easier	   comparison	  
between	  both	  curves,	  I	  represent	  the	  standardized	  values68	  in	  the	  charts.	  	  
The	   data	   was	   collected	   through	   a	   keyword	   search	   in	   each	  
newspaper’s	  historical	  archives.	  The	  keywords	  used	  were	   ‘air	  pollution’	  
and	  ‘smog’	  (joined	  with	  the	  Boolean	  operator	  ‘OR’69).	  One	  issue	  with	  this	  
kind	  of	  indicator	  and	  data	  collection	  strategy	  is	  that,	  firstly,	  it	  does	  not	  
account	   for	   changes	   in	   length	   of	   newspapers	   or	   articles	   (however,	   by	  
using	   more	   than	   one	   newspaper	   as	   a	   source,	   this	   issue	   is	   less	   of	   a	  
concern).	   Secondly,	   it	   does	   not	   account	   for	   changes	   in	   meanings,	  
interpretations	  and	  framings	  of	  the	  local	  air	  pollution	  issue	  throughout	  
its	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   This	   issue	   will	   be	   tackled	   through	   the	   narrative	  
approach.	  	  
2) Political	   (Congressional	   and	   Regulatory)	   attention:	   To	   capture	   the	  
dynamics	  of	  attention	   to	  air	  pollution	  and	  smog	  by	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Primary	  quantitative	  data	  other	  than	  for	  the	  attention	  charts	  were	  collected	  from	  governmental	  
sources	  (e.g.	  the	  US	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency;	  Department	  of	  Transportation)	  and	  
industry	  journals	  (e.g.	  Ward’s;	  Automotive	  News).	  
67	  Indeed,	  as	  the	  case	  study	  will	  show,	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  in	  California	  followed	  distinctive	  
dynamics,	  representing	  a	  source	  of	  pressure	  on	  higher	  level	  developments.	  
68	  Standardized	  values	  show	  how	  many	  standard	  deviations	  the	  particular	  yearly	  value	  is	  from	  the	  
whole	  period	  (1940-­‐1990)	  average	  value.	  




regulators,	   I	   look	   at	   two	   indicators,	   respectively:	   the	   number	   of	   bills	  
introduced	   in	   Congress	   to	   regulate	   air	   pollution	   and	   the	   number	   of	  
publications	  on	  air	  pollution	  in	  the	  Federal	  Register70.	  For	  the	  number	  of	  
congressional	  bills,	  I	  draw	  on	  a	  figure	  by	  Bailey	  (1998),	  who	  analysed	  the	  
politics	  of	  air	  pollution	  in	  the	  US	  Congress.	  The	  author	  used	  a	  keyword	  
search	   in	   the	  Congressional	   Record71,	   but	   filtered	   the	   results	   to	   restrict	  
outputs	   to	   ‘bills’	  only.	  Bailey’s	   (1998)	  data	  collection	   strategy	   served	  as	  
an	  inspiration	  for	  me	  to	  look	  for	  an	  indicator	  for	  regulatory	  attention,	  by	  
carrying	  out	  similar	  data	  collection	  strategy	  –	  a	  keyword	  search	  –	  in	  the	  
Federal	  Register.	  Again,	   these	   indicators	  do	  not	  account	   for	  differences	  
in	  meaning,	  interpretations	  and	  framings	  of	  the	  air	  pollution	  issue	  over	  
time,	  making	  it	  warranted	  to	  triangulate	  the	  quantitative	  findings	  with	  
the	  narrative	  approach.	  
3) Industry	   ‘attention’/technology	   development:	   In	   this	   case	   study,	   I	   use	  
only	   one	   indicator	   for	   industry	   ‘attention’	   (or,	   more	   precisely,	   for	  
industry	   technology	   development	   strategy):	   the	   number	   of	   emission	  
control	  patents	  per	  year.	  This	  indicator	  has	  been	  used	  in	  studies	  by	  Lee	  
and	   colleagues	   (2010;	   2011).	   My	   data	   collection	   strategy	   is	   inspired	   by	  
theirs:	   I	  used	  a	  keyword	  search	  approach,	  which	   includes	   issue-­‐related	  
words	   and	   technology-­‐related	   (emission	   control)	   words. 72 	  I	   also	  
separated	   the	  resulting	  patent	  dataset	   in	   terms	  of	  assignee	  groups:	   the	  
Big	  Three	  American	   automakers	   (Chrysler,	   Ford	   and	  General	  Motors);	  
foreign	   automakers;	   and	   regime	   outsiders	   (chemical	   &	   oil	   industry	  
suppliers	  and	  others).	  Only	  assigned	  patents	  were	  counted,	  but	  for	  the	  
visual	  representation,	  they	  were	  ordered	  according	  to	  the	  filing	  year	  and	  
displayed	  as	  standardized	  values	  (see	  footnote	  60).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  The	  Federal	  Register	  publishes	  US	  regulatory	  agency’s	  notifications	  and	  rules	  and	  (presidential)	  
executive	  orders,	  two	  key	  types	  of	  policy-­‐implementation	  action	  at	  the	  US	  Federal	  level.	  
71	  The	  Congressional	  Record	  publishes	  transcripts	  of	  hearings,	  debates	  and	  speeches	  and	  bill	  
proposals,	  indicating	  evolving	  attention	  to	  issues.	  
72	  The	  words	  used	  were:	  ‘emission	  control,	  ‘air	  pollution’,	  ‘smog’,	  ‘exhaust	  emission’,	  ‘catalytic	  
converter’,	  ‘catalyst’,	  ‘thermal	  management	  system’,	  ‘crankcase	  ventilation’,	  and	  ‘vapor	  separator’.	  
The	  search	  was	  carried	  out	  with	  the	  Boolean	  operator	  ‘OR’.	  The	  technology	  keywords	  were	  
selected	  based	  on	  the	  book	  by	  Mondt	  (2000).	  The	  database	  used	  was	  Google	  Patents,	  which	  
provides	  a	  search	  tool	  for	  the	  USPTO:	  the	  advantage	  of	  using	  Google	  Patents	  instead	  of	  the	  
USPTO	  search	  engine	  is	  that	  Google	  offers	  the	  possibility	  of	  carrying	  out	  a	  keyword	  search	  for	  all	  




V.2.2. Sources	  for	  the	  qualitative	  case	  study	  (narrative)	  
Primary	  sources	   for	  protests	  and	  public	  discourse	  are	  articles	   in	  newspapers	   (the	  
Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  the	  Washington	  Post	  and	  the	  Wall	  Street	  
Journal)	   and	   in	  magazines	   (Time	   and	  Science).	   Besides	   articles,	   I	   also	   looked	   for	  
political	   cartoons	   published	   in	   those	   newspapers	   and	   periodical,	   because	   these	  
graphically	  capture	  public	  interpretations	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  issues	  of	  the	  time.	  
In	  particular,	  cartoons	  were	  extracted	  from	  Johnson	  and	  Katz	  (2009),	  who	  offer	  a	  
comprehensive	   compilation	   of	   cartoons	   by	   the	   prominent	   Washington	   Post	  
(liberal)	  cartoonist	  Herblock73;	  and	  from	  the	  book	  edited	  by	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  
Health,	  Education	  and	  Welfare	  ‘No	  laughing	  matter:	  The	  Cartoonist	  Focuses	  on	  Air	  
Pollution’	  (USDHEW,	  1966),	  which	  compiles	  air	  pollution	  editorial	  cartoons	  up	  to	  
mid-­‐1960s.	  
The	  narrative	  draws	  on	  many	  secondary	  sources,	  most	  of	  which	  studies	  that	  
have	  a	  disciplinary	  bias:	  
• From	  an	  engineering	  perspective,	  Mondt	  (2000),	  a	  former	  engineer	  at	  GM,	  
highlighted	   the	   technical	   choices	   and	   concerns	   in	   the	   development	   of	  
various	   emission	   control	   systems.	   Heck	   and	   Farrauto	   (2002)	   offers	   a	  
detailed	   explanation	   of	   emission	   control	   technologies	   based	   on	   chemical	  
catalysis.	  
• From	  an	  innovation	  studies	  perspective,	  Lee,	  Veloso,	  Hounshell	  and	  Rubin	  
(2010)	   and	   Lee,	   Veloso	   and	   Hounshell	   (2011)	   analysed	   the	   technological	  
changes	   through	   an	   in-­‐depth	   patent	   and	   cost	   (learning	   curve)	   analysis;	  
while	   Nill	   and	   Tiessen	   (2005)	   studied	   different	   technological	   trajectories	  
(namely	   catalyst	   and	   lean	   burn	   engine),	   and	   how	   one	   of	   them	   became	  
dominant	   through	   interactions	   between	   technological,	   competitive	   and	  
policy	  developments.	  
• From	  an	  economics	  point	  of	  view,	  Crandall	  et	  al.	  (1986)	  made	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  
analysis	   of	   the	   air	   pollution	   regulations,	   weighing	   the	   health	   and	  
environmental	   benefits	   against	   the	   pecuniary	   costs	   of	   regulations	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Herbert	  Lawrence	  Block,	  winner	  of	  three	  Pulitzer	  prizes	  for	  editorial	  cartooning,	  and	  co-­‐winner	  
of	  a	  fourth	  Pulitzer	  prize	  for	  Public	  Service	  on	  the	  Watergate	  scandal	  (Johnson	  and	  Katz,	  2009).	  
After	  his	  death,	  Herblock	  deserved	  two	  exhibitions	  in	  the	  US	  Library	  of	  Congress	  (available	  at:	  
http://www.loc.gov/rr/print/swann/herblock/	  and	  





industry	   and	   consumers.	   Bresnahan	   and	   Yao	   (1985)	   address	   other	   non-­‐
pecuniary	  costs,	  such	  as	  the	  influences	  of	  catalytic	  converters	  on	  driveability	  
and	  fuel	  efficiency	  of	  cars.	  
• Krier	   and	   Ursin	   (1977)	   provided	   a	   detailed	   chronological	   account	   of	   the	  
internal	   policy	   process,	   focusing	   on	   agenda	   building,	   negotiations	   in	  
committees,	   decision	   making	   in	   Congress,	   implementation,	   etc.	   In	  
particular	   they	   focus	  on	   the	  various	   interactions	  between	   the	   federal	   level	  
and	  the	  state	  level	  (especially	  California).	  Dewey	  (1999)	  retells	  the	  history	  of	  
the	  ‘anti-­‐trust	  case	  of	  the	  century’,	  in	  which	  American	  automakers	  and	  their	  
trade	   association	   were	   judged	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   for	   alleged	   anti-­‐
competitive	  behaviour	  in	  the	  development	  of	  emission	  control	  technologies.	  
• Gonzales	   (2002a;	   2002b)	   looked	   at	   the	   politics	   of	   air	   pollution	   regulation	  
and	  automobile	  emissions	  from	  a	  critical	  Marxian	  perspective.	  Luger	  (2000)	  
and	  Doyle	   (2000)	  make	   a	  broader	  political	   economy	  analysis,	   focusing	  on	  
the	  interactions	  between	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  car	  industry,	  and	  the	  corporate	  
political	  strategies	  the	  latter	  employ.	  
From	   the	   TEF	   perspective,	   it	   thus	   appears	   that	   previous	   studies	   have	   addressed	  
important	  single	  dimensions	  of	  the	  local	  air	  pollution	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  
these	   studies	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   interactions	   and	   spillovers	   between	   the	   various	  
dimensions	   in	   order	   to	   develop	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   and	   multi-­‐dimensional	  
analysis	  based	  on	   the	  DILC-­‐model.	   I	  will	  also	  use	  secondary	  accounts	  of	  broader	  
contextual	  developments	  affecting	  the	  American	  automobile	  industry	  (White,	  1971;	  
Abernathy	   et	   al.,	   1983;	   Yates,	   1983;	   Halberstam,	   1987;	   Flink,	   1990;	   Ingrassia	   and	  
White,	   1995;	  Freeland,	  2001;	  Studer-­‐Noguez,	  2001;	  Hyde,	  2003;	   Ingrassia,	   2010)	   to	  
analyze	  how	  other	  issues	  (such	  as	  safety,	  fuel	  efficiency,	  competition	  from	  foreign	  
new	  entrants,	  market	  fluctuations	  and	  financial	  problems)74	  influenced	  or	  not	  the	  
air	  pollution	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  
V.3. QUANTIFICATION	  APPROACH:	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  ATTENTION	  
INDICATORS	  
Figure	   V.3	   present	   the	   representations	   of	   the	   attention	   indicators:	   (a)	   public	  
attention	  to	  air	  pollution	  and	  smog;	  (b)	  congressional	  attention	  to	  air	  pollution	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Some	  of	  the	  issues	  to	  which	  I	  pay	  less	  attention	  are	  labour	  relations,	  international	  markets,	  




smog;	  (c)	  regulatory	  attention	  to	  air	  pollution	  and	  smog;	  and	  (d)	  emission	  control	  
patents	  (‘industry	  attention’)	  by	  assignee	  type.	  Here	  I	  provide	  a	  visual	  analysis	  of	  
how	  each	   indicator	  behaved	   through	   time	  and	  how	   they	  appear	   to	  be	   related	   to	  
one	  another.	  The	  analysis	  is	  triangulated	  with	  my	  qualitative	  knowledge	  of	  the	  case	  
in	  order	  to	  arrive	  at	  the	  sub-­‐periods:	  
a) Air	   pollution	   and	   smog	   received	   rising	   levels	   of	   attention	   in	   California	  
already	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1940s,	  nationwide	  attention	  remained	  relatively	  low	  and	  
stable	  in	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  (Figure	  V.3.a).	  In	  fact,	  public	  
attention	   in	   California	   begins	   to	   increase	   fast	   by	   1953,	   while	   nationwide	  
attention	   to	   air	   pollution	   shows	   a	   slow	   upwards	   trajectory	   up	   to	   1964.	   In	  
qualitative	   terms,	   the	   issue	  received	  a	  compelling	  scientific	   framing	   in	  the	  
early	  1950s,	  after	  Dr.	  A.J.	  Haagen-­‐Smit	  (California	  Institute	  of	  Technology)	  
described	   the	   photochemical	   reaction	   that	   converted	   pollutants	   from	  
automobiles	   (and	   refineries)	   into	   smog	   (Krier	   and	   Ursin,	   1977).	   In	   1953,	  
American	   automakers	   formed	   (together	   with	   members	   from	   the	   oil	  
industry)	   an	   inter-­‐organizational	   alliance	   around	   the	   issue	   (Gonzales,	  
2002b):	   the	   Air	   Pollution	   Foundation.	   In	   the	   same	   year,	   the	   automakers	  
established	   a	  Vehicle	   Combustion	   Products	   Committee	   within	   their	   main	  
trade	  organization	  Automobile	  Manufacturers	  Association	  (AMA).	  
Nationwide	  attention	  to	  air	  pollution	  follows	  a	  peak	  and	  burst	  in	  the	  
1960s,	   peaking	   again	   in	   1970,	  when	   the	   first	   Earth	  Day	  was	   celebrated.	   It	  
followed	  however	  a	  downward	  trend	  until	  late	  1980s.	  In	  California,	  attention	  
peaked	  again	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  coinciding	  with	  environmental	  scandals	  of	  
the	  Reagan75	  presidency	  (Dunlap	  and	  Mertig,	  1992).	  
b) At	  the	  Federal	  policy-­‐making	  level,	  air	  pollution	  received	  some	  attention	  in	  
the	   mid-­‐1950s,	   with	   a	   few	   bills	   being	   introduced	   in	   the	   House	   of	  
Representatives	   (Figure	   V.3.b).	   However,	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1960s,	   considerably	  
more	   attention	   was	   devoted	   to	   the	   issue,	   both	   in	   the	   House	   and	   in	   the	  
Senate.	   This	   peak	   and	   bust	   cycle	   of	   political	   attention	   is	   in	   line	   with	  
nationwide	  public	  attention	  in	  the	  period.	  After	  peaking	  during	  the	  1969-­‐70	  
Congress	  (together	  with	  the	  peak	  in	  public	  attention),	   the	  number	  of	  bills	  
and	  political	   activities	   to	   regulate	   air	   pollution	  declined	   sharply,	   but	   rises	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




again	  in	  1977-­‐78,	  when	  amendments	  to	  the	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  (CAA)	  were	  voted.	  
The	  curve	  follows	  a	  downward	  trend	  until	  1990s,	  when	  new	  revisions	  to	  the	  
CAA	  were	  in	  order.	  
c) Regulatory	   attention	   (Figure	   V.3.c)	   followed	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   US	  
Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  by	  the	  1970	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  It	  
peaks	   in	   1976,	  but	   fluctuates	  at	  a	   relatively	  high	   level	  until	   the	   1980s.	  The	  
peak	   in	   public	   attention	   to	   air	   pollution	   in	   California	   in	   the	   early	   1980s	  
seems	  related	  to	  Federal	  executive	  level	  developments.	  
d) Patenting	  activity	  by	  American	  automakers,	   foreign	  automakers,	   suppliers	  
and	   others	   (Figure	   V.3.d)	   only	   starts	   to	   increase	   in	   the	   late	   1960s.	   Most	  
patenting	  activity	  is	  concentrated	  between	  1973	  and	  1983.	  This	  may	  indicate	  
an	  innovation	  race.	  Yet,	  suppliers	  seem	  to	  have	  reacted	  to	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  
public	  and	  political	  attention	  or	  to	  have	  anticipated	  the	  CAA	  policy-­‐making	  
process;	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  automakers	  seem	  to	  have	  reacted	  to	  policy-­‐
making	  and	  implementation	  (regulatory)	  activities,	  respectively.	  In	  a	  sense,	  
this	  confirms	  the	  idea	  that	  outsiders	  are	  the	  first	  to	  react	  to	  the	  emergence	  
of	  an	  issue	  that	  demands	  technical	  solutions.	  




Figure	  V.3	  (a-­‐d,	  top-­‐down):	  Attention	  to	  air	  pollution	  and	  smog	  indicators	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  construction	  (see	  section	  V.2.1	  for	  data	  sources	  and	  data	  collection	  procedures).	  




This	   exploratory	   visual	   analysis,	   triangulated	   with	   qualitative	   knowledge	   of	   the	  
case,	  leads	  me	  to	  establish	  five	  breaking	  points	  in	  the	  case	  study76:	  
• 1953,	   when	   air	   pollution	   was	   an	   issue	   already	   experienced	   in	   many	  
metropolises	   (Doyle,	   2000),	   so	   that	   American	   automakers	   recognized	   the	  
issue	  as	  such	  (accepting	  the	  technological	  framing);	  
• 1963,	  when	  an	  early	  policy-­‐making	  process	  took	  place,	  with	  accompanying	  
increased	  attention	  to	  the	  issue;	  
• 1970,	  when	   the	   first	  Earth	  Day	  was	   celebrated	   and	   the	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  was	  
established;	  
• 1977,	  when	  Congressional	  attention	  peaks	  again,	  but	  public	  attention	  enters	  
a	  downward	  trajectory;	  
• 1985,	   when	   public	   attention	   reaches	   a	   low,	   regulatory	   attention	   starts	  
declining	  and	  patenting	  activities	  is	  also	  at	  a	  low	  level.	  
The	  case	  study	  will	  look	  in	  depth	  into	  five	  periods,	  to	  allow	  comparison	  (pattern-­‐
matching)	  with	  the	  five	  phases	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model:	  
1) The	  first	  period,	  from	  1940	  to	  1953,	  is	  characterized	  by	  severe	  occurrences	  of	  
smog	  in	  California	  (1943,	  1946,	  1949),	  emerging	  public	  concerns,	  and	  sense-­‐
making	  efforts.	  
2) The	   second	   period,	   from	   1953	   to	   1963,	   is	   characterized	   by	   policy	   and	  
industry	  learning	  (with	  early	  policy	  action	  in	  California);	  political	  debates;	  
and	   industry	   voluntary	   action	   through	   a	   collaborative	   R&D	  program	   (via	  
the	  industry’s	  1953	  Vehicle	  Combustion	  Products	  Committee).	  
3) The	   third	   period,	   from	   1963	   to	   1970,	   saw	   the	   first	   substantial	   regulatory	  
efforts,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   California’s	  Motor	   Vehicle	  
Pollution	  Control	  Act	  (1960)	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  first	  Federal	  Clean	  
Air	   Act	   (1963).	   These	   regulations	   spurred	   the	   industry	   to	   develop	   and	  
implement	  some	  incremental	  refinements	  to	  engine	  components.	  
4) The	  fourth	  period,	  from	  1970	  to	  1977,	  starts	  with	  Earth	  Day	  1	  (1970)	  and	  the	  
tough	   Clean	   Air	   Act	   amendments	   (1970),	   and	   involves	   industry	   moving	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  periodization	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towards	   add-­‐on	   oxidation	   catalysts,	   which	   required	   new	   (chemical)	  
capabilities.	  
5) The	  fifth	  period,	  from	  1977	  to	  1985,	  saw	  postponements	  of	  the	  standards	  via	  
the	  1977	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  Amendment,	  and	  another	  innovation	  spurt	  towards	  
three-­‐way	  catalytic	  converters,	  which	  entailed	  architectural	  reconfiguration	  
of	  engines	  and	  new	  capabilities	  in	  electronics.	  (This	  period	  will	  briefly	  refer	  
to	  developments	  after	  1985,	  in	  the	  run	  to	  the	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  revisions	  of	  1990.)	  
V.4. QUALITATIVE	  APPROACH:	  IN-­‐DEPTH	  NARRATIVE	  
To	  investigate	  how	  the	  case	  matches	  or	  not	  with	  the	  core	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  DILC-­‐
model,	   I	   analyse	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   issue	   of	   air	   pollution	   (smog)	   and	   the	  
responses	   from	   the	   car	   industry	   through	   an	   in-­‐depth	   narrative.	   Following	   my	  
proposed	  case	  study	  protocol,	   for	  each	  period	  I	  will	  discuss:	   (1)	  various	  pressures	  
around	  the	  air	  pollution	  issue,	  (2)	  car	  industry	  responses;	  and	  (3)	  broader	  industry	  
developments	  and	  strategies	  that	  affected	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  
V.4.1. Issue	  emergence	  and	  sense-­‐making	  attempts	  (1940-­‐1953)	  
V.4.1.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Social	  movements	  and	  public	  opinion.	  Historically,	  air	  pollution	  had	  been	  associated	  
with	  a	  prospering	  industry	  (Figure	  V.4),	  and,	  indeed,	  fossil	  fuel	  burning	  by	  industry	  
is	   a	   major	   cause	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   London-­‐type	   fog	   (Mondt,	   2000).	   The	   issue	   of	  
‘smog’	  (local	  air	  pollution),	  however,	  emerged	  in	  California	  in	  the	  1940s	  where	  the	  
combination	  of	  a	  unique	   topography	  and	  meteorology	  and	  widespread	  car	  usage	  
formed	   conditions	   for	   its	   creation	   (Gonzales,	   2002a).	   Los	   Angeles	   in	   particular	  
began	   to	   experience	   a	   general	   haze	   over	   the	   city,	   which	   caused	   eye	   irritation,	  
coughing,	   chest	   and	   upper	   respiratory	   discomfort.	   There,	   smog	   was	   common	  
occurrence,	  especially	  in	  summer,	  and	  episodes	  of	  severe	  smog	  happened	  in	  1943,	  
1946	  and	  1949	  (Krier	  and	  Ursin,	  1977).	  	  
This	   state	   of	   affairs	   gave	   rise	   to	   public	   concerns	   that	   “would	   be	   aired	  
through	   letters	   to	   the	   editor,	   newspaper	   articles,	   and	   the	   occasional	   public	  
demonstration”	   (Gonzales,	   2002a,	   p.	   134).	   The	   LA	   Times	   engaged	   in	   attention	  
advocacy	   and	   in	   1946	   started	   a	   campaign	   to	   ‘banish	   smog,	   [and]	   bring	   the	   sun	  




county-­‐appointed	  commissions	  the	  finger	  of	  suspicion	  points	  to	  the	  manufacturing	  
and	  industrial	  districts	  in	  the	  south	  and	  southeast	  of	  Los	  Angeles	  as	  the	  principal	  
offenders”	  (Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  1946).	   	  
Figure	  V.4:	  1936	  Cartoon	  on	  air	  pollution	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  economic	  prosperity	  
	  
Source:	  Johnson	  and	  Katz	  (2009)	  
Policy-­‐makers.	  Although	  local	  policy-­‐makers	  expressed	  some	  concerns	  about	  smog,	  
they	  did	  not	  go	  beyond	  “well-­‐publicised	  but	  essentially	  token	  enforcement	  efforts”	  
(Gonzalez,	   2002a,	   p.	   134).	   Yet,	   scientific	   research	   into	   LA-­‐type	   smog	   received	  
important	   impulse	   in	   1947,	   when	   the	   LA	   County	   established	   the	   Air	   Pollution	  
Control	  District	   (APCD).	  Two	  years	   later,	   the	  APCD	  announced	  the	   findings	  of	  a	  
research	   effort	   in	   cooperation	   with	   Dr.	   Haagen-­‐Smit,	   that	   organic	   peroxide	   was	  
involved	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  smog	  (Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  1949).	  In	  1950,	  Haagen-­‐Smit	  
described	   the	   photochemical	   reaction	   that	   converted	   pollutants	   into	   smog	   and	  
pointed	  to	  automobiles	  (and	  refineries)	  as	  main	  sources	  of	  LA-­‐type	  smog	  (Doyle,	  
2000;	  Krier	  and	  Ursin,	  1977).	  
V.4.1.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  
Issue-­‐related	   pressures	   on	   the	   car	   industry	   were	   relatively	   weak	   throughout	   the	  
1940s.	  When	  Haagen-­‐Smit	  published	  his	  findings,	  however,	  the	  industry	  promoted	  
public	   information	   strategies	   to	   deny	   the	   ‘hypothesis’	   (Luger,	   2000;	   Gonzales,	  




research	   from	   the	   Stanford	   Research	   Institute	   (SRI)	   to	   refute	   Haagen-­‐Smit’s	  
findings.	   The	   SRI	   contested	   the	   fundamentals	   of	   his	   research,	   and	   argued	   that	  
smog	  was	  still	  a	  mystery	  (Doyle,	  2000;	  Krier	  and	  Ursin,	  1977).	  
In	   1953,	   with	   their	   legitimacy	   under	   threat,	   the	   car	   industry	   and	   the	   oil	  
industry	   decided	   to	   form	  a	   research	   alliance	   –	   the	  Air	   Pollution	   Foundation	   –	   to	  
investigate	   the	   issue	   (Doyle,	  2000;	  Gonzalez,	  2002a).	  American	  automakers	   (GM,	  
Ford,	   Chrysler	   and	   American	   Motors)	   also	   established	   the	   Vehicle	   Combustion	  
Products	   Committee	   (within	   the	   Automobile	   Manufacturers	   Association),	  
announced	  as	  a	  collaborative	  effort	  to	  develop	  emission-­‐control	  technologies.	  
V.4.1.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  trends	  and	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	  
In	   the	   immediate	   post-­‐World	  War	   II	   (WWII),	   the	   broader	   industry	   context	  was	  
highly	  favourable	  to	  American	  automakers.	  The	  car	  industry	  enjoyed	  high	  political	  
legitimacy,	   because	   of	   its	   weapon	   manufacturing	   effort	   during	   the	   war,	   and	  
because	  of	  post-­‐war	  economic	  and	  employment	  contributions	  (Halberstam,	   1987;	  
Luger,	  2000).	  Culturally,	  the	  car	  became	  an	  American	  icon,	  representing	  modernity	  
and	  progress	  (Flink,	   1990).	  Demand	  for	  passenger	  cars	  boomed	  after	  WWII,	  with	  
passenger	  car	   sales	  achieving	  a	   record	  of	   5.8	  million	   in	   1953	   (Ward’s	  Automotive	  
Group,	  2011).	  The	  Big	  Three	  accounted	  for	  91%	  of	  the	  market	  (Ward’s	  Automotive	  
Group,	   2013).	   In	   this	   favourable	   scenario,	   the	   American	   car	   industry	   paid	   little	  
attention	  to	  air	  pollution.	  In	  fact,	  the	  industry’s	  economic	  (positioning)	  strategy	  was	  
oriented	   towards	   the	   sale	  of	  more	  profitable	   large-­‐cars	   (Flink,	   1990),	  which	  were	  
less	  fuel	  efficient	  and	  thus	  polluted	  more.	  
V.4.2. Policy	  learning	  and	  defensive	  industry	  responses	  (1953-­‐1963)	  
V.4.2.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Social	   movements	   and	   public	   opinion.	   The	   1953	   ‘five-­‐day	   siege	   of	   smog’	   (in	   Los	  
Angeles)	   heightened	   public	   concerns	   (Krier	   and	   Ursin,	   1977).	   Public	   pressure	  
further	   increased	  with	  the	  formation	  of	  anti-­‐pollution	  groups	  such	  as	  Stamp	  Out	  
Smog	   (SOS)	   in	   1958	   (Jacobs	   and	   Kelly,	   2008).	   Newly	   established	   environmental	  
groups	  would	  later	  join	  and	  promote	  anti-­‐pollution	  campaigns	  (Dunlap	  and	  Mertig,	  
1992),	   but	   general	   public	   attention	   remained	   low	   except	   for	   California	   –	   albeit	  




Science.	  With	  severe	  episodes	  of	  smog	  happening	  also	   in	   the	  rest	  of	   the	  country,	  
the	  American	  medical	  community	  began	  to	  voice	  concerns	  about	  the	  health	  effect	  
of	  air	  pollution	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  1986).	  Medical	  research	  contributed	  to	  the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  new	   framing	  of	   smog	   from	   ‘nuisance’	   to	   ‘health	   risk’	   (Jacobs	  and	  
Kelly,	  2008)	  (Figure	  V.5).	  
Figure	  V.5:	  Cartoon	  from	  the	  early	  1960s	  portraying	  the	  health-­‐risk	  framing	  of	  air	  pollution	  
	  
Source:	  USDHEW	  (1966)	  
Policy-­‐makers.	   The	   1953	   shock	   event	   and	   rising	   public	   concerns	   led	   to	   policy	  
debates,	   investigations	   and	   policy	   learning	   in	   California.	   Policy-­‐makers	   began	  
discussing	   the	   creation	   of	   regional	   pollution	   control	   districts,	   while	   California’s	  
Governor	  sponsored	  research,	  which	  confirmed	  that	  automobiles	  were	   important	  
contributors	   to	   smog	   problems	   (Krier	   and	   Ursin,	   1977).	   Also	   the	   federal	   level	  
engaged	   in	   policy	   learning.	   The	   federal	   Air	   Pollution	   Control	   Act	   (1955),	   for	  
instance,	  stimulated	  studies	  on	  the	  causes	  and	  (health)	  effects	  of	  air	  pollution.	  A	  
study	  by	  the	  Surgeon	  General	  was	  debated	  at	  the	  First	  National	  Conference	  on	  Air	  
Pollution	  in	  1958	  (Gonzales,	  2002a),	  and	  prepared	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  1960	  ‘Schenck	  
Act’	   that	   made	   the	   study	   of	   motor	   vehicle	   emissions	   part	   of	   the	   remit	   of	   the	  
Surgeon	  General	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  In	  1959,	  air	  quality	  was	  made	  part	  of	  the	  mission	  of	  
the	  California	  Department	  of	  Public	  Health	  (Krier	  and	  Ursin,	  1977),	  something	  that	  
strengthened	   the	   issue’s	   health	   framing.	   The	   next	   year,	   California	   adopted	   the	  
Motor	   Vehicle	   Pollution	   Control	   Act,	   which	   would	   be	   “key	   in	   spurring	   the	  




V.4.2.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  
Socio-­‐cultural	  and	  political	  strategies.	  By	  1953,	  the	  car	  industry	  was	  still	  arguing	  that	  
the	  understanding	  of	   air	   pollution	  was	   too	  uncertain	   to	   assign	  blame	   (Krier	   and	  
Ursin,	  1977).	  In	  a	  1953	  letter	  to	  Los	  Angeles	  Supervisor	  Kenneth	  Hahn,	  Ford	  argued,	  
for	  instance,	  that	  its	  “engineering	  staff,	  although	  mindful	  that	  automobile	  engines	  
produce	   gases,	   feels	   that	   these	   waste	   vapors	   are	   dissipated	   in	   the	   atmosphere	  
quickly	  and	  do	  not	  present	  an	  air	  pollution	  problem”	  (quoted	  in	  Doyle,	  2000,	  17).	  
However,	  in	  1954	  the	  Air	  Pollution	  Foundation	  announced	  research	  results	  
that	   confirmed	   Haagen-­‐Smit’s	   findings;	   and,	   in	   another	   study	   from	   1956,	   the	  
Foundation	   pointed	   the	   automobile	   as	   the	  main	   source	   of	   L.A.	   smog	   (Krier	   and	  
Ursin	   1977).	   Although	   the	   car	   industry	   acknowledged	   the	   findings,	   it	   pointed	   to	  
‘uncertainties’	   and	   insisted	   on	   further	   investigations	   (Mondt,	   2000).	   The	   car	  
industry	  deployed	   information	  strategies	   that	  aimed	   to	   ‘divide	  and	   rule’	  between	  
state	   and	   federal	   levels,	   arguing	   that	   national	   regulations	   were	   not	   necessary	  
because	   ‘California	   was	   a	   special	   case’	   (Doyle,	   2000).	   In	   a	   1960	   Congressional	  
hearing,	   a	   representative	   of	   the	   AMA	   declared:	   “The	   popular	   term	   ‘Los	   Angeles	  
smog’...	  has	  a	   sound	  origin,	  because	  photochemical	   smog	   is...	  not	   likely	   to	  occur	  
anywhere	   else	   on	   earth	   with	   the	   frequency	   and	   intensity	   found	   in	   this	   area”	  
(quoted	  in	  Krier	  and	  Ursin,	  1977,	  p.	  89).	  
Technology	   innovation	   strategy.	   The	   car	   industry	   also	   adopted	   innovation	  
strategies,	   which	   were	   coordinated	   by	   AMA’s	   Vehicle	   Combustion	   Products	  
Committee.	   The	   initiative	   also	   included	   a	   cross-­‐licensing	   agreement	   on	   sharing	  
emission	  control-­‐related	  patents.	  But	  this	  was	  an	  institutional	  strategy	  as	  much	  as	  
technological.	   The	   industry’s	   political	   message	   was	   that	   regulations	   were	   not	  
needed,	   because	   the	   industry	   was	   already	   working	   hard	   on	   solutions.	   And	   to	  
further	  close	  the	  industry	  front,	  the	  Committee	  rather	  than	  individual	  companies	  
would	  manage	  public	  communications	  (Luger,	  2000).	  Thus,	  this	  IOR	  was	  formed	  
for	   reasons	   of	   reciprocity	   and	   efficiency	   (in	   the	   development	   of	   technologies)	   as	  
much	  as	  for	  reasons	  of	  stability	  and	  legitimacy.	  
But	   the	   industry	  did	  promote	  R&D	  on	  emission-­‐control	   technologies.	  The	  
research	  program	  focused	  on	  incremental	  innovations	  in	  engine	  components,	  such	  
as	   the	  Positive	  Crankcase	  Ventilation	   (PCV)	  valve	   (a	   technology	  known	  since	   the	  




‘tinkering’	  (Mondt,	  2000):	  filtered	  air	  replaces	  the	  pollutants	  present	  in	  crankcases,	  
which	  are	  recycled	  into	  the	  engine	  intake	  and	  mixed	  with	  the	  air-­‐fuel	  mixture	  to	  be	  
burned	  again	  in	  the	  combustion	  chamber	  (Figure	  V.6).	  
Figure	  V.6:	  GM’s	  1961	  PCV	  system	  
	  
Source:	  Mondt	  (2000,	  p.	  53)	  
Although	   PCV	   devices	   cost	   only	   $10.00	   per	   car77,	   car	  manufacturers	   complained	  
about	   the	   extra	   costs	   of	   installing	   pollution	   control	   devices	   (Doyle,	   2000),	  
indicating	  a	  new	  framing	  strategy	  in	  California,	  drawing	  on	  economic	  factors.	  But	  
the	  industry	  also	  argued	  that	  regulations	  were	  not	  needed,	  because	  solutions	  were	  
in	  the	  making.	  To	  demonstrate	  goodwill,	  in	  1960,	  GM	  wrote	  to	  Californian	  officials	  
to	   inform	  that	   its	   1961	  model-­‐year	   (MY)	  cars	   sold	   in	   the	  state	  would	  have	  a	  PCV	  
valve	  (Doyle,	  2000)	  –	  which	  became	  the	  first	   innovation	  in	  response	  to	  the	  smog	  
issue.	   In	   fact,	   GM’s	   strategy	   attempted	   to	   pre-­‐empt	   the	   need	   for	   legislation	  
mandating	  emission-­‐control	  technology.	  
There	   was	   also	   some	   work	   on	   more	   radical	   alternatives.	   AMA’s	   Exhaust	  
System	  Task	  Group,	  formed	  in	  1955,	  investigated	  oxidation	  catalysts	  (Lester,	  1983).	  
In	   1957	   Ford	   publicly	   announced	   that	   it	   was	   working	   on	   vanadium	   pentoxide	  
catalysts,	  while	  Chrysler	  also	  publicly	  announced	  the	  development	  of	  better	  tuned	  
engines	   that	   produced	   less	   fumes.	  GM	   reprehended	   both	   initiatives	   through	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  In	  1962	  dollars	  (=	  $75	  in	  2011	  dollars).	  A	  best-­‐selling	  sedan,	  such	  as	  the	  1962	  Chevrolet	  409,	  cost	  




AMA,	   reminding	   both	   companies	   of	   their	   agreement	   on	  managed	   publicity	   and	  
threatening	  them	  with	  sanctions	  (Doyle,	  2000).78	  
V.4.2.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  trends	  and	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	  
The	  cultural	   legitimacy	  of	  the	  car	  (and	  the	  industry)	  remained	  high,	  with	  the	  car	  	  
fleet	   increasing	  more	   than	   4%	   per	   annum	   in	   the	   1950s,	   reaching	  more	   than	   60	  
million	   registrations	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   decade	   (USDOT/FHWA,	   2011).	   The	   car	  
symbolized	   success,	   status,	  modernity	  –	  and	   freedom.	  The	  car	  and	   the	   interstate	  
highway	   system	   also	   stimulated	   a	   new	   kind	   of	   tourism	   (camping)	   and,	  
consequently,	  renewed	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  ‘the	  wild’	  and	  in	  national	  parks,	  which	  
the	  general	  public	   could	   then	  visit	   thanks	   to	   cars.	  The	  car	   thus	   contributed	   to	  a	  
new	  wave	   of	   ‘conservationism’,	   which	   resulted	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   environmental	  
groups	   such	   as	   Nature	   Conservancy	   (1951)	   and	   the	   World	   Wildlife	   Fund	   (1961)	  
(Doyle,	   2000).	   This	   cultural	   change	   represented	   an	   early	   incentive	   for	   policy-­‐
makers	  to	  become	  somewhat	  more	  concerned	  with	  environmental	  issues.	  Yet,	  the	  
main	   automobile-­‐related	   policy	   issue	   rising	   on	   the	   political	   agenda	   was	   safety	  
(Eastman,	  1984).	  	  	  
The	   industry’s	   positioning	   strategy	   was	   directed	   towards	   the	   large	   car	  
segment,	   where	   firms	   competed	   on	   styling,	   gadgets,	   and	   costs.	   This	   focus	   on	  
gadgetry	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  functional	  technologies	  –	  such	  as	  air	  pollution	  control	  
–	   became	   the	   focus	   of	   public	   (Figure	  V.7)	   and	   political	   criticisms	   (Doyle,	   2000).	  
The	   small-­‐car	   market	   formed	   an	   entry	   point	   for	   foreign	   manufacturers	   (Yates,	  
1983).	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  GM’s	  threats	  became	  public	  after	  the	  1969	  Supreme	  Court	  antitrust	  case.	  This	  event	  indicates	  
that	  the	  IOR,	  while	  apparently	  symmetric,	  was	  in	  fact	  asymmetric,	  as	  GM,	  the	  market	  leader,	  was	  




Figure	  V.7:	  Cartoon	  from	  the	  Washington	  Post	  (March	  4th,	  1960)	  on	  automakers’	  reaction	  to	  
‘attachments	  to	  reduce	  poisonous	  gases’	  
	  
Source:	  Johnson	  and	  Katz	  (2009)	  
Innovation	   strategy	   remained	   of	   limited	   priority.	   “The	   American	   automobile	  
industry	   [lagged]	   far	   behind	   foreign	   competition	   in	   the	   1950-­‐1980	   period	   in	  
developing	  and	  adopting	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  innovations	  that	  improved	  fuel	  economy,	  
performance,	  handling,	  and	  safety”	  (Flink,	  1990,	  p.	  292).	  In	  the	  late	  1950s,	  the	  Big	  
Three	  (GM,	  Ford	  and	  Chrysler)	  responded	  to	  the	  foreign	  imports	  by	  building	  their	  
own	   compacts	  models,	   e.g.	   Ford	   Falcon;	   Dodge	  Dart;	   Plymouth	   Valiant	   (White,	  
1971;	  Flink,	  1990).	  This	  did	  entail	  an	  innovation	  effort	  and	  the	  development	  of	  new	  
engine	  concepts	   (e.g.	   rear-­‐mounted,	  air-­‐cooled	  aluminium	  engines),	  and	  changes	  
in	   transmissions	   and	   chassis	   design.	   Although	   the	   transilience	   index 79 	  of	  
innovation	   thus	   briefly	   improved	   (Figure	   V.8),	   these	   innovations	   were	   targeted	  
towards	   a	   special	   market	   niche,	   and	   only	   affected	   mainstream	   (large	   car)	  
technologies	   to	  a	   limited	  extent.	  The	   transilience	   index	  subsequently	  went	  down	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  The	  transilience	  index	  reflects	  the	  degree	  of	  technical	  difficulty	  of	  innovations	  over	  time.	  For	  
the	  1894-­‐1980	  period,	  Abernathy	  et	  al.	  (1983)	  construct	  this	  index	  for	  the	  American	  car	  industry,	  
based	  on	  a	  coding	  of	  631	  technical	  innovations	  using	  a	  7-­‐point	  scale	  (based	  on	  how	  disruptive	  the	  




again.	   Compact	   models	   achieved	   disappointing	   sales,	   which	   hardened	   Detroit’s	  
negative	  beliefs	   about	   the	   small	   car	  market	   (Yates,	   1983).	  The	   industry’s	   strategy	  
towards	   the	   task	  environment	   thus	  continued	   to	  negatively	   contribute	   to	   the	  air	  
pollution	  problem.	  
Figure	  V.8:	  Pattern	  of	  innovative	  activity	  of	  the	  American	  automobile	  industry	  	  
	  
Source:	  Abernathy	  et	  al.	  (1983,	  p.	  115)	  
V.4.3. Increasing	  public	  concern,	  enactment	  of	  legislation	  and	  industry	  
delay	  (1963-­‐1970)	  
V.4.3.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Social	  movements	  and	  public	  opinion.	  Smog	  problems	  became	  commonplace	  events	  
in	   states	   other	   than	   California	   (e.g.	   New	   York,	   Philadelphia)	   as	   car	   ownership	  
increased	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  The	  scientific	  understandings	  of	  health	  effects	  also	  grew	  
and	  became	  publicly	  shared	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  1986;	  Jacobs	  and	  Kelly,	  2008);	  
thus	   a	  more	   widespread	   view	   that	   the	   issue	   was	   getting	   worse	   added	   to	   a	   new	  
public	   sense	   of	   urgency,	   reflected	   in	   political	   cartoons	   (Figure	   V.9).	   This	   public	  
framing	   resonated	   with	   new	   cultural	   sensitivities	   about	   environmental	  
vulnerability	  (Dunlap,	  1992),	  which	  had	  also	  been	  influenced	  by	  the	  debate	  around	  
Rachel	  Carlson’s	  Silent	   Sprint	   (1962),	  a	  public	  science	  book	  on	  the	  environmental	  
effects	  of	  pesticides.	  New	  activist	  groups,	  e.g.	  Clean	  Air	  Council	   (1967)	  and	  Group	  
Against	   Smog	   and	   Pollution	   (GASP)	   (1969),	   coalesced	   with	   physicians	   and	  
environmental	   groups	   into	   a	   social	   movement,	   which	   organized	   protests	   and	  
disseminated	  information	  about	  air	  pollution	  (Dunlap	  and	  Mertig,	  1992;	  Gonzales,	  
2002b).	   Air	   pollution	   concerns	   increasingly	   spilled	   over	   to	   public	   opinion,	   and	  
public	  attention	  peaked	  in	  1967	  (Figure	  V.3.a).	  




Figure	  V.9	  (a-­‐b):	  1966	  Cartoons	  by	  Herblock	  (September	  23rd	  and	  December,	  30th,	  
respectively)	  
	   	  
Source:	  Johnson	  and	  Katz	  (2009)	  
In	   1969,	  public	  opinion	  was	   also	   influenced	  by	   an	  anti-­‐trust	   case	   against	   the	  Big	  
Three,	   American	   Motors	   and	   the	   AMA	   (Dewey,	   1999;	   Doyle,	   2000).	   The	  
Department	  of	  Justice	  (DOJ)	  accused	  the	  industry	  of	  conspiracy	  not	  to	  compete	  in	  
terms	   of	   pollution	   control	   devices	   (via	   AMA’s	   Vehicle	   Combustion	   Products	  
Committee).	   “Publicly,	   the	   automakers’	   cooperative	   venture	   appeared	   to	   be	   a	  
laudable	   undertaking…	   But	   unbeknownst	   to	   the	   public,	   ‘the	   agreement’	   would	  
work	   its	   will	   on	   any	   company	   that	   stepped	   out	   ahead	   of	   the	   others,	   retarding	  
progress,	   not	   pushing	   it	   forward”	   (Doyle	   2000,	   p.	   35).	   The	   industry	   was	   able	   to	  
settle	  the	  issue	  with	  DOJ	  in	  a	  consent	  decree80,	  but	  its	  reputation	  and	  image	  was	  
severely	  damaged.	  Congressmen,	  citizens	  and	  social	  movements	  sent	  thousands	  of	  
petitions	   to	  DOJ,	   arguing	  against	   the	  decree	  and	   in	   favour	  of	  public	  prosecution	  
(Dewey,	   1999;	   Luger,	   2000).	   Although	   the	   decision	   was	   upheld,	   the	   event	  
“demonstrated	   to	   many,	   particularly	   those	   supporting	   or	   participating	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  The	  decree	  prohibited	  e.g.	  the	  exchange	  of	  restricted	  information	  between	  car	  manufacturers,	  
cross-­‐licensing	  of	  future	  patents,	  delay	  in	  installation	  of	  technologies,	  restriction	  of	  publicity	  on	  
technological	  achievements,	  joint	  assessment	  of	  third	  party’s	  technologies.	  It	  also	  required	  that	  




growing	  environmental	  movement,	   that	  the	  auto	   industry	  would	  heed	  the	  public	  
interest	  only	  if	  it	  were	  forced	  to	  by	  Congress”	  (Luger,	  2000,	  p.	  86).	  	  
Policy-­‐makers.	   The	   original	   1963	  Clean	   Air	   Act	   (CAA)	   signalled	   stronger	   federal	  
involvement,	   and	   was	   followed	   by	   a	   rapid	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   bills	  
introduced	   in	   the	  House	   and	   Senate	   (Figure	   V.3.b).	  Methods	   for	   controlling	   car	  
emissions	  were	   not	   included	   in	   the	   1963	   CAA,	   because	   of	   ongoing	   deliberations	  
with	  the	  car	  industry	  (Mondt,	  2000).	  However,	  California,	  which	  had	  specified	  the	  
first	   emission	   standards	   for	   car	   exhausts	   in	   1960	   (Gonzalez,	   2002b),	   began	   to	  
mandate	   emission	   control	   technologies	   in	   the	   1966MY.	   	   Candidate	   technologies	  
were	   to	   be	   tested	   in	   1964	   by	   California’s	  Motor	   Vehicle	   Pollution	   Control	   Board	  
(MVPCB)	  (Mondt,	  2000).	  
It	   was	   the	   Federal	   Motor	   Vehicle	   Pollution	   Control	   Act	   (1965)	   that	  
established	   the	   first	   national	   emission	   standards	   for	   cars,	   to	   be	   adopted	   in	   the	  
1968MY	   (model	   year)	   –	   it	   however	   followed	  what	   the	   industry	   said	  was	   feasible	  
(Krier	  and	  Ursin,	  1977;	  Doyle,	  2000).	  But	  as	  policy-­‐makers	  got	  frustrated	  with	  the	  
industry’s	   delay	   tactics	   and	   slow	   technical	   progress,	   debates	   gradually	   moved	  
towards	  more	  willingness	  to	  tighten	  regulations	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  
V.4.3.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  
Socio-­‐cultural	   and	   political	   strategies.	   While	   in	   the	   early	   1960s,	   automakers	  
resorted	   to	   framing	   strategies	   that	   claimed	   California	   was	   a	   special	   case	   (Luger,	  
2000),	   when	   other	   states	   (New	   York,	   Philadelphia)	   began	   introducing	   pollution	  
control	   laws,	   the	   industry	   changed	   its	   position	   and	   began	   arguing	   for	   federal	  
standards:	   “When	   faced	  with	   the	   threat	  of	   inconsistent	  and	   increasingly	   rigorous	  
state	  laws,	  they...	  [used]	  their	  superior	  organizational	  capacities	  in	  Washington	  to	  
preempt	   or	   control	   the	   environmentalists’	   legislative	   victories	   at	   the	   state	   level”	  
(Elliott	   et	  al.,	  1985,	  p.326).	  The	  political	  strategies	  used	  were	  mainly	  lobbying	  and	  
disclosure	  of	  information	  in	  hearings	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  
Technological	   innovation	   strategy.	  While	   the	   threat	   of	   regulation	   increased,	   the	  
industry	  continued	  to	   focus	  on	   incremental	   improvements	   in	  combustion	  engine	  
components,	  such	  as	  the	  positive	  crankcase	  ventilation	  (PCV)	  valve;	  evaporation-­‐
control	  system	  (ECS);	  air	  preheat	  by	  a	  thermal	  air	  cleaner	  (e.g.	  GM’s	  THERMAC);	  




thermovacuum	  switch	  (TVS)	  (Mondt,	  2000).	  In	  1966,	  the	  air	  injected	  reactor	  (AIR),	  
which	   promoted	   the	   oxidation	   of	   HCs	   and	   CO	   in	   exhaust	   manifolds,	   was	  
successfully	   introduced	   in	   vehicles	   sold	   in	   California.	   These	   incremental	  
innovations	   made	   it	   possible	   to	   meet	   the	   regulations	   mandated	   for	   1966	   in	  
California	  and	  1968	  nationwide.	  In	  subsequent	  years	  the	  car	  industry	  focused	  much	  
technological	   attention	   on	   thermal	   reactors81,	   which	   were	   an	   extension	   of	   AIR	  
systems.	  
Automakers	  resisted	  the	   implementation	  of	  catalytic	  devices	  developed	  by	  
suppliers,	   a	   technology	   they	   did	   not	   yet	   dominate.	   Because	   there	   were	   some	  
prospects	   that	   catalytic	   converters	   could	   be	   certified	   by	   California’s	   MVPCB,	   in	  
1964	   the	   director	   of	   the	   AMA	   recommended	   its	   members	   to	   avoid	   the	   topic	   of	  
catalytic	   converters	   –	   ‘shrug	   it	   off	   or	   ignore	   it’	   –	   and	   if	   they	   would	   come	   to	   be	  
certified,	  then	  automakers	  should	  claim	  that	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  time	  to	  install	  
them	   in	   1966	  model-­‐year	   vehicles	   (Doyle,	   2000,	   p.	   45).	   American	   carmakers	   did	  
however	  set	  up	  R&D	  programs	  to	  investigate	  the	  technology	  (Lester,	  1983;	  Mondt,	  
2000).	  Ford	  joined	  the	  Inter-­‐Industry	  Emission	  Control	  Program	  (IIEC1,	  1967-­‐1973)	  
with	  outside	  firms	  to	  acquire	  new	  capabilities,	  while	  GM	  created	   its	  own	  catalyst	  
R&D	  program	   (Mondt,	   2000).	   In	   1968,	  GM	   found	   that	   unleaded	   fuel	   diminished	  
catalyst	  degradation,	  which	  has	  been	  a	  serious	  problem:	  
It	   is	   difficult	   to	  overstate	   the	   significance	  of	   the	  GM	   lead-­‐free	   tests	   in	   the	  
evolution	  of	  catalytic	  control	  of	  vehicle	  emissions.	  They	  demonstrated	  that,	  
when	  operated	  on	  unleaded	  fuel,	  catalytic	  systems	  could	  be	  made	  durable,	  
[...]	   and	   that	   they	   need	   not	   substantively	   impact	   engine	   operation	   or	  
performance,	  including	  fuel	  economy.	  (Lester,	  1983,	  p.	  422)	  
New	   entrants	   and	   outsiders.	   Outsiders	   such	   as	   American	   Cyanamid,	   Walker	  
Manufacturing,	   and	   Universal	   Oil	   developed	   catalyst	   technologies	   (Lester,	   1983)	  
(cf.	   Figure	   V.3.d).	   In	   1962,	   Engelhard	   Industries	   successfully	   tested	   catalytic	  
converters	   in	  automobiles	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  Although	  the	  MVPCB	  certified	  catalytic	  
converters	   from	   suppliers,	   the	   industry	   –	   characterized	   by	   strong	   vertical	  
integration	  –	  did	  not	  buy	  these	  new	  technologies,	  because	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  sell	  
and	   warrant	   vehicles	   equipped	   with	   expensive	   devices	   made	   by	   third	   parties	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Thermal	  reactors,	  which	  operated	  at	  temperatures	  above	  750oC,	  aimed	  to	  further	  improve	  the	  
oxidation	  of	  hydrocarbons.	  They	  did	  not	  control	  for	  NOx	  emissions,	  however,	  and	  implied	  a	  fuel	  





(Mondt,	  2000).	  Automakers	  adopted	  instead	  an	  incremental	  solution	  to	  meet	  the	  
Californian	   standards	   for	   1966,	   the	   ‘Clean	   Air	   Package’	   (based	   on	   improved	  
adjustment	   of	   the	   air/fuel	   ratio	   and	   spark	   retarding	   techniques)	   developed	   by	  
Chrysler	  (Doyle,	  2000;	  Mondt,	  2000).	  	  
V.4.3.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  trends	  and	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	  
The	  industry’s	  public	  and	  political	  reputation	  were	  eroded	  by	  Nader’s	  book	  Unsafe	  
at	  Any	  Speed	  (1965),	  which	  criticized	  their	  reluctance	  to	  introduce	  safety	  features	  
like	   seatbelts	   (Luger,	   2000),	   and	   by	   the	   subsequent	   ‘Ribicoff	   hearings’	   (1965-­‐6),	  
which	   exposed	   secret	   recall	   campaigns	   through	  which	  one	   in	   five	   cars	   had	  been	  
recalled	   for	  safety	  defects	  between	   1960	  and	   1966.	   “Since	   this	   revelation	  came	  on	  
the	   heels	   of	   the	   industry’s	   refusal	   to	   support	   any	   form	   of	   federal	   regulation,	  
legislators	  now	  were	  inclined	  to	  see	  the	  industry	  as	  not	  just	  uncooperative	  but	  as	  
unreasonable”	   (Luger,	   2000,	   p.	   72).	   The	   safety	   issue	   resonated	   with	   the	   air	  
pollution	   issue	   and	   strengthened	   the	   political	   willingness	   to	   introduce	   stricter	  
legislations.	   The	   rise	   of	   an	   ‘activist	   culture’	   and	   new	   environmental	   groups	   (e.g.	  
Environmental	  Defense	   Fund	   (1967);	   Friends	   of	   the	   Earth	   (1968);	   Environmental	  
Action	   (1970) 82 )	   (Doyle,	   2000)	   strengthened	   the	   public	   discourse	   about	   air	  
pollution.	  
V.4.4. Tough	  legislation	  and	  resisted	  implementation	  (1970-­‐1977)	  
V.4.4.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Social	  movements	  and	  public	  opinion.	  Public	  pressure	  peaked	  (Figure	  V.9.a)	  during	  
the	  April	   1970	   first	  Earth	  Day	   event,	  when	  about	  20	  million	  people	   (Luger	  2000)	  
participated	  in	  workshops,	  seminars	  or	  protest	  marches	  to	   ‘save	  the	  planet’.	  Time	  
magazine	   reported	   on	   the	   occasion:	   “Earth	   Day	   planners	   scheduled	   stunts	   to	  
dramatize	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  environmental	  crisis.	  (...)	  The	  biggest	  target	  of	  all	  
was	  the	  automobile.	  In	  Danbury,	  Conn.,	  students	  made	  ready	  to	  perform	  the	  now	  
popular	   ritual	   of	   burying	   an	   internal-­‐combustion	   engine.	   At	   Wayne	   State	  
University	   they	   marshalled	   pickets	   for	   General	   Motors’	   headquarters...”	   (Time,	  
1970,	   online).	   Other	   type	   of	   initiative	   was	   taken	   by	   SOS,	   who	   co-­‐sponsored	   a	  
‘share-­‐a-­‐hide-­‐day’	   –	   “the	   first	   organized	   demonstration	   of	   carpooling	   and	   bus	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




riding”	   (Jacobs	   and	   Kelly,	   2008,	   p.	   220).	  Out	   of	   the	   Earth	  Day	   came	   also	   a	   new	  
brand	   of	   environmental	   lobbying,	   which	   supported	   the	   tough	   Clean	   Air	   Act	  
amendments	  proposed	  by	  Senator	  Muskie	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  The	  United	  Auto	  Workers	  
(UAW)	   joined	   the	   ‘Coalition	   for	  Clean	  Air’,	  which	   lobbied	   the	  Senate	   for	   stricter	  
auto	  emissions	  regulations	  (Luger,	  2000).	  	  
Policy-­‐makers.	  Congress	  enacted	  the	  1970	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  amendments	  (CAA),	  which	  
was	   a	   tough	   piece	   of	   regulation	   that	   demanded	   90%	   reductions	   in	  HC	   and	   CO	  
emissions	   by	   1975	   and	   in	   NOx	   by	   1976	   (Mondt,	   2000).	   The	   CAA	   specified	   a	  
$10,000/vehicle	  fine	  for	  firms	  selling	  cars	  that	  did	  not	  comply	  (Luger,	  2000).83	  The	  
CAA	  was	  the	  culmination	  of	  reinforcing	  processes,	  which	  explain	  why	  the	  local	  air	  
pollution	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   followed	   the	   regulatory	   route	   in	   the	  US:	   (a)	   decreasing	  
legitimacy	   of	   automakers;	   (b)	   increasing	   political	   frustration	   over	   the	   industry’s	  
delay	  tactics;	  (c)	  macro-­‐cultural	  trends	  such	  as	  rising	  environmentalism	  and	  social	  
activism;	   (d)	   political	   jockeying	   between	   Senator	   Muskie	   and	   President	   Nixon	  
(Elliott	  et	  al.,	  1985).84	  
CAA	  implementation	  was	  delegated	  to	  the	  newly	  created	  US	  Environmental	  
Protection	  Agency	  (EPA),	  which	  could	  also	  regulate	  fuels	  (Stikkers,	  2002).	  Lead	  as	  a	  
fuel	  additive	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  concern,	  because	  of	  its	  effects	  on	  human	  health	  –	  and	  
on	  the	  durability	  of	  catalytic	  converters	  (Lester,	  1983;	  Mondt,	  2000).	  Since	  1971	  EPA	  
therefore	   issued	   regulations	   that	   progressively	   removed	   lead	   from	   gasoline	   and	  
ordered	  the	  sale	  of	  unleaded	  gasoline	  in	  1975	  (Stikkers,	  2002).	  
The	   CAA	   pushed	   automakers	   towards	   more	   comprehensive	   innovations	  
(Luger,	   2000;	  Mondt,	   2000),	   being	   regarded	   as	   a	   prime	   example	   of	   technology-­‐
forcing	  policy	  (Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2005;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  But	  the	  CAA	  also	  contained	  
a	  loophole,	  because	  standards	  could	  be	  postponed	  if	  this	  was	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  
and	  if	  the	  requisite	  technology	  was	  not	  available.	  EPA	  would	  test	  the	  performance	  
of	   American	   car	   models,	   while	   foreign	   manufacturers	   were	   required	   to	   submit	  
emissions	   data	   (Mondt,	   2000).	   The	   test	   procedures	   themselves,	   the	   outcomes	   of	  
test	  procedures,	  and	  the	  feasibility	  of	  technologies	  formed	  new	  dimensions	  where	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  $10,000	  (1970)	  amounts	  to	  $58,000	  in	  2011.	  
84	  Muskie,	  a	  possible	  candidate	  for	  the	  1972	  presidential	  elections,	  introduced	  proposals	  for	  
stricter	  emissions	  in	  1969.	  Nixon	  upped	  the	  ante	  and	  proposed	  even	  tougher	  standards	  (90%	  
reductions)	  for	  1980.	  Muskie	  then	  adopted	  similar	  standards	  but	  tightened	  the	  deadline	  to	  1975	  




the	   car	   industry	   would	   struggle	   with	   policy-­‐makers.	   The	   industry	   exploited	   this	  
loophole	   and	   played	   a	   strategic	   game	   with	   regulators,	   drawing	   on	   information	  
asymmetries.	   This	   led	   to	   an	   intricate	   regulatory	   process,	   reflected	   in	   ups	   and	  
downs	  in	  regulatory	  outputs	  (Figure	  V.3.c).	  The	  industry	  adopted	  a	  confrontational	  
stance,	   initially	   petitioning,	   and	   later	   suing	   the	   EPA	   for	   extensions,	   arguing	   in	  
court	   that	   technology	   to	  meet	   emission	   standards	   was	   not	   yet	   available	   (Doyle,	  
2000;	   Gerard	   and	   Lave,	   2005).	   In	   1973,	   when	   the	   court	   favoured	   a	   delay,	   EPA	  
postponed	  the	  HC	  and	  CO	  emission	  standards	  to	  1976,	  and	  NOx	  standards	  to	  1977	  
(Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2005).	  
The	   1973	   energy	   crisis	   influenced	   the	   air	   pollution	   struggle,	   because	   it	  
changed	  the	  public	  focus	  to	  economic	  problems	  and	  fuel	  efficiency.	  When	  the	  car	  
industry	  claimed	  that	  pollution	  control	  hindered	  fuel	  economy,	  Congress	  extended	  
standards	  to	  1977	  (HC	  and	  CO)	  and	  1978	  (NOx).	  In	  1975,	  EPA	  further	  extended	  HC	  
and	   CO	   standards	   to	   1978,	   because	   of	   a	   new	   controversy	   involving	   sulphur	  
emissions	  by	  cars	  equipped	  with	  catalytic	  converters	  (Lester,	  1983;	  Doyle,	  2000).	  
V.4.4.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  
Socio-­‐cultural	   and	   political	   strategy.	   Following	   the	   1970	   CAA,	   car	   industry	  
resistance	  was	   stepped	  up	   and	   top	  managers	  became	   involved,	   such	   as	   the	   vice-­‐
present	  of	   Ford,	  Lee	   Iacocca,	  who	   claimed	   that	   ‘this	  bill	   is	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   entire	  
American	  economy	  and	  to	  every	  person	  in	  America’	  (cited	  in	  Bauner,	  2007).	  GM’s	  
CEO	   sent	   a	   letter	   to	   Senators	   and	   Representatives,	   claiming	   that	   developing	  
control	   technologies	  was	   not	   feasible	   in	   the	   specified	   time	   frame	   and	   that	   costs	  
would	  anyway	  be	  prohibitive.	  CEOs	  from	  the	  Big	  Three	  also	  formed	  a	  task	  force	  to	  
lobby	  senators	  and	  urge	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  to	  reject	  the	  law	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  
So,	  in	  this	  period,	  the	  industry	  flexed	  its	  strong	  lobbying	  muscle	  to	  influence	  high-­‐
level	  (macro)	  politicians.	  
When	   the	   CAA	   was	   enacted,	   strategies	   shifted	   towards	   hindering	  
implementation	  through	  information	  strategies	  (technical	  reports,	  testimonials	  in	  
hearings),	   constituency-­‐building	   strategies	   (‘astroturf’	   campaigns),	   and	   non-­‐
compliance	  strategies	  (petitions,	  litigation).	  The	  argument	  was	  based	  on	  the	  claim	  
that	  the	  technology	  was	  not	  available	  and	  that	  high	  costs	  would	  cause	  a	  business	  
catastrophe	   (Doyle,	   2000;	   Bauner,	   2007).	   These	   arguments	   signalled	   a	   shift	   in	  




aspects,	   e.g.	   costs	   of	   regulations,	   negative	   impact	   on	   job	   creation	   and	   inflation,	  
disadvantages	   to	   consumers	   (Luger,	   2000).	   Estimates	   suggested	   that	   catalytic	  
converters,	   thermal	   reactors,	   and	   exhaust	   gas	   recirculation	   would	   cost	   $860	   per	  
vehicle	  (Mondt,	  2000),	  increasing	  the	  price	  of	  best-­‐selling	  cars	  by	  30%.	  
To	   reinforce	   the	   argument,	   GM	   began	   an	   information	   campaign	   in	   1972,	  
highlighting	  the	  costs	  of	  control	  technologies	  and	  the	  penalties	  for	  fuel	  economy85	  
and	   driveability	   (Doyle,	   2000).	   During	   the	   EPA	   hearings,	   Ford	   started	   an	  
informational	  campaign,	  which	  included	  press	  briefings,	  luncheons,	  and	  speeches	  
by	   Ford	   executives.	   This	   campaign	   aimed	   at	   influencing	   public	   opinion	   and	  
convincing	   communities	   to	  pressure	   their	  political	   representatives	   to	   change	   the	  
CAA.	   Chrysler	   published	   newspaper	   ads	   and	   a	   booklet,	   which	   said	   that	   “even	   if	  
automotive	  engineers	  could	  meet	  the	  1975-­‐76	  federal	  motor	  vehicles	  standards	  (...)	  
Chrysler...	   would	   oppose	   them	   because	   they	   are	   wasteful,	   unnecessary	   and	  
unrealistic...”	  (Doyle,	  2000,	  p.	  89).	  	  
Foreign	   new	   entrants	   undermined	   the	   industry’s	   claims	   about	   technical	  
unfeasibility	   during	   congressional	   hearings.	   In	   1972,	   Honda	   reported	   that	   its	  
Compound	   Vortex	   Controlled	   Combustion	   (CVCC)	   engines	   already	   met	   CAA	  
standards.	   Mazda	   and	   Mercedes-­‐Benz	   made	   similar	   claims	   for	   their	   rotary	   and	  
diesel	   engines,	   respectively	   (Doyle,	   2000).	   Catalyst	   suppliers	   (such	   as	   Engelhard	  
Industries)	  challenged	  the	  industry’s	  claim	  that	  catalytic	  converters	  presented	  too	  
many	   problems	   (idem).	   Figure	   V.3.d	   shows	   how	   catalyst	   supplier	   (and	   latter,	  
foreign	   manufacturers)	   stepped	   up	   their	   patenting	   activity	   during	   the	   early	  
implementation	  process.	  
Innovation	  strategy.	  While	  American	  automakers	  collectively	  delayed	  on	  the	  political	  
and	   public	   fronts,	   they	   individually	   stepped	   up	   their	   innovation	   efforts,	   which	  
resulted	   in	  more	  patents	   on	   emission	   control	   technologies	   (Figure	  V.3.d).	   Initially	  
they	  focused	  on	  further	  incremental	  engine	  modifications,	  adding	  air	  pumps,	  spark	  
retardation,	  thermal	  afterburners,	  and	  exhaust	  gas	  recirculation	  to	  existing	  engines	  
(Mondt,	   2000)	   (Figure	   V.10).	   Because	   these	  modifications	   had	   negative	   effects	   on	  
fuel	  economy,	  performance	  and	  driveability	  (Lester,	  1983;	  Mondt,	  2000),	  the	  industry	  
gradually	  moved	  towards	  catalytic	  converters	  (Nill	  and	  Tiessen,	  2005).	  Ford	  and,	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




particular,	   GM	   were	   catching	   up	   fast	   with	   catalyst	   suppliers,	   which	   had	   the	  
technological	   lead	   (Lee	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   cf.	   Figure	   V.3.d).	   GM	   pursued	   an	   internal	  
innovation	   path,	   while	   Ford	   joined	   the	   second	   Inter-­‐Industry	   Emission	   Control	  
programme	   (1974-­‐1977),	   which	   allocated	   about	   $32	   million	   (nominal)	   to	   various	  
technological	  options,	  including	  catalytic	  converters	  (Doyle,	  2000;	  Mondt,	  2000).	  
Figure	  V.10	  (a-­‐b,	  up-­‐down):	  GM	  1971MY	  and	  1973MY	  incremental	  emission	  control	  systems	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Mondt	  (2000)	  
GM	  clearly	   pursued	   a	   dual	   strategy,	   joining	   the	   industry	   front	   to	   fight	   the	  CAA,	  
while	   also	   becoming	   a	   product	   champion	   for	   oxidation	   catalysts86	  (Figure	   V.11).	  
During	  the	  EPA	  hearings,	  GM	  suggested	  that	  the	  catalytic	  converter	  was	  the	  best	  
emissions	  control	  technology,	  but	  complained	  about	  the	  time	  frame	  of	  the	  HC	  and	  
CO	   standards	   (Doyle,	   2000).87	  GM	   also	   asked	   for	   a	   review	   of	   the	   NOx	   standard,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  GM’s	  president	  Ed	  Cole,	  with	  engineering	  background,	  was	  in	  fact	  championing	  the	  device	  
since	  GM’s	  breakthrough	  with	  unleaded	  gasoline.	  
87	  Ford	  and	  Chrysler,	  however,	  resisted	  both	  the	  CAA	  and	  catalysts.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  technical	  
struggle	  over	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  platinum-­‐lined	  catalysts	  promoted	  the	  conversion	  of	  
sulphur	  into	  sulphuric	  acid	  mist,	  as	  research	  from	  Ford	  and	  Esso	  Research	  and	  Engineering,	  Inc.	  
suggested.	  If	  this	  was	  indeed	  true,	  EPA	  would	  hinder	  the	  use	  of	  oxidation	  catalysts	  (Science,	  1973,	  
p.	  368).	  GM	  resolved	  this	  problem	  in	  1975	  by	  promoting	  an	  experiment	  in	  its	  testing	  grounds,	  for	  
which	  both	  EPA	  and	  other	  manufacturers	  were	  invited.	  The	  experiment	  showed	  that	  sulphuric-­‐




because	   oxidation	   catalysts	   only	   diminished	  HC	   and	  CO	   emissions.	  However,	   in	  
1973,	   it	   announced	   that	   catalytic	   converters	   would	   be	   standard	   item	   in	   1975MY	  
cars.	  With	  this	  surprise	  move	  (Ingrassia	  and	  White,	   1995),	  GM	  attempted	  to	  gain	  
competitive	   advantage	   in	   the	   subsequent	   innovation	   race,	   e.g.	   using	   patents	   to	  
create	   barriers	   for	   competitors,	   licensing	   catalytic	   converters	   to	   Nissan	   and	  
American	  Motors	  (WSJ,	  1977;	  WSJ,	  1979),	  and	  apparently	  exploiting	  its	  investments	  
in	  South	  African	  platinum	  futures	  (Science,	  1973,	  p.	  371).	  
Figure	  V.11:	  1975	  advertisement	  by	  GM	  
	  
Source:	  Google	  newspaper	  archives	  search	  
The	   introduction	   of	   catalyst	   technology	   in	   the	   1975MY	   increased	   car	   prices	   by	  
$444.64	  per	  vehicle	  (in	  2000	  dollars,	  see	  Figure	  V.12).	  Retooling	  of	  production	  lines	  
raised	  capital	  expenditures	  from	  $242	  million	  in	  1974	  to	  $1.57	  billion	  in	  1975,	  a	  549%	  
increase	  (Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2005).	  




Figure	  V.12:	  Emission	  control	  technology	  cost	  per	  vehicle	  (sum	  of	  costs	  for	  all	  control	  
technologies	  such	  as	  catalytic	  converters,	  EGR	  units	  etc.)	  
	  
Source:	  USEPA	  (1990,	  p.	  C-­‐19)	  
V.4.4.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  trends	  and	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
The	   1973	   energy	   crisis	   not	   only	   diminished	   media	   attention	   for	   environmental	  
problems	  (Dunlap,	  1992)	  and	  air	  pollution	  (Figure	  V.3.a),	  but	  also	  contributed	  to	  an	  
economic	  recession	   from	  late	   1973	   to	  early	   1975	  (3.1%	   fall	   in	  GDP).	  The	  recession	  
impacted	   the	   results	   of	   the	   Big	   Three,	   but	   only	   Chrysler	   posted	   losses	   in	   1975	  
(Figure	   V.13).	   Following	   the	   crisis,	   Detroit	   automakers	   emphasized	   trade-­‐offs	  
between	  pollution	  control	  and	  fuel	  efficiency	  (Luger,	  2000)	  to	  gain	  delays.	  Despite	  
this	  resistance	  against	  regulations,	   the	  external	  pressures	  also	  brought	   innovation	  
back	   on	   the	   agenda	   of	   corporate	   strategists:	   “The	   energy	   shocks	   of	   the	   1970s,	  
coupled	  with	  the	  government	  mandates	  for	  clean	  air,	  ended	  Detroit’s	  technological	  
stagnation”	  (Yates,	  1983,	  p.	  202).	  
Figure	  V.13:	  Net	  income	  of	  the	  Big	  Three	  car	  companies,	  current	  dollars	  
	  




V.4.5. Industry	  fight-­‐back,	  further	  implementation	  delays,	  issue	  
institutionalization,	  and	  industry	  adoption	  of	  three-­‐way	  catalytic	  
converters	  (1977-­‐1985)	  
V.4.5.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Social	  movements	  and	  public	  opinion.	  Public	  attention	  for	  air	  pollution	  diminished	  
nationwide 88 	  (Figure	   V.3.a),	   while	   attention	   for	   the	   car	   industry’s	   economic	  
problems	   increased.	   The	   Big	   Three	   posted	   substantial	   losses	   in	   the	   late	   1970s	  
(Figure	  V.13),	  and	  Chrysler	  had	  to	  be	  rescued	  with	  a	  $2	  billion	  bailout	  package.	  A	  
new	  anti-­‐regulation	  discourse	   gained	  prominence:	   “Government	   regulation	   came	  
to	  be	  blamed	  for	  the	  nation’s	  economic	  difficulties.	  (…)	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  
public	   debate	  was	   framed	   around	   the	   costs	   of	   regulation,	   and	   less	   and	   less	   was	  
heard	  about	  its	  benefits”	  (Luger,	  2000,	  p.	  90).	  Fearing	  unemployment,	  the	  United	  
Auto	  Workers	  abandoned	   the	  anti-­‐smog	  coalition	  and	   joined	   the	  car	   industry	   in	  
lobbying	  for	  delays	  in	  emission	  standards	  (Figure	  V.14).	  In	  1977,	  the	  UAW	  urged	  its	  
members	  to	  pressure	  political	  representatives	  to	  delay	  emission	  standards	  (Doyle,	  
2000;	  Luger,	  2000).	  
Figure	  V.14	  (a-­‐b):	  1977	  cartoons	  on	  the	  UAW	  joining	  the	  auto	  industry	  coalition	  in	  the	  
lobbying	  effort	  agains	  emission	  standards	  
	   	  
Source:	  Johnson	  and	  Katz	  (2009)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Policy-­‐makers.	  In	  1977,	  the	  American	  automakers	  began	  producing	  cars	  that	  would	  
not	   meet	   the	   air	   pollution	   standards	   for	   1978.	   This	   illegal	   action	   challenged	  
Congress	   to	   shut	   down	   factories	   (as	   the	   $10,000/car	   fine	   would	   lead	   to	  
bankruptcies)	   or	   postpone	   the	   standards.	   This	   led	   to	   hearings	   during	   which	  
Senator	   Muskie	   angrily	   characterized	   the	   industry’s	   attitude	   as:	   “We’re	   too	  
important.	  There	  are	  too	  many	  jobs	  involved.	  We’ll	  break	  the	  present	  law	  and	  dare	  
Congress	  to	  do	  anything	  about	  it”	  (cited	  in	  Doyle,	  2000,	  p.	  126).	  Policy-­‐makers	  gave	  
more	  prominence	  to	  economic	  support	  than	  to	  air	  pollution,	  so	  that	  Congress	  gave	  
in	  and	  postponed	  the	  standards	  instead	  of	  shutting	  down	  factories	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  
HC	  and	  CO	  standards	  were	  pushed	  back	  to	  1980	  and	  1981,	  respectively,	  while	  the	  
NOx	  standard	  was	  relaxed	  (from	  0.4	  to	  1.0	  g/mile)	  for	  1981	  cars	  (Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  
2005).	   After	   1977,	   a	   decreasing	   number	   of	   bills	   regulating	   air	   pollution	   were	  
introduced	  in	  Congress	  (Figure	  V.3.b).	  
The	  new	  Reagan	  administration	  (since	  January	  1981)	  was	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  
industry’s	  complaints	  and	  set	  up	  a	  Task	  Force	   for	  Regulatory	  Relief.	  But	  when	  the	  
administration	   advanced	   a	   plan	   to	   roll	   back	  more	   than	   34	   safety,	   emissions	   and	  
fuel	   economy	   regulations	   (cf.	   Figure	   V.3.b,	   which	   shows	   a	   peak	   in	   executive	  
activities	   during	   the	   Reagan	   years)	   there	  was	   a	   backlash	   (Luger,	   2000).	  Opinion	  
polls	   showed	   that	   the	   public	   generally	   supported	   environmental	   protection,	   and	  
that	   this	   support	   was	   growing	   in	   response	   to	   the	   administration’s	   attacks	   on	  
environmental	  regulation	  (Dunlap,	  1992;	  Luger,	  2000).	  The	  administration	  decided	  
not	   to	   push	   ahead,	   because	   its	   reputation	   had	   already	   been	   damaged	   by	   other	  
environmental	   controversies	   (such	  as	   firing	   the	  head	  of	  EPA)	   (Doyle,	   2000),	   and	  
the	   bill	   eventually	   died	   in	   Congress	   for	   lack	   of	   support.	   Although	   the	  
administration	   was	   unable	   to	   roll	   back	   clean	   air	   regulations,	   it	   stopped	   further	  
legislative	  progress	  until	  1990,	  when	  a	  revised	  clean	  air	  act	  was	  enacted	  (Lee	  et	  al.	  
2010;	  Bauner,	  2007).	  	  
V.4.5.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  
Socio-­‐cultural	   and	   political	   strategies.	   The	   economic	   problems	   emboldened	   the	  
industry’s	   political	   strategies,	   which	   simply	   refused	   to	   comply	   with	   1978	   CAA	  
standards	   and	   threatened	   to	   shut	   down	  plants.	   The	   industry	   also	   adopted	   other	  
political	  strategies	  such	  as	  setting	  up	  ‘grassroots’	  (astroturf)	  movements	  to	  pressure	  




mailgrams	   to	   representatives	   (Doyle,	   2000).	   The	   industry	   also	   mobilized	  
supporters	  inside	  Congress,	  such	  as	  Representative	  Dingell	  from	  Michigan,	  to	  delay	  
bills	   in	   hearings	   and	   propose	   alternative	   (weaker)	   bills.	   The	   industry	   supported	  
Dingell’s	  efforts,	  with	  the	  auto	  dealers	  and	  Big	  Three	  lobbying	  Republicans	  and	  the	  
UAW	   going	   after	   Democrats	   (Doyle,	   2000).	   This	   lobbying	   task-­‐force	   thus	  
represented	  an	  informal	  closed-­‐industry	  front	  against	  regulatory	  pressures	  in	  face	  
of	  economic	  troubles.	  
The	   industry	  used	  framing	  strategies	  based	  on	  economic	  arguments	  (cost-­‐
benefit	  analysis	  as	  in	  Crandall	   et	  al.,	  1982;	  Bresnahan	  and	  Yao,	  1985),	  arguing	  that	  
strict	   regulations	   would	   damage	   economic	   competitiveness	   and	   that	   emission	  
control	  technologies	  would	  bring	  non-­‐pecuniary	  costs,	  such	  as	  on	  fuel	  efficiency.89	  
In	   1979,	   “with	   the	   industry	  as	  a	  whole	   in	  crisis,	   industry	  officials	  approached	   the	  
federal	   government	   for	   changes	   in	   virtually	   every	   aspect	   of	   public	   policy	   that	  
affected	  them”	  (Luger,	  2000,	  p.	  104).	  
Technological	  innovation	  strategies.	  When	  the	  CAA	  standards	  were	  postponed,	  the	  
industry	  downscaled	  its	  R&D	  efforts,	  leading	  to	  decreased	  patenting	  activity	  since	  
1977	   (Figure	   V.3.d).	   By	   then,	   the	   industry	   already	   had	   developed	   the	   basic	  
technology	   for	   the	   three-­‐way	   catalyst	   (Lee	   et	   al.,	   2010).90	  The	   three-­‐way	   catalyst	  
(TWC),	   which	   could	   simultaneously	   control	   emissions	   of	   HC,	   CO	   and	   NOx,	  
entailed	   architectural	   innovations	   in	   the	   engine,	   based	   on	   electronic	   control,	  
oxygen	  sensors,	  and	  feedback	  mechanisms	  that	  were	  necessary	  to	  keep	  the	  air/fuel	  
ratio	  within	  a	  narrow	  operational	  window.	  Because	  automakers	   lacked	  electronic	  
competencies,	   outside	   electronic	   suppliers	   became	   involved	   (Lee	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   see	  
also	  Figure	  V.3.d).	  
In	   the	   1981MY,	  GM	   introduced	  an	   ‘emission	  control	   system’	   that	   included	  
(Mondt,	   2000)91 :	   (1)	   the	   three-­‐way	   catalytic	   converter;	   (2)	   an	   oxygen	   sensor;	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  The	  industry	  thus	  downplayed	  the	  evidence	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  catalyst	  in	  1975	  had	  
actually	  improved	  fuel	  efficiency.	  The	  phase-­‐out	  of	  lead	  as	  a	  gasoline	  additive	  did,	  however,	  
diminish	  engine	  performance,	  because	  automotive	  engineers	  had	  not	  yet	  learned	  how	  to	  make	  
high-­‐horsepower	  engines	  run	  without	  the	  performance	  enhancing	  properties	  of	  lead	  (Ingrassia,	  
2010).	  
90	  A	  content	  analysis	  of	  patents	  shows	  that	  GM	  filed	  an	  “Air-­‐fuel	  ratio	  sensor”	  patent	  in	  1973	  
(Riddel,	  1974)	  and	  a	  “Process	  for	  improved	  3-­‐way	  emission	  control”	  patent	  in	  1976	  (Schlatter	  and	  
Taylor,	  1978).	  Ford	  also	  had	  patents	  related	  to	  three-­‐way	  catalyst	  (e.g.	  Stewart,	  1975).	  
91	  GM’s	  move	  was	  apparently	  a	  reaction	  to	  Mitsubishi	  Motor’s	  announcement	  (in	  1977)	  of	  a	  new	  
engine	  that	  could	  both	  comply	  with	  the	  stringent	  NOx	  standards	  and	  improve	  fuel	  economy	  




(3)	  electronic	  control	  module,	  which	  controlled	  several	  parameters	  such	  as	  oxygen	  
concentration	   and	   carburettor	   mixture;	   (4)	   electronic	   ignition;	   (5)	   closed-­‐loop	  
carburettor;	   (6)	   early	   fuel	   evaporation	   system;	   and	   (7)	   exhaust	   gas	   recirculation.	  
This	  system	  could	  lower	  emissions	  level	  by	  96%	  for	  CO	  and	  HC	  and	  76%	  for	  NOx	  
(Mondt	  2000).	  The	  three-­‐way	  catalytic	  converter	  system	  is	  thus	  more	  complex	  than	  
early	   oxidation	   catalyst	   systems	   (Figure	   V.15).	   “The	   total	   device	   is	   a	   very	  
sophisticated	   electronic	   control	   system	   to	  maintain	   the	   air:fuel	   ratio	   within	   the	  
narrow	   window,	   which	   allows	   the	   conversion	   of	   all	   three	   pollutants.	   [...]	   Even	  
today,	   the	   oxygen	   sensor	   is	   the	   state	   of	   the	   art	   in	   air:fuel	   ratio	   control	   in	   the	  
gasoline	  internal-­‐combustion	  engine”	  (Heck	  and	  Farrauto,	  2002,	  p.	  85-­‐6).	  
Figure	  V.15	  (a-­‐b,	  up-­‐down):	  GM’s	  1975	  Emission	  Control	  System	  with	  catalytic	  converter	  and	  
GM’s	  1981	  Closed-­‐loop	  emission	  control	  system	  
	  
	  
Source:	  Mondt	  (2000)	  
Although	  the	   implementation	  of	  TWC	  devices	  added	  another	  $200	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  
cars	  (Figure	  V.12),	  industry	  resistance	  was	  lesser	  than	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	  One	  reason	  
is	  that	  the	  industry	  had	  more	  time	  following	  the	  1977	  amendments.	  Another	  reason	  




reason	  is	  that	  the	  industry	  learned	  that	  electronic	  controls	  could	  also	  be	  used	  for	  
general	   engine	   improvements,	   especially	   when	   combined	   with	   fuel	   injection	  
(Gerard	  and	  Lave,	  2005).	  
The	   period	   of	   regulatory	   stability	   that	   began	   with	   the	   Reagan	  
administration	  gave	  time	  for	  the	  industry	  “to	  learn	  ways	  to	  reduce	  their	  costs	  since	  
they	   faced	   no	   stringent	   increases	   from	   1981	   until	   1994”	   (Lee	   et	   al.,	   2010:259).	  
Developments	  in	  e.g.	  material	  technology92	  improved	  the	  catalyst’s	  life	  and	  made	  it	  
more	   resistant	   to	  higher	   temperatures	   (Heck	   and	  Farrauto,	   2002).	   Technological	  
development	   of	   catalytic	   converters	   continued	   in	   an	   incremental	   pace,	   with	  
responsibility	  shared	  between	  suppliers	  and	  automakers	  (Lee	  et.	  al,	  2010;	  cf.	  Figure	  
V.3.d).	  
Although	   with	   the	   TWC	   CO	   and	   HC	   emission	   levels	   nationwide	   were	  
lowered	   by	   96%,	   cuts	   in	   NOx	   emission	   reached	   only	   76%	   (compared	   to	   1960s	  
levels)	  (Mondt,	  2000;	  see	  Figure	  V.1),	  i.e.	  lower	  than	  the	  90%	  cut	  in	  emissions	  of	  all	  
three	   pollutants	   that	   the	   original	   CAA	   established	   in	   1970.	   Original	   1970	   NOx	  
standards	  were	  only	  met	   after	   the	   1990	  CAA	   revisions	   finally	  mandated	   them	  by	  
law	   (Doyle,	   2000).	   Thus,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   policy	   provisions,	   improvements	   in	  
TWC	   designs	   and	   technical	   characteristics	   did	   not	   lead	   to	   further	   cuts	   in	  
emissions.	  
V.4.5.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  trends	  and	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	  
The	  environmental	  movement	  declined	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  which	  eased	  the	  pressure	  
on	  the	  car	  industry.	  Ironically,	  Reagan’s	  anti-­‐environmental	  activities	  stimulated	  a	  
resurgence	   of	   concern	   and	   activism,	   which	   contributed	   to	   the	   societal	  
institutionalization	  of	  environmental	  consciousness	  (Dunlap,	  1992).	  
In	   the	   task	   environment,	   the	   car	   industry	   faced	   economic	   problems	   as	  
overall	  markets	  (for	  cars	  and	  trucks)	  declined	  in	  1979	  (-­‐8.23%),	  1980	  (-­‐19.14%),	  1981	  
(-­‐5.82%)	  and	  1982	  (-­‐2.23%)	  (Ward’s	  Automotive	  Group,	  2011).	  Cumulatively,	  the	  Big	  
Three	   lost	   about	   $4.73	   billion	   between	   1980	   and	   1982	   (Figure	   V.13).	   Consumers	  
increasingly	  preferred	  Japanese	  cars	  because	  of	  higher	  quality,	  fuel	  efficiency,	  and	  
lower	   price,	   so	   that	   American	   automakers’	   market	   share	   declined	   steadily,	   with	  
GM’s	  market-­‐shared	  going	  below	  40%	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  history	  in	  1986	  (Ward’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Automotive	  Group,	  2011).	  Between	  1984	  and	  1990	  the	  economic	  tide	  turned	  for	  the	  
better	  when	  the	  Big	  Three	  made	  record	  profits	  (Figure	  V.13).	  In	  sum,	  in	  this	  period,	  
due	  to	   its	  economic	  troubles,	   the	   industry	  gained	  the	  upper	  hand	  with	  regard	  to	  
institutional	  pressures	  around	  air	  pollution,	  and	  benefitted	  from	  political	  support	  
measures.	  	  
V.5. ANALYSIS	  
V.5.1. Pattern-­‐matching	  of	  DILC-­‐	  model	  and	  case	  study	  
This	  section	  confronts	  the	  empirical	  periods	  with	  the	  ideal-­‐type	  phase-­‐model.	  The	  
case	  study	  confirms	  the	  overall	  logic	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model:	  the	  air	  pollution	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	   was	   a	   long	   and	   contested	   (‘dialectic’)	   process	   played	   out	   on	   various	  
dimensions.	  Air	   pollution	   emerged	   as	   an	   issue	   on	   the	   periphery	   of	   the	   industry,	  
gradually	   spilling	   over	   between	  domains.	  As	   institutional	   pressures	   built	   up,	   the	  
issue	  spilled	  over	  to	  the	  economic	  environment	  (through	  policy)	  and	  forced	   it	   to	  
make	  adjustments	   in	   the	   industry	   regime.	  Regarding	   the	  match	  between	  periods	  
and	  phases,	  the	  case	  study	  had	  a	  relatively	  good	  match	  (minor	  deviations)	  with	  the	  
first	  three	  conceptual	  phases,	  but	  deviated	  (major	  deviations)	  from	  the	  fourth	  and	  
fifth	  phase.	  
In	   the	   first	   period	   pressure	   came	   from	   civil	   society,	   as	   suggested	   by	   the	  
model.	  The	   car	   industry	   largely	   ignored	   the	   issue	  or	  denied	   its	   involvement,	  not	  
moving	   beyond	   its	   ‘zone	   of	   indifference’.	   One	   small	   deviation	   from	   the	   phase-­‐
model	   was	   that	   early	   pressure	   and	   attention	   advocacy	   came	   from	   newspaper	  
activism	  (L.A.	  Times).	  A	  second	  minor	  deviation	  was	  that	  sense-­‐making	  was	  also	  
informed	  by	  scientific	  research.	  
The	   second	   period	   started	   when	   new	   social	   movement	   organizations	  
enacted	  pressure	  and	  engaged	  in	  attention	  advocacy,	  leading	  to	  minor	  spillovers	  to	  
public	   opinion	   (slow	   increase	   in	   public	   attention	   except	   for	  California).	  A	   shock	  
event	  (the	  ‘five-­‐day	  siege	  of	  smog’	  in	  California)	  and	  scientific	  research	  (including	  
the	  initiation	  of	  a	  dramatic	  ‘health	  framing’)	  both	  played	  important	  roles	  in	  rising	  
general	   concern	   with	   the	   issue.	   The	   industry	   responded	   by	   creating	   collective	  
organizations	  to	  investigate	  the	  problem.	  Although	  the	  car	  industry	  acknowledged	  
the	  contribution	  of	   the	  car,	   it	  delayed	  solutions	  by	  stressing	   the	  need	   for	   further	  




represented	  a	  closed	  front	  on	  the	  technical	  dimension,	  but	  also	  served	  as	  public-­‐
relation	  strategy.	  So,	  the	  case	  study	  confirms	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  industry	  responds	  
collectively	   to	   institutional	   pressures	   in	   earlier	   stages	  of	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	  One	  
deviation	   is	   that	   the	   industry	   investigated	   technical	  alternatives	   (e.g.	  Ford’s	  early	  
work	  on	  catalytic	  converters)	  and	  not	  just	  incremental	  solutions.	  
The	   third	   period	  was	   close	   to	   the	   predicted	  pattern	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	  
issue	   spilled	   over	   to	   the	   policy	   domain	   when	   public	   opinion	   became	   more	  
concerned	  (i.e.	  public	  attention	  increased	  considerably).	  So,	  the	  third	  period	  was	  of	  
political	   debate,	   but	   also	   entailed	   initial	   regulations	   (early	   emission	   standards).	  
This	   early	   regulation	   represents	   a	   deviation,	   but	   seems	   connected	   to	  multi-­‐level	  
governance	   dynamics	   in	   the	   case	   (i.e.	   developments	   in	   California).	   The	   industry	  
changed	   position	   and	   favoured	   tackling	   the	   issue	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   where	   it	  
used	   information,	   lobbying	   and	   other	   framing	   strategies	   to	   delay	   issue	   progress.	  
Yet,	  automakers	  also	  made	  incremental	  engine	  improvements,	  and	  pursued	  some	  
defensive	  hedging	  towards	  alternative	  solutions	  such	  as	  catalysts.	  A	  deviation	  from	  
the	  model	   is	   that	   there	  were	   no	   visible	   spillovers	   to	   ‘moral	   customers’.	   Industry	  
technical	  developments	  were	  therefore	  more	  connected	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  regulation	  
and	  action	  by	  outsiders	  (suppliers)	  looking	  for	  mandated	  markets.	  
The	   fourth	   period	  matched	   the	  model	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   strict	   regulations	  
were	  introduced	  (1970	  CAA).	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  decrease	  in	  public	  attention	  to	  
the	   issue,	   so	   that	   the	  CAA	   represented	  a	   turning	  point	   in	   the	  process.	  However,	  
political	  and	  regulatory	  attention	  fluctuated	  at	  high	  levels	  due	  to	  implementation	  
struggles	  between	  regulators	  and	  the	   industry	   (as	  suggested	   in	   the	  DILC-­‐model).	  
The	  CAA	  also	  led	  the	  industry	  to	  increase	  R&D	  investments	  and	  patenting.	  Cracks	  
appeared	  in	  the	  industry	  front	  as	  GM	  became	  a	  product	  champion	  for	  catalysts	  and	  
sought	   first-­‐mover	   advantages,	   leading	   to	   a	   new	   (within-­‐industry)	   dialectical	  
process	   in	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	  These	  cracks	  helped	   in	   the	   implementation	  of	   the	  
CAA,	  which	  might	  have	  suffered	   further	  delays,	   if	   the	   industry	  had	  maintained	  a	  
closed-­‐front	  in	  the	  task	  environment.	  The	  technological	  jockeying	  for	  position	  was	  
accompanied	  by	  collective	  strategies	  to	  delay	  issue	  progress,	  so	  that	  GM	  (and	  Ford)	  
got	  more	  time	  to	  catch	  up	  with	  catalyst	  suppliers.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  key	  reason	  for	  




already	   decided	   to	   go	   for	   catalytic	   converters.93	  An	   apparent	   ‘innovation	   race’	  
emerged.	  But	  the	  fourth	  phase	  also	  deviated	  from	  the	  model	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  issue	  
progression	   slowed	   down	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1970s:	   this	   deviation	   happened	   due	   to	  
weakening	  public	  opinion	  pressure,	  competing	  issues	  coming	  to	  the	  fore	  (oil	  shock,	  
fuel	  efficiency,	  economic	  problems),	  and	  because	  the	  industry	  successfully	  counter-­‐
mobilized.	  Moreover,	  market	   demand	   for	   ‘low-­‐emission	   cars’	   never	  materialized	  
spontaneously,	  as	  suggested	  by	  the	  model.	  This	  is	  a	  key	  deviation.	  
	   The	   fifth	   period	   also	   deviated	   from	   the	   predicted	   pattern,	   because	   policy	  
and	  public	  opinion	  pressure	  further	  weakened,	  but	  not	  due	  to	  the	  factors	  suggested	  
in	   the	   DILC-­‐model.	   Furthermore,	   the	   industry	   only	   made	   some	   changes	   in	  
technology	   and	   strategy,	   but	   there	   was	   no	   comprehensive	   reorientation	   in	  
foundational	  beliefs	  and	  mission.	  The	  end	  of	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  in	  fact	  meant	  
that	   issue	  progression	   remained	  dormant	  until	   the	   1990s.	  So,	   this	  period	  did	  not	  
represent	  the	   fifth	  stage	  of	   the	  DILC-­‐model:	  although	  the	  air	  pollution	   issue	   life-­‐
cycle	   followed	   the	   predicted	   normal	   pattern,	   it	   was	   ‘interrupted’	   between	   the	  
fourth	   and	   fifth	   stage	   (Bigelow	   et	   al.,	   1993),	   mainly	   due	   to	   lack	   of	   policy	  
developments.	  The	  fifth	  period	  could	  be	  seen	  as	   ‘phase	  4.5’,	  because	  (a)	  the	  issue	  
was	   institutionalized	   in	   the	   socio-­‐political	   environment	   but	   not	   in	   the	   task	  
environment;	   and	   (b)	   the	   industry	   regime	   suffered	   changes	   in	   its	   regulatory	   and	  
technical	  elements,	  but	  not	  in	  its	  beliefs	  and	  mission.	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  case	  followed	  
this	  sequence	  of	  phases:	  1	  –	  2	  –	  3	  –	  4	  –	  4.5.	  
	   These	   findings	   reinforce	   the	  qualification	   that	   the	  DILC-­‐model	   represents	  
an	  ideal-­‐typical	  pattern	  from	  which	  real-­‐world	  cases	  usually	  deviate.	  If	  real-­‐world	  
deviations	   from	   this	   pattern	   can	   be	   explained	   with	   the	   same	   pressures	   and	  
mechanisms,	  then	  the	  underlying	  conceptual	  framework	  is	  still	  valid.	  This	  applies	  
to	   this	   case	   study,	   where	   the	  main	   deviations	   were	   due	   to	   the	   following	   causal	  
mechanisms:	   (a)	  decreasing	  pressure	   from	  public	  opinion	  and	  policy;	   (b)	   limited	  
spillovers	   from	   the	   issue	   to	   consumer	   demand;	   and	   (c)	   rise	   of	   competing	   issues	  
(which	  led	  to	  decreasing	  pressures).	  Therefore,	  the	  internal	  validity	  of	  the	  Dialectic	  
Issue	  Life-­‐Cycle	  model	  seems	  to	  be	  confirmed	  by	  the	  case	  study.	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  It	  is	  not	  unfair	  to	  say	  that	  policy	  only	  forced	  catalytic	  converters	  into	  the	  market	  after	  GM	  had	  
developed	  its	  own	  three-­‐way	  catalytic	  converter,	  given	  that	  outsiders	  had	  already	  demonstrated	  




V.5.2. Explanation-­‐building	  based	  on	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  
V.5.2.1. Beyond	  the	  focal	  issue	  	  
In	  the	  introduction,	  I	  proposed	  to	  investigate	  how	  other	  strategic	  issues	  interfered	  
(or	   not)	  with	   the	   local	   air	   pollution	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   The	   case	   study	   showed	   that	  
issue	  evolution	  cannot	  be	   fully	  understood	  by	   looking	  only	  at	   (internal)	  dialectic	  
struggles.	  Because	  industry	  actors	  operate	  in	  multiple	  contexts,	  they	  also	  face	  other	  
pressures	   from	  markets,	   civil	   society,	   and	  polity,	  which	  may	  accelerate	  or	  hinder	  
issue	   life-­‐cycles.	   The	   case	   therefore	   revealed	   multi-­‐dimensional	   (mis)alignments	  
between	  (internal)	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  and	  broader	  contexts.	  In	  the	  air	  pollution	  issue	  
life-­‐cycle,	   the	   following	  positive	  alignments	  with	   field-­‐level	  developments	  helped	  
the	  issue	  forward:	  
• In	   the	   1960s,	   the	   emergence	   of	   environmental	   consciousness	   was	   a	   broad	  
cultural	  trend	  that	  strengthened	  public	  attention	  for	  air	  pollution.	  Earth	  Day	  1	  
was	   the	  culmination	  of	   this	   trend,	  which	  created	  a	   favourable	  context	   for	   the	  
1970	  CAA.	  
• In	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  public	  concerns	  around	  car	  safety	  damaged	  the	  car	  industry’s	  
reputation,	  and	  strengthened	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  industry	  was	  not	  interested	  in	  
public	  welfare	  and	  would	  only	  act	  if	  forced.	  
• Competitive	   struggles	   with	   foreign	   car	   companies	   influenced	   the	   regulatory	  
battle,	   because	   the	   engine	   innovations	   and	   information	   strategies	   from	   new	  
entrants	   undermined	   the	   American	   industry’s	   claims	   that	   the	   1970	   CAA	  
standards	  were	  unfeasible.	  
The	  case	  study	  also	  contained	  negative	  alignments	  that	  hindered	  issue	  progression:	  
• The	  1973	  oil	  shock	  created	  economic	  problems	  and	  stimulated	  interest	   in	  fuel	  
efficiency,	   which	   overshadowed	   cultural	   and	   political	   attention	   for	   air	  
pollution.	  
• In	  the	  late	  1970s,	  the	  industry	  used	  its	  economic	  problems	  to	  articulate	  an	  anti-­‐
regulation	   discourse	   that	   resonated	   with	   broader	   problems	   in	   the	   American	  
economy.	  This	  discourse	  halted	  regulatory	  progress	  on	  air	  pollution.	  
These	   findings	   underline	   that	   an	   analysis	   of	   (internal)	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   dynamics	  
should	   be	   complemented	   with	   an	   analysis	   of	   broader	   contexts	   and	   field-­‐level	  




issues,	  industries	  and	  technologies	  based	  in	  a	  dialectic	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  model	  with	  
an	  embedded	  view	  of	  industries.	  
V.5.2.2. Regime	  inertia	  and	  technology	  development	  
An	   analysis	   of	   the	   industry	   regime	   provides	   deeper	   explanations	   of	   inertia	   and	  
industry	  resistance	  regarding	  technology	  strategies.	  In	  the	  first	  and	  second	  period,	  
the	  industry	  positioning	  strategy,	  rooted	  in	  their	  subjective	  elements	  (beliefs	  about	  
consumer	   demands,	   interpretations	   of	   market	   forces,	   economically-­‐oriented	  
mission),	   negatively	   contributed	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   air	   pollution,	   because	   carmakers	  
focused	   on	   the	   production	   and	   sale	   of	   big	   cars.	   The	   favourable	  market	   scenario	  
(increasing	  demand,	  high	  market	   shares)	  also	  meant	   that	   the	   industry	  paid	   little	  
attention	  to	  institutional	  pressures	  connected	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  air	  pollution,	  allowing	  
it	  to	  stay	  within	  its	  zone	  of	  indifference.	  In	  this	  context,	  no	  specific	  technology	  had	  
to	  be	  developed	  in	  response	  to	  air	  pollution.	  
In	  the	  third	  period,	  the	  main	  source	  of	  inertia,	  which	  prevented	  technology	  
development,	  was	   the	   technical	   element	   of	   the	   industry	   regime	   (as	   suggested	   in	  
the	   DILC-­‐model):	   the	   industry	   preferred	   to	   follow	   an	   incremental	   pathway	   to	  
emission	   control,	   because	   it	   did	   not	   have	   competencies	   needed	   for	   catalyst	  
technology.	  Thus,	   it	  was	  unwilling	   to	   certify	   and	  warrant	   cars	  with	   a	   technology	  
external	   to	   the	   industry	   regime.	   In	   the	   fourth	   period,	   inertia	   regarding	  
technological	   developments	   was	   less	   pronounced,	   but	   for	   part	   of	   the	   industry	  
(Ford	  and	  Chrysler)	  it	  was	  still	  rooted	  in	  the	  technical	  element.	  Conversely,	  GM’s	  
escaped	  lock	  in	  by	  opening	  up	  its	  own	  technical	  regime	  to	  include	  new	  capabilities	  
in	  organic	  chemistry	  that	  allowed	  the	  firm	  to	  develop	  an	  in-­‐house	  emission	  control	  
system	   with	   catalytic	   converter.	   GM	   thus	   experienced	   a	   steeper	   learning	   curve,	  
while	  Ford	  and	  Chrysler	  contributed	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  industry	  regime’s	  
technical	   element	   in	   the	   fifth	   period,	   when	   they,	   too,	   adopted	   the	   three-­‐way	  
catalytic	  converter	  solution.	  	  
V.5.2.3. Changes	  in	  regime	  elements	  
The	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  process	  therefore	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  full	  strategic	  reorientation,	  as	  
in	   the	   conceptual	   issue-­‐life	   cycle	   proposed	   by	   the	   DILC-­‐model.	   Despite	   the	  
achievements	   in	   controlling	   emissions	   and	   addressing	   local	   air	   pollution,	   the	  




mission.	   The	   industry’s	   belief	   system	   remained	   unchanged;	   namely,	   that	  
‘environmental	  innovations	  do	  not	  sell	  but	  increase	  costs’.	  The	  technical	  knowledge	  
base	  was	  altered	  through	  the	  incorporation	  of	  new	  competencies	  (in	  catalysts	  and	  
electronic	  controls),	  and	  the	  technology	  forcing	  policies	  stimulated	  the	  American	  
automakers	  to	  reengage	  with	  innovation,	  which	  received	  more	  strategic	  attention	  
(Abernathy	  and	  Clark,	   1983;	  Yates,	   1983;	  Flink,	   1990).	  The	  technical	  changes	  were	  
forced	  by	  law	  (changes	  in	  industry	  specific	  regulations)	  and	  spurred	  by	  external	  and	  
internal	   competition.	   Therefore,	   competition	   alone	   did	   not	   drive	   the	   changes	   in	  
the	  technical	  element	  to	  address	  the	  societal	  issue.	  
V.6. CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  
V.6.1. Evaluation	  of	  the	  mixed-­‐methods	  approach	  
In	  this	  case	  study,	  I	  employed	  an	  experimental	  visual	  analysis	  method	  to	  divide	  the	  
whole	   period	   of	   interest	   into	   sub-­‐periods.	   The	   method	   seems	   particularly	  
appropriate	  for	  the	  study	  of	  the	  air	  pollution	  issue-­‐life	  cycle,	  because	  a	  vast	  amount	  
of	   secondary	   sources	   was	   available,	   so	   that	   the	   visual	   analysis	   could	   be	   cross-­‐
checked	   with	   qualitative	   inputs.	   I	   was	   therefore	   able	   to	   triangulate	   the	   visual	  
analysis	  with	  qualitative	  knowledge	  of	  key	  events	  in	  the	  case.	  
The	  visual	  analysis	  of	  attention	  indicators	  provides	  a	  useful	  ‘first	  approach’	  
to	  the	  case,	  and	  helped	  establish	  initial	  patterns	  and	  relationships	  that	  were	  later	  
confirmed	   in	   the	  case	  study.	  Therefore,	  quantitative	  attention	   indicators	  seem	  to	  
reveal	  some	  of	  the	  qualitative	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  relationships.	  The	  combined	  analysis	  
of	   quantitative	   indicators	   for	   issue-­‐attention	   and	   of	   qualitative	   material	   thus	  
revealed	   that	   the	   dynamics	   of	   attention	   is	   closely	   connected	   to	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  
dynamics.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  attention	  advocacy	  (by	  activists	  and	  scientists,	  social	  
movements,	  the	  media	  etc.)	  plays	  an	  important	  role	   in	  driving	  the	   issue	  forward.	  
On	  the	  other,	   factors	  usurping	  attention	  from	  the	  focal	   issue	  (such	  as	  competing	  
issues)	  play	  a	  role	  in	  delaying	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  
To	  my	  best	  knowledge,	  the	  systematic	  use	  of	  attention	  indicators	  represent	  
a	   contribution	   in	   measuring	   issue	   life-­‐cycles,	   thus	   helping	   to	   address	   the	  
methodological	   gap	   in	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	   that	   I	   identified	   in	  Chapter	   II.	   The	  
experimental	   method	   also	   threw	   light	   into	   the	   relationship	   between	   issue-­‐




followed	  a	  ‘normal’	  trajectory	  (even	  though	  it	  did	  not	  reach	  ‘phase	  5’	  in	  the	  period	  
of	  interest),	  a	  question	  that	  remains	  open	  is	  whether	  attention	  indicators	  are	  also	  
useful	  measures	   for	   other	   types	   of	   trajectories	   (cyclical,	   recurring	   etc.).	   Another	  
question	  still	  open	  is	  how	  technology	  hype-­‐cycles	  influence	  issue	  life-­‐cycles.	  These	  
open	  issues	  will	  be	  tackled	  in	  cases	  2	  and	  3,	  respectively.	  
V.6.2. Implications	  for	  thesis’	  research	  focus	  and	  questions	  
The	  case	   study	   revealed	   important	   insights	   into	  how,	  when,	  and	  why	   incumbent	  
industries	  change	  their	  strategies	  (the	  technological	  one,	  in	  particular)	  to	  address	  a	  
societal	  problem.	  The	  DILC-­‐model’s	  basic	  pattern	  has	  been	  confirmed	  by	  the	  case:	  
in	  early	  phases,	  industry	  actors	  formed	  a	  closed	  front	  (through	  APF	  and	  AMA),	  and	  
employed	  defensive	   (mostly	   socio-­‐cultural	   and	  political)	   strategies	   to	  protect	   the	  
existing	  regime.	  As	   institutional	  pressures	  accumulated,	   industry	  actors	  gradually	  
moved	   towards	   incremental	   technical	   innovation	   and	   some	   defensive	   hedging	  
(exploration	  of	  alternatives).	  
A	  shift	  towards	  more	  pro-­‐active	  strategies	  did	  not	  happen	  until	  the	  fourth	  
period	  (phase	  4),	  when	  several	  developments	  aligned:	  (a)	  tough	  regulations	  (1970	  
CAA),	  backed	  up	  by	  civil	  society	  pressure,	  changed	  the	  industry’s	  frame	  conditions,	  
(b)	   regime	   outsiders	   (catalyst	   suppliers)	   and	   new	   entrants	   (foreign	   competitors	  
such	  as	  Honda	  and	  Mazda)	  exerted	  competitive	  pressures	  on	  industry	  incumbents	  
and	  provided	  information	  that	  helped	  reduce	  the	  information	  asymmetry	  between	  
regulators	   and	   the	   industry,	   (c)	   the	   closed	   industry-­‐front	   began	   to	   crumble	   as	  
individual	   firms	   adopted	   pro-­‐active	   innovation	   strategies	   (GM	   acting	   as	   product	  
champion	  for	  catalysts).	  The	  industry	  front	  closed	  again	  in	  the	  fifth	  period,	  when	  
American	   car	   firms	   experienced	   serious	   economic	   problems,	   counter-­‐mobilized	  
and	  articulated	  an	  anti-­‐regulation	  coalition	  around	  an	  economic	  discourse.	  
The	  case	   study	   thus	   raises	   two	   important	   insights	   for	   this	   thesis’	   research	  
focus:	  
1. An	   important	   way	   through	   which	   industries	   respond	   to	   issues	   is	   by	   using	  
collective	   strategies.	   The	   opening	   up	   and	   closing	   down	   of	   an	   industry	   fronts	  
appear	  to	  be	  a	  crucial	  mechanism	  in	  issue	  life-­‐cycles.	  In	  other	  words,	  collective	  
industry	  strategies	  are	  an	  important	  mechanism	  in	  accelerating	  or	  delaying	  the	  




2. Strategies	  do	  not	  remain	  strictly	  separated,	  but	  are	  fuzzier	  in	  the	  real-­‐world.	  In	  
particular,	   there	   were	   frequent	   spillovers	   between	   the	   industry’s	   innovation	  
activities	   and	   political	   strategies,	   e.g.	   signalling	   that	   regulations	   were	   not	  
necessary,	  because	  firms	  are	  already	  working	  on	  solutions.	  	  
In	   this	   sense,	   the	   case	   shows	   the	   usefulness	   of	   building	   a	   new	   model	   of	   issue	  
evolution	   that	   draws	   on	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	   and	   combines	   insights	   from	  
technology	  and	  innovation	  policy	  studies	  and	  Organizational	  Institutionalism.	  The	  
latter	   point	   also	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	   qualifying	   the	   distinction	   between	  
symbolic	  and	  substantive	  strategies,	  a	  point	  to	  which	  I	  shall	  return	  in	  this	   thesis’	  




VI. AUTOMOBILE	  SAFETY	  AND	  THE	  AMERICAN	  
AUTOMOBILE	  INDUSTRY	  (1900-­‐2000)	  
VI.1. INTRODUCTION	  
This	   second	   case	   study94	  investigates	   the	   automobile	   safety	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   in	   the	  
United	  States,	   from	   1900	   to	   2000.	  The	   issue	   represented	   an	   important	   and	   long-­‐
lasting	   challenge	   to	   the	   American	   society.	   To	   put	   the	   issue	   in	   perspective,	   the	  
number	   of	   car-­‐related	   fatalities	   in	   the	  US	   can	   be	   compared	  with	   the	   number	   of	  
deaths	  of	  American	  military	  in	  war	  combats:	  car-­‐related	  fatalities	  took	  as	  much	  as	  
169,700	  lives	  between	  1941	  and	  1946	  –	  despite	  tyre	  and	  fuel	  rationing	  policies	  and	  
the	   interruption	  of	  production	  of	  cars	   for	  civil	  use	  (USDOT/FHWA,	  2010);	   in	  the	  
same	   period,	   the	   number	   of	   casualties	   of	   Americans	   in	  WWII	   combats	   reached	  
291,557	  (Leland	  and	  Oboroceanu,	  2010).	  During	  the	  period	  of	  the	  Korea	  War	  (1950-­‐
1953)	   and	   the	   Vietnam	   Conflict	   (1964-­‐1973),	   automobile-­‐fatalities	   amounted	   to	  
140,773	   and	   522,412	   cases,	   respectively,	  while	   combat	   causalities	  were	   33,739	   and	  
47,434,	  respectively.	  In	  fact,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  car-­‐related	  fatalities	  had	  
already	  surpassed	  the	  number	  of	  deaths	  in	  all	  wars	  the	  United	  States	  took	  part	  in	  
since	  1775	  (both	  during	  combats	  and	  otherwise).	  	  
The	  absolute	  number	  of	  automobile-­‐related	  fatalities	  (Figure	  VI.1)	  increased	  
steadily	   in	   the	   first	  half	  of	   the	   twentieth	  century,	  with	  brief	   interruptions	  during	  
the	  depression	  years	  (1930s)	  and	  World	  War	  II.	  After	  the	  1950s,	  automobile-­‐related	  
fatalities	   increased	   sharply,	   reaching	   a	   peak	   of	   55,600	   cases	   in	   1972,	   but	  
subsequently	   followed	   a	   downward	   trajectory	   (with	   oscillations).	   The	  number	   of	  
fatalities	  seems	  correlated	  with	  miles	  travelled	  per	  registered	  vehicle95,	  particularly	  
between	  1920	  and	  197296.	  But	  from	  1972	  onwards	  the	  two	  indicators	  go	  in	  opposite	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  A	  shorter	  version	  of	  this	  case	  study	  appears	  in	  Geels	  and	  Penna	  (2013),	  which	  is	  currently	  under	  
(the	  second	  round	  of)	  review	  for	  publication	  in	  Research	  Policy.	  As	  in	  the	  air	  pollution	  case	  study,	  
I	  use	  part	  of	  that	  material	  in	  this	  Chapter,	  but	  the	  present	  case	  study	  differs	  and	  goes	  beyond	  the	  
article’s	  case	  study,	  drawing	  on	  more	  sources	  and	  highlighting	  additional	  evidence	  for	  the	  analysis.	  
Moreover,	  this	  Chapter	  is	  based	  on	  the	  original	  version	  submitted	  to	  Research	  Policy,	  analysing	  
the	  case	  up	  to	  2000	  (the	  second	  submitted	  version	  ends	  in	  1995).	  Finally,	  I	  use	  a	  different	  set	  of	  
car-­‐safety	  related	  patents	  for	  the	  quantification	  approach.	  These	  differences	  led	  me	  to	  a	  somehow	  
different	  pattern-­‐matching	  analysis,	  so	  that	  I	  indicate	  the	  differences	  in	  footnotes	  (wherever	  
appropriate).	  
95	  In	  turn,	  sharp	  declines	  in	  miles	  travelled	  per	  registered	  vehicle	  are	  associated	  with	  economic	  
crises	  and	  WWII.	  
96	  In	  fact,	  Spearman’s	  rho	  correlation	  coefficient	  between	  fatalities	  and	  miles	  travelled	  per	  vehicle	  




directions.	   So,	   in	   the	   1960s/1970s97	  a	   turning	   point	   happened	   in	   the	   trajectory	   of	  
automobile-­‐related	  fatalities.	  
Figure	  VI.1:	  Automobile-­‐related	  fatalities	  and	  car	  diffusion	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
	  
Source:	  Based	  on	  data	  from	  USDOT/FHWA	  (2010)	  (fatalities)	  and	  USDOT/FHWA	  (2011)	  (VMT	  and	  registrations)	  
The	  American	   car	   industry	   long	   denied	   the	   influence	   of	   car	   design	   on	   fatalities,	  
blaming	  drivers	  or	  road	  conditions	  instead	  (Eastman,	  1984).	  It	  also	  strongly	  held	  a	  
belief	  that	  there	  was	  no	  effective	  consumer	  demand	  for	  safety	   items	  (captured	  in	  
the	  motto	   ‘safety	   doesn’t	   sell’).	   But	   the	   industry	   gradually	   changed	   its	   position,	  
initially	  reluctantly	  under	  pressure	  from	  public	  opinion	  and	  regulation	  (1960s),	  but	  
more	   wholeheartedly	   when	   safety	   became	   part	   of	   consumer	   preferences	   (mid-­‐
1980s).	  I	  bound	  the	  case	  study	  with	  an	  endpoint	  in	  the	  year	  2000,	  not	  because	  the	  
problem	   was	   ‘solved’	   (cf.	   Figure	   VI.1:	   car	   crashes	   were	   still	   taking	   about	   40,000	  
American	   lives	   per	   year),	   but	   because	   by	   then	   the	   industry	   had	   reoriented	   and	  
included	  safety	  in	  its	  mission,	  beliefs	  (‘safety	  sells’),	  and	  innovation	  strategy.	  
This	   case	   is	   more	   complex	   than	   the	   air	   pollution	   one.	   Firstly,	   public	  
attention	   for	   air	   pollution	   followed	   a	   relatively	   unique	   ‘up-­‐and-­‐down’	   curve	   that	  
peaked	  in	  1970	  and	  led	  to	  the	  Clean	  Air	  Act,	  which	  forced	  introduction	  of	  catalytic	  
converters	  years	   later.	  Public	  debates	  on	  auto-­‐safety	  not	  only	  showed	  more	   ‘ups-­‐
and-­‐downs’	  in	  an	  upward	  trajectory	  (Figure	  IV.3,	  p.	  126),	  but	  also	  entailed	  changes	  
in	   the	  way	   the	   problem	  was	   framed:	   initially,	   it	  was	   seen	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   driver’s	  
education,	   but	   latter,	   the	   problem	   received	   a	   technical	   framing	   (as	   a	   matter	   of	  
redesigning	  the	  car	  for	  crash-­‐worthiness	  and	  crash-­‐protection).	  I	  therefore	  expect	  
the	  car-­‐safety	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  to	  follow	  a	  more	  complicated	  path	  than	  air	  pollution,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  If	  one	  calculates	  the	  rate	  of	  fatalities	  per	  miles	  travelled	  per	  registered	  vehicle,	  then	  the	  peak	  




possibly	  with	  recursive/cyclical	  patterns	  (Bigelow	  et	  al.,	   1993)	  –	  this	  was	  indeed	  a	  
key	  rationale	  in	  selecting	  this	  case.	  	  
Secondly,	   safety	   required	   redesign	   of	  more	   car	   components,	   both	   to	   help	  
the	  driver	   to	  avoid	  crashes	   (e.g.	  breaks,	   steering	  system,	  windshields	  etc.)	  and	  to	  
protect	   the	   driver	   and	   passengers	   in	   case	   they	   happen	   (e.g.	   seatbelts,	   airbags,	  
crumble-­‐zones	   etc.).	   Thirdly,	   as	   shown	   in	   Chapter	   V,	   demand	   for	   ‘low-­‐emission	  
cars’	  never	  materialized	  during	  the	  air	  pollution	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  Safety,	  in	  contrast,	  
eventually	  spilled	  over	  from	  the	  institutional	  to	  the	  task	  environment,	  becoming	  a	  
key	  criterion	  for	  car	  purchase	  decisions	  (consumer	  preferences);	  thus,	  the	  resulting	  
market	   demand	   stimulated	   automakers	   to	   fully	   embrace	   safety	   innovations.	   The	  
safety	  case	  therefore	  followed	  the	  ‘changes	  in	  consumer	  preferences’	  route.	  
In	  summary,	  the	  characteristics	  of	  this	  case	  allows	  me,	  firstly,	  to	  investigate	  
the	  factors	  and	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  a	  societal	  issue	  or	  challenge	  spills	  over	  
to	   consumer	   preferences.	   Secondly,	   because	   the	   issue	   initially	   received	   a	  
behavioural	   framing	   and	   only	   later	   a	   technical	   one,	   the	   case	   will	   allow	   me	   to	  
investigate	  how	  different	  problem	  framings	  influence	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  and	  lead	  or	  
not	  to	  the	  development	  of	  distinctive	  solutions.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  this	  case	  I	  will	  
look	  at	   the	  co-­‐evolution	  between	   societal	  problems	  and	   technical	   solutions:	  how	  
processes	  underlying	  problem-­‐related	  pressures	   lead	  to	  the	  development	  (or	  not)	  
of	   technical	   solutions	  by	   the	   incumbent	   industry.	  Thirdly,	   as	   the	   car-­‐safety	   issue	  
life-­‐cycle	  appears	  to	  be	  more	  complicated	  than	  the	  air	  pollution	  issue	  life-­‐cycle,	  it	  
can	  potentially	   reveal	  which	   factors	  and	  mechanisms	   influence	   the	  path	  an	   issue	  
takes	   and	   make	   it	   deviate	   from	   the	   ‘normal’	   phase-­‐based	   DILC-­‐model.	   I	   shall	  
return	  to	  these	  three	  points	  in	  the	  analysis	  section.	  	  
VI.2. DATA	  SOURCES	  &	  DATA	  COLLECTION	  PROCEDURES	  
Like	  the	   local	  air	  pollution	  case	  study,	   this	  historical	  case	  study	  of	  car	  safety	  and	  
the	  responses	  of	  the	  American	  car	  industry	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  unveil	  new	  historical	  
evidence,	   but	   to	   further	   test	   the	   DILC-­‐model	   and	   to	   generate	   insights	   for	  
additional	   conceptualization	   based	   on	   case	   idiosyncrasies.	   I	   therefore	   draw	   on	  
primary	   sources	   for	   quantitative	   indicators,	   while	   the	   qualitative	   case	   study	   is	   a	  




VI.2.1. Sources	  for	  quantitative	  indicators	  and	  data	  collection	  procedures	  
In	  this	  case	  study,	  I	  will	  apply	  two	  quantification	  approaches:	  the	  exploratory	  visual	  
examination	   of	   attention	   indicator	   charts	   and	   the	  meta-­‐analysis	   of	   correlations.	  
While	   in	   the	   air	   pollution	   case	   study	   I	   used	   just	   the	   ‘interpretive’	   quantification	  
method	   to	   generate	   insights	   about	   broad	   patterns	   and	   apparent	   relationships	  
between	  (indicators	  of)	  attention,	  in	  this	  case	  study	  I	  will	  use	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  
method	   –	   the	   meta-­‐analysis	   of	   correlations	   –	   to	   generate	   first	   insights	   about	  
patterns	   and	   relationships.	   Indeed,	   the	   exploratory	   visual	   examination	   will	   be	  
triangulated	  with	   qualitative	   knowledge	   of	   key	   events	   throughout	   the	   car	   safety	  
issue	  life-­‐cycle	  to	  establish	  relevant	  break	  points	  (for	  the	  ‘temporal	  bracketing’	  into	  
sub-­‐periods)	   to	   be	   used	   in	   the	   meta-­‐analysis	   of	   correlations,	   and,	   later,	   in	   the	  
qualitative	  in-­‐depth	  narrative.	  
In	  this	  case,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  following	  attention	  indicators:98	  
1) Public	   attention:	   Like	   in	   the	   air	   pollution	   case,	   as	   a	   proxy	   indicator	   of	  
public	   attention,	   I	   use	   the	   number	   of	   articles	   on	   automobile	   safety	   in	  
mass-­‐circulation	  newspapers:	  Chicago	  Tribune	   (CT),	   Los	  Angeles	  Times	  
(LAT),	  New	  York	  Times	   (NYT),	  Washington	  Post	  (WP)	  and	  Wall	  Street	  
Journal	  (WSJ).	  I	  used	  the	  same	  data	  collection	  method	  as	  in	  the	  first	  case	  
study:	  a	  keyword	  search	  in	  each	  newspaper’s	  historical	  archive,	  using	  the	  
expressions	   “auto	   safety”	   and	   “highway	   safety”	   (with	   the	   Boolean	  
operator	  ‘OR’99),	  two	  of	  the	  most	  common	  ways	  to	  which	  the	  issue	  was	  
referred	  in	  the	  United	  States100.	  Figure	  VI.2.a	  plots	  the	  average	  number	  of	  
articles	   published	   by	   the	   five	   newspapers	   per	   year.	   This	   indicator’s	  
caveat	   of	   not	   accounting	   for	   changes	   in	   meaning	   (framing)	   of	   the	  
problem	   is	   rather	   important	   in	   this	   case,	   so	   that	   I	   will	   pay	   particular	  
attention	  to	  this	  in	  the	  narrative	  approach101.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  As	  in	  the	  air	  pollution	  case	  study,	  I	  also	  look	  at	  primary	  quantitative	  data	  other	  than	  attention	  
indicators,	  which	  were	  collected	  from	  governmental	  sources	  (e.g.	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  
Transportation)	  and	  industry	  journals	  and	  databases	  (e.g.	  Ward’s;	  Automotive	  News).	  
99	  Or	  equivalent	  strategies,	  depending	  on	  which	  operators	  were	  available	  for	  each	  database.	  	  
100	  Other	  combinations	  of	  words	  and	  expressions	  were	  tested,	  but	  the	  added	  value	  was	  little	  
compared	  to	  the	  use	  of	  these	  two	  expressions	  (i.e.	  more	  words/expressions	  did	  not	  result	  in	  more	  
relevant	  articles	  but	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  irrelevant	  articles).	  
101	  I	  also	  looked	  for	  particular	  expressions	  that	  reflect	  the	  different	  framings	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  
and	  collected	  the	  number	  of	  articles	  using	  these	  expressions	  over	  the	  decades.	  I	  will	  however	  draw	  




2) Political	   (Congressional	   and	   Regulatory)	   attention:	   For	   congressional	  
attention,	   I	   searched	   the	  Congressional	   Record	   (using	   the	  HeinOnline	  
database)	   with	   a	   set	   of	   auto-­‐safety-­‐related	   keywords.102	  The	   political	  
attention	   chart	   plots	   the	   yearly	   number	   of	   relevant	   publications	  
(outcomes	   of	   public	   hearings,	   bills	   proposals,	   reports).	   For	   regulatory	  
attention	   (implementation	   activity),	   I	   searched103	  the	   Federal	   Register	  
(HeinOnline	   database)	   for	   the	   number	   of	   publications	   per	   year	   by	  
executive	   agencies.	   These	   indicators	   do	   not	   address	   content	   and	  
meanings	  (to	  be	  analysed	  through	  the	  narrative),	  but	  does	  indicate	  the	  
evolving	  attention	  to	  the	  issue.	  
3) Industry	  ‘attention’/technology	  development:	  In	  this	  case	  study,	  I	  adopted	  
two	   strategies	   for	   collecting	   car	   safety-­‐related	   patents.	   A	   class-­‐based	  
search	  in	  the	  USPTO104	  and	  a	  keyword	  search	  in	  Google	  Patents105.	  This	  
was	   necessary	   for	   two	   reasons:	   (1)	   in	   order	   to	   investigate	   the	  
development	  of	  different	  types	  of	  ‘solutions’	  according	  to	  the	  patents	  in	  
different	   classes	   (related	   to	   e.g.	   accident	   avoidance	   or	   passenger	  
protection	   or	   airbags	   or	   seatbelts	   etc.);	   however,	   (2)	   because	   the	   case	  
covers	   a	   period	   beyond	   which	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   search	   the	   USPTO	   for	  
assignees	  and	  filing	  date,	  I	  used	  the	  strategy	  of	  searching	  for	  car	  safety-­‐
related	   patents	   in	   Google	   Patents	   and	   ordering	   the	   set	   according	   to	  
assignee	  name	  and	  filing	  year.	  The	  Google	  Patents	  search	  dataset	  may	  be	  
seen	  as	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  USPTO	  class	  search	  (the	  class-­‐based	  search	  is	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  After	  testing	  different	  combinations	  of	  words	  and	  expressions,	  I	  used	  the	  following	  Boolean	  
search	  string	  to	  maximize	  the	  return	  of	  relevant	  results:	  “auto	  safety”	  OR	  “highway	  safety”	  OR	  
“traffic	  safety”	  OR	  “motor	  vehicle	  safety”	  OR	  “automobile	  safety”.	  
103	  Same	  Boolean	  string	  as	  in	  the	  Congressional	  Record	  search.	  	  
104	  The	  classes	  were:	  180/268	  to	  180/290	  (“Motor	  Vehicles/Safety	  promoting	  means”);	  180/232	  
(“Motor	  Vehicles/Collision,	  protecting	  occupant	  or	  Motor	  from”);	  180/268	  	  to	  180/270	  (“Motor	  
Vehicles	  /Safety	  belt	  or	  harness,	  Motor	  vehicle	  system	  responsive”);	  280/801.1	  to	  280/808	  (“Land	  
Vehicles/	  Safety	  belt	  or	  harness,	  Passive”);	  280/278.1	  to	  280/728.3	  and	  280/729	  to	  280/743.2	  (“Land	  
Vehicles/Air	  bag	  passenger	  restraints”);	  and	  280/748,	  280/750	  to	  280/752,	  280/756,	  and	  280/757	  
(“Land	  Vehicles/Passenger	  safety	  guards”).	  
105	  The	  following	  search	  string	  was	  used:	  collision	  OR	  accident	  OR	  crash	  OR	  safety	  OR	  occupant-­‐
restraint	  OR	  passenger-­‐restraint	  OR	  occupant-­‐protection	  OR	  passenger-­‐protection	  OR	  passenger-­‐
safety	  OR	  occupant-­‐safety	  OR	  crashworthiness	  OR	  crash-­‐protection	  automobile	  OR	  motor-­‐
vehicle	  OR	  highway.	  Because	  some	  of	  the	  terms	  are	  very	  general,	  I	  restricted	  the	  search	  to	  the	  
biggest	  American	  and	  foreign	  automakers	  (and	  subsidiaries/associated	  companies)	  and	  suppliers	  
(namely,	  General	  Motors,	  Ford,	  Chrysler,	  Mercedes,	  BMW,	  Volvo,	  Volkswagen,	  Toyota,	  Honda,	  
Nissan,	  Kaiser	  Motors,	  Tucker	  Corporation,	  Eaton	  Corporation,	  Autoliv,	  NSK,	  Breed	  Corporation,	  





fact	   a	   ‘census’	   –	   all	   patents	   in	   those	   classes	   were	   counted).	   In	   the	  
quantification	   approach,	   however,	   I	   will	   use	   only	   the	   Google	   Patents	  
dataset,	  because	  (a)	  it	  is	  ordered	  by	  filing	  year	  and	  thus	  presents	  less	  ‘lag’	  
(in	  relation	  to	  the	  actual	   ‘invention	  year’);	  and	  (b)	   it	  allows	  me	  to	  gain	  
insights	  into	  the	  response	  by	  the	  American	  car	  industry	  (Big	  Three)	  and	  
by	  the	  outsiders.	  The	  USPTO	  set	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  gain	  insight	  into	  the	  
types	  of	   technologies	  being	  developed	  throughout	   the	  safety	   issue	   life-­‐
cycle	  (i.e.	  into	  the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  solutions	  and	  problems),	  and	  will	  be	  
referred	  to	  in	  the	  narrative	  approach.	  
VI.2.2. Sources	  for	  the	  qualitative	  case	  study	  (narrative)	  
The	  qualitative	  case	   study	  provides	  a	   longitudinal	   analysis	  of	   the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  
the	   auto-­‐safety	   problem	   and	   car	   industry	   responses.	   The	   case	   study	   draws	   on	  
primary	  and	  secondary	  sources.	  Primary	  sources	  for	  public	  protests	  and	  discursive	  
framings	   are	   articles	   from	   newspapers	   and	   magazines106,	   such	   as	   the	  New	   York	  
Times,	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  Newsweek,	  Popular	  Science,	  and	  Popular	  Mechanics,	  and	  
newspaper	  cartoons	  by	  Herblock	  (Johnson	  and	  Katz,	  2009).	  For	   industry	  views,	   I	  
draw	  on	   industry	   journals	   (e.g.	  Ward’s;	  Automotive	  News)	   and	   statements	   in	   the	  
media,	   and	   look	   at	   advertisements	   with	   ‘safety’	   as	   primary	   or	   secondary	   theme,	  
which	   I	   collected	   from	   an	   archive	   search	   in	  Life	  magazine	   (and	   others	   for	  more	  
recent	   years);	   from	   Stevenson	   (2008),	   who	   analysed	   the	   American	   car	   industry	  
advertising	   strategy	   from	   1930	   to	   1980;	   and	   from	   the	   Old	   Car	   Advertisements	  
database	  (www.oldcaradvertising.com),	  which	  makes	  available	  a	  vast	  collection	  of	  
printed	  ads	  from	  American	  automakers	  from	  1903	  to	  1989.	  
The	  case	  study	  narrative	  also	  triangulates	  secondary	  accounts	  that	  address	  
different	   dimensions	   of	   auto-­‐safety:	   legal	   and	   political	   dimensions	   (Miller,	   1988;	  
Weingroff	  and	  Seabron,	  2003);	  public	  criticisms	  and	  discursive	  (framing)	  struggles	  
from	  a	  historical	  perspective	  (Eastman,	  1981;	  Eastman,	  1984;	  Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  
1986);	   medical	   perspective	   (MacLennan,	   1988;	  Waller,	   2002);	   insurance	   industry	  
perspective	  (O'Neill,	  2009);	  car	  safety	  technologies,	  particularly	  seatbelt	  and	  airbag	  
(Struble,	   1998;	   Waters	   et	   al.,	   1998;	   Nilsson	   et	   al.,	   2003;	   Strother	   et	   al.,	   2003;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  While	  newspaper	  and	  magazine	  articles	  may	  be	  considered	  also	  a	  type	  of	  secondary	  source,	  I	  
attempt	  not	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  opinions	  of	  the	  authors	  (journalists),	  but	  on	  facts	  and	  quotes	  of	  




Leonardi,	  2010);	  organizational,	  advertising	  and	  corporate	  strategies	  in	  response	  to	  
the	  safety	  issue	  (Nader,	  1965;	  O’Connell	  and	  Myers,	  1966;	  Schnapp,	  1979;	  Davidson,	  
1983;	   Abeles,	   2004;	  Albaum,	   2005;	  Gerard	   and	   Lave,	   2007;	   Stevenson,	   2008).	   For	  
broader	  industry	  developments	  impacting	  on	  the	  safety	  issue	  life-­‐cycle,	  I	  draw	  on	  
the	   same	   sources	   as	   in	   the	   air	   pollution	   narrative.	  My	   case	   study	  will	   develop	   a	  
comprehensive	   multi-­‐dimensional	   analysis	   through	   the	   triangulation	   of	   insights	  
from	  these	  works.	  
VI.3. QUANTIFICATION	  APPROACH:	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  ATTENTION	  
INDICATORS	  
VI.3.1. Exploratory	  visual	  examination	  	  
Figure	   VI.2	   plots	   the	   indicators	   of	   attention	   to	   car	   safety	   in	   the	   US	   over	   time:	  	  
(a)	   public	   attention;	   (b)	   congressional	   attention	   and	   regulatory	   (executive)	  
attention;	   (c)	   car	   safety-­‐related	   patents	   by	   assignee	   type	   (incumbents/Big	   Three	  
and	  outsiders);	  and	  (d)	  car-­‐safety	  patents	  by	  type.	  The	  visual	  examination	  will	  look	  
at	   the	   first	   three	   charts,	   while	   the	   fourth	   will	   be	   explored	   in	   the	   narrative.	   The	  
analysis	  is	  triangulated	  with	  key	  events	  in	  the	  auto	  safety	  case	  in	  America	  in	  order	  
to	  arrive	  at	  the	  sub-­‐periods:	  
a) Car	  safety	  received	  increasing	  levels	  of	  public	  attention	  in	  the	  first	  decades	  of	  
the	   1900s	   (Figure	   VI.2.a),	   but	   the	   issue	   was	   reported	   in	   local	   news	   sections	  
(Eastman,	   1984).	   After	   the	   First	   World	   War,	   public	   attention	   to	   car	   safety	  
increased	   fast,	   possibly	   reflecting	   the	   rapid	   increase	   in	   fatalities	   that	  
accompanied	   automobile	   diffusion	   (Figure	   VI.1).	   In	   the	   late	   1920s,	   attention	  
declined,	  possibly	  due	   to	   the	   competing	   issue	  of	   economic	  depression.	  But	   it	  
increased	  again	  when	  fatalities	  reached	  record	  levels	  in	  the	  1930s.	  World	  War	  II	  
diverted	   automobile	   production	   to	   the	  military	   effort	   and	   led	   to	   rationing	   of	  
rubber	  (tyre)	  and	  fuel,	  so	  that	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  halted	  between	  1941	  and	  1946,	  
which	  is	  reflected	  both	  in	  the	  level	  of	  automobile-­‐related	  fatalities	  and	  of	  public	  
attention	  to	  it.	  In	  the	  1950s,	  public	  attention	  increased	  again,	  but	  remained	  at	  
moderate	  levels,	  until	  it	  rose	  sharply	  in	  the	  1960s.	  In	  fact,	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  saw	  
the	  emergence	  of	   the	   technical	   framing	   to	   the	   issue	   (Eastman,	   1984).	   Indeed,	  
the	  way	  the	  issue	  was	  framed	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  words	  used	  in	  association	  to	  the	  




common	   up	   to	   the	   1950s,	   while	   technological	   terms	   such	   as	   ‘seatbelt’	   and	  
‘airbag’	   began	   to	   be	   referred	   to	   more	   prominently	   from	   the	   1960s	   onwards	  
(‘airbag’	   was	   particularly	   focused	   by	   the	   media	   in	   the	   1990s,	   due	   to	   a	  
controversy	   regarding	   hazard	   to	   children).	   The	   year	   of	   1966	   –	   when	   the	  
National	   Traffic	   and	   Motor	   Vehicle	   Safety	   Act	   (NTMVSA)	   was	   enacted	   –	  
represents	   a	   local	   peak	   in	   public	   attention.	   Although	   it	   declined	   sharply	  
immediately	   after	   the	   passage	   of	   this	   strong	   piece	   of	   regulation,	   which	  
mandated	  safety	  innovations,	  public	  attention	  returned	  to	  a	  trajectory	  of	  ups-­‐
and-­‐downs	   from	   1976	  onwards.	  Only	   after	   the	   year	   2000	  –	  when	   I	   finish	   this	  
case	  study	  –	  public	  attention	  declined	  again,	  and	  to	  pre-­‐1970s	  levels.	  
b) Congressional	  attention	  (Figure	  VI.2.b)	  to	  car	  safety	  shows	  some	  oscillations	  at	  
very	  low	  levels	  in	  the	  late	  1920s	  and,	  at	  relatively	  higher	  level,	   in	  the	  1930s.	  In	  
this	   period,	   policy-­‐makers,	   including	   the	   President107,	   promoted	   car	   safety	  
conferences	  and	   sponsored	   research	  on	   the	  problem.	  Congressional	   attention	  
declined	  during	  WWII,	  and	  then	  returned	  to	  1930s’	  levels	  until	  mid-­‐1950s,	  when	  
the	   new	   technical	   framing	   began	   to	   be	   voiced	   by	   professional	   activists	  
(engineers	   and	   medical	   doctors).	   A	   great	   surge	   in	   Congressional	   activity	  
appears	   in	   the	   1960s,	   which	   seems	   connected	  with	   the	   same	   surge	   in	   public	  
attention.	   Thereafter,	   Congressional	   attention	   oscillates	   in	   a	   downward	  
trajectory,	   therefore	   contrary	   to	   public	   attention.	   Executive	   or	   Regulatory	  
attention	   (Figure	   VI.2.b)	   only	   shows	   significant	   increase	   after	   1966,	   as	   the	  
implementation	  of	   the	  NTMVSA	  was	  delegated	   to	  a	  new	  agency:	   the	  NHTSA	  
(National	  Highway	  Traffic	  Safety	  Agency).	  Implementation	  activity	  by	  NHTSA	  
increased	   steeply	   and	   remained	   high	   after	   1970	   (because	   of	   implementation	  
struggles	   between	   NHTSA	   and	   the	   car	   industry).	   Public	   attention	   seems	   to	  
reflect	   these	   struggles,	   and	   this	   association	   will	   be	   tested	   in	   the	   correlation	  
analysis.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	  The	  Federal	  Record	  only	  started	  being	  published	  in	  1936,	  so	  there	  is	  no	  indicator	  for	  executive	  




Figure	  VI.2	  (a-­‐d,	  top-­‐down):	  Attention	  to	  automobile	  and	  highway	  safety	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  construction	  (see	  section	  VI.2.1	  for	  data	  sources	  and	  data	  collection	  




Figure	  VI.3:	  The	  usage	  of	  terms	  associated	  to	  car	  safety	  over	  the	  decades	  reflected	  different	  
problem	  framings	  and	  solutions	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  construction	  based	  on	  keyword	  search	  in	  the	  ProQuest	  database.	  
c) Incumbent	  industry	  attention	  to	  safety	  technologies	  (Big	  Three	  patents)	  (Figure	  
VI.2.c)	  shows	  oscillations	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1930s	  (when	  Chrysler	  ‘flirted’	  with	  safety	  –	  
crash	  avoidance	  –	  features	  and	  aerodynamic	  designs)	  and	  the	  1950s	  (when	  Ford	  
attempted	  to	  position	  in	  the	  market	  new	  models	  with	  safety	  –	  passenger	  crash-­‐
protection	  –	  features,	  and	  GM	  carried	  in-­‐house	  R&D	  on	  car-­‐safety).	  Big	  Three	  
patenting	  only	  shows	  significant	  increase	  after	  implementation	  of	  the	  NTMVSA	  
began	   in	   late-­‐1960s/1970s.	   In	   the	   mid-­‐1980s,	   when	   the	   issue	   spilled	   over	   to	  
consumer	  preferences,	  we	  see	  a	  surge	  in	  patenting	  by	  the	  Big	  Three,	  which	  may	  
indicate	   an	   innovation	   race.	   The	   Google	   Patents	   dataset	   show	   outsiders	  
relatively	   inactive	  before	  the	   1960s108,	  although	  in	  the	   late	   1940s	  there	   is	  some	  
patenting	   activity	   (associated	   with	   the	   initiative	   of	   Tucker	   Corporation	   and	  
Kaiser	   Motors	   to	   design	   cars	   with	   safety	   –	   crash-­‐avoidance	   and	   passenger	  
protection	   –	   features).	   And,	   in	   the	   late	   1960s,	   outsiders	   seem	   relatively	  more	  
active	  than	  regime	  actors,	  albeit	  at	  a	  low	  level.	  From	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  onward,	  we	  
see	  a	  steep	  upward	  trajectory	  in	  outsiders’	  patenting,	  reinforcing	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  
innovation	  race.	  
Based	   on	   this	   visual	   analysis	   complemented	   with	   qualitative	   knowledge 109 ,	   I	  
propose	  the	  following	  sub-­‐division	  of	  the	  1900-­‐2000	  period:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  The	  relative	  inactivity	  of	  outsiders	  indicated	  by	  this	  dataset	  may	  be	  deceptive,	  given	  the	  
amount	  of	  patents	  found	  with	  USPTO	  class-­‐based	  search.	  This	  might	  be	  due	  to	  restricting	  the	  
search	  to	  a	  small	  (but	  important)	  number	  of	  outside	  firms	  (a	  closer	  look	  –	  random	  scanning	  –	  at	  
the	  patents	  in	  the	  USPTO	  set	  shows	  however	  many	  inventions	  by	  individuals	  in	  the	  pre-­‐1960s	  era).	  
109	  Alternative	  periodization	  based	  on	  a	  visual	  analysis	  is	  possible,	  particularly	  for	  the	  first	  two	  
periods.	  This	  point	  emphasizes	  an	  important	  caveat	  of	  the	  visual	  analysis,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  a	  




1. 1900-­‐1924:	  emerging	  public	  attention	  and	  concern;	  
2. 1924-­‐1942:	  rising	  public	  attention,	  with	  some	  political	  and	  industry	  activity;	  
3. 1942-­‐1946:	  disruption	  by	  Second	  World	  War;	  
4. 1946-­‐1955:	   relatively	   low	   public	   attention	   but	   moderate	   Congressional	  
attention;	  
5. 1955-­‐1966:	   substantially	   increasing	   public	   and	   political	   attention,	  
culminating	  in	  the	  1966	  peak;	  
6. 1966-­‐1976:	   substantial	   increase	   in	   implementation	   activity	   (decreasing	  
Congressional	   attention)	   and	   in	   incumbent	   industry	   technology	  
development;	  
7. 1976-­‐1984:	   decreasing	   regulatory	   activity	   and	   industry	   innovation	  
(implementation	  controversies);	  
8. 1984-­‐1991110:	  end	  of	  regulatory	  uncertainty	  and	  increasing	  patenting	  activity,	  
with	   innovation	   race	   between	   incumbents	   and	   outsiders	   around	   airbag	  
technology;	  	  
9. 1991-­‐2000:	   emerging	   market	   for	   safety	   innovations	   further	   accelerating	  
patenting	  activity.	  
So,	   the	   case	   appears	   to	   have	  more	   ‘phases’	   than	   in	   the	   ‘normal’	   pathway	   of	   the	  
DILC-­‐model.	  Have	  any	  of	  the	  ideal-­‐type	  phases	  been	  repeated	  during	  the	  car	  safety	  
issue	   life-­‐cycle?	   If	   so,	  what	  pathway	  did	   it	   follow?	  The	  qualitative	  case	  study	  will	  
attempt	  to	  address	  these	  questions.	  Before	  I	  turn	  to	  it,	  the	  next	  section	  will	  look	  for	  
initial	   insights	   about	   relationships	   by	   applying	   the	   method	   of	   meta-­‐analysis	   of	  
correlations	  within	  this	  ‘temporal	  bracketing’	  framework.	  	  
VI.3.2. Meta-­‐analysis	  of	  correlations	  within	  a	  temporal	  bracketing	  
framework	  	  
The	  meta-­‐analysis	   of	   correlations	   should	   be	   treated	  with	   care,	   particularly	   since	  
some	  sub-­‐periods	  are	  rather	  short.	  I	  therefore	  take	  a	  conservative	  approach	  in	  this	  
analysis.	   As	   explained	   in	   the	   methodological	   Chapter	   (section	   IV.2.2.2),	   I	   use	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
periodization	  (dividing	  the	  period	  between	  1900	  and	  1942	  into	  three	  sub-­‐periods),	  but	  concluded	  
that	  two	  sub-­‐periods	  were	  more	  appropriate,	  because	  core	  dynamics	  and	  process	  did	  not	  differ	  
substantially	  between	  the	  alternate	  three	  sub-­‐periods	  (see	  case	  study	  narrative).	  Robustness	  of	  the	  
periodization	  based	  on	  visual	  analysis	  will	  be	  objectively	  tested	  in	  the	  third	  case	  study	  (Chapter	  
VII),	  which	  will	  also	  make	  use	  of	  the	  statistical	  test	  for	  unknown	  structural	  breaks.	  




Spearman’s	   rho	   correlation	   coefficient	   (instead	   of	   the	   more	   common	   Pearson’s	  
correlation	   coefficient),	   which	   is	   more	   appropriate	   for	   non-­‐parametric/non-­‐
normally	   distributed	   data	   and	   for	   smaller	   samples	   (Gibbons	   and	   Chakraborti,	  
2003).	  Moreover,	  I	  will	  adopt	  a	  conservative	  confidence	  interval	  and	  mostly	  focus	  
on	   strong	   (>	   0.80)	   correlations	   that	   are	   significant	   at	   the	   1%	   level.	   One	   may	  
interpret	  Spearman’s	  correlation	  as	  following:	   if,	   for	  example,	  public	  and	  political	  
attention	   are	   strongly	   correlated,	   it	  means	   that,	   in	   a	   given	   period,	   years	   of	   high	  
(low)	  public	  attention	  are	  associated	  with	  years	  of	  high	  (low)	  political	  attention.	  
Although	   I	   adopt	   an	   overlapping	   sub-­‐periodization,	   for	   the	   correlation	  
analysis	  I	  consider	  the	  final	  year	  of	  a	  period	  as	  part	  of	  the	  precedent	  period	  (e.g.	  the	  
period	   1955-­‐1966,	   identified	   above,	   is	   composed	   of	   11	   observations,	   not	   including	  
1955	  but	   including	   1966).	  The	  correlation	  analysis	   reveals	   interesting	  associations	  
(the	  reader	  is	  referred	  to	  Appendix	  I.1	  for	  the	  complete	  set	  of	  results):	  	  
• Associations	  during	  first	  sub-­‐period	  [1900-­‐1924]:	  In	  the	  first	  sub-­‐period,	  the	  only	  
significant	   and	   strong	   correlation	   (0.8159)	   is	   between	   public	   attention	   and	  
fatalities,	   implying	   that	   the	  media/public	   is	  attentive	   to	   the	   ‘objective’	   side	  of	  
the	  issue.	  This	  is	   less	  trivial	  and	  obvious	  than	  it	  appears:	  proponents	  of	   issue-­‐
attention	  cycle	  argue	  that	  “an	  issue	  may	  rise	  and	  fall	  more	  or	  less	  independently	  
of	  the	  factual	  development	  of	  the	  publicly	  perceived	  problem	  or	  whether	   it	   is	  
politically	  ‘solved’	  or	  not”	  (Newig,	  2004,	  p.	  151).	  Yet,	  it	  seems	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  
objective	  side	  of	  the	  issue	  matters,	  at	  least	  during	  early	  phases	  of	  the	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle.	  
• Associations	  during	  the	  second	  sub-­‐period	  [1925-­‐1942]:	  In	  the	  second	  sub-­‐period,	  
the	   correlation	   analysis	   did	   not	   capture	   any	   significant	   correlation	   at	   the	   1%	  
level.	  (At	  the	  5%	  level,	  however,	  Congressional	  attention	  is	  medially	  correlated	  
to	  fatalities	  (0.5654),	  which	  could	  indicate	  that	  policy-­‐makers	  began	  to	  engage	  
in	  (maybe	  symbolic)	  action.)	  Although	  this	  lack	  of	  associations	  is	  possibly	  due	  
to	  methodological	   issues,	   it	   could	   also	   be	   indicative	   of	   a	   period	   when	  many	  
issues	  were	  competing	  for	  attention	  from	  all	  actors	  (e.g.	  Great	  Depression,	  arms	  
race	  before	  WWII,	  labour	  and	  market	  issues	  etc.).	  	  
• Associations	   during	   third	   sub-­‐period,	   the	  WWII	   break	   [1943-­‐1946]:	  This	  period	  




• Associations	   during	   fourth	   sub-­‐period	   [1947-­‐1955]:	   In	   this	  period,	  patenting	  by	  
the	  Big	  Three	  is	  significantly	  and	  strongly	  (0.9048)	  associated	  with	  fatalities	  (at	  
the	  5%,	  it	  is	  medially	  correlated	  with	  Public	  (0.7730)	  and	  Congressional	  (0.7321)	  
attention).	  This	  period	  was	  characterized	  by	  increasing	  political	  debates	  and	  a	  
(failed)	  attempt	  by	  Ford	  to	  break	  an	  existing	  ‘closed	  industry	  front’	  with	  safety	  
innovations.	  
• Associations	  during	  fifth	  sub-­‐period	  [1956-­‐1966]:	  The	  correlation	  analysis	  did	  not	  
capture	   any	   significant	   correlation	   in	   this	   sub-­‐period.	   This	   was	   a	   period	   of	  
intense	   public	   and	   political	   debate,	   and	   this	   result	   may	   stem	   from	   a	  
methodological	  issue.	  
• Associations	   during	   sixth	   sub-­‐period	   [1967-­‐1976]:	   After	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	  
NTMVSA,	   patenting	   activity	   by	   outsiders	   became	   significantly	   and	   strongly	  
(0.9268)	  associated	  with	  regulatory	  attention	  (implementation	  activities).	  This	  
is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  outsiders	  react	  first	  to	  pressures	  connected	  to	  a	  
societal	   issue.	   Public	   attention	   is	   also	   strongly	   (0.8788)	   associated	   with	  
fatalities,	   which	   fell	   after	   the	   energy	   crisis	   of	   1973.	   (Big	   Three	   patenting	   is	  
medially	   correlated	   with	   both	   outsiders’	   patenting	   (0.7038)	   and	   regulatory	  
activity	  (0.6650),	  but	  just	  at	  the	  5%	  level.)	  
• Associations	  during	  seventh	  sub-­‐period	  [1977-­‐1984]:	  The	  correlation	  analysis	  did	  
not	   capture	   any	   significant	   correlation	   in	   this	   sub-­‐period,	   except	   between	  
regulatory	  attention	  and	  fatalities,	  which	  does	  not	  make	  much	  analytical	  sense.	  
This	   was	   a	   period	   of	   intense	   implementation	   struggles,	   and	   this	   result	   may	  
stem	  from	  a	  methodological	  issue.	  
• Associations	   during	   eighth	   sub-­‐period	   [1985-­‐1991]:	   Public	   attention	   becomes	  
significantly	   and	   strongly	   (0.8829)	   associated	  with	   regulatory	   attention.111	  This	  
was	  a	  period	  when	  regulatory	  activities	  resumed,	  and	  when	  there	  was	  a	  public	  
debate	   over	   mandatory	   ‘passive	   safety’	   technologies	   (automatic	   seatbelts	   vs.	  
airbags);	  the	  public/media	  seems	  therefore	  attentive	  to	  these	  developments.	  
• Associations	   during	   ninth	   sub-­‐period	   [1991-­‐2000]:	   In	   the	   final	   sub-­‐period,	   the	  
correlation	  analysis	  did	  not	  capture	  any	  significant	  correlation	  at	  the	  1%	  level.	  
(At	  the	  5%	  level,	  however,	  outsiders’	  patenting	  is	  medially	  (0.7017)	  correlated	  to	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  Big	  Three	  patenting	  is	  significantly	  but	  negatively	  correlated	  to	  Congressional	  attention,	  which	  




public	   attention.)	   This	   was	   a	   period	   of	   controversy	   over	   airbag	   safety	   for	  
children,	  and	  outsiders	  might	  have	  been	  reacting	  to	  pressures	  for	  safer	  airbags.	  
• To	  test	  the	  notion	  that	  an	  innovation	  race	  started	  after	  1984,	  I	  also	  carried	  out	  a	  
correlation	   analysis	   for	   the	   period	   [1985-­‐2000]:	   Indeed,	   the	   analysis	   shows	   a	  
significant	   and	  mid-­‐strong	   (0.7795)	   correlation	   between	   Big	   Three	   patenting	  
and	  outsiders	  patenting.112	  
Even	  though	  I	  am	  using	  Spearman’s	  rho,	  which	  is	  a	  more	  powerful	  correlation	  test	  
for	   small	   samples,	   many	   sub-­‐periods	   are	   very	   short	   (few	   observations),	   so	   the	  
correlation	  analysis	  revealed	  problematic	  and	  these	  findings	  should	  be	  treated	  with	  
extreme	   care	   (i.e.,	   not	   definitive).	   Yet,	   the	   basic	   correlations	   suggest	   some	  
interesting	  patterns,	  some	  of	  which	  resonate	  reasonably	  well	  with	  the	  DILC-­‐model:	  
(a)	   public	   attention	   appears	   reactive	   to	   the	   objective	   side	   of	   the	   issue	   in	   early	  
periods	  (which	  indicates	  phases	  1	  and	  2),	  but	  later	  tends	  to	  correlate	  with	  political	  
and	   regulatory	   attention	   (phase	   3	   and	   4);	   (b)	   some	   political	   attention	   is	   also	  
attracted	  to	  the	  objective	  side	  of	  the	  issue	  in	  early	  periods	  (phase	  2);	  (c)	  outsider’s	  
seem	  to	  react	  first	  to	  the	  prospects	  and	  the	  actual	  enactment	  of	  substantive	  pieces	  
of	  legislation	  (phases	  3	  and	  4);	  and	  (d)	  innovation	  race	  takes	  place	  towards	  the	  end	  
of	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	   when	   the	   issue	   is	   spilling	   over	   to	   the	   task	   environment	  	  
(phases	  4	  and	  	  5).	  	  
However,	   the	   analysis	   also	   showed	   incumbents	   reacting	   to	   the	   issue	   in	  
terms	  of	  technological	  development	  maybe	  earlier	  than	  expected	  (1946-­‐1955),	  given	  
that	   the	   issue	   was	   interrupted	   by	   WWII.	   This	   is	   a	   puzzle	   to	   be	   analysed	  
qualitatively.	   More	   importantly,	   the	   correlation	   analysis	   did	   not	   capture	  
associations	  during	  some	  of	  the	  periods	  (in	  section	  VI.6	  I	  will	  critically	  evaluate	  the	  
method).	   These	   insights	   should	   not	   be	   treated	   as	   definitive:	   to	   qualitatively	  
investigate	  patterns	  and	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  car-­‐safety	  issue	  life-­‐cycle,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  
an	  in-­‐depth	  narrative-­‐based	  case	  study.	  
VI.4. QUALITATIVE	  APPROACH:	  IN-­‐DEPTH	  NARRATIVE	  
Following	  the	  case	  study	  protocol,	   for	  each	  period	  I	  describe:	  (1)	  problem-­‐related	  
pressures	   (from	   activists;	   social	   movements;	   public	   opinion;	   policy-­‐makers;	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  Outsiders’	  patenting	  is	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  both	  public	  and	  regulatory	  attention	  (0.8800	  




suppliers;	  competitors;	  regime	  outsiders	  etc.);	  (2)	  response	  strategies	  from	  firms	  in	  
the	  American	  car	   industry;	  and	  (3)	  broader	  developments	   in	   task	  or	   institutional	  
environments	   that	   (positively	   or	   negatively)	   influenced	   car-­‐safety	   life-­‐cycle	  
dynamics	   or	   industry	   strategies.	   Because	   this	   is	   a	   rather	   long	   case,	   to	   guide	   the	  
reader,	   I	   introduce	   some	   analytical	   notion	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   each	   period,	  
anticipating	  matches	  and	  deviations	  with	  phases	  from	  the	  DILC-­‐model.	  
VI.4.1. Issue	  emergence	  and	  sense-­‐making	  (1900-­‐1924)	  
The	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  car	  numbers	  (from	  8,000	  in	  1900	  to	  23	  million	  in	  1930)	  was	  
accompanied	   by	   rising	   fatalities,	   from	   36	   in	   1900,	   1,599	   in	   1910,	   to	   12,155	   in	   1920	  
(Figure	  VI.1).	  Public	  concerns	  led	  to	  sense-­‐making	  activities	  –	  the	  main	  process	  at	  
work	  in	  the	  period,	  which	  fits	  well	  with	  phase	  1	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model.	  The	  3E-­‐framing	  
became	   the	   dominant	   problem	   definition,	   emphasizing	   driver	   Education,	   law	  
Enforcement,	  and	  road	  Engineering.	  The	  empirical	  period	  deviates	  in	  some	  respects	  
from	   phase	   1:	   (a)	   there	   was	   no	   indication	   of	   a	   framing	   struggle	   through	   denial	  
strategies,	  because	  (b)	  the	  industry	  accepted	  the	  3E-­‐approach,	  which	  posed	  no	  real	  
threat	  to	  its	  identity.	  The	  transition	  to	  the	  next	  period	  entailed	  the	  formation	  of	  an	  
organized	   safety	  movement,	   but	   around	   a	   particular	   framing	   that	   did	   not	  make	  
automakers	  accountable	  for	  the	  issue.	  
VI.4.1.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Social	  movements	  and	  public	  opinion.	  Car	  accidents	  (Figure	  VI.4)	  were	  commonly	  
featured	   in	   local	   news	   sections	   of	   newspapers,	   which,	   together	   with	   influential	  
periodicals	   (Scientific	   American,	   American	   Agriculturist)	   raised	   auto-­‐safety	   as	   a	  
public	   issue,	   expressing	   concerns	   about	   careless	   driving	   and	   speeding	   (Eastman,	  
1984).	   The	   National	   Safety	   Council	   (NSC),	   created	   in	   1913,	   included	   highway	  
accidents	   in	   its	   remit	   a	   couple	   of	   years	   later	   (NSC,	   1995).	   Because	   the	   criticisms	  
threatened	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   cars,	   automobile	   clubs	   lobbied	   policy-­‐makers	   for	  




Figure	  VI.4:	  Accident	  on	  a	  winter	  day	  in	  Washington,	  D.C.,	  circa	  1920	  (despite	  material	  
damage	  –	  to	  the	  vehicle,	  a	  mailbox,	  an	  emergency	  call	  box	  and	  a	  lamppost	  –	  no	  human	  
casualty	  was	  registered)	  
	  
	  Source:	  National	  Photo	  Co.,	  available	  at	  http://www.shorpy.com/node/6957,	  downloaded	  on:	  Jan.	  31st,	  2011	  
Policy-­‐makers.	  Public	  authorities	  introduced	  various	  regulations	  to	  embed	  the	  car	  
in	   society	   (Geels,	   2005).	  Car	   registration	   and	   car	   tags	   facilitated	   identification	   in	  
case	   of	   accidents.	   States	   established	   driver’s	   licenses,	   speed	   limits,	   and	   traffic	  
police.	   But	   regulations	   were	   not	   uniform	   and	   often	   symbolic	   (Rao,	   2004).	   Road	  
expansion	  programmes	   led	  engineers	   to	   focus	  on	   the	   influence	  of	   road	  design	   in	  
accidents.	  In	  1915,	  a	  safety	  activist	  (Julian	  Harvey)	  coined	  the	  ‘triple	  E’	  (3E)	  slogan	  
that	   came	   to	   dominate	   the	   public	   framing	   of	   road	   and	   auto	   safety	   (MacLennan,	  
1988).	   This	   3E-­‐framing	   became	   “almost	   universally	   held	   by	   the	   public,	   private	  
safety	  organizations	  and	  government”	  (Eastman,	  1984,	  p.	  127).	  The	  framing	  was	  in	  
fact	  a	  result	  of	  common	  sense:	  because	  the	  car	  was	  an	  inanimate	  object,	  the	  blame	  
for	   causing	   an	   accident	   was	   on	   the	   driver.113	  Moreover,	   the	   word	   ‘accident’	   also	  
implied	  it	  was	  a	  chance	  occurrence.	  The	  technical	  design	  of	  cars	  was	  not	  included	  
in	  this	  early	  problem	  framing,	  which	  thus	  posed	  no	  threat	  to	  the	  shared	  industry	  
identity.	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  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  gun	  lobby	  claim	  and	  framing	  that	  ‘guns	  do	  not	  kill	  people;	  people	  kill	  




VI.4.1.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  	  
Socio-­‐cultural	  and	  political	  strategies.	  Because	  the	  car	  industry	  was	  interested	  in	  a	  
safe	   environment	   for	   cars,	   it	   created	   the	   Safety	   First	   Committee	   (1916),	   which	  
became	  the	  Traffic	  Planning	  and	  Safety	  Committee	  in	  the	  early	  1920s	  (Luger,	  2000).	  
This	  committee	  supported	  the	  3E-­‐framing,	  arguing	  that	  people	  –	  not	  cars	  –	  caused	  
accidents.	   Because	   accidents	   were	   ‘abnormal	   events’,	   they	   saw	   no	   obligation	   to	  
design	   cars	   for	   this	   ‘unlikely	   circumstance’	   (Eastman,	   1984).	   Trade	   journals	  
emphasized	   driver’s	   responsibility	   for	   accidents,	   using	   metaphors	   such	   as	   ‘the	  
reckless	  driver’	  or	  ‘the	  nut	  behind	  the	  wheel’	  (Nader,	  1965),	  terms	  also	  adopted	  by	  
the	  mass	  media	  (Figure	  VI.3).	  The	  committee	  therefore	  only	  supported	  educational	  
efforts	   (including	   to	   children,	   ‘drivers	   of	   the	   future’)	   and	   information	   campaigns	  
based	   on	   slogans.	   So,	   the	   main	   type	   of	   industry	   response	   was	   through	   public	  
relations	   strategies.	   Safety	   was	   mainly	   absent	   from	   marketing	   strategies	  
(Stevenson,	  2008).	  
VI.4.1.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
Car-­‐related	  fatalities	  were	  not	  high	  on	  the	  agenda,	  because	  the	  emerging	  industry	  
faced	  many	  other	  pressures	   (Geels,	   2005),	   e.g.	   industry	   shake-­‐out	   and	   cut-­‐throat	  
competition;	  the	  creation	  of	  dealer	  networks	  and	  supply	  chains	  for	  raw	  materials	  
and	  components;	  product	   and	  process	   innovation	   (e.g.	  development	  of	   assembly	  
lines	  and	  mass	  production	  methods).	  Exits,	  mergers	  and	  take-­‐overs	  resulted	  in	  an	  
oligopoly,	  with	  the	  ‘Big	  Three’	  (Ford,	  General	  Motors	  and	  Chrysler)	  accounting	  for	  
over	  80%	  of	  the	  industry’s	  output	  in	  1930.	  
VI.4.2. Increasing	  public	  concerns,	  policy	  interest,	  and	  closed	  industry	  front	  
(1924-­‐1942)	  
The	   key	   processes	   in	   this	   period	   fit	   well	   with	   phase	   2	   from	   the	   DILC-­‐model:	  
(a)	   increasing	   public	   attention	   to	   auto-­‐safety,	   which	   however	   only	   led	   to	  
(b)	   symbolic	   policy	   action;	   the	   1924	  National	   Conference	   on	   Street	   and	   Highway	  
Safety	   was	   “the	   first	   official	   [Federal]	   government	   acknowledgement	   that	  motor	  
vehicles	   presented	   safety	   problems”	   (Luger,	   2000,	   p.	   56);	   (c)	   incremental	  
innovations	   (accident-­‐avoidance	   technologies)	   and	   political	   strategies:	   the	   car	  
industry	  set	  up	  a	  front	  organization,	  the	  Automobile	  Safety	  Foundation	  (ASF),	  and	  




automobile	  design.	  This	   period	   also	  deviated	   in	   some	   respects	   from	  phase	   2:	   (a)	  
social	   movements	   did	   not	   dramatize	   new	   scientific	   findings;	   instead,	   outside	  
professionals	  (engineers,	  physicians)	  raised	  concerns	  about	  the	  ignored	  role	  of	  car	  
design,	   which	   however	   (b)	   did	   not	   lead	   to	   a	   public	   framing	   struggle’;	   (c)	   tyre	  
manufactures	  exerted	   symbolic	  pressure	   in	   the	   task	  environment;	   and	   (d)	  public	  
and	  political	  attention	  declined	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1930s	  (due	  to	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  
as	  military	  preparations	  increased).	  The	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  came	  to	  a	  halt	  with	  the	  US	  
entering	  WWII.	  
VI.4.2.1. 	  Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Social	   movements	   and	   public	   opinion.	   Public	   attention	   peaked	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1920s,	  
following	  national	  conferences	  in	  1924	  and	  1926,	  and	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1930s,	  following	  a	  
1935	   article	   in	  Reader’s	  Digest	   (“…	  and	   sudden	  death”),	  which	   caused	  a	   “jump	   in	  
public	   concern	   for	   the	   problem	   of	   vehicle	   safety”	   (Luger,	   2000,	   p.	   56).	   Reader’s	  
Digest	   received	   3.5	   million	   reprint	   orders	   by	   individuals,	   businesses,	   police	  
departments,	   and	   traffic	   courts;	   by	   January	   1936	   an	   estimated	   35	   million	   article	  
copies	  had	  been	  printed	   (Eastman,	   1984).	  The	   article	  not	   only	  drew	  attention	   to	  
rising	   fatalities,	   but	   also	   vividly	   described	   how	   e.g.	   knobs	   and	   sharp	   edges	   in	  
dashboards	  caused	  serious	  injuries	  in	  car	  accidents	  (Figure	  VI.5).	  But	  –	  echoing	  the	  




Figure	  VI.5:	  Graphic	  illustrations	  of	  the	  1935	  Reader’s	  Digest	  article	  by	  Herblock114	  
	  
	  Source:	  Johnson	  and	  Katz,	  2009	  
Science.	  But	  not	  everyone	  accepted	  the	  3E-­‐framing.	  Some	  professionals	  advanced	  a	  
different	  understanding,	  drawing	  attention	   to	   technical	   car	  designs.	  Dr.	  Claire	  L.	  
Straith,	   a	   plastic	   surgeon	   who	   witnessed	   the	   trauma	   from	   car	   accidents	   in	   her	  
clinic,	   urged	   industry	   officials	   to	   redesign	   cars	   to	   minimize	   injuries	   in	   case	   of	  
crashes	  (Eastman,	  1981).	  Hugh	  DeHaven,	  an	  independent	  automotive	  engineer	  who	  
pioneered	  crash-­‐injury	   research	  and	  crash-­‐survival	   engineering	   (Hasbrook,	   1956),	  
linked	   car	   features	   –	   windshield	   structures,	   instrument	   panels,	   etc.	   –	   to	   specific	  
injuries.	  He	   therefore	  called	   for	  changes	   in	   the	   ‘structural	  environment’	   (internal	  
design)	   of	   automobiles.	   An	   editorial	   in	   Scientific	   American	   (1937,	   p.	   216,	   apud	  
Eastman,	   1984)	   also	   suggested	   that	   automobile	   designers	   should	   go	   “as	   far	   as	  
possible	   in	   making	   the	   whole	   interior	   of	   a	   motor	   car	   a	   safety	   interior”.	   This	  
alternative	   scientific	   understanding	   of	   auto-­‐safety	   was	   largely	   ignored	   by	  
established	  safety	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  NSC,	  whose	  3E-­‐framing	  excluded	  car	  design	  
as	  a	  contributing	  factor	  (Weingroff	  and	  Seabron,	  2003).	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  Before	  WWII,	  Herblock	  worked	  for	  the	  Newspaper	  Enterprise	  Association,	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syndicated	  cartoons	  that	  were	  published	  across	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  after	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  where	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  served	  during	  




Policy-­‐makers.	   The	   federal	   government	   organized	   national	   safety	   conferences	   in	  
1924	   and	   1926,	   which	   were	   attended	   by	   many	   stakeholders	   (MacLennan,	   1988).	  
While	  expressing	  concern	  with	  the	  issue115,	  the	  government	  left	  safety	  legislation	  to	  
state	  and	   local	  governments	   (Eastman,	   1984),	  and	  embraced	  the	  3E-­‐framing.	  The	  
conferences	   paid	   some	   attention	   to	   safety	   features	   that	   could	   help	   the	   driver	   to	  
avoid	   accidents	   (brakes,	   steering	   gears,	   lighting,	   horns),	   but	   otherwise	   embraced	  
the	   3E-­‐framing	   and	   called	   for	   education,	   enforcement	   and	   better	   roads	  
(MacLennan,	  1988).	  	  
In	  the	  late	  1930s,	  some	  changes	  appeared	  in	  the	  government’s	  position.	  The	  
1936	   conference,	   organized	   by	   President	   Roosevelt,	   deviated	   somewhat	   from	   the	  
3E-­‐framing	  in	  its	  emphasis	  on	  technical	  design	  changes:	  “engineering	  –	  a	  change	  in	  
the	  power	  and	  design	  of	  cars	  to	  protect	  the	  reckless	  motorist	  against	  his	  own	  folly	  –	  
appears	  to	  hold	  out	  the	  only	  possible	  hope	  of	  solution”	  (quoted	  in	  Eastman,	  1984,	  
p.	  145).	  The	  final	  report	  also	  hoped	  that	  carmakers	  would	  make	  changes	  voluntarily	  
rather	  than	  wait	  for	  mandated	  design	  standards	  (O’Connell	  &	  Myers,	  1966).	  Thus,	  
no	  substantive	  policy	  outcome	  resulted	  from	  the	  conference.	  
Regime	  outsiders.	  While	  incumbents	  largely	  ignored	  car	  safety	  in	  positioning	  their	  
products,	  tyre	  manufacturers,	  which	  were	  relatively	  invisible	  industry	  players	  (i.e.	  
regime	  outsiders),	   adopted	  a	  more	  aggressive	  approach,	  because	   they	   saw	  public	  
concerns	  as	  an	  opportunity	  for	  selling	  safer	  (and	  more	  expensive)	  tires.	  Goodyear,	  
for	   instance,	   used	   ‘shocking’	   ads	   to	   convince	   costumers	   to	   buy	   ‘Lifeguard	   Tires’	  
(Figure	   VI.6).	   Also	  General	   Tires	   promoted	   its	   product	   with	   reference	   to	   safety	  
(Stevenson,	  2008).	  This	  kind	  of	  ‘symbolic	  pressure’	  by	  weak	  players	  was	  not	  enough	  
to	  nudge	  automakers	  into	  similarly	  aggressive	  marketing	  approach	  (see	  below).	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Figure	  VI.6	  (a-­‐b,	  left-­‐right):	  ‘Shocking’	  Goodyear	  ads	  to	  sell	  ‘lifeguard’	  tires	  
	   	  
Source:	   Life	   megazine,	   several	   editions	   from	   the	   1930s,	   available	   at:	  
http://books.google.com/books?id=VFEEAAAAMBAJ,	  accessed	  on	  Dec.	  1st,	  2010	  
VI.4.2.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  	  
Socio-­‐cultural	   and	   political	   strategies.	  Automakers	   created	   the	  Automobile	   Safety	  
Foundation	   (ASF),	   which	   “took	   the	   lead	   in	   directing	   the	   issue	   of	   traffic	   safety,	  
ensuring	  that	  the	  industry’s	  interests	  would	  be	  protected”	  (Luger,	  2000,	  p.	  58).	  The	  
ASF	   offered	   grants	   for	   the	   training	   of	   policemen	   and	   traffic	   engineers,	   and	   for	  
assisting	   existing	   safety	   organizations	   in	   their	   education	   campaigns	   (Eastman,	  
1984).	   The	   ASF	   advanced	   the	   3E-­‐framing	   through	   a	   seven-­‐point	   programme	  
focused	   on	   Legislation,	  Motor	   Vehicle	   Administration,	   Enforcement,	   Engineering,	  
Education,	  Technical	  Personnel	  Training,	  and	  Research,	  which	  was	  amply	  promoted	  
in	  mass	  media	   (Eastman,	   1984).	   Through	   a	   continuation	   of	   the	   public	   relations	  
approach	   based	   on	   slogans	   (Weingroff	   and	   Seabron,	   2003),	   the	   ASF	   “deflected	  
attention	  away	  from	  the	  dangerous	  characteristics	  of	  cars	  and	  trucks	  manufactured	  
by	  the	  auto	  industry”	  (Farber,	  2002,	  p.	  182).	  	  
Technological	   innovation	   and	   positioning	   strategy.	   Safety	   glass	   was	   introduced	  
because	   consumers	   worried	   about	   razor-­‐edged	   glass	   pieces	   in	   case	   of	   accidents	  
(Farber,	   2002).	   GM	   mainly	   implemented	   ‘safety	   features’	   which	   helped	   avoid	  
accidents	  or	  improved	  the	  cars	  structure	  (e.g.	  hydraulic	  brakes,	  all-­‐steel	  bodies)	  (cf.	  




promoting	   means’,	   not	   specifically	   for	   car-­‐occupant	   protection,	   which	   seems	   to	  
reflect	  the	  dominant	  framing	  of	  the	  early	  decades	  indicated	  in	  Figure	  VI.3).	  
While	   advertisements	   mentioned	   these	   design	   features,	   these	   were	  
promoted	   “as	   a	   facet	   of	   generally	   improved	   design”	   (Stevenson,	   2008,	   p.	   189).	  
Crashes	  or	  accidents	  were	  not	  mentioned,	  because	  automakers	  did	  not	  want	  to	  link	  
cars	  to	  negative	  images	  that	  could	  scare	  consumers.	  The	  industry	  believed	  that	  the	  
explicitly	  promotion	  of	  safety	  features	  would	  imply	  that	  “their	  absence	  would	  lead	  
to	  illness,	  injury,	  or	  the	  death	  of	  the	  consumer’s	  family”	  (Stevenson,	  2008,	  p.	  191).	  
Chrysler	   however	   deviated	   from	   the	  mainstream	   framing	   of	   the	   problem,	  
because	   it	   was	   directly	   influenced	   (lobbied)	   by	  Dr.	   Straith,	  who	   visited	   Chrysler	  
production	  facilities	  in	  Detroit	  (Eastman,	  1984).	  It	  thus	  developed	  some	  occupant-­‐
production	  features,	  such	  as	  instrument	  panel	  controls	  that	  were	  set	  flush	  with	  the	  
surface;	   protruding	   knobs	   were	   removed;	   door	   handles	   were	   smoothed	   and	  
rounded;	  and	  the	  top	  of	  front-­‐seat	  backs	  were	  tufted	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  rear	  seat	  
passengers	  (idem).	  Again,	  these	  were	  not	  explicitly	  promoted	  as	  safety	  features	  but	  
as	  general	  improvements	  of	  a	  new	  model	  year.	  	  
VI.4.2.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
To	   cope	   with	   an	   increasingly	   saturated	   market,	   automakers’	   attention	   shifted	  
towards	   styling	   and	  marketing	  practices	   associated	  with	  Sloanism:	   annual	  model	  
changes	   and	   planned	   obsolescence;	   consumption	   ladder;	   and	   consumer	   credit.	  
While	  the	  first	  principle	  could	  be	  based	  in	  new	  generations	  of	  technologies,	  in	  fact	  
it	  resulted	  in	  non-­‐functional	  changes:	  
The	  use	  of	   technological	   innovation	  as	  a	  basis	   for	   yearly	  new	  models	  was	  
rarely	  considered	  by	  General	  Motors	  or	  any	  other	  manufacturer	  –	  research	  
was	  expensive,	  risky,	  unpredictable	  and	  not	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  the	  industry;	  
furthermore,	   technical	  developments	  were	  often	  difficult	   for	   the	  consumer	  
to	  appreciate.	  The	  use	  of	  restyling,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  could	  easily	  be	  made	  
to	  conform	  to	  a	  yearly	  cycle	  and	  a	  precise	  budget,	  and	  the	  modifications	  to	  
be	  made	  in	  the	  product	  could	  be	  selected	  on	  a	  basis	  of	  their	  adaptibility	  to	  
advertising.	  (Eastman,	  1984,	  p.	  23)	  
The	  obsession	  with	   annual	  model	   changes	   resulted	   in	   implementation	  of	   styling	  
innovations	  that	  negatively	  influenced	  safety	  (Nader,	  1965).	  Windshield	  designs,	  for	  
instance,	  were	  built	  with	  increasingly	  sharper	  angles	  (‘V-­‐type	  windshields’)	   in	  the	  
1930s	   (Figure	  VI.7),	  which	  negatively	   influenced	  driver’s	   visibility	  with	   distortion	  




visibility	  problems,	  because	  the	  front	  fender	  was	  outside	  the	  driver’s	  camp	  of	  vision	  
(Nader,	  1965;	  Eastman,	  1984).	  
Figure	  VI.7:	  V-­‐type	  windshield,	  such	  as	  in	  this	  luxurious	  1934	  Packard	  Twelve	  Runabout	  
Speedster,	  could	  distort	  driver’s	  vision	  	  
	  
Source:	  Atlanta	  High	  Museum	  of	  Art,	  The	  Allure	  of	  the	  Automobile	  exhibition	  
Consumers	  were	  interested	  in	  fashionable,	  fast,	  large	  and	  powerful	  cars,	  which	  led	  
the	   industry	   to	   focus	   on	   high	   performance	   and	   speed.	   In	   the	   late	   1920s,	   the	  
industry’s	  advertising	  practices	  received	  some	  criticisms	  because	  they	  encouraged	  
speeding	   (Stevenson,	   2008),	   and	   thus	   contradicted	   driver	   education	   efforts.	  
Automakers	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  not	  their	  fault	  that	  cars	  were	  driven	  too	  fast.	  They	  
also	  claimed	  that	  cars	  that	  could	  be	  driven	  at	  100MPH	  were	  so	  well	  built	  that	  they	  
would	  be	  exceptionally	   safe	  at	  ordinary	  speeds	  and	  help	  drivers	  escape	  accidents	  
(Eastman,	   1984).	   Consumers	   exerted	   no	   demand	   for	   safety-­‐related	   technical	  
features,	  which	  is	  why	  firms	  paid	  limited	  attention	  to	  it	  (Gartman,	  1994).	  
VI.4.3. Interruption	  by	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  (1942-­‐1946)	  
The	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   was	   interrupted	   by	   the	   Second	   World	   War,	   which	   greatly	  
diminished	  social	  and	  political	  pressures	  regarding	  car	  safety.	  War	  policies	  stopped	  
civilian	  car	  production	  and	  restricted	  car	  driving	  through	  the	  rationing	  of	  gas	  and	  
tires	  (Yates,	  1983).	  To	  save	  fuel	  and	  rubber,	  a	  maximum	  ‘Victory	  Speed’	  was	  set	  at	  
35	  MPH.	  There	  was	  a	  marked	  decline	  in	  highway	  fatalities	  (Figure	  VI.1).	  In	  fact,	  all	  
attention	   indicators	   (Figure	   VI.2)	   declined	   during	   the	   war.	   In	   addition,	   the	   car	  




The	  car	   industry	  came	  to	  be	  seen	  as	   the	  “keystone	  of	   the	  Arsenal	  of	  Democracy”	  
(Frazier,	   1942).	   The	   war	   effort	   consolidated	   Detroit’s	   legitimacy	   and	   reputation	  
before	  politicians	  and	  public	  opinion.	  
VI.4.4. The	  High-­‐point	  of	  the	  safety	  establishment	  and	  of	  the	  3-­‐E	  framing	  
(1946-­‐1955)	  
In	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  decade,	  highway	  casualties	  rapidly	   increased	  to	  pre-­‐War	  levels	  
(Figure	  VI.1).	  	  While	  public	  attention	  remained	  lower	  than	  in	  the	  1920s-­‐30s,	  policy-­‐
makers	  and	  the	  established	  highway	  safety	  movement,	  which	  was	  ‘captured’	  by	  the	  
car	  industry	  through	  the	  ASF	  (Nader,	  1965;	  Eastman,	  1984;	  Weingroff	  and	  Seabron,	  
2003),	   continued	   to	   advocate	   the	   3E-­‐approach	   to	   auto-­‐safety	   in	   response	   to	   the	  
issue.	  But	  this	  approach	  was	  criticized	  by	  two	  professional	  communities:	  (1)	  crash-­‐
injury	   researchers	   and	   crashworthiness	   engineers;	   and	   (2)	   the	   medical	  
establishment.	  Both	  communities	  articulated	  an	  alternative	  problem	  framing	  that	  
focused	   on	   car	   designs	   that	   limited	   injuries	   (in	   addition	   to	   the	   prevention	   of	  
accidents).	  The	  articulation	  of	  a	  (new)	  problem	  framing	  by	  activists	   indicates	  the	  
issue	   life-­‐cycle	   restarted	   at	   phase	   1.	   However,	   the	   period	   contains	   an	   important	  
element	   of	   phase	   2:	   a	   framing	   struggle,	   because	   the	   industry	   had	   already	  
established	  an	  IOR,	  the	  Automobile	  Safety	  Foundation,	  which	  closed	  the	  industry-­‐
front	  around	  a	   framing	  that	  maintained	  the	  status	   quo.	  The	  period	  also	  contains	  
elements	  from	  phase	  3:	  (a)	  small	  firms	  (Tucker,	  Kaiser-­‐Frazer)	  tried	  to	  open	  up	  the	  
industry-­‐front	   by	   publicly	   promoting	   safety	   innovations,	   which	   (b)	   resulted	   in	  
defensive	  hedging	  by	  automakers	  (who	  established	  safety	  departments	  to	  monitor	  
crash-­‐injury	  research).	  And	  elements	  from	  phase	  4:	  direct	   involvement	  of	  macro-­‐
level	  politicians	   (the	  President,).	  Overall,	   this	  appears	  a	  mixed	  period,	  but	  better	  
characterized	  as	  phase	  2116,	  due	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  framing	  struggle.	  
VI.4.4.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Public	   opinion	   and	   science.	   Public	   attention	   to	   auto-­‐safety	   was	   relatively	   low	  
(Figure	  VI.2.a).	  Pressure	  came	  primarily	   from	  two	  professional	  communities.	  The	  
new	  field	  of	  “crash-­‐survival	  design	  engineering”	  (Hasbrook,	  1956)	  investigated	  the	  
influence	   of	   car	   design	   features.	   The	  Auto	   Crash	   Injury	   Research	   (ACIR)	   project	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





(1948),	   coordinated	   by	   Hugh	   DeHaven	   in	   partnership	   with	   the	   Indiana	   Police	  
Force,	   showed	  that	  opening	  doors,	  windshield	  structures,	  dashboard	  designs	  and	  
steering	  systems	  caused	  many	  injuries	  and	  deaths	  (MacLennan,	  1988).	  Air	  Force117	  
Colonel	  Stapp	  started	  experimental	  crash	  research	  (using	  anesthetized	  animals	  or	  
human	   volunteers	   in	   crash	   experiments)	   to	   further	   investigate	   relationships	  
between	  design	  features	  and	  types	  of	  injury	  (Eastman,	  1981).	  “In	  effect,	  [...]	  a	  new	  
engineering	   field	   has	   been	   created,	   namely	   that	   of	   crash-­‐survival	   design	  
engineering”	  (Hasbrook,	  1956,	  p.	  273).	  
While	  the	  engineering	  community	  contributed	  with	  scientific	  findings,	  the	  
medical	  profession	  was	  the	  strongest	  group	  engaged	  in	  attention	  advocacy,	  actively	  
promoting	  the	  associated	  technical	  framing	  to	  address	  car	  safety.	  In	  the	  late	  1940s,	  
medical	   doctors	   (Straith,	   Fletcher,	   Sheldon)	   also	   began	   advocating	   design	  
modifications	   to	  minimize	   injuries	   in	   case	  of	   crashes	   (Eastman,	   1981).	   Some,	   like	  
Dr.	  Straith,	  continued	  to	  directly	  lobby	  automakers.	  They	  suggested	  removal	  of	  all	  
knobs,	   cranks,	   drop-­‐down	   ash	   trays	   and	   sharp	   edges	   from	   dashboards;	   that	   the	  
steering	  column	  be	  ‘collapsible’	  (instead	  of	  rigid);	  that	  the	  windshield	  be	  hinged	  so	  
that	   it	   is	   forced	   outward	   before	   breaking;	   installation	   of	   seatbelts	   as	   standard	  
equipment,	   like	   they	   were	   in	   aircrafts	   (Eastman,	   1984).	   By	   the	   mid-­‐1950s,	   the	  
American	  Medical	  Association	  and	  the	  American	  College	  of	  Surgeons	  began	  issuing	  
official	  resolutions	  urging	  car	  manufacturers	  to	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  automobile	  
safety	  (Luger,	  2000).	  
Policy-­‐makers.	  Auto-­‐safety	  received	  high-­‐level	  political	  attention	  at	  the	  President’s	  
Highway	   Safety	   Conferences	   in	   1946,	   1949	   and	   1951.	   These	   conferences	   were	  
dominated	   by	   automakers,	   traditional	   safety	   organizations	   (NSC,	   ASF),	   and	  
highway	  and	  traffic	  engineers	  (Weingroff	  and	  Seabron,	  2003),	  and	  reflected	  the	  3E-­‐
framing	   emphasis	   on	   education,	   enforcement	   and	   engineering.	   Concerns	   about	  
rising	   fatalities	  also	   led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	   the	  President’s	  Action	  Committee	  
on	  Traffic	  Safety	  (1954).	  Although	  many	  groups	  (labour,	  media,	  rural	  associations,	  
insurance	  industry,	  safety	  organizations,	  women’s	  groups,	  public	  officials)	  became	  
members,	  the	  committee	  was	  dominated	  by	  the	  car	  industry,	  which	  appointed	  and	  
paid	  the	  executive	  director	  (Luger,	  2000).	  This	  committee	  institutionalized	  the	  3E-­‐
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framing	  at	  the	  highest	  political	  level	  and	  “symbolized	  the	  high	  point	  of	  the	  status	  
and	   significance	   of	   the	   safety	   establishment	   and	   of	   the	   automobile	   industry	  
influence	  on	  the	  highway	  safety	  movement”	  (Eastman,	  1984,	  p.	  147).	  
New	  entrants	  and	  regime	  outsiders.	  Pressure	  in	  the	  task	  environment	  was	  exerted	  
by	  (a)	  two	  new	  entrants,	  who	  were	  influenced	  by	  the	  call	  for	  safer	  automobiles	  by	  
the	   professional	   communities,	   and	   (b)	   an	   industry	   regime	   outsider	   from	   the	  
insurance	  industry.	  
a) In	   the	   late	   1940s,	   Tucker	   Corporation,	   which	   embraced	   safety	   in	   its	  mission	  
(Figure	  VI.8.a),	  produced	  a	  car	  (the	  1948	  ‘Tucker	  Torpedo’)	  with	  safety-­‐oriented	  
design	  features.	  After	  a	  visit	  of	  Dr.	  Straith,	  the	  engineering	  team	  redesigned	  the	  
door	   handles	   (to	   prevent	   opening	   in	   case	   of	   crashes)	   and	   the	   locations	   of	  
control	   knobs	   (installed	   beneath	   the	   steering	   wheel),	   and	   added	   ‘sponge-­‐
rubber’	   crash	  padding	   to	   the	   entire	   circumference	  of	   the	   interior	   and	  behind	  
front	   seats	   (Popular	  Mechanics,	   1947).	   They	   also	  made	   the	   rear-­‐view	  mirrors	  
safer	  by	  using	  silver-­‐plated	  ‘flexiglass’,	  and	  mounted	  the	  safety-­‐glass	  windshield	  
so	   that	   it	   would	   break	   away	   under	   a	   100	   pounds	   per	   square	   inch	   pressure	  
(Eastman,	   1984).	   In	   the	   early	   1950s,	   Kaiser-­‐Frazer	   claimed	   to	   have	   developed	  
the	   ‘World’s	   First	   Safety-­‐First	   Car’,	   which	   incorporated	   a	   crash-­‐pad	   that	  
extended	   throughout	   the	   instrument	  panel,	   recessed	   instruments,	  and	  a	  pop-­‐
out	   windshield	   (Stevenson,	   2008).	   In	   advertisements,	   Kaiser	   claimed	   its	   cars	  
had	  ‘the	  world’s	  safest	  front	  seat’	  (Figure	  VI.8.b).	  




Figure	  VI.8	  (a-­‐b,	  left-­‐right):	  Tucker’s	  logo	  and	  Kaiser’s	  1952MY	  advertisement	  	  
	   	  
Source:	  Tucker’s	  advertisement	  published	  in	  Life,	  vol.	  24	  (8),	  Mar	  1,	  1948,	  p.	  63;	  and	  Old	  Car	  Advertisements,	  
available	  at:	  http://www.oldcarads.ca/Kaiser-­‐Frazer%20Ads/dirindex.html;	  downloaded	  on	  Dec.	  6,	  2010	  
Both	  companies	  actively	  advertised	  the	  safety	  features,	  which	  stimulated	  public	  
attention,	   particularly	   from	   specialized	   publications	   such	   as	   Popular	   Science	  
and	  Popular	  Mechanics.	   In	  the	  words	  of	  Popular	  Mechanics	  (1947,	  p.	   137),	   the	  
1948	  Tucker	  Torpedo	  was	  a	  “convention-­‐defying	  car”	  that	  would	  “revolutionize	  
the	   automobile	   industry”.	   However,	   the	   task	   environment	   pressure	   soon	  
subsided	   and	   the	   impact	   of	   these	   positioning,	   innovation	   and	   advertising	  
strategies	   was	   limited	   (Stevenson,	   2008):	   Tucker	   went	   bankrupt	   before	  mass	  
producing	   the	   Torpedo,	   while	   Kaiser-­‐Frazer	   never	   conquered	   much	   market	  
share	  and	  in	  1953	  was	  acquired	  by	  Willys-­‐Overland	  (Flink,	  1990).	  
b) In	   1951,	   Liberty	   Mutual	   Insurance	   Company	   of	   Boston	   contracted	   Cornell	  
Aeronautical	   Laboratory	   (connected	   to	   Cornell	   University)	   “to	   undertake	   a	  
study	   of	   how	   passengers	   moved	   within	   an	   automobile	   in	   a	   crash	   and	   the	  
probability	   of	   their	   hitting	   objects	   within	   the	   vehicle	   which	   could	   cause	   an	  
injury”	   (Eastman,	   1981,	   p.	   418).	   This	   initiative	   was	   significant,	   given	   that	   the	  
insurance	   industry 118 	  was	   an	   historical	   supporter	   of	   the	   highway	   safety	  
establishment	  and	  its	  3E-­‐approach	  to	  the	  auto	  accident	  problem.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




VI.4.4.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  	  
Socio-­‐cultural	   and	   political	   strategies.	  The	  car	   industry	   supported	   the	  3E-­‐framing	  
through	   the	   ASF	   and	   the	   NSC,	   which	   functioned	   as	   an	   “arm	   of	   the	   industry”	  
(Luger,	  2000,	  p.	  58).	  The	  3E-­‐framing	  protected	  industry	   interests,	  because	   it	  kept	  
car	   design	   off	   the	   agenda.	   Automakers	   also	   shaped	   the	   political	   (safety)	   agenda	  
through	   lobbying	   and	   public	   relations:	   direct	   conversation	   with	   the	   President,	  
through	  membership	  of	  the	  President’s	  Action	  Committee,	  and	  through	  letters	  and	  
testimonies	  (Weingroff	  and	  Seabron,	  2003).	  	  
Technological	   innovation	   strategy.	   As	   a	   defensive	   hedging	   strategy,	   the	   industry	  
began	   monitoring	   developments	   in	   crash-­‐injury	   research	   and	   crashworthiness	  
engineering	   (Luger,	   2000).	   Chrysler	   established	   a	   safety	   department	   in	   1952,	  
followed	   by	   Ford	   (1955)	   and	   GM	   (mid-­‐1950s).	   These	   departments	   enabled	   new	  
specialized	   capability	   development,	   and	   thus	   represented	   an	   important	  
organizational	   innovation:	   “for	   first	   time,	  major	   automobile	  manufactures’	   safety	  
tests	  were	  fully	  conducted	  and	  analyzed	  not	  by	  parts	  technicians,	  but	  by	  engineers	  
who	  worked	  to	  integrate	  the	  emerging	  theories	  of	  crash	  energy	  management	  into	  
vehicle	  testing”	  (Leonardi,	  2010,	  p.	  259).	  However,	  “this	  did	  not	  represent	  a	  sudden	  
transformation	   of	   the	   industry’s	   thinking	   on	   vehicle	   design.	   Instead,	   business	  
prudence	   dictated	   watching	   these	   developments	   closely”	   (Luger,	   2000,	   p.	   63-­‐4).	  
The	  defensive	  hedging	  strategies	  were	   to	   some	  extent	   spurred	  on	  by	  activities	  of	  
the	   two	   new	   entrants,	   and	   by	   the	   coalescence	   of	   automotive	   crash	   engineering	  
research	   into	   a	   body	   of	   knowledge.	   So,	   scientific	   findings	   compounded	   with	  
pressure	  in	  the	  task	  environment	  seem	  to	  explain	  the	  ‘puzzle’	  (identified	  through	  
the	   correlation	   analysis)	   of	   (early)	   development	   of	   technologies	   after	   the	  WWII	  
interruption.	  
VI.4.4.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
Consumer	  demand,	  which	  had	  been	  deferred	  during	  the	  war,	  showed	  a	  preference	  
for	  stylish,	  almost	  extravagant,	  high	  performance	  cars	  (Yates,	  1983).	  Safety	  was	  not	  
a	  primary	  criterion	   for	  most	   car	  buyers	   (Stevenson,	  2008).	  Automakers	   therefore	  
paid	   more	   attention	   to	   price,	   styling,	   gadgetry,	   and	   horsepower	   than	   to	   safety.	  




negative	  influences	  on	  safety.119	  The	  high-­‐performance	  V8	  engine	  developed	  by	  GM	  
(1949),	   which	   kicked	   off	   the	   1950s	   ‘horsepower	   race’,	   also	   negatively	   influenced	  
safety,	  because	  it	  increased	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  cars	  could	  be	  driven	  (Flink,	  1990).	  
Policy-­‐makers	  hardly	  interfered	  with	  these	  developments,	  because	  the	  car	  industry	  
enjoyed	  high	   political	   legitimacy	   in	   the	   immediate	   post-­‐WWII,	  which	   translated	  
into	  relative	  autonomy	  (Luger,	  2000).	  
VI.4.5. Political	  debates	  and	  erosion	  of	  the	  3E-­‐framing	  (1955-­‐1966)	  
This	  period	  shows	  an	  underlying	  dynamic	  that	  fits	  with	  an	  ideal	  typical	  ‘phase	  3’	  of	  
the	  DILC-­‐model.	  Although	  public	  attention	  initially	  stayed	  at	  moderate	  levels,	  the	  
dialectical	  framing	  struggle	  spilled	  over	  to	  the	  political	  debate,	  leading	  to	  a	  surge	  in	  
public	  attention	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  (Figure	  VI.2.a).	  The	  design-­‐oriented	  approach	  to	  
safety	   gathered	   pace	   and	   influenced	   policy-­‐makers,	  who	   engaged	   in	   increasingly	  
heated	  debates	  in	  investigative	  hearings	  (which	  also	  fits	  phase	  3).	  The	  3E-­‐framing	  
gradually	   eroded	   (cf.	   Figure	   VI.3).	   While	   GM	   engaged	   in	   defensive	   hedging	  
through	  in-­‐house	  R&D,	  Ford	  stepped	  ahead,	  and,	  in	  1955,	  an	  early	  crack	  appeared	  
in	   the	   industry	   front,	   when	   Ford	   used	   safety	   designs	   to	   jockey	   for	   competitive	  
advantage.	  This	  deviates	  from	  the	  phase-­‐model,	  which	  posits	  cracks	  only	  in	  phase	  
4.	  Yet,	  the	  remainder	  incumbent	  industry	  (GM,	  in	  particular)	  quickly	  apprehended	  
Ford’s	   initiative,	   re-­‐closing	   the	   industry	   front.	   By	   the	   mid-­‐1960s,	   industry	  
legitimacy	  weakened	   substantially	   because	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	  Ribicoff-­‐hearings	   and	  
two	  scandals.	  The	  related	  surge	  in	  public	  and	  political	  attention	  (Figure	  VI.2.a	  and	  
Figure	  VI.2.b)	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  1966	  auto-­‐safety	  act,	  which	  adopted	  as	  official	  
framing	   the	   design-­‐oriented	   approach.	   The	   act	   signalled	   the	   move	   to	   the	   next	  
period.	  
VI.4.5.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Science,	   social	   movements	   and	   public	   opinion.	   The	   design-­‐oriented	   framing	  
gathered	  strength	  because	  of	  ongoing	  activities	  from	  the	  engineering	  and	  medical	  
communities.	  In	  1955,	  DeHaven	  patented	  the	  first	  three-­‐point	  seatbelt	  system.	  Its	  
effectiveness	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  experimental	  crash	  tests	  (Nader,	  1965;	  Eastman,	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  Although	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1984).	  Stapp’s	  contribution	  to	  crash	  research	  was	  recognized	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  
annual	   Stapp	   car-­‐crash	   conference,	   which	   was	   embraced	   by	   the	   Society	   of	  
Automotive	  Engineers	  in	  1966,	  signalling	  wider	  recognition	  and	  institutionalization	  
of	  the	  field	  (Leonardi,	  2010).	  	  
The	   American	   Medical	   Association	   increasingly	   urged	   Congress	   to	   enact	  
legislation	  mandating	   car	   safety	   standards	   (Eastman,	   1981).	   Doctors	   campaigned	  
for	   seatbelt	   installation	   (Figure	  VI.9),	   framing	   it	  as	   the	   ‘medicine’	   that	  was	  being	  
withheld	  from	  patients.	  Special	  issues	  on	  automobile	  crash	  injuries	  were	  published	  
in	  Clinical	  Orthopaedics	  (1956)	  and	  the	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  
(1957).	  The	  newly	   founded	  (1957)	  Association	   for	   the	  Advancement	   of	  Automotive	  
Medicine	   (AAAM)	   organized	   annual	   scientific	   conferences	   on	   safety	   and	   traffic	  
injury	  prevention	  (Eastman,	  1981).	  
Figure	  VI.9:	  The	  medical	  community	  campaigned	  for	  seat-­‐belt	  installation	  and	  use	  
	  
Source:	  Reading	  Eagle,	  Feb.	  18th,	  1962,	  p.	  41	  
While	  the	  design-­‐oriented	  framing	  gained	  credibility	  and	  visibility,	  the	  3E-­‐framing	  
began	   to	  weaken	   before	   public	   opinion,	   because	   of	   increasing	   doubts	   about	   the	  




News	   pointed	   to	   a	   ‘safety	   slogan	   fatigue’,	   “brought	   on	   by	   an	   overdose	   of	   jingles,	  
catchy	  phrases	  and	  righteous	  warnings	  asking	  us	  not	  to	  kill	  ourselves”	  (quoted	  in	  
Weingroff	  and	  Seabron,	  2003,	  p.	  93).	  In	  the	  early	  1960s,	  criticisms	  also	  appeared	  in	  
magazines	   (e.g.	   Consumer	   Reports	   and	   Nation),	   arguing	   that	   education	   efforts	  
diverted	  attention	  from	  the	  car	  to	  the	  driver	  (Eastman,	  1984).	  The	  book	  Safety	  last:	  
an	   indictment	   of	   the	   auto	   industry	   (O’Connell	   and	   Myers,	   1966)	   accused	   the	  
President’s	   Committee	   for	   Traffic	   Safety	   (chaired	   by	   GM’s	   CEO)	   of	   being	   “an	  
example	  of	  the	  sloganizing	  approach	  at	  its	  apex”	  and	  a	  “public	  relations	  coup”	  that	  
directed	  public	  attention	  away	  from	  vehicle	  design	  (p.	  62).	  
	  A	  scandal	  around	  Nader’s	  (1965)	  book,	  Unsafe	  at	  any	  speed,	  escalated	  public	  
opinion	  around	  the	  issue.	  Nader	  synthesized	  the	  new	  body	  of	  crash	  injury	  research	  
and	   described	   the	   industry’s	   longstanding	   political	   opposition	   to	   vehicle	   safety	  
standards.	  He	  “painted	  the	  nation’s	  auto	  executives	  as	  callous,	  if	  not	  worse,	  in	  their	  
attitude	  towards	  safety”	  (Luger,	  2000,	  p.	  69).	  When	  Nader	  was	  called	  to	  testify	  in	  the	  
1965-­‐6	   Ribicoff	   hearings,	   GM	   hired	   a	   private	   investigator	   to	   look	   into	   Nader’s	  
personal	  affairs,	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  blackmailing	  or	  discrediting	  him	  (Luger,	  2000).	  But	  
GM’s	   strategy	   backfired	   when	   these	   investigations	   became	   public	   (Figure	   VI.10),	  
making	  Nader	   into	   a	  national	   figure.	  GM	  was	   forced	   to	   publicly	   apologize,	  which	  
“sent	  shock	  waves	  throughout	  the	  industry	  and	  further	  diminished	  the	  credibility	  of	  




Figure	  VI.10:	  GM’s	  harassment	  of	  Ralph	  Nader	  by	  Herblock	  
	  
Source:	  Johnson	  and	  Katz	  (2009)	  
Regime	  outsiders.	  The	  crash-­‐injury	  research	  sponsored	  by	  Liberty-­‐Mutual	  Insurance	  
Company	   resulted	   in	   the	   ‘Survival	   Car	   I’	   (1956MY),	   a	   non-­‐operational	   prototype	  
mounted	   on	   a	   conventional	   1955	   Ford	   Four	   sedan	   that	   included	   sixty	   safety	  
innovations,	   both	   incremental	   (safety	   belts,	   ‘extra-­‐heavy’	   padding,	   recessed	  
buttons,	  wider	  brakes)	  and	  also	  ‘unusual’	  (‘centre	  driver’s	  seat’	  and	  passenger	  seats	  
facing	   backwards,	   levers	   instead	   of	   steering	   wheels,	   a	   front-­‐view	   mirror	   that	  
employed	  side-­‐periscopes	  to	   ‘look	  ahead’).	   In	  1961,	   to	  demonstrate	  “the	  feasibility	  
of	  safety	  improvements	  within	  conventional	  production-­‐line	  automobiles”	  (Nader,	  
1965,	   p.	   208),	   Cornell’s	   engineers	   developed	   the	   ‘Survival	   Car	   II’.	   This	   was	   an	  
operational	   prototype,	  mounted	   on	   four	   1960	  Chevrolet	   four-­‐door	   sedans,	  which	  
included	   twenty-­‐four	   safety	   features,	   such	   as	   capsule	   seats,	   collapsible	   steering	  
columns,	  dual	  braking	  systems,	  and	  rollover	  bars	  (Eastman,	  1984).	  This	  resulted	  in	  
pressures	   both	   in	   the	   task	   environment	   and	   in	   the	   institutional	   environment:	   it	  




drawing	  public	   and	  political	   attention	   to	   technological	   alternatives	   (Nader,	   1965;	  
Eastman,	  1984).	  
Policy-­‐makers.	   Political	   support	   for	   the	   3E-­‐framing	   weakened	   as	   investigative	  
hearings	   culminated	   in	   more	   negative	   attitudes	   towards	   the	   car	   industry.	   The	  
Special	   Subcommittee	   on	   Traffic	   Safety	   held	   several	   hearings	   (1956,	   1959),	   which	  
increasingly	   advocated	   an	   active	   role	   for	   the	   federal	   government	   through	   the	  
establishment	  of	  car-­‐safety	  standards	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  1986).	  As	  a	  first	  step,	  
the	  House	  mandated	  safety	  devices	  for	  the	  governmental	  fleet	  in	  1959	  (Weingroff	  
and	   Seabron,	   2003).	   Responding	   to	   the	   pledge	   from	   the	   medical	   community,	  
certain	   states	   subsequently	   introduced	   mandatory	   seatbelt	   use	   laws	   (Wisconsin	  
1961,	   New	   York	   1962),	   which	   indirectly	   mandated	   seatbelt	   installation	   by	  
automakers.	  	  
The	   1965-­‐6	  Ribicoff	  hearings,	  which	   invited	  automakers’	   top	  executives	   to	  
testify	  in	  Congress,	  accelerated	  the	  regulatory	  process.	  The	  hearings	  exposed	  “the	  
industry’s	   disregard	   for	   vehicle	   safety”	   (Luger,	   2000,	   p.	   8).	   Nader’s	   testimony	  
“provided	   a	   scathing	  description	  of	   the	   safety	   establishment	   and	   the	   automobile	  
industry”	  (Weingroff	  and	  Seabron,	  2003,	  p.	  150).	  Senator	  Robert	  Kennedy	  criticized	  
the	  lack	  of	  investment	  in	  safety,	  noting	  that	  “if	  [GM]	  had	  spent	  only	  [one]	  percent	  
of	  its	  [1964]	  profits	  on	  safety,	  [investments]	  would	  amount	  to	  $17	  million”	  (Luger,	  
2000,	  p.	  68-­‐9),	  instead	  of	  just	  US$1.25	  million	  (both	  figures	  in	  nominal	  dollars).	  The	  
Washington	   Post	   (July	   14,	   1965)	   commented	   that	   “Kennedy	   dealt	   with	   [GM’s	  
executives]	  much	   as	   if	   he	   were	   examining	   a	   couple	   of	   youthful	   applicants	   for	   a	  
driver’s	  license	  who	  hadn’t	  done	  their	  homework”	  (quoted	  in	  Luger,	  2000,	  p.	  69).	  
High	   public	   attention,	   scandals	   and	   poor	   performance	   of	   the	   executives	   during	  
these	  hearings	  were	  the	  “turning	  point	  in	  creating	  a	  climate	  in	  Congress	  conducive	  
to	  the	  passage	  of	  a	  meaningful	  automobile	  safety	  bill”	  (Eastman,	  1984,	  p.	  246):	  the	  
1966	  National	  Traffic	  and	  Motor	  Vehicle	  Safety	  Act	  (NTMVSA).	  
VI.4.5.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  	  
Socio-­‐cultural	   and	   political	   strategies.	  The	   industry	  collectively	  deployed	  political	  
strategies	  to	  hinder	  safety	  regulations.	  	  In	  subcommittee	  hearings	  the	  Automobile	  
Manufacturers	   Association	   (AMA)	   lobbied	   against	   regulations,	   highlighting	   the	  




Ribicoff	   hearings,	   automakers	   opposed	   federal	   regulations	   and	   argued	   for	   a	  
voluntary	  approach	  (Eastman,	  1984).	  These	  hearings	  turned	  into	  a	  public	  relations	  
disaster,	  because	  executives	  responded	  poorly	  to	  critical	  questions.	  The	  Wall	  Street	  
Journal	   (July	   20,	   1965)	   commented	   that	   the	   industry	   “underestimated	   the	  
opposition	  and	  failed	  to	  prepare	  adequately”	  and	  ascertained:	  “so	  dismal	  [was]	  the	  
auto	   industry’s	   performance	   at	   the	   Senate’s	   safety	   hearings	   that	   the	   chances	   of	  
Federal	  legislation	  in	  the	  field	  have	  markedly	  increased”.	  
While	   GM	   acted	   alone	   in	   harassing	   Nader,	   the	   industry’s	   collective	  
legitimacy	  and	  reputation	  were	  undermined	  by	  the	  subsequent	  scandal.	  Moreover,	  
congressional	   investigations	   found	  that	   from	  1960	  to	   1966	  the	   industry	  promoted	  
426	  recall	  cases	  of	   faulty	  automobiles.	  These	  were	  secret	   recall	  campaigns,	  which	  
made	   policy-­‐makers	   perceive	   the	   industry	   not	   only	   as	   uncooperative,	   but	   also	  
‘unreasonable’	   (Luger,	   2000).	   In	   this	   context	   of	   weakened	   cultural	   and	   political	  
legitimacy,	  the	  industry	  could	  not	  prevent	  the	  1966	  NTMVSA.	  
Technological	   innovation	   and	   positioning	   strategies.	   Early	   cracks	   appeared	   in	   the	  
closed	   industry	   front	   as	   firms	   developed	   different	   orientations	   towards	   safety-­‐
related	  design	  innovations,	  ranging	  from	  public	  opposition	  (GM),	  through	  relative	  
passivity	   (Chrysler),	   to	  positive	   engagement	   (Ford).	  To	   counter	  declining	  market	  
shares,	   Ford	   decided	   to	   incorporate	   safety	   innovations	   in	   1956MY	   cars	   with	   the	  
strategic	  aim	  of	  gaining	  first-­‐mover	  advantages	  (Eastman,	  1984).	  Its	  ‘safety	  package’	  
included	   safe	   door	   latches;	   recessed	   hub,	   dished	   steering	   wheel	   with	   energy	  
absorbing	  capability;	  padded	  instrument	  panels;	  and	  redesigned	  rear	  view	  mirror.	  
Ford	   also	   offered	   (lap)	   seatbelts	   as	   optional	   equipment	   for	   c.	   $130	   (2011	   dollars).	  
Ford’s	   original	   safety	   advertising	   campaign	   (Figure	   VI.11.a)	   attracted	   positive	  
attention	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  1986),	  and	  its	  strategy	  seemed	  to	  work.	  A	  survey	  
at	  the	  Chicago	  Auto	  Show	  (1956)	  indicated	  that	  potential	  Ford	  buyers	  saw	  safety	  as	  
a	  reason	  for	  their	  choice	  (Eastman,	  1984).	  
Yet,	   Ford’s	   strategy	   attracted	   controversy	   amongst	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   auto	  
industry,	  particularly	  GM:	  
The	   implication	   was	   clearly	   not	   only	   that	   the	   Ford	   was	   safe,	   but,	   by	  
extension,	   that	   the	   rival	   Chevrolet	   [GM’s	   subsidiary]	  was	   less	   safe.	   This	  
suggestion	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  photographs	  that	  dealers	  were	  instructed	  




new	   Ford	   were	   more	   likely	   to	   survive	   a	   given	   accident	   than	   those	   who	  
travelled	  by	  Chevrolet.	  (Stevenson,	  2008,	  p.	  193)	  
GM	   “expressed	   its	   disapproval	   of	   the	   safety	   campaign	   directly	   to	   Ford’s	   top	  
executives”,	  using	  “the	  weight	  of	  its	  enormous	  monopoly	  power	  to	  have	  it	  halted”	  
(Luger,	  2000,	  p.	  63).	  Following	  GM’s	  threat,	  Ford	  dropped	  its	  superior	  safety	  claims	  
and	   returned	   to	   traditional	   advertising	   themes	   such	   as	   increased	   horsepower	  
(Figure	  VI.11.b).	  
Figure	  VI.11	  (a-­‐b,	  left-­‐right):	  The	  1956MY	  safety-­‐led	  ad	  campaign	  (by	  Ford)	  started	  with	  
strong	  claims	  (left)	  but	  was	  weakened	  after	  negative	  reaction	  from	  rest	  of	  industry	  (right)	  
	   	  
Source:	  Old	  Car	  Advertisements,	  available	  at:	  http://www.oldcarads.ca/Ford/1956/dirindex.html;	  downloaded	  on	  
Dec.	  6th,	  2010	  
GM	  thus	  succeeded	  in	  apprehending	  Ford’s	  safety	  initiative,	  and	  restored	  a	  closed	  
industry	  front.	  “Ford	  terminated	  its	  safety	  campaign	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1956	  after	  an	  
internal	  policy	  struggle	  won	  by	  those	  who	  agreed	  with	  the	  General	  Motors	  analysis	  
of	   the	   probable	   unsettling	   consequences	   of	   a	   vehicle	   safety	   campaign”	   (Nader,	  
1965,	  p.	  96).	  Ford’s	  initiative	  was	  labelled	  a	  market	  fiasco,	  hardening	  the	  belief	  that	  
‘safety	   does	   not	   sell’,	   which	   became	   an	   industry	   truism	   for	   the	   following	   three	  
decades	   (Kurylko,	   1996).	   Henceforth,	   the	   American	   car	   industry	   argued	   against	  





After	   Ford’s	   initiative,	   technological	   strategies	   continued	   to	   focus	   on	  
accident-­‐avoidance	   innovations 120 :	   improved	   headlights,	   emergency	   flashing	  
systems	  (Eastman,	  1984).	  One	  exception	  was	  the	  installation	  of	  front-­‐seat	  lap-­‐belt	  
as	  standard	  equipment,	  following	  Studebaker’s	  lead	  in	  1963	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  
1986).	  Another	  exception	  was	  the	  exploration	  of	  a	  very	  radical	  technology:	  airbags,	  
which	  had	  been	  patented	  by	  an	  independent	  inventor	  in	  1953	  (Strother	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  
The	  patent	  attracted	  some	  attention	  from	  Ford	  and	  GM,	  which	  experimented	  with	  
inflatable	  restraints	  in	  the	  late	  1950s	  (Sherman,	  1995).	  But	  they	  discontinued	  airbag	  
research	  activities	  when	  these	  encountered	  two	  engineering	  challenges:	  (a)	  quickly,	  
reliably,	   and	  accurately	   sensing	  a	  collision;	  and	   (b)	   inflating	   the	  air	  bag	   in	  about	  
forty	  milliseconds,	  which	  is	  faster	  than	  the	  blink	  of	  an	  eye	  (Sherman,	  1995).	  The	  21	  
airbag	   patents	   between	   1953	   and	   1966	   (Figure	   VI.2.d)	   were	   all	   assigned	   to	  
independent	  inventors	  or	  auto	  industry	  outsiders.	  
VI.4.5.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
Local	  air	  pollution	  and	  car	  quality	  were	  two	  other	  issues	  that	  encroached	  upon	  the	  
car	   industry,	   undermining	   its	   social	   and	   political	   legitimacy.	   Social	   movements,	  
such	  as	  Stamp	  Out	  Smog	  (SOS),	  criticised	  automakers	  for	  not	  addressing	  HC,	  NOx	  
and	  CO	  emissions.	  These	  concerns	  spilled	  over	  to	  policy-­‐makers,	  who	  introduced	  
initial	   regulations	   in	   the	   1960s.	   These	   acts	   signalled	   increasing	   willingness	   for	  
legislative	  actions	  on	  social	  issues	  (see	  Chapter	  V).	  
Declining	   car	   quality,	   which	   resulted	   in	   embarrassing	   recall	   campaigns	  
(Figure	   VI.12),	   was	   due	   to	   limited	   investments	   in	   factories	   and	   parts	   supply.	   To	  
increase	   profits	   and	   stock	   value,	   automakers	   postponed	   process	   and	   product	  
innovation,	  which	  were	  seen	  as	  unnecessary	  expenditures	  (Yates,	  1983).	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Figure	  VI.12:	  Herblock’s	  cartoon	  mocking	  American	  automakers’	  recall	  campaigns,	  which	  
became	  commonplace	  events	  in	  the	  1960s	  
	  
Source:	  Johnson	  and	  Katz	  (2009)	  
VI.4.6. Implementing	  safety	  standards:	  Compliance,	  resistance	  and	  the	  
seatbelt-­‐airbag	  controversy	  (1966-­‐1976)	  
This	  period	  presents	  many	  underlying	  processes	  that	  fit	  well	  with	  phase	  4	  from	  the	  
DILC-­‐model:	   (a)	   the	   safety	   issue	   spilled	   over	   to	   the	   task	   environment	  when	   the	  
implementation	   of	   regulations	   and	   safety	   standards	   began;	   (b)	   the	   car	   industry	  
complied	  with	  safety	  innovations	  and	  increasing	  R&D	  investments	  in	  more	  radical	  
alternatives	   (airbags);	   (c)	   GM’s	   initial	   support	   for	   airbags	   caused	   a	   crack	   in	   the	  
industry	  front.	  But	  the	  industry	  also	  resisted	  the	  implementation	  of	  new	  standards	  
(with	  litigation,	  lobbying,	  threats,	  and	  inconvenient	  technical	  designs),	  playing	  off	  
seatbelts	  against	  airbags.	  When	  GM	  abandoned	  airbags	  in	  1976,	  the	  industry	  front	  
closed	   down	   again,	   shutting	   the	   window	   of	   opportunity	   for	   faster	   change.	  
Spillovers	  to	  consumers	  remained	  limited	  and	  public	  attention	  to	  safety	  decreased	  
following	  the	  1973	  oil	  shock	  and	  subsequent	  recession.	  
VI.4.6.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Social	   movements	   and	   public	   opinion.	  After	   the	   1966	  NTMVSA,	   public	   attention	  
declined	  (Figure	  VI.2.a)	  as	  the	  safety	  issue	  moved	  to	  the	  administrative	  arena	  and	  




interest	  organizations	  (such	  as	  Nader’s	  Centre	   for	  Auto	  Safety)	  continued	  to	  exert	  
pressure	  (Luger,	  2000).	  The	  Consumers	  Union	  also	  exerted	  pressure	  by	  providing	  
consumers	   with	   technical	   data	   and	   accident	   statistics	   and	   helping	   them	   find	  
attorneys	   for	   litigating	   automakers	   for	   defective	   products	   (Mashaw	   and	   Harfst,	  
1990).	  
Policy-­‐makers.	  The	  NTMVSA	  was	  a	  milestone	  because	  it	  asserted	  an	  active	  role	  for	  
Federal	   government	   in	   auto-­‐safety;	   articulated	   safety	   performance	   standards	   for	  
motor	   vehicles;	   and	   established	   the	   NHTSA	   (National	   Highway	   Traffic	   Safety	  
Agency)	  to	  implement	  the	  new	  regulations	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  1986).	  The	  new	  
safety	   standards	   included	   crash	   avoidance	   (e.g.	   lights,	   brakes,	   headlamps,	   tires),	  
crashworthiness	   (e.g.	   padded	   instruments,	   head	   restraints,	   seatbelts,	   energy	  
absorbing	   steering	   columns)	   and	   post-­‐crash	   (e.g.	   fuel	   systems	   integrity)	  
specifications.	  Congress	  specified	  that	  the	  new	  standards	  be	  ‘reasonable,	  practical	  
and	   appropriate’.	   These	   vague	   specifications	  became	   the	   source	  of	   conflicts	  with	  
the	   car	   industry	   (Luger,	   2000),	   moving	   the	   struggle	   from	   the	   political	   to	   the	  
implementation	  stage	  (which	  is	  reflected	  in	  attention	  indicators,	  cf.	  Figure	  VI.2).	  
Particularly	   Standard	   208	   (seat-­‐belts)	   became	   the	   focus	   of	   a	   long-­‐lasting	  
controversy,	  when,	  in	  1969,	  NHTSA	  upgraded	  the	  initial	  standard	  to	  an	  automatic	  
crash	  protection	  (or	  passive	  restraint121)	  standard.	  There	  were	  two	  technical	  options	  
to	  meet	  this	  standard:	  airbags	  or	  seatbelts	  with	  an	  ignition-­‐interlock	  system	  (which	  
sounded	  an	  alarm	  and	  prevented	  engine	  ignition	  unless	  the	  driver	  buckled	  up).122	  
Regulators,	  safety	  advocates,	  consumer	  interest	  groups,	  and	  the	  insurance	  industry	  
assumed	   that	   the	   standard	  meant	   the	   installation	   of	   airbag	   systems	   (Bollier	   and	  
Claybrook,	   1986;	  Miller,	   1988).	   But	   automakers	   preferred	   the	   cheaper	   solution	   –	  
seatbelts	   –	   because	   airbag	   technology	  was	   difficult	   and	  more	   expensive	   (Abeles,	  
2004).	   In	   1970	   regulators	   postponed	   the	   standard	   to	   1973,	   acknowledging	   an	  
‘inadequate	  supply’	  of	  airbags	  (Miller,	  1988).	  Ongoing	  opposition	  from	  automakers	  
resulted	   in	   further	  delays	  and	  modifications,	  so	  that	  by	  1976	  the	  passive	  restraint	  
standard	  faced	  an	  impasse.	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  the	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  safety’	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  technologies	  that	  do	  not	  
require	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  from	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New	   entrants	   and	   regime	   outsiders.	   The	   Insurance	   Institute	   for	   Highway	   Safety	  
(IIHS)	  also	  became	  involved	  in	  the	  airbag	  struggle,	  performing	  vehicle	  safety	  tests	  
(as	   inputs	   for	   standards)	   and	   lobbying	   for	   auto-­‐safety	   regulation	   (Nishida,	   1996).	  
And	   insurance	   companies	   such	   as	   Allstate	   ran	   advertising	   campaigns	   about	   the	  
reliability	  of	  airbags.	  European	  manufacturers	   (e.g.	  Mercedes-­‐Benz,	  Volvo)	  began	  
using	   safety	   as	   an	   entry	   point	   into	   the	   American	  market.	   Their	   advertisements,	  
which	   highlighted	   voluntary	   design	   changes	   that	   went	   beyond	   regulatory	  
requirements	  (Figure	  VI.13),	  helped	  build	  consumer	  awareness.	  
Figure	  VI.13:	  Mercedes-­‐Benz	  safety	  advertisement	  (1970)	  
	  
Source:	  The	  Palm	  Beach	  Post,	  1970,	  (Aug.,	  28th),	  C11	  
Mercedes	  also	  collaborated	  with	  Bayern-­‐Chemicals	  (Nilsson	  et	  al.,	  2003)	  to	  develop	  
airbags,	  using	   the	   latter’s	   capabilities	   in	   gas	   generator	   technology.	  Mercedes	   saw	  
airbags	   as	   complement	   to,	   not	   substitute	   of,	   seatbelts.	   After	   GM	   changed	   its	  
strategic	   position	   on	   airbags	   (see	   below),	   Mercedes	   became	   “the	   only	   car	  
manufacturer	  seriously	  working	  on	  airbags”	  (Nilsson	  et	  al.,	  2003,	  p.	  52).	  
VI.4.6.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  
Socio-­‐cultural	  and	  political	  strategies.	  Automakers	  used	  strategies	  to	  resist	  the	  1966	  
NTMVSA,	   claiming	   that	   the	   new	   standards	   were	   technically	   unfeasible	   and	  
publicly	   threatening	   to	   close	   down	   factories	   (Bollier	   and	   Claybrook,	   1986).	   The	  
industry	  also	  attacked	   the	  original	  Standard	  208,	  claiming	   that	  Americans	  would	  
not	   wear	   seatbelts	   (Luger,	   2000).	   Automakers	   installed	   large,	   restrictive	   and	  




wanted	   an	   excuse	   for	   not	   taking	   the	   trouble	   to	   buckle	   their	   seatbelts,	   the	  
manufacturers	  gave	   it	   to	   them”	  (Waters	   et	   al.,	   1998,	  p.	   1338-­‐9).	  The	   industry	  also	  
opposed	   the	   upgraded	   Standard	   208,	   suing	  NHTSA	   in	   the	  US	  Court	   of	  Appeals.	  
The	  court	  endorsed	  NHTSA’s	  authority	  to	  issue	  technology-­‐forcing	  standards,	  but	  
suspended	   Standard	   208	   because	   of	   a	   technical	   specification	   that	   should	   be	  
corrected	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  1986).	  
The	  industry	  engaged	  in	  direct	   lobbying,	  drawing	  on	  economic	  arguments	  
to	  call	  for	  regulatory	  easing:	  top	  executives	  met	  with	  President	  Nixon,	  warning	  that	  
safety	  (and	  emission)	  regulations	  would	   increase	  car	  prices	  and	  damage	  Detroit’s	  
competitiveness	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  The	  political	  strategies	  succeeded:	  the	  compliance	  
deadline	  was	   extended	  and	  NHTSA	  allowed	  automakers	   to	   comply	  with	   seatbelt	  
interlock	   systems.	   But	   ignition	   interlock	   systems	   annoyed	   users,	   who	   felt	   their	  
freedom	  was	  curbed	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  1986).	  Many	  drivers	  disconnected	  the	  
system	   and	   wrote	   complaint	   letters	   to	   policy-­‐makers	   (Luger,	   2000).	   In	   1974,	  
Congress	   repealed	   the	   requirement	   of	   the	   interlock	   system,	   forbade	   any	   buzzer-­‐
system,	   and	   ruled	   that	   any	   safety	   standard	   different	   than	   an	   active	   seatbelt	  
mandate	   had	   to	   be	   voted	   by	   both	   Houses	   (Abeles,	   2004).	   The	   passive	   restraint	  
standard	  thus	  reached	  a	  stalemate.	  
Technological	  innovation	  and	  positioning	  strategies.	  Although	  the	  industry	  formed	  a	  
closed	   political	   front,	   there	   was	   strategic	  manoeuvring	  with	   regard	   to	   technology	  
and	  positioning	  strategies.	  The	  industry’s	  strategy	  towards	  the	  task	  environment	  can	  
be	  qualified	  as	  ‘reluctant	  compliance’,	  with	  political	  use	  of	  innovations,	  but	  positive	  
positioning	  and	  exploration	  of	  alternatives.	  Automakers	  began	  offering	  certain	  safety	  
innovations	  as	   standard	  equipment	   in	  advance	  of	   the	  announcement	  of	   standards	  
(1967),	   e.g.	   energy-­‐absorbing	   armrests,	   collapsible	   (‘telescoping’)	   steering	   columns,	  
energy-­‐absorbing	   bumpers,	   roll-­‐over	   safety	   structures,	   and	   anti-­‐skid	   breaking	  
systems	   (an	   early	   anti-­‐lock	   braking	   system	   by	   Chrysler)	   (Abernathy	   et	   al.,	   1983;	  
Luger,	  2000).	  With	  these	  mostly	  incremental	  innovations,	  they	  also	  aimed	  to	  delay	  
the	  speed	  of	  change	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  1986).	  When	  NHTSA	  announced	  stricter	  
safety	  standards,	  automakers	  complained	  that	  their	  ongoing	  production	  plans	  were	  
too	   advanced	   for	   major	   engineering	   changes	   and	   retooling	   to	   be	   implemented	  




	   	  Yet,	  the	  industry	  also	  began	  advertising	  safety	  innovations.	  “Now	  that	  certain	  
safety	   provisions	   were	   mandatory,	   and	   the	   issue	   was	   irreversibly	   on	   consumers’	  
agenda,	   it	   was	  worth	   stressing	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   one’s	   product.”	   (Stevenson,	  
2008,	  p.	   198).	  GM’s	  1966	  advertising	  campaign	  (Figure	  VI.14.a),	  which	  claimed	  that	  
“Safety	  comes	  first	  at	  GM	  (but	  remember...	  you’re	  in	  the	  driver’s	  seat)”,	  incorporated	  
car	   design,	   but	   also	   continued	   to	   highlight	   driver	   responsibility.	   Chrysler	   (Figure	  
VI.14.b)	  and	  Ford	  also	  used	  safety	  as	  an	  advertising	  theme	  (Stevenson,	  2008).	  This	  
marketing	  and	  positioning	  strategy	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  socio-­‐cultural	  approach	  to	  
regain	  legitimacy	  and	  confidence	  from	  consumers.	  
Figure	  VI.14	  (a-­‐b):	  GM’s	  and	  Chrysler’s	  ad	  campaigns	  from	  late	  1960s	  focused	  on	  safety	  
	   	  
Sources:	  Life,	  1966,	  60	  (1),	  p.	  9-­‐10,	  and	  Stevenson	  (2008),	  respectively.	  
While	   automakers	   politically	   resisted	   mandatory	   safety	   standards	   and,	   in	  
particular,	   airbags,	   they	   privately	   restarted	   R&D	   programs	   on	   this	   technology	  
because	   military	   and	   space	   research	   had	   developed	   promising	   options	   for	   the	  
engineering	   challenges	   related	   to	   collision	   sensing	   and	   rapid	   airbag	   inflation	  
(Sherman,	  1995;	  Struble,	  1998;	  Strother	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Nilsson	  et	  al.,	  2003):	  (1)	  the	  US	  
army	   developed	   a	   new	   detonating	   valve	   for	   very	   rapid	   gas	   transfer,	   (2)	   Thiokol	  
Chemical	   Corporation	   developed	   a	   solid	   propellant	   (sodium	   azide)	   for	   aerospace	  
rockets	  and	  missiles,	  which	  could	  be	  used	  for	  airbag	  inflation;	  (3)	  research	  on	  time-­‐
delay	  ordnance	  fuses123	  resulted	  in	  a	  simple	  and	  reliable	  electromechanical	  collision	  
sensor.	   Building	   on	   these	   inventions,	   carmakers	   restarted	   airbag	   research	   in	   the	  
late	  1960s,	  leading	  to	  a	  peak	  in	  airbag	  patenting	  activities	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  (Figure	  
VI.2.d).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Ford	   engaged	   in	   external	   collaborations	   (with	   automotive	   supplier	  Eaton,	  
Yale	  &	  Towne),	  while	  GM	  pursued	  in-­‐house	  R&D	  (Strother	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Sherman,	  
1995).124	  Ford	  decided	  not	  to	  market	  the	  new	  technology	  when	  field	  tests	  showed	  
fatality	  risks	  with	  child-­‐size	  dummies	  and	  when	  an	  airbag	  failed	  to	  deploy	  during	  a	  
demonstration	   experiment	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   its	   CEO	   (Bollier	   and	   Claybrook,	  
1986).	  
Up	   to	   1974,	   GM	   had	   invested	   about	   $300	   million	   in	   its	   airbag	   project	  
(Griswold	   and	   Henson,	   2003),	   using	   expertise	   from	   its	   AC	   (Delco)	   Electronics	  
aerospace	  division.	  In	  1976,	  the	  industry’s	  front	  on	  airbags	  seemed	  to	  crack	  when	  
GM	   equipped	   1,000	   Chevrolets	   with	   the	   radical	   technology	   for	   field	   testing	   and	  
announced	  plans	  to	  set	  up	  a	  sales	  program	  in	  1974-­‐1976	  (Struble,	  1998).	  GM	  tooled	  
up	   to	   produce	   100,000	   airbag-­‐equipped	   cars	   and	   envisaged	   sales	   of	   more	   than	  
300,000	   (Abeles,	   2004).	   Although	  GM	   subsidized	   the	   cost	   of	   airbags,	   consumers	  
bought	   only	   10,000	   (Albaum,	   2005).	   This	   failure	   caused	  GM	   to	   “shift	   [...]	   from	   a	  
pro-­‐bag	   position	   to	   an	   anti-­‐bag	   position”	   (Lund,	   1975,	   p.	   32)	   and	   hardened	   the	  
belief	   that	   consumers	   were	   not	   interested	   in	   safety.125	  By	   the	  mid-­‐1970s,	   Detroit	  
automakers	  therefore	  geared	  most	  of	  their	  R&D	  efforts	  towards	  automatic	  seatbelt	  
systems	  (Schnapp,	  1979),	  leading	  to	  decreasing	  airbag	  patents	  Figure	  VI.2.d).	  
VI.4.6.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
Societal	   pressures	   regarding	   safety	   aligned	   positively	   with	   three	   broader	  
developments.	  First,	   they	   linked	  up	  with	  the	  general	   rise	  of	  an	  activist	  culture	   in	  
the	  1960s	  and	  anti-­‐corporatist	  sentiments.	  Second,	  it	  resonated	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  air	  
pollution,	   which	   gathered	   pace	   and	   led	   to	   frustrations	   about	   the	   car	   industry’s	  
reluctance	  to	  implement	  substantive	  solutions.	  The	  perceived	  disregard	  for	  public	  
interests	   damaged	   the	   industry’s	   legitimacy	   and	   strengthened	   the	   political	  
willingness	  to	  introduce	  strict	  legislations	  (see	  Chapter	  V).	  Third,	  safety	  was	  linked	  
to	   increasing	   concerns	   about	   the	   quality	   of	   American	   cars,	   as	   indicated	   by	   900	  
recall	  campaigns	  between	  1966	  and	  1972,	  which	   involved	  25	  million	  vehicles	  with	  
defects	  (Luger,	  2000).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  Chrysler	  also	  started	  an	  airbag	  programme,	  which	  however	  “did	  not	  result	  in	  hardware	  being	  
integrated	  into	  vehicles”	  (Struble,	  1998,	  p.	  55).	  
125	  Critics	  also	  proposed	  other	  explanations.	  Schnapp	  (1979,	  p.	  50)	  claims	  that	  “GM	  did	  not	  
aggressively	  market	  air	  bags	  to	  its	  customers”.	  Additionally,	  airbags	  were	  only	  available	  in	  large-­‐




	   Although	   the	   industry	   reluctantly	   complied	   with	   (some)	   NTMVSA	  
standards,	  it	  did	  not	  incorporate	  safety	  (or	  environmentalism)	  in	  its	  mission	  in	  the	  
period126,	  despite	  the	  safety	  innovations	  and	  advertisements.	  The	  shared	  belief	  was	  
that	   both	   issues	   were	   externally	   imposed	   by	   regulators,	   not	   demanded	   by	  
customers.	  Additionally,	  American	   automakers	  paid	  more	   attention	   to	   economic	  
problems	  in	  the	  early	  1970s,	  related	  to	  market	  contraction127,	  the	  1973	  oil	  crisis,	  and	  
increasing	  competition	  from	  German	  and	  Japanese	  carmakers	  (Halberstam,	  1986).	  
The	  industry	  therefore	  began	  developing	  a	  new	  framing	  strategy,	  emphasizing	  that	  
regulations	  were	  costly,	  hampered	  the	  industry’s	  financial	  situation	  and	  threatened	  
the	  US	  economy	  (Luger,	  2000).	  
VI.4.7. Moving	  backwards	  due	  to	  weakening	  political	  pressure	  (1976-­‐1984)	  
The	  core	  dynamic	  is	  a	  new	  framing	  struggle	  in	  the	  political	  arena	  (about	  the	  proper	  
‘passive	   safety’	   technology,	   and	   whether	   regulations	   were	   cost-­‐effective),	   with	  
incumbents	   forming	   a	   closed	   industry	   front.	   The	   struggle	   was	   reflected	   in	  
increased	  public	  attention.	  These	  developments	  indicate	  a	  return	  to	  phase	  3	  in	  the	  
DILC-­‐model.	   Financial	   problems	   led	   politicians	   to	   adopt	   a	   different	   official	  
problem	  framing	  (based	  on	  economic	  considerations)	  and	  support	  the	  car	  industry	  
by	  weakening	  safety	   regulations.	  The	  political	   controversy	  over	   standards	   slowed	  
down	  industry	  innovation	  efforts.	  
VI.4.7.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Social	   movements	   and	   public	   opinion.	   Public	   attention	   to	   auto-­‐safety	   increased	  
(Figure	  VI.2.a),	  galvanized	  by	  safety	  scandals	  (e.g.	  the	  Ford	  Pinto	  subcompact	  car	  
issue	   with	   fuel	   tanks),	   and	   a	   return	   to	   the	   behavioural	   framing,	   this	   time	  
represented	  by	   the	   ‘drunken	  driver’	  metaphor.	  Regarding	  Ford’s	   case,	   the	   trigger	  
was	  an	  article	  in	  Mother	  Jones	  (1977),	  which	  claimed	  that	  500	  people	  had	  burned	  to	  
death	   in	   Pinto	   crashes,	   because	   of	   a	   flawed	   fuel-­‐tank	   design.	   It	   further	   accused	  
Ford	  of	  knowing	  about	  the	  hazard,	  but	  deciding	  not	  to	  fix	  it	  because	  cost-­‐benefit	  
analysis	   showed	   the	   change	   was	   not	   economically	   efficient.	   The	   public	   was	  
shocked	   that	   Ford	   placed	   a	   dollar	   value	   on	   human	   life	   (Luger,	   2000).	   Although	  
Ford	  denied	  the	  accusations,	  it	  recalled	  1.5	  million	  Pintos	  in	  1978	  (Davidson,	  1983).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  Indeed,	  the	  period	  fits	  with	  a	  phase	  four,	  and	  these	  changes	  in	  mission	  and	  beliefs	  are	  expected	  
in	  phase	  5.	  




The	  scandal	  damaged	  the	  public	  image	  of	  Ford	  and	  that	  of	  the	  whole	  industry:	  “For	  
the	  public,	  the	  case	  came	  to	  stand	  for	  Detroit’s	  disregard	  for	  vehicle	  safety”	  (Luger,	  
2000,	  p.	  83).	  
A	  new	  organized	  social	  movement,	  with	  groups	  such	  as	  Remove	  Intoxicated	  
Drivers	  (RID),	  founded	  in	  1978	  in	  New	  York,	  and	  Mothers	  Against	  Drunk	  Driving	  
[originally,	  Driver]	  (MADD),	  founded	  in	  1980	  in	  California,	  revived	  the	  behavioural	  
framing	  of	  car-­‐safety	  in	  their	  campaign	  against	  the	  specific	  issue	  of	  drunk	  driving.	  
The	  campaign	  initially	  focused	  on	  punitive	  measures	  and	  education,	  but	  gradually	  
widened	  to	  include	  pricing	  and	  alcohol	  availability,	  underage	  drinking,	  advertising	  
and	   marketing	   (Waller,	   2002).	   This	   new	   sub-­‐issue	   did	   not	   impact	   on	   the	   car	  
industry’s	  identity,	  but	  helped	  galvanize	  public	  attention	  to	  safety.	  
Policy-­‐makers.	   Political	   safety	   pressure	   weakened	   throughout	   this	   period	   (cf.	  
Congressional	  and	  Regulatory	  attention	  levels	  in	  Figure	  VI.2),	  because	  of	  concerns	  
about	   the	   industry’s	   economic	   problems	   and	   because	   Reagan’s	   administration	  
(1981-­‐1989)	  favoured	  regulatory	  rollback.128	  	  
Because	  Standard	  208	  faced	  an	  implementation	  stalemate,	  they	  moved	  back	  
to	   the	   policy-­‐making	   arena129.	   Three	   consecutive	   Secretaries	   of	   Transportation	  
issued	   contradictory	   rulings	   on	   the	   passive	   restraint	  mandate:	   in	   1976,	   Coleman	  
proposed	  to	  withdraw	  the	  mandate	  if	  automakers	  would	  produce	  between	  40,000	  
and	   400,000	   airbag	   equipped	   cars	   for	   a	   demonstration	   programme	   (Bollier	   and	  
Claybrook,	   1986);	   in	   1977,	   Adams	   reissued	   Standard	   208,	   arguing	   that	   a	  
demonstration	  programme	  was	  not	  necessary;	   in	   1981,	  Lewis	  delayed	  compliance	  
and	  subsequently	  repealed	  the	  standard	  altogether	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  regulatory	  
rollback	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  1986).	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  costs	  would	  outweigh	  the	  
benefits:	   implementation	   of	   an	   automatic	   restraint	   standard	   was	   thought	   to	  
require	  $1.0	  billion	  (nominal	  dollars)	  with	  uncertain	  safety	  benefits	  (Miller,	  1988).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128	  One	  important	  initiative	  established	  in	  1979,	  was	  NHTSA’s	  New	  Car	  Assessment	  Program	  
(NCAP),	  a	  consumer	  information	  initiative,	  which	  rates	  the	  safety	  performance	  of	  new	  cars.	  The	  
Program	  was	  part	  of	  the	  Motor	  Vehicle	  Information	  and	  Cost	  Savings	  Act	  of	  1972.	  In	  1980,	  NHTSA	  
published	  the	  results	  in	  a	  book	  for	  consumers,	  which	  was	  however	  discontinued	  by	  the	  Reagan	  
administration	  in	  1981	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  1986).	  The	  program	  itself	  continued,	  but	  the	  results	  
would	  again	  be	  made	  public	  on	  annual	  basis	  –	  in	  an	  easy-­‐to-­‐understand	  format	  for	  consumers	  –	  
only	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  (Hershman,	  2001).	  
129	  Note	  that	  the	  specification	  of	  standards	  was	  delegated	  to	  the	  NHTSA,	  which	  has	  the	  discretion	  
to	  modify	  performance	  levels	  or	  to	  require	  different	  technologies.	  Thus,	  policy-­‐making	  took	  place	  
at	  the	  executive	  level.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  air	  pollution	  (Chapter	  V),	  emission	  standards	  were	  
established	  by	  law,	  and	  any	  change	  had	  to	  be	  approved	  by	  Congress.	  Hence	  the	  declining	  level	  of	  




But	   consumer	   advocacy	   groups	   and	   automobile	   insurance	   companies	   took	   the	  
government	  to	  court	  (Waters	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  
In	   1982,	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeals	   overturned	   the	   rescission	   of	   Standard	   208.	  
Automakers	   then	   took	   the	  case	   to	   the	  Supreme	  Court,	  which	   in	   1983	  upheld	   the	  
previous	   decision	   (Bollier	   and	   Claybrook,	   1986).	   The	   new	   Secretary	   of	  
Transportation	  (Dole)	  then	  announced	  a	  complete	  review	  of	  the	  Standard,	  which	  
meant	  more	  delay	  (Abeles,	  2004).	  The	  subsequent	  review	  in	  1984	  reissued	  Standard	  
208	  and	  mandated	  passive	  restraint	  systems	  by	  1989	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  1986).	  
But	   it	   also	   created	   a	   loophole,	   establishing	   that	   the	   passive	   restraint	   standard	  
would	  be	  annulled	  if,	  by	  April	  1989,	  states	  accounting	  for	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  United	  
States’	  population	  passed	  mandatory	  seat-­‐belt	  use	  laws	  (Miller,	  1988).	  
New	   entrants	   and	   regime	   outsiders.	   Insurance	   companies	   and	   other	   airbag	  
advocates	   (such	   as	   consumer	   groups)	   contested	   the	   claims	   of	   American	  
automakers	  (see	  below),	  arguing	  that	  costs	  were	  less	  than	  half	  of	  what	  automakers	  
claimed	   (Abeles,	   2004).	   Airbag	   suppliers	   further	   claimed	   that	   they	   had	   solved	  
many	  of	  the	  technical	  problems	  cited	  by	  automakers.	  Nevertheless,	  many	  suppliers	  
(such	   as	  Eaton,	   Yale	   &	   Towne)	   stopped	   production	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1970s,	   because	   a	  
market	   did	   not	   materialize	   (Albaum,	   2005).	   The	   insurance	   industry	   however	  
continued	   to	   lobby	   for	   an	   airbag	   mandate	   (O’Neill,	   2009),	   and	   deployed	  
information	   campaigns	   in	   the	   media	   (Figure	   VI.15).	   It	   also	   offered	   consumers	  
discounts	  of	  30%	  for	  cars	  with	  airbags	  (Abeles,	  2004).	  




Figure	  VI.15:	  Allstate’s	  information	  campaign	  calling	  for	  an	  airbags	  
	  
Source:	  The	  Rotarian	  (February	  1980,	  p.	  15).	  
Japanese	  companies	  lagged	  behind	  in	  airbag	  development.	  In	  the	  late	  1970s,	  Nissan	  
performed	   some	  R&D,	   but	   preferred	   passive	   belts	   to	   comply	  with	   Standard	   208;	  
Toyota	  and	  Honda	  had	  airbag	  development	  programmes,	  which	  did	  not	  produce	  
satisfactory	  results	  (Schnapp,	  1979).	  The	  main	  problem	  was	  limited	  space	  for	  airbag	  
systems	  in	  small	  cars	  (Struble,	  1998).	  In	  the	  late	  1970s,	  Mercedes-­‐Benz	  continued	  to	  
work	   on	   airbags,	   collaborating	   with	   Bayern-­‐Chemicals,	   Bosch	   (which	   supplied	  
crash	   sensors),	  Morton-­‐Thiokol	   (which	   supplied	   inflators),	   and	   Petri	   AG	   (which	  
supplied	   steering	   wheels	   with	   airbag	   module)	   (Nilsson	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   In	   1981,	  
Mercedes	  began	  offering	  driver-­‐side	  airbags	  as	  an	  option	  on	  luxury	  cars	  in	  Europe	  
(Scott,	  1980).	  
VI.4.7.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  	  
Political	  strategies.	  Automakers	  contributed	  to	  the	  regulatory	  weakening	  of	  safety	  
standards,	   contesting	   or	   delaying	   their	   implementation	   with	   information	  
strategies.	  They	  spoke	  at	  hearings,	  lobbied	  Congress,	  and	  expressed	  their	  concerns	  




high	  costs	  and	  competitiveness	  problems	  (decline	  in	  sales,	  job	  losses)	  (MacLennan,	  
1988;	   Abeles,	   2004);	   (b)	   limited	   effectiveness	   compared	   to	   seatbelts,	   (c)	   risk	   of	  
liability	   claims	   in	   case	   airbags	   did	   not	   inflate	   properly;	   (d)	   lack	   of	   consumer	  
demand;	  and	  (e)	  technical	  difficulties	  related	  to	  airbag	  installation	  in	  small	  vehicles	  
and	   problems	   concerning	   out-­‐of-­‐position	   passengers	   and	   children	   in	   front	   seats	  
(Struble,	   1998;	  Kent,	  2003).	  Automakers	   thus	  supported	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  of	  
mandated	  passive	  restraints.	  	  
Technological	  strategies.	  The	  legal	  struggles	  created	  regulatory	  uncertainty,	  which	  
led	  automakers	  to	  diminish	  their	  safety	  innovation	  strategies,	  resulting	  in	  declining	  
safety	   patents	   (Figure	   VI.2.d).	   The	   industry	   was	   also	   in	   dire	   straits,	   which	  
diminished	   its	   interest	   in	   product	   innovations	   and	   led	   to	   an	   interest	   in	  
organizational	   (‘restructuration’)	   and	   process	   innovations	   to	   compete	   with	   the	  
Japanese	  (Ingrassia,	  2010).	  
VI.4.7.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
The	   safety	   issue	  was	  negatively	   influenced	  by	   the	   industry’s	   economic	  problems,	  
which	   related	   to	   shrinking	  markets130	  and	  declining	  market	   shares	   (Figure	  VI.16),	  
due	  to	  increasing	  Japanese	  competition.	  These	  problems	  caused	  substantial	  losses:	  
Chrysler	   $10	   billion	   (1978-­‐1981),	   Ford	   $8	   billion	   (1980-­‐1982),	  GM	   $2	   billion	   (1980)	  
(Figure	  VI.17).	  
Figure	  VI.16:	  Share	  of	  American	  motor	  vehicle	  market	  by	  firm	  groups	  
	  
Sources:	  Until	  1960,	  White	  (1971);	  after,	  Ward’s	  Automotive	  Group	  (2013)	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Figure	  VI.17:	  Net	  income	  of	  the	  Big	  Three	  American	  automakers,	  1976-­‐2012	  
	  
Sources:	  Freeland	  (2001)	  for	  GM;	  Hyde	  (2003)	  for	  Chrysler;	  and	  Studer-­‐Noguez	  (2003)	  for	  Ford	  	  
The	  economic	  problems	  decreased	  the	  industry’s	  attention	  to	  the	  safety	  issue	  and	  
diminished	  the	  willingness	  to	  comply	  with	  safety	  regulations,	  leading	  to	  enhanced	  
lobbying	   activities	   for	   regulatory	   relief.	   The	   industry	   continued	   to	   see	   safety	   as	  
externally	   imposed	   and	   did	   not	   include	   it	   in	   its	  mission.	   Industry	   resistance	   to	  
safety	   also	   had	   an	   ideological	   component,	   as	   a	  New	   York	   Times	   editorial	   (NYT,	  
1981,	  p.	  A30)	  noted:	  “The	  real	  mystery	  (…)	  is	  why	  the	  auto	  industry	  fights	  safety	  so	  
hard.	  The	  explanation	  for	  the	  mystery	  may	  be	  as	  simple	  as	  it	  is	  sad:	  American	  auto	  
makers	  (…)	  oppose	  airbags	  because	  they	  would	  give	  regulation	  a	  good	  name”.	  
The	  economic	  problems	  also	  weakened	  political	  safety	  pressure,	  as	  policy-­‐
makers	  stepped	  in	  to	  protect	  the	  American	  car	  industry.	  In	  1980,	  President	  Carter	  
announced	  a	  plan	   to	  help	   the	  auto	   industry	  with	   tax	   reliefs,	   relaxation	  of	   federal	  
regulations,	   and	   financial	   aid.	   This	   opened	   “a	   new	   era	   of	   cooperation	   between	  
government	   and	   industry”	   (Luger,	   2000,	   p.	   106).	   The	  Reagan	   administration	  was	  
even	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  industry’s	  complaints,	  and	  set	  up	  a	   ‘Task	  Force	  for	  
Regulatory	  Relief’,	  which	  proposed	  to	  roll	  back	  more	  than	  34	  safety,	  emissions	  and	  
fuel	   economy	   regulations	   (Luger,	   2000).	  Reagan	  also	  ensured	   that	  all	   regulations	  
should	  be	  assessed	  with	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  (MacLennan,	  1988).	  This	  empowered	  
industries	  because	  it	  imposed	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  (that	  benefits	  outweigh	  costs)	  on	  
(weakened)	  governmental	  agencies,	  and	  because	  it	  restricted	  debate	  to	  economic	  
issues,	  away	  from	  the	  health	  protection	  and	  social	  principles	  based	  on	  which	  the	  




VI.4.8. Acceleration	  due	  to	  spillover	  to	  consumer	  preferences	  (1984-­‐1991)	  
In	  this	  period,	  the	  auto-­‐safety	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  seems	  to	  have	  moved	  forward	  again,	  
presenting	  new	  dynamics	  that	  fit	  with	  the	  model’s	  phase	  4131:	  (a)	  frame	  conditions	  
were	   changed	   with	   states	   introducing	   seatbelt	   use	   laws	   (but	   no	   new	   Federal	  
regulation	   was	   introduced);	   and,	   more	   importantly,	   (b)	   safety	   concerns	   became	  
part	   of	   consumer	   preferences,	  which	   created	  market	   demand	   for	   safety	   features.	  
The	  period	  also	  fits	  phase	  4,	  because	  significant	  cracks	  appear	  in	  the	  industry	  front.	  
Firstly,	  the	  industry	  began	  to	  positively	  support	  seatbelts	  (in	  the	  hope	  of	  repealing	  
airbags).	   Secondly,	   Mercedes	   introduced	   airbag-­‐equipped	   cars	   in	   1984,	   which	  
sparked	  off	  an	  innovation	  race,	  with	  firms	  jockeying	  for	  position	  in	  the	  market	  that	  
now	  demanded	  safety	  features.	  	  
VI.4.8.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Social	   movements	   and	   public	   opinion.	   Auto-­‐safety	   advocacy	   groups	   (e.g.	   Public	  
Citizen)	  and	  the	   insurance	   industry	  created	  the	  Advocates	   for	  Highway	   and	  Auto	  
Safety	   (1989)	   coalition	   that	   pressured	  NHTSA	   and	  Congress	   for	   improved	   safety	  
standards	  and	  adoption	  of	  an	  airbag	  mandate	  (Brown,	   1989;	  Mashaw	  and	  Harfst,	  
1990;	  Nishida,	   1996).	   Public	   attention	   to	   automobile	   safety	   also	   increased	   in	   the	  
second	   half	   of	   the	   1980s	   (Figure	   VI.2.a),	   because	   of	   industry-­‐sponsored	   seatbelt	  
campaigns	   and	   the	   general	   rise	   of	   a	   health	   and	   safety	   movement	   (Centers	   for	  
Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention,	  2011).	  Public	  debates	  about	  auto-­‐safety	  began	   to	  
influence	   behavioural	   and	   consumption	   practices,	   leading,	   for	   instance,	   to	  
increasing	   use	   of	   manual	   seatbelts	   (Figure	   VI.18)	   even	   before	   most	   states	   had	  
adopted	  mandatory	  use	  laws	  (MULs).	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  Because	  in	  Geels	  and	  Penna	  (2013)	  this	  period	  ends	  in	  1995,	  it	  has	  been	  assessed	  as	  a	  hybrid	  




Figure	  VI.18:	  Increasing	  seatbelt	  use	  
	  
Source:	  Based	  on	  data	  from	  Committee	  for	  the	  Safety	  Belt	  Technology	  Study,	  2003,	  p.	  6	  
Consumer	   demand.	   Safety	   began	   to	   spill	   over	   to	   consumer	   preferences,	   creating	  
market	  demand	  for	  safety	  features	  such	  as	  airbags	  and	  anti-­‐lock	  braking	  systems,	  
initially	  in	  the	  upper	  market	  segment	  (Albaum,	  2005).	  From	  the	  late-­‐1980s,	  surveys	  
also	  showed	  that	  consumers	  increasingly	  valued	  safety	  as	  a	  car	  purchase	  criterion	  
(Abeles,	  2004)	  (Figure	  VI.19)132.	  An	  article	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  (January	  26,	  1990),	  
titled	   ‘Selling	   autos	   by	   selling	   safety’	   (Judge,	   1990),	   signalled	   a	   ‘cultural	   change’,	  
with	  technically	  sophisticated	  people	  demanding	  more	  car	  safety.	  	  
Figure	  VI.19:	  Relative	  importance	  of	  safety	  features	  as	  car-­‐buying	  criterion	  
	  
Source:	  National	  Research	  Council,	  1996,	  p.	  85	  
Changing	  consumer	  attitudes	  were	  related	  to	  several	  factors:	  (1)	  the	  100-­‐year	  long	  
public	  debate	  about	  auto-­‐safety	  and	  the	  more	  recent	  debate	  over	  passive	  restraint	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  The	  Figure	  may	  not	  give	  a	  precise	  indication	  of	  the	  change,	  but	  Abeles	  (2004,	  p.	  12)	  cites	  
different	  surveys	  that	  show	  that	  by	  1983,	  safety	  was	  the	  most	  highly	  valued	  attribute	  for	  c.	  8-­‐9%	  of	  
consumers,	  while	  by	  1987	  that	  figures	  had	  increased	  to	  c.	  12-­‐13%.	  In	  the	  1990s,	  one	  third	  of	  




regulations;	  (2)	  the	  rise	  of	  health-­‐and-­‐safety	  movement;	  (3)	  demographic	  changes,	  
such	   as	   the	   baby	   boomers	   reaching	  maturity	   and	  women	  becoming	   increasingly	  
involved	  in	  new	  vehicle	  purchases	  (Automotive	  News,	  1988);	  (4)	  the	  disclosure	  of	  
auto-­‐safety	  ratings	   (by	  consumer	  magazines	  and	  the	   insurance	   industry),	  and	  (5)	  
car	  industry	  advertisements	  of	  seatbelts	  and	  other	  safety	  features.	  
Policy-­‐makers.	  The	  conservative	  Reagan	  and	  Bush	  (Sr.)	  governments	  embraced	  an	  
anti-­‐regulatory	   and	   pro-­‐business	   ideology	   (Luger,	   2000).	   No	   substantive	   federal	  
safety	   regulations	  were	   introduced	   in	   the	   1984-­‐1991	   period.	   But	   the	   1984	   passive	  
restraint	   ruling	   (208)	   from	   the	   previous	   period	   still	   held,	   including	   the	   loophole	  
that	   automakers	   could	   avoid	   the	   airbag	   mandate	   by	   enhancing	   seatbelt	   use.	  
Automakers	   subsequently	   lobbied	   states	   to	  pass	  Mandatory	  Use	  Laws	   (MUL)	   for	  
seatbelts	   (O’Neill,	   2009).	   In	   1985,	   New	   York	   and	   several	   other	   states	   adopted	  
MULs.	  But	  the	  hope	  of	  reaching	  the	  2/3-­‐population	  threshold	  was	  dashed	  in	  1986,	  
when	  Californian	  legislators	  (who	  wanted	  a	  state-­‐level	  seatbelt	  MUL	  and	  a	  Federal	  
mandate)	  specified	  that	  their	  MUL	  would	  apply	  if	  and	  only	  if	  was	  not	  counted	  by	  
NHTSA	  (O’Neill,	  2009).	  
With	   the	   loophole	   closed,	   policy-­‐makers	   carried	   forward	   the	   phase-­‐in	  
schedule	   for	   passive	   restraint	   standard	   technologies	   (either	   airbags	   or	   automatic	  
seatbelts):	  they	  should	  be	  installed	  in	  10%	  of	  all	  new	  automobiles	  for	  1987MY;	  25%	  
for	  1988MY;	  40%	  for	  1989MY;	  and	  100%	  for	  1990MY	  (Abeles,	  2004).	  Although	  many	  
automakers	  were	  planning	  to	  comply	  with	  automatic	  seatbelts,	   the	  new	  schedule	  
also	  provided	  an	  additional	  push	  for	  the	  unfolding	  airbag	  race.	  
Regime	   outsiders.	   While	   in	   the	   institutional	   environment	   the	   impasse	   was	   still	  
being	   settled,	   in	   the	   task	   environment	   an	   airbag	   race	   began,	   triggered	   by	  
Mercedes-­‐Benz,	   which	   introduced	   optional	   airbags	   in	   1984MY	   models	   for	   the	  
American	   luxury	   segment	   (Albaum,	   2005).	  Mercedes	   offered	   airbags	   as	   part	   of	   a	  
‘Supplemental	   Restraint	   System’	   (SRS),	   which	   also	   included	   seatbelts	   (O’Neill,	  
2009).	  This	  changed	  the	  safety	  debate,	  because	  “[w]hat	  had	  been	  viewed	  by	  many	  
people	  as	  a	  choice	  between	  belts	  and	  airbags	  was	  now	  becoming	  a	  recognition	  of	  
the	  need	   for	  both”	   (O’Neill,	  2009,	  p.	   118).	   In	   1985,	   the	  Mercedes	  airbags	   included	  
digital	   sensors	   (developed	   by	   Bosch),	   which	   opened	   a	   new	   pathway	   for	   the	  




responded	   to	   Mercedes,	   whose	   advertising	   (Figure	   VI.20)	   attracted	   positive	  
attention	  (Abeles,	  2004).	  
Figure	  VI.20:	  Mercedes-­‐Benz	  1984	  advertisement	  of	  its	  airbag	  system	  	  
	  
Source:	  New	  York	  Magazine,	  Apr.	  23rd,	  1984,	  17	  (17),	  pp.	  82-­‐3.	  
VI.4.8.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  	  
Socio-­‐cultural	  and	  political	  strategies.	  Hoping	  to	  repeal	  Standard	  208,	  the	  industry	  
began	   promoting	   seatbelt	   use	   with	   advertising	   campaigns	   that	   called	   drivers	   to	  
‘buckle-­‐up’.	   Carmakers	   also	   founded	   a	   front	   organization,	   Traffic	   Safety	   Now,	  
funded	  with	   $20	  million	   (nominal)	   to	  organize	   a	   lobbying	   effort	  urging	   states	   to	  
enact	  MULs	   (Reavis,	   1985).	   The	   campaign	  was	   planned	   on	   a	   geographical	   basis,	  
depending	  on	  the	  acceptance	  of	  seatbelts	  in	  each	  state.	  These	  industry	  actions	  to	  
promote	   safety	   in	   the	   form	   of	   seatbelt	   use	   represented	   a	   significant	   shift	   in	  
orientation	  (Bollier	  and	  Claybrook,	  1986).	  It	  was	  the	  first	  time	  the	  industry	  would	  
act	  together	  in	  promoting	  seatbelt	  use.	  	  
Technological	   strategy.	   While	   American	   automakers	   promoted	   seatbelts,	   they	  
found	   themselves	   caught	   up	   in	   the	   airbag	   innovation	   race.	   In	   1986,	   Ford	  
announced	  that	  it	  would	  offer	  driver-­‐side	  airbag	  as	  optional	  equipment	  (Crawford,	  
1985).	   To	   produce	   the	   device,	   Ford	   collaborated	   with	   suppliers	   such	   as	   Talley	  




(diagnostic	   unit)	   (Nilsson	   et	   al.,	   2003).	   In	   1987,	   Chrysler	   ‘upped	   the	   ante’	   and	  
announced	   driver-­‐side	   airbag	   systems	   as	   standard	   equipment	   in	   all	   big	   models	  
(Abeles,	   2004).	   GM	   offered	   optional	   driver-­‐side	   airbags	   on	   1988	   and	   1989	   car-­‐
models,	  and	  provided	  rebates	  to	  consumers	  who	  purchased	  airbags	  and	  two	  other	  
options	   (e.g.	   aluminium	  wheels,	   air	   conditioning).	  By	   the	   1988MY,	   1/3	  of	   all	  new	  
Big	  Three	  models	  had	  driver-­‐side	  airbags	  as	  optional	  or	  standard	  equipment	  (my	  
calculation	  based	  on	  information	  presented	  by	  Henry,	  1988).	  
Airbag	   adoption	   was	   also	   stimulated	   by	   the	   insurance	   industry,	   which	  
continued	  to	  offer	  discounts	  (20-­‐30%)	  in	  insurance	  premiums	  for	  airbag-­‐equipped	  
vehicles	  (Henry,	  1988;	  Abeles,	  2004).	  With	  other	  foreign	  companies	  such	  as	  BMW,	  
Saab,	  Volvo,	  Audi,	  and	  Porsche	  also	  offering	  airbags,	  the	  ‘airbag	  race’	  accelerated,	  
and	   airbag-­‐related	   patenting	   activities	   surged	   (Figure	   VI.2.d).	   The	   shift	   towards	  
airbags	  was	   related	   to	  perceived	  market	  demand	   rather	   than	   regulatory	  pressure	  
(as	  automakers	  could	  also	  comply	  with	  Standard	  208	  with	  automatic	  seatbelts).	  A	  
1990	  (Jan.	  26th)	  article	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  summarised	  the	  sea	  change	  in	  beliefs	  
and	  strategies:	  
Lee	  A.	  Iacocca,	  now	  Chrysler's	  chairman	  and	  then	  president	  of	  Ford,	  said	  in	  
1972	   that	   ‘safety	   doesn't	   sell.’	   But	   the	   growing	   demand	   for	   safer	   cars	   [...]	  
caused	  Mr.	  Iacocca	  to	  change	  his	  mind.	  Indeed,	  when	  Chrysler	  announced	  
its	  commitment	  to	  air	  bags	  in	  1988,	  the	  company	  ran	  ads	  with	  a	  picture	  of	  
its	   well-­‐known	   chairman,	   proclaiming,	   ‘Who	   says	   you	   can’t	   teach	   an	   old	  
dog	  new	  tricks?’	  (Judge,	  1990,	  p.	  D1)	  
VI.4.8.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
The	   auto-­‐safety	   issue	   benefitted	   from	   the	   broader	   health-­‐and-­‐safety	   movement,	  
which	  got	  new	  impulse	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  in	  response	  to	  concerns	  with	  occupational	  
safety,	  industrial	  accidents	  such	  as	  Bhopal	  (1984)	  and	  Chernobyl	  (1986),	  and	  anti-­‐
smoking	   campaigns. 133 	  The	   development	   of	   airbags	   benefitted	   from	   the	  
microelectronics	   revolution,	   which	   gathered	   pace	   in	   the	   1980s.	   Airbags	   also	   co-­‐
evolved	  with	   the	  move	   towards	   ‘total	   quality’	   control,	   as	   the	  need	  of	   full	   system	  
reliability	  requires	  “quality	  assurance	  inspection	  and	  testing	  at	  a	  100	  percent	  level,	  
as	  opposed	  to	  statistical	  sampling	  process”	  (Struble,	  1998,	  p.	  66).	  Another	  broader	  
development	  was	  the	  creation	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  of	  a	  new	  market	  segment	  around	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





the	  minivan	  (Ingrassia,	  2010).	  This	  new	  design	  trajectory	  resulted	  in	  large	  cars	  and	  
trucks,	  which	   created,	  however,	   new	   safety	   risks	   to	  bystanders	   and	  occupants	   of	  
smaller	  vehicles.	  
VI.4.9. Spillovers	  to	  mainstream	  markets	  and	  strategic	  industry	  
reorientation	  (1991-­‐2000)	  
In	   this	   period,	   the	   auto-­‐safety	   issue	   spilled	   over	   to	   mainstream	   markets,	   with	  
demand	  for	  safety	  spreading	  to	  mainstream	  customers.	  This	  in	  turn	  stimulated	  the	  
strategic	  reorientation	  of	  American	  automakers	  and	  the	  inclusion	  of	  safety	  in	  core	  
beliefs	  and	  missions.	  The	  period	  can	  therefore	  be	  characterized	  as	  an	  ideal-­‐typical	  
phase	  5.	  
VI.4.9.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Social	   movements	   and	   public	   opinion.	   Mandatory	   seat-­‐belt	   use	   laws,	   buckle-­‐up	  
campaigns,	   and	   safety	   feature	  advertisements	   caused	  a	   further	   increase	   in	  public	  
attention	  to	  safety	  (Figure	  VI.2.a),	  culminating	  in	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  auto-­‐
safety	  as	  a	  cultural	  value	  and	  diffusion	  of	  behavioural	  practices	  such	  as	  seatbelt	  use	  
(Figure	  VI.18).	   A	   sub-­‐issue	   that	   generated	   debate	   and	   increased	   public	   attention	  
(cf.	   Figure	   VI.3)	   was	   airbag-­‐related	   fatalities	   of	   children	   in	   front	   seats	   (Albaum,	  
2005).	  The	  organization	  Parents	  for	  Safer	  Airbags	  called	  for	  NHTSA	  rulings	  on	  the	  
placement	  of	  warning	  labels	  in	  cars	  (Pressler,	  1998).	  
Consumer	  demand.	  Despite	  airbag-­‐related	  children	  fatalities,	  many	  surveys	  showed	  
that	   the	  public	   regarded	   airbags	   as	   a	  desirable	   technology	   (Graham	   et	   al.,	   1997).	  
This	  consumer	  preference	  translated	  into	  market	  demand,	  which	  stimulated	  rapid	  
diffusion	  of	  airbags	  for	  drivers	  and	  passengers	  (Figure	  VI.21).	  
Figure	  VI.21:	  Number	  of	  airbags	  installed	  in	  passenger	  cars	  
	  




Policy-­‐makers.	  The	  1991	  Intermodal	  Surface	  Transportation	  Efficiency	  Act	  mandated	  
that	  by	  1997	  new	  cars	  should	  have	  dual	  airbags	  systems	  (i.e.	  in	  the	  driver-­‐side	  and	  
passenger-­‐side).	   The	   Act	   however	   just	   officially	   endorsed	   an	   already	  
institutionalized	  practice134,	   because	   airbags	  were	  by	   then	  already	  a	   reality	   in	   the	  
marketplace:	  the	  20-­‐year-­‐long	  regulatory	  struggle	  on	  the	  passive	  restraint	  mandate	  
thus	   came	   to	   a	   quiet	   end	   (Abeles,	   2004).	   In	   response	   to	   the	   hazard	   to	   children	  
issue,	   Congress	   carried	   out	   a	   hearing	   (Pressler,	   1998),	   and	   the	   NHTSA	   issued	  
mandatory	  warnings	  that	  parents	  should	  not	  place	  children	  in	  front	  seats	  (Albaum,	  
2005).	  
VI.4.9.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  
Socio-­‐cultural	   strategy.	   In	   response	   to	   children-­‐safety	   concerns,	   American	  
automakers	   launched	   collective	   information	   campaigns	   (Figure	   VI.22),	   and	  
promoted	   other	   individual	   efforts.	   “Virtually	   every	   automaker	   in	   the	   US	   [was]	  
either	  planning	  or	  ha[d]	   started	  some	  sort	  of	  notification	  program	  to	  car	  owners	  
addressing	  air	  bag	  safety.	  Several	  [were]	  going	  beyond	  the	  direct	  mail	  route,	  with	  
other	  advertising	  and	  educational	  programs”	  (Halliday,	  1996,	  online).	  In	  1996,	  the	  
Big	   Three	   announced	   the	  Occupant	   Safety	   Research	   Partnership	   to	   develop	   the	  
‘next	  generation	  of	  airbags’	  (Pressler,	  1998)	  and	  address	  the	  child-­‐fatality	  problem,	  
using	   new	   devices	   for	   deactivating	   and	   depowering	   inflated	   airbags	   at	   the	  
discretion	  of	  owners	  (Albaum,	  2005).	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Figure	  VI.22:	  Airbag	  safety	  campaigns	  by	  the	  Big	  Three	  (mid-­‐1990s)	  
	  
Source:	  Pressler	  (1998)	  
Positioning	   strategy.	   In	  response	  to	  new	  markets,	   the	  Big	  Three	  automakers	   fully	  
embraced	   safety	   in	   their	   positioning	   and	   marketing	   strategies,	   which	   signalled	  
major	   shifts	   in	   strategic	   attitudes,	   and	   an	   abandonment	  of	   the	  belief	   that	   ‘safety	  
does	  not	  sell’.	  Airbags,	  microelectronics	  and	  digital	  technologies	  also	  changed	  the	  
industry’s	  technical	  regime.	  Airbag-­‐patenting	  activities	  exploded	  (Figure	  VI.2.d)	  as	  
automakers	   exploited	   the	   new	   innovation	   potential,	   developing	   digital	   sensors,	  
software	   algorithms,	   side	   and	   curtain	   airbags	   etc.	   (Struble,	   1998).	   American	  
automakers	   aimed	   to	   differentiate	   themselves	   from	   Japanese	   automakers,	   which	  
lagged	  behind	  in	  the	  airbag	  race	  (Abeles,	  2004).	  	  
VI.4.9.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
American	  automakers	  experienced	  major	  financial	  problems	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  due	  
to	  a	   recession	   (which	  depressed	  demand)	  and	   ‘legacy’	  problems	   (post-­‐retirement	  
and	  health	  benefits)	  (Ingrassia,	  2010):	  in	  1991	  losses	  amounted	  to	  $5.0	  billion	  (2012	  
dollars)	  for	  GM,	  $2.5	  for	  Ford,	  and	  $0.9	  billion	  for	  Chrysler	  (Figure	  VI.17).	  In	  1992,	  
losses	   increased	   to	   $25.7	   billion	   (2012	   dollars)	   for	   GM	   and	   $8.1	   billion	   for	   Ford,	  
while	   in	   1993,	   Chrysler	   faced	   a	   $2.7	   billion	   loss.	   Unlike	   the	   late	   1970s,	   these	  




because	  it	  had	  become	  a	  commercial	  battleground,	  and	  safety	  was	  already	  part	  of	  
the	   industry’s	   mission	   and	   belief	   system.	   Financial	   fortunes	   of	   the	   Big	   Three	  
improved	   during	   the	   1990s,	   largely	   because	   of	   expanding	   sales	   of	   sport-­‐utility	  
vehicles	  in	  the	  large	  car	  and	  truck	  market.	  
VI.5. ANALYSIS	  
VI.5.1. Pattern-­‐matching	  of	  DILC-­‐	  model	  and	  case	  study	  
Despite	  the	  relatively	  good	  match	  between	  phases	  and	  periods	  (which	  I	  indicated	  
in	  the	  introduction	  to	  each	  period),	  there	  were	  some	  minor	  deviations	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	   certain	   empirical	   periods	   simultaneously	   included	   conceptual	   mechanisms	  
from	  multiple	  theoretical	  phases.	  The	  1946-­‐1955	  period,	  for	  instance,	  was	  primarily	  
about	  framing	  struggles	  (phase	  2),	  but	  also	  contained	  elements	  from	  phase	  1	  (new	  
problem	   definition),	   3	   (defensive	   hedging	   by	   automakers;	   small	   firms	   deviating	  
from	  the	  closed	  industry	  front),	  and	  4	  (involvement	  of	  macro-­‐politicians).	  So,	  the	  
case	   is	   in	  some	   instances	  more	  complex	   than	  the	  analytical	  model	   (as	  expected).	  
Overall,	  however,	  empirical	  periods	  matched	  relatively	  well	  with	  conceptual	  phases	  
in	  the	  DILC-­‐model.	  This	  empirical	  complexity	  emphasizes	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  DILC-­‐
model	  is	  an	  ideal	  type,	  and,	  as	  such,	  should	  be	  used	  as	  heuristic	  tool.	  
In	   four	  ways,	   the	  case	  showed	  somewhat	   larger	  deviations	   from	  the	   ideal-­‐
typical	  DILC-­‐model.	   	   These	   deviations	   suggest	  ways	   in	  which	   the	  model	   can	   be	  
further	   elaborated.	  First,	   outside	  professional	   communities	  were	  more	   important	  
than	  social	  movements	  in	  getting	  car	  design	  on	  the	  safety	  agenda.	  Activists	  such	  as	  
Nader	  played	  a	  role	  in	  popularizing	  findings,	  but	  they	  drew	  on	  preceding	  research	  
from	  medical	  doctors	  and	  crash-­‐engineers.	  Scientific	  research	  should	  thus	  be	  made	  
more	   prominent	   in	   the	   first	   or	   second	   phase	   of	   the	   DILC-­‐model	   (problem-­‐
articulation).	  	  
Second,	  changes	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  auto-­‐safety	  (in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s)	  
influenced	   the	   direction	   of	   issue-­‐evolution.	   This	   process	   is	   not	   yet	   explicitly	  
included	  in	  the	  ideal-­‐type	  five-­‐phase	  model,	  but	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  
co-­‐evolution	  of	  problems	  and	  solutions	  (see	  next	  section).	  
Third,	  competing	  issues	  (air	  pollution,	  car	  quality	  concerns,	  scandals	  about	  
secret	   recall	  campaigns,	   Japanese	  competition,	  car	  styling,	  profitability	  problems)	  




activist	  culture,	  energy	  crises,	  economic	  recession,	  demographics,	  health	  and	  safety	  
movement,	   micro-­‐electronics	   revolution)	   can	   positively	   or	   negatively	   influence	  
issue	   life-­‐cycle	  dynamics.	   So,	   internal	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  dynamics	   are	   influenced	  by	  
external	   developments,	   as	   the	   air	   pollution	   case	   has	   also	   shown.	   This	   is	   an	  
important	  insight	  that	  has	  been	  overlooked	  by	  the	  Greening	  of	  Industry	  literature	  
(see	  Chapter	  I).	  
The	  largest	  deviation	  is	  that	  the	  case	  did	  not	  follow	  a	  linear	  sequence	  of	  five	  
phases,	   but	   moved	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   phases.	   This	   deviation	   however	  
emphasises	  the	  internal	  validity	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model,	  because	  the	  multiple	  periods	  
could	  be	  characterized	  as	  akin	  to	  certain	  theoretical	  stages.	  I	  therefore	  suggest	  that	  
auto-­‐safety	  was	  interrupted	  and	  later	  followed	  a	  cyclical	  life-­‐cycle	  path	  (Bigelow	  et	  
al.,	   1993),	  with	   the	   issue	  moving	   backwards	   and	   forwards	   through	   the	   following	  
phases:	  Phase	  1	  (1900-­‐1924),	  Phase	  2	  (1924-­‐1942),	  Interruption	  (1942-­‐1946),	  Phase	  2	  
(1946-­‐1955),	  Phase	  3	  (1955-­‐1966),	  Phase	  4	  (1966-­‐1976),	  Phase	  3	  (1976-­‐1984),	  Phase	  4	  
(1984-­‐1991),	  Phase	  5	   (1991-­‐2000).	   I	   shall	  attempt	  at	  explaining	  this	  deviation	   from	  
the	  model’s	  ‘normal’	  path	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
VI.5.2. Explanation-­‐building	  based	  on	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  
VI.5.2.1. Explanation	  of	  mechanisms	  and	  factors	  leading	  to	  spills	  over	  to	  
consumer	  preferences	  
As	   the	   case	   study	   has	   shown,	   the	   car	   safety	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   led	   to	   incumbent	  
industry	   reorientation	   through	   a	   ‘changes	   in	   consumer	   preferences’	   route.	  
Although	   the	   1966	   NTMVSA	   forced	   technologies	   into	   the	   market,	   it	   did	   not	  
succeed	  in	  triggering	  changes	  in	  the	  industry	  belief	  and	  mission.	  In	  fact,	  the	  issue	  
returned	  to	  a	  political	  process	  due	  to	  implementation	  struggles,	  and	  reorientation	  
only	  happened	  when	  the	  issue	  decisively	  spilled	  over	  to	  mass	  markets.	  
Which	  factors	  and	  mechanisms	  explain	  changing	  consumer	  attitude	  in	  the	  
1980s?	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  case	  study,	  new	  consumer	  attitudes	  were	  related	  to:	  (1)	  
public	   and	   political	   debates	   about	   auto-­‐safety	   and	   over	   passive	   restraint	  
regulations;	   (2)	   the	   institutionalization	   of	   the	   health-­‐and-­‐safety	   movement;	   (3)	  
demographic	  changes;	  (4)	  consumer	  education	  about	  relative	  car	  safety;	  and	  (5)	  car	  
industry	   (regime	   actors’	   and	   outsiders’)	   advertisements	   of	   seatbelts	   and	   other	  




‘attention	  advocacy’	  by	  activists	  and	  social	  movements	  and	  political	  struggles	  in	  the	  
institutional	   environment	   and	   (b)	   outsiders’	   strategies	   in	   the	   task	   environment.	  
While	  these	  mechanisms	  were	  present	  in	  the	  air	  pollution	  case,	  they	  were	  active	  for	  
a	  couple	  of	  decades.	  So,	  time	  (not	  only	  timing)	  and	  duration	  of	  mechanisms	  also	  
seem	  important	  in	  explaining	  changes	  in	  consumer	  preferences.	  	  
VI.5.2.2. Co-­‐evolution	  of	  problems	  and	  solutions	  
With	   regard	   to	   specific	  dynamics	   in	   the	   co-­‐evolution	  of	  problems	  and	   solutions,	  
the	  case	  study	  showed	  that	  struggles	  over	  the	  meaning	  and	  problem	  definition	  of	  
auto-­‐safety	   were	   an	   important	   part	   of	   the	   process.	   (While	   these	   dynamics	   were	  
mainly	   captured	   in	   the	   narrative	   approach,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   highlight	   that	  
attention	   indicators	   –	   namely,	   patents	   by	   type	   (Figure	  VI.2)	   and	  media	   usage	   of	  
issue-­‐related	   terms	   (Figure	   VI.3)	   –	   also	   appeared	   to	   highlight	   how	   technical	  
solutions	  co-­‐evolve	  with	  how	  the	  problem	  is	  framed.)	  
The	   gradual	   and	   contested	   replacement	   of	   the	   ‘education-­‐enforcement-­‐
engineering’	  framing	  by	  the	  ‘injury	  prevention’	  framing	  also	  had	  major	  implications	  
for	   the	   solutions	   that	  were	  pursued.	  The	   car	   industry	   initially	   supported	   the	   3E-­‐
framing,	  because	  it	  minimized	  their	  responsibility	  to	  develop	  solutions	  (by	  keeping	  
car	  design	  off	   the	  problem	  agenda).	  When	  automakers	  were	   forced	   (in	   the	   1950s	  
and	   1960s)	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   injury	   prevention	   framing,	   they	   reluctantly	  
introduced	  safety-­‐related	  solutions.	   Industry	  resistance	   lasted	  until	   the	   late	   1980s	  
when	   spillovers	   to	   consumer	  preferences	   created	  demand	   for	   safety	   innovations.	  
Only	  then	  did	  automakers	  strategically	  reorient	  and	  include	  safety	  in	  their	  beliefs,	  
mission,	  and	  innovation	  strategies.	  
So,	   the	   case	   study	   showed	  not	   only	   the	   general	   co-­‐evolution	   of	   problems	  
and	   solutions,	   but	   also	   that	   incumbent	   industry	   actors	   can	   become	   part	   of	   the	  
solution	   when	   they	   see	   economic	   opportunities	   (as	   predicted	   in	   phase	   5	   of	   the	  
DILC-­‐model).	  
VI.5.2.3. Explanation	  of	  factors	  and	  mechanisms	  influencing	  the	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle	  path	  
The	   deviations	   from	   the	   ‘normal’	   path	   can	   be	   explained	   with	   the	   other	   three	  
deviations	   mentioned	   in	   the	   pattern-­‐matching	   exercise	   and	   the	   mechanisms	  




• The	  interruption	  (1942-­‐1946)	  was	  due	  to	  an	  external	  issue	  at	  the	  macro-­‐context	  
(Second	  World	  War).	  
• The	   issue	   return	   to	  phase	  2	   (1946-­‐1955),	  where	   it	  was	  before	   the	  War,	  due	   to	  
outside	   professionals	   contesting	   the	   established	   3E-­‐framing,	   causing	  
reinterpretation	  of	  the	  problem	  and	  a	  framing	  struggle	  with	  the	  industry.	  
• The	   move	   to	   phase	   3	   (1955-­‐1966)	   was	   related	   to	   simultaneous	   increases	   in	  
public	  and	  political	  attention	  (due	  to	  the	  Ribicoff	  hearings,	  and	  outrage	  about	  
Nader’s	  harassment,	  and	  secret	  recall	  campaigns).	  
• The	   1966	  NTMVSA	   adopted	   an	   official	   –	   technical	   –	   framing	   and	  moved	   the	  
issue	  to	  phase	  4	  (1966-­‐1976).	  However,	   the	  backwards	  move	  to	  phase	  3	  (1976-­‐
1984)	  was	   related	   to	   an	   economic	   recession,	   financial	   industry	  problems,	   and	  
changing	   political	   orientation	   (from	   public	   interest	   legislation	   to	   industry	  
support	  and	  regulatory	  rollback).	  
I	   therefore	   suggest	   that	   four	   factors	   help	   explain	   the	  more	   complicated	   cyclical	  
path:	  (1)	  changes	  in	  interpretations	  and	  framing;	  (2)	  changes	  in	  the	  orientation	  and	  
relative	   strength	  of	   issue-­‐proponents	  and	   issue-­‐opponents;	   (3)	   alignment	  with	  or	  
competition	  from	  other	  issues;	  and	  (4)	  changes	  in	  macro-­‐contexts.	  
VI.6. CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  
VI.6.1. Evaluation	  of	  the	  mixed-­‐methods	  approach	  
The	   case	   study	   applied	   two	   quantification	   approaches:	   the	   exploratory	   visual	  
examination	   and	   the	   meta-­‐analysis	   of	   correlations.	   While	   the	   first	   method	   was	  
again	  a	  useful	   first	  approach	  to	   the	  case,	  helping	   to	  establish	   initial	  patterns	  and	  
relationships	   and	   to	   define	   sub-­‐periods,	   the	   meta-­‐analysis	   of	   correlations	   was	  
somehow	   problematic	   (although	   it	   did	   reveal	   some	   intriguing	   relationships	  
confirmed	  and	  explained	  by	  the	  qualitative	  narrative).	  
I	  believe	  the	  issue	  with	  the	  correlation	  analysis	  was	  due	  to	  methodological	  
problems	  with	  data	  collection:	  firstly,	  given	  the	  length	  of	  the	  case	  study,	  the	  class-­‐
based	   search	   using	   the	   USPTO	   system	   could	   not	   be	   combined	   with	   a	   keyword	  
search	  or	  with	  additional	  criteria	  such	  as	  ‘filing	  date’	  or	  ‘priority	  date’	  or	  ‘assignee	  
name’.	   While	   the	   class-­‐based	   search	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   census,	   I	   had	   to	  
compromise	   and	   use	   a	   sample	   of	   patents	   from	   a	   keyword	   search	   in	   the	   Google	  




to	  test	  in	  the	  contemporary	  case	  study	  (on	  climate	  change,	  Chapter	  VII),	  which	  will	  
use	   a	   different	   data	   collection	   strategy.	   Secondly,	   by	   working	   with	   yearly	  
observations,	   the	   statistical	   tests	   were	   compromised,	   because	   many	   sub-­‐periods	  
were	   rather	   short	   (although	   the	   statistical	   tests	   I	   used	   take	   sample	   size	   into	  
account).	  Because	  the	  method	  did	  not	  result	  in	  many	  significant	  correlations,	  I	  was	  
not	  able	  to	  experiment	  the	  method	  fully:	  the	  meta-­‐analysis	  –	  comparison	  between	  
correlation	  coefficients	  –	  was	  not	  adopted.	  In	  the	  next	  case	  study,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  
overcome	  these	  limitations	  with	  an	  alternative	  analytical	  strategy	  (q.v.).135	  	  
	   Notwithstanding,	   the	   correlation	   analysis	   did	   reveal	   interesting	   ‘within	  
period’	  relationships	  that	  were	  confirmed	  in	  the	  narrative	  analysis:	  
a) An	   early	   connection	   between	   public	   and	   political	   attention	   with	   the	  
objective	  side	  of	  the	  issue	  –	  this	  seem	  to	  be	  due	  to	  sense-­‐making	  attempts	  
and	  initial	  political	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  issue;	  
b) Further	   down	   in	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	   a	   disconnection	   between	   attention	  
indicators	  and	  the	  objective	  side	  of	  the	  issue	  –	  attention	  indicators	  are	  more	  
connected	  to	  visible	  societal	  struggles;	  
c) Technology	   development	   in	   response	   to	   the	   issue	   is	   firstly	   attempted	   by	  
regime	   outsiders	   and	   later	   by	   regime	   actors.	   The	   relative	   inertia	   of	  
incumbents	  is	  explained	  by	  their	  adherence	  to	  the	  industry	  regime	  (lock-­‐in	  
and	  path	  dependence).	  
d) The	  dialectical	  process	  between	  incumbents	  and	  outsiders	  is	  accelerated	  by	  
substantive	  regulation,	  and	  ultimately	  leads	  to	  an	  innovation	  race.	  However,	  
the	  existence	  of	  consumer	  demand	  is	  a	  crucial	  factor	  in	  triggering	  the	  race.	  
A	   fifth	  quantitative	   insight	  has	  not	  been	  explored	   in	   the	  correlation	  analysis:	   the	  
co-­‐evolution	   of	   problem	   framings	   and	   technical	   solutions	   seems	   to	   have	   been	  
captured	  by	  attention	  indicators	  (media	  usage	  of	  issue-­‐related	  terms	  and	  patenting	  
by	  types).	  The	  analysis	  of	  these	  indicators	  with	  quantitative	  methods	  could	  be	  the	  
focus	  of	  further	  research.	  
	   In	   sum,	   despite	   the	   caveats	   of	   the	   meta-­‐analysis	   of	   correlations,	   the	  
combined	   use	   of	   the	   quantitative	   approaches	  with	   the	   narrative	  method	   proved	  
very	  fruitful	  in	  the	  case	  study.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  Another	  solution	  would	  be	  to	  work	  with	  a	  dataset	  with	  monthly	  or	  quarterly.	  However,	  this	  is	  
too	  time-­‐consuming	  without	  machine-­‐assistance,	  i.e.	  coding	  of	  an	  automatic	  search	  algorithm,	  a	  




VI.6.2. Implications	  for	  thesis’	  research	  focus	  and	  questions	  
Most	   empirical	   periods	   had	   a	   good	   fit	   with	   the	   conceptual	   phases,	   as	   noted	   in	  
pattern-­‐matching	   analysis.	   Deviations	   were	   explained	   with	   recourse	   to	   model	  
specifications,	  corroborating	  the	  DILC-­‐model’s	   internal	  validity.	   In	  particular,	   the	  
case	  brought	  about	  two	  important	  lessons	  for	  this	  thesis	  research	  focus:	  
1. The	  American	  society	  faced	  a	  ‘Grand	  Societal	  Challenge’136	  with	  regard	  to	  safety	  
and	   car	   fatalities.	   The	   case	   clearly	   showed	   that	   this	   challenge	  did	  not	   simply	  
exist	   ‘out	   there’,	   but	   had	   to	   be	   articulated,	   defined,	   discussed	   and	   placed	   on	  
policy	  agendas.	  The	  term	  ‘challenge’	  itself	  seems	  to	  imply	  a	  general	  agreement	  
about	   the	   societal	   problem,	   that	   all	   that	   is	   needed	   is	   the	   development	   and	  
implementation	  of	   solutions.	  The	  car	   safety	  case	   study	  showed	   that	   these	  are	  
however	  not	  given:	  the	  development	  of	  technical	  solutions	  depends	  on	  how	  the	  
issue	   is	   framed.	   In	   this	   case,	   a	   behavioural	   framing	   that	   blamed	   drivers	   was	  
connected	  to	  the	  development	  of	  solutions	  that	  helped	  drivers	  to	  avoid	  crashes,	  
while	   a	   framing	   that	   blamed	   car	   designs	   for	   injuries	   and	   deaths	   led	   to	   the	  
development	  of	  solutions	  that	  protect	  car-­‐occupants	  in	  case	  of	  crashes.	  In	  the	  
end,	  of	  course,	  both	  types	  of	  technologies	  contribute	  to	  address	  the	  issue.	  But	  a	  
match	   between	   framing	   and	   solutions	   is	   needed	   depending	   on	   society’s	  
objective	   in	   addressing	   ‘Grand	   Challenges’.	   And,	   here,	   the	   case	   showed	   that	  
science	  (in	  the	  case,	  crashworthy	  engineering/crash	  research)	  plays	   important	  
role	  in	  finding	  an	  appropriate	  match.	  
2. As	   the	   air	   pollution	   case	   study,	   this	   one	   further	   confirmed	   an	   important	  
mechanism	  advanced	  by	  the	  DILC-­‐model:	  the	  closing	  and	  opening	  of	  industry	  
fronts.	  In	  the	  first	  two	  periods	  incumbent	  automakers	  created	  a	  closed	  industry	  
front	   through	   organizations	   such	   as	   the	   Safety	   First	   Committee	   and	   the	  
Automobile	  Safety	  Foundation,	  which	  embraced	  the	  3E-­‐framing	  and	  maintained	  
the	   status	   quo	   through	   symbolic	   strategies	   towards	   the	   institutional	  
environment.	   In	   subsequent	   periods	   incumbents	   succeeded	   in	   keeping	   this	  
front	  closed	  and	  suppressing	  safety-­‐related	  solutions:	  (a)	  relative	  outsiders	  (tyre	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  While	  some	  could	  contest	  the	  claim	  that	  auto	  safety	  is	  a	  Grand	  Challenge,	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  so	  
based	  on	  (a)	  the	  statistics	  shown	  in	  the	  first	  paragraphs	  of	  this	  chapters;	  (b)	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  
issue	  life-­‐cycle;	  and	  (c)	  the	  fact	  it	  still	  is	  a	  persistent	  problem	  for	  many	  developed	  and	  developing	  
countries.	  Moreover,	  as	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  IV,	  the	  issue	  present	  characteristics	  akin	  to	  those	  





suppliers	  in	  the	  1930s,	  small	  new	  entrants	  in	  the	  late-­‐1940s)	  were	  marginalized;	  
(b)	  Ford’s	  safety	  initiative	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1950s	  was	  apprehended	  by	  GM;	  and	  (c)	  in	  
the	  early	   1970s,	  GM	  tried	  to	  break	  the	   front	  with	  airbags,	  but	  abandoned	  this	  
strategy	   in	   1976.	  The	   industry	   front	   finally	  cracked	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1980s	  when	  an	  
outsider	   (Mercedes-­‐Benz)	   introduced	   airbags	   in	   a	   more	   safety-­‐conscious	  
consumer	   context.	   The	   ensuing	   innovation	   race	   signalled	   a	   breakdown	   of	  
industry	  resistance	  and	  a	  reorientation	  of	  strategies,	  beliefs,	  and	  capabilities.	  
The	  finding	  highlights	  the	  general	  importance	  of	  tensions	  between	  closed	  industry	  
fronts	  and	  escape	  attempts	  (to	  gain	  competitive	  advantage)	  and	  how	  these	  affected	  
innovation	   strategies.	   It	   therefore	   throws	   more	   light	   on	   this	   thesis’	   research	  
question(s),	  suggesting	  that	  major	  reorientation	  is	  unlikely	  until	  cracks	  appear	   in	  
the	   industry	   front.	   The	   case	   study	   validates	   the	   key	   dialectical	   dynamics	   of	   the	  




VII. THE	  CLIMATE	  CHANGE	  ISSUE	  IN	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  
AND	  THE	  RESPONSES	  FROM	  THE	  CAR	  INDUSTRY	  
VII.1. INTRODUCTION	  
Climate	   change	   is	   one	  of	   the	   ‘Grand	  Challenges’	   faced	  by	   society,	   requiring	   low-­‐
carbon	   innovations	   in	  many	   sectors	   and	   industries	   to	   achieve	   significant	   cuts	   in	  
emissions	   (European	  Commission,	   2012).	   The	   transportation	   sector	   is	   one	   of	   the	  
major	  contributors	   to	  carbon	  emissions.	  The	  sector	   is	   largely	  dependent	  on	   road	  
transport,	   which	   dominates	   the	  moving	   of	   both	   goods	   and	   passengers.	   In	   2005,	  
road	  transport	  was	  the	  main	  source	  of	  CO2	  emissions	  in	  the	  US,	  Germany	  and	  the	  
UK,	  and	  the	  second	  main	  source	  in	  Japan	  (OECD,	  2004).	  While	  truck	  freight	  was	  
responsible	   for	   15%	   of	   the	   world’s	   CO2	   emissions	   in	   2000,	   light-­‐duty	   vehicles	  
contributed	  with	  almost	  50%	  of	  these	  (WBSD,	  2004).	  Considering	  that	  changes	  in	  
personal	   mobility	   habits	   are	   not	   only	   slow,	   but	   indeed	   socially	   and	   politically	  
difficult	   (Geels	   et	   al.,	   2012;	  Wells	   and	  Nieuwenhuis,	   2012),	   changes	   in	   light-­‐duty	  
vehicle	  technologies	  are	  crucial	  for	  a	  transition	  to	  low-­‐carbon	  transport.	  
The	  recent	  trend	  in	  modal	  split	  of	  passenger	  transport	  in	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU	  
has	  been	  markedly	  steady	  since	  at	  least	  the	  1990s	  (OECD,	  2004).	  A	  change	  in	  this	  
pattern	   does	   not	   seem	   likely	   in	   the	   foreseeable	   future,	   in	   view	   of	   the	   cultural	  
embeddedness	  of	  cars	  in	  the	  society	  (Flink,	  1990)	  and	  the	  economic	  dependence	  of	  
individuals	   and	   states	   on	   the	   car	   industry	   for	   employment	   and	   revenues	   (Luger,	  
2000).	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  automotive	  industry’s	  technology	  strategies	  in	  response	  
to	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  become	  fundamental	  for	  the	  transition	  process.	  
This	   case	   study137	  investigates	   low-­‐carbon	   innovation	   and	   reorientation	   in	  
the	   car	   industry	   in	   response	   to	   climate	   change	   pressures,	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   the	  
United	   States.	   This	   case	   study	   plays	   a	   different	   role	   than	   the	   historical	   cases	  
investigated	  in	  this	  thesis.	  It	  aims	  at	  three	  objectives:	  (a)	  it	  will	  investigate	  an	  issue	  
life-­‐cycle	   in	  which	  multiple	  competing	  technological	  solutions	  co-­‐exist;	  (b)	   it	  will	  
test	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  in	  studying	  a	  contemporary	  case	  of	   ‘Grand	  
Societal	   Challenge’;	   and	   (c)	   it	   will	   do	   both	   with	   the	   aid	   of	  mixed-­‐methods	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  The	  study	  appears	  in	  Penna	  and	  Geels	  (2013),	  which	  have	  been	  submitted	  to	  Research	  Policy	  for	  
publication	  (currently	  going	  under	  first	  round	  of	  reviews).	  Yet,	  the	  case	  study	  I	  present	  here	  	  
(1)	  have	  slight	  changes	  in	  the	  dates	  of	  the	  sub-­‐periods;	  due	  to	  (b)	  refinement	  in	  the	  quantification	  




include	  sophisticated	  quantification	  approaches.	  The	  case	  study	  therefore	  aims	  at	  
making	   theoretical,	   empirical	   and	  methodological	   contributions:	   it	  will	   elaborate	  
the	  model	  in	  regards	  to	  ‘technology	  hype-­‐cycles’;	  test	  the	  model’s	  analytical	  power	  
beyond	  historical	  cases;	  and	  verify	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  sophisticated	  quantitative	  
methods	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  narrative	  approach.	  
Goals	   (a)	   and	   (b)	   are	   somewhat	   intertwined.	   The	   innovation	   studies	  
literature	   contains	   many	   papers	   on	   various	   low-­‐carbon	   automotive	   innovations,	  
e.g.	   hydrogen	   and	   fuel	   cell	   vehicles	   (Bakker,	   2010;	   Van	   den	   Hoed,	   2005;	   2007;	  
Budde	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  hybrid	  electric	  vehicles	  (Dijk	  and	  Yarime,	  2010),	  battery-­‐electric	  
vehicles	  (Johnson,	  1999;	  Dijk	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  and	  biofuels	  (Duffield	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  The	  
focus	  on	  single	  innovations	  fails	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  firms	  (particularly	  in	  the	  car	  
industry)	   face	  multiple	   possible	   low-­‐carbon	   technologies,	   and	   that	   this	   diversity	  
creates	   strategic	   uncertainty.	   It	   also	   pays	   insufficient	   attention	   to	   the	   possibility	  
that	   low-­‐carbon	   technologies	  may	  compete	   for	  public	  and	  political	  attention,	   for	  
funding,	  and	  for	  market	  share.	  An	  implication	  of	  these	  complexities	  is	  that	  studies	  
of	  single	  low-­‐carbon	  innovations	  may	  be	  too	  optimistic	  in	  their	  future	  assessment.	  
By	   investigating	   the	   implications	   of	   technology	   hype-­‐cycles	   (Figure	   VII.1)	   to	   the	  
climate	  change	  life-­‐cycle,	  in	  the	  conclusion	  to	  this	  Chapter,	  I	  will	  therefore	  attempt	  
to	  provide	  a	  more	  nuanced	  assessment	  of	  a	   likely	  scenario	  for	  the	  years	  to	  come,	  
based	  on	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  conceptualization.	  	  
Figure	  VII.1:	  An	  analytical	  interpretation	  of	  hype-­‐disappointment	  cycles	  for	  green	  propulsion	  
technologies	  in	  the	  past	  20	  years	  
	  














VII.2. DATA	  SOURCES	  &	  DATA	  COLLECTION	  PROCEDURES	  
Like	   the	   other	   ones,	   this	   case	   study	   draws	   on	   primary	   sources	   for	   quantitative	  
indicators,	   while	   the	   qualitative	   case	   study	   is	   a	   triangulation	   of	   primary	   and	  
secondary	  sources.	  
VII.2.1. Sources	  for	  quantitative	  indicators	  and	  data	  collection	  procedures	  
This	  case	  study	  offers	  the	  possibility	  of	  applying	  the	  three	  quantification	  methods,	  
because	   a	   range	   of	   quantitative	   data	   is	   available	   from	   databases	   that	   allow	   for	  
‘qualitative’	   refinements.	   I	   will	   therefore	   apply,	   firstly,	   the	   exploratory	   visual	  
examination	  of	  attention	  indicator,	  which	  will	  be	  triangulated	  with	  a	  QLR	  test	  for	  
structural	  breaks.	  I	  then	  will	  carry	  out	  the	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  correlations	  to	  generate	  
first	   insights	   about	   patterns	   and	   relationships.	   These,	   together	   with	   qualitative	  
knowledge	  of	  events,	  will	  be	  used	  to	  establish	  the	  sub-­‐periods,	  which	  will	  provide	  
the	  temporal	  bracketing	  for	  the	  narrative	  approach	  that	  will	  further	  investigate	  the	  
insights.	  	  
In	  this	  case	  study,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  following	  attention	  indicators:138	  
• For	  public	  attention,	  I	  use	  the	  number	  of	  newspaper	  articles	  on	  climate	  change	  
as	   proxy	   (Newig,	   2004).	   I	   searched	   the	  Nexis	   database	   for	   newspaper	   articles	  
(New	  York	  Times,	  USA	  Today,	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  and	  Washington	  Post)	  with	  
the	   keywords	   ‘climate	   change’,	   ‘global	   warming’	   or	   ‘greenhouse	   effect’	   (and	  
derivations)	   in	   their	   headlines.	   The	   Nexis	   database	   allows	   for	   splitting	   the	  
initial	   sample	   into	   articles	   with	   no/little/substantive	   references	   to	   the	  
automotive	  industry,139	  thus	  adding	  a	  more	  nuanced,	  qualitative	  dimension.	  	  
• For	   policy-­‐making	   activities	   (Congressional	   attention)	   and	   policy-­‐
implementation	  activities	  (executive/regulatory	  attention),	  I	  use	  climate-­‐change	  
related	   entries	   in	   the	   Congressional	   Record	   and	   the	   Federal	   Register,	  
respectively.	  I	  searched	  these	  publications	  in	  the	  HeinOnline	  database	  with	  the	  
same	  keyword	  string	  as	  above.	  While	  these	  proxy	  indicators	  present	  qualitative	  
limitations,	   I	   also	   tried	   to	   add	   a	   qualitative	   factor	   by	   further	   searching	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  As	  in	  the	  historical	  studies,	  I	  also	  look	  at	  primary	  quantitative	  data	  other	  than	  attention	  
indicators,	  collected	  from	  governmental	  sources	  (e.g.	  DOT,	  DOE,	  EPA,	  NHTSA)	  and	  industry	  
journals	  and	  databases	  (e.g.	  Ward’s;	  Automotive	  News).	  
139	  To	  split	  the	  sample,	  I	  used	  the	  tool	  that	  restricts	  results	  to	  articles	  with	  little/substantive	  




entries	   mentioning	   ‘fuel	   economy’	   or	   ‘fuel	   efficiency’,	   concepts	   historically	  
related	  to	  (automobile)	  energy	  security	  regulation,	  but	  also	  key	   in	  controlling	  
automobile	   greenhouse	   gas	   (GHG)	   emissions.	   This	   enabled	   to	   split	   each	  
political	   and	   regulatory	   sample	   into	   three	   groups	   of	   documents:	   those	   citing	  
only	   climate	   change	   (and	   synonyms),	   those	   co-­‐citing	   the	   issue	   and	   fuel	  
economy/efficiency,	   and	   those	   citing	   only	   fuel	   economy/efficiency.	  
Furthermore,	  I	  also	  looked	  for	  articles	  mentioning	  ‘climate	  change’	  (and	  other	  
expressions	  used)	  and	  ‘flex-­‐fuel’	  or	  ‘biofuel’,	  whose	  use	  has	  also	  been	  regarded	  
as	  a	  way	  to	  address	  carbon	  emissions140.	  The	  results	  allowed	  for	  a	  more	  nuanced	  
analysis	   of	   how	   the	   issue	   of	   climate	   change,	   automobile	   fuel	   economy	  
regulation	  and	  biofuels	  were	  jointly	  discussed	  or	  not.	  
• I	  use	  article	  count	  in	  the	  Automotive	  News	  (American	  edition)	  as	  proxy	  for	  how	  
much	  attention	  the	  American	  auto	  industry	  dedicated	  to	  climate	  change	  (same	  
search	  string	  as	  above)	  and	  different	  drivetrain	  technologies.	  Ups	  and	  downs	  in	  
industry	   attention	   to	   technologies	   can	   be	   used	   to	   identify	   ‘technology	   hypes’	  
(Bakker,	   2010).	   I	   distinguished	   between	   four	   alternative-­‐fuel	   vehicle	   (AFV)	  
technologies:	   (1)	   fuel	   cell	   and	   hydrogen	   vehicles	   (FCV);	   (2)	   battery-­‐electric	  
vehicles	   (BEV);	   (3)	   hybrid-­‐electric	   vehicles	   (HEV)	   and	   plug-­‐in	   hybrid	   vehicles	  
(PHEV);	  and	  (4)	  biofuel,	  ethanol,	  and	  flex-­‐fuel	  vehicles	  (FFV),	  and	  searched	  for	  
articles	  with	  keyword-­‐strings	  related	  to	  each	  of	  them.141	  
• As	   a	   proxy	   for	   technical	   development	   by	   the	   auto	   industry,	   I	   searched	   the	  
USPTO	  database	  with	  the	  AcclaimIP142	  patent	  search	  and	  analysis	  application.	  I	  
searched	   for	  patents	   related	   to	   the	   four	   alternative	   vehicle	   technologies,	   and,	  
additionally,	   for	   those	   related	   to	   more	   fuel-­‐efficient	   advanced	   internal	  
combustion	   engine	   (aICE)	   technologies	   (e.g.	   improved	   fuel-­‐injection	   systems,	  
turbo	  charging,	  advanced	  valve	  management).	  My	  search	  methodology	  builds	  
on	  Oltra	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   for	   the	   identification	  of	   ‘eco-­‐patents’	  on	  environmental	  
technologies	   and	   ‘green’	   products,	   which	   combines	   in	   the	   search	   string	  
keywords	  and	  patent	  classes	  related	  to	  the	  focal-­‐technology	  (see	  an	  example	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  This	  series	  may	  overlap	  with	  the	  other	  two	  citing	  climate	  change,	  i.e.	  articles	  citing	  climate	  
changed	  (and	  fuel	  economy)	  may	  also	  be	  citing	  flex-­‐fuel	  or	  biofuel.	  
141	  Articles	  citing	  more	  than	  one	  technology	  were	  assigned	  to	  all	  cited	  technologies.	  
142	  Previously	  known	  as	  ‘CobaltIP’;	  available	  at	  https://www.acclaimip.com/	  (accessed	  multiple	  




search	   string	   for	   HEV-­‐related	   patents	   assigned	   to	   General	   Motors	   in	   Table	  
VII.1).	  This	  method	  allows	  for	  a	  reduction	  in	  ‘noise’	  (i.e.	  exclusion	  of	  irrelevant	  
patents,	   inclusion	  of	  relevant	  ones).	  I	  restricted	  the	  search	  to	  a	  selected	  set	  of	  
twelve	   leading	  OEMs	   (BMW,	   Chrysler,	   Daimler-­‐Benz,	   Ford,	   General	  Motors,	  
Honda,	   Hyundai-­‐Kia,	   Mitsubishi	   Motors,	   Peugeot-­‐Citröen,	   Renault-­‐Nissan,	  
Toyota,	   and	   Volkswagen).	   Duplicated	   patents	   were	   excluded.	   Some	   patents	  
appeared	  in	  the	  results	  of	  more	  than	  one	  technology,	  but	  I	  only	  included	  it	  in	  
one	  technology	  category,	  according	  to	  the	  following	  order	  of	  precedence	  (from	  
more	   radical	   to	   more	   incremental	   technologies):	   FCV	   >	   BEV	   >	   HEV	   >	  
FFV/biofuel	  >	  aICE.	  
Table	  VII.1:	  Example	  of	  patent	  search	  string	  (HEV-­‐related	  patents	  in	  the	  USPTO	  assigned	  to	  GM)	  




((PSCLS:180/65.21	  OR	  PSCLS:903)	  OR	  
(TTL:(("hybrid	  vehicle"	  OR	  "hybrid	  
electric	  vehicle"	  OR	  "hybrid	  
propulsion"	  OR	  "hybrid	  powertrain"	  
OR	  "hybrid	  powerplant")	  NOT	  "fuel	  
cell"))	  OR	  (ABST:(("hybrid	  vehicle"	  OR	  
"hybrid	  electric	  vehicle"	  OR	  "hybrid	  
propulsion"	  OR	  "hybrid	  powertrain"	  
OR	  "hybrid	  powerplant")	  NOT	  "fuel	  
cell"))	  OR	  (ACLM:(("hybrid	  vehicle"	  OR	  
"hybrid	  electric	  vehicle"	  OR	  "hybrid	  
propulsion"	  OR	  "hybrid	  powertrain"	  
OR	  "hybrid	  powerplant")	  NOT	  "fuel	  
cell")))	  AND	  	  
AN:(	  "general	  motors"	  OR	  "Delphi	  
Technologies"	  OR	  "delphi	  technology"	  
OR	  "gm	  global"	  OR	  "gen	  motors"	  OR	  






























I	  searched	  for	  keywords	  in	  the	  patent’s	  
title	  (TTL),	  abstract	  (ABST)	  and	  claims	  
(ACLM).	  The	  “AN”	  code	  searches	  the	  
patent	  assignee	  field	  for	  certain	  
keywords.	  The	  field	  code	  ‘PSCLS’	  
searches	  for	  patents	  with	  the	  
predefined	  primary	  parent	  class(es)	  or	  
any	  subclasses	  under	  the	  specified	  










related	  to	  car	  
technologies.	  
The	  65.21	  







The	  class	  903	  







Motors	  and	  its	  
controlled	  
subsidiaries	  
that	  are	  known	  
to	  file	  most	  of	  
the	  OEM’s	  
patents.	  
Source:	  Author’s	  construction.	  
The	  resulting	  set	  was	  ordered	  according	  to	  the	  patent’s	  priority	  date,	  which	  is	  
the	  date	  of	  the	  first	  filing	  of	  a	  similar	  claim	  in	  any	  patent	  office	  in	  the	  world,	  in	  
order	  to	  better	  reflect	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  invention.	  To	  address	  the	  lag	  between	  




more	  recent	  years143),	  I	  divided	  the	  number	  of	  patents	  of	  interest	  per	  year	  by	  the	  
total	   number	   of	   patents	   per	   year	   by	   the	   selected	   carmakers	   to	   arrive	   at	   a	  
percentage	  value.	  	  
• To	  capture	  consumer	  demand,	  I	  collected	  sales	  data	  for	  the	  different	  categories	  
of	   AFVs,	   calculated	   the	   market	   share	   (relative	   sales)	   of	   the	   different	   green	  
technologies	   in	   the	   US	   market,	   and	   plotted	   them	   over	   time.	   The	   data	   was	  
collected	   from	   several	   sources:	  US	  DOE’s	  Alternative	   Fuel	   Data	   Center144,	   the	  
Electric	   Drive	   Transportation	   Association 145 ;	   HybridCars.com 146 ;	   and	   the	   US	  
Energy	   Information	  Administration147.	  Market-­‐shares	  were	  calculated	  based	  on	  
data	  from	  Ward’s	  Automotive	  Group	  (2013).	  A	  complication	  with	  these	  figures	  
concerns	  flex-­‐fuel	  vehicles,	  which	  can	  be	  fuelled	  either	  with	  ethanol	  or	  gasoline	  
or	   both,	   and	   thus	   may	   overestimate	   the	   share	   of	   ‘alternative’	   fuel	   vehicles.	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  data	  brings	  insight	  into	  the	  actual	  diffusion	  of	  different	  low-­‐
carbon	  vehicle	  technologies.	  
The	  quantitative	   analysis	   consisted	   of	   four	   steps:	   (a)	   firstly,	   I	   performed	   a	   visual	  
inspection	  of	   the	  plots;	   then	  (b)	   I	  carried	  out	  a	  Quandt	  Likelihood	  Ratio	   test	   for	  
unknown	   structural	   breaks148 	  (Stock	   and	   Watson,	   2006),	   in	   order	   to	   identify	  
significant	  breaks	  in	  the	  time-­‐series;	  thirdly,	  (c)	  I	  triangulated	  these	  findings	  with	  
the	  visual	  examination	  of	  the	  plotted	  time-­‐series	  and	  my	  a	  priori	  knowledge	  of	  key	  
events	   in	   the	   case	   study	   to	   establish	   sub-­‐periods;	   and	   finally,	   (d)	   I	   performed	   a	  
meta-­‐correlation	   analysis149	  to	   gain	   further	   insights	   into	   strength	   of	   association	  
between	  the	  proxy-­‐variables	  in	  each	  sub-­‐period.	  
For	   this	   quantification	   approach,	   I	   used	   the	   following	   time-­‐series:	   (1)	   the	  
general	  series	  of	  public	  attention	  to	  climate	  change150	  (all	   three	  methods);	   (2)	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  For	  the	  same	  reason,	  I	  did	  not	  include	  2011	  and	  2012	  in	  my	  analysis.	  
144	  Available	  at	  www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/data/;	  last	  accessed	  on	  April	  14th,	  2013.	  
145	  Available	  at	  http://electricdrive.org/index.php?ht=d/sp/i/20952/pid/20952;	  last	  accessed	  on	  
April	  14th,	  2013.	  	  
146	  Available	  at	  http://hybridcars.com/market-­‐dashboard.html;	  last	  accessed	  on	  April	  14th,	  2013.	  
147	  Available	  at	  http://www.eia.gov/renewable/afv/supply.cfm;	  last	  accessed	  on	  April	  14th,	  2013.	  
148	  The	  tests	  included	  one	  lag	  (two	  restrictions)	  to	  account	  for	  autocorrelations,	  and	  were	  applied	  
to	  the	  natural	  logarithm	  of	  the	  variables.	  Following	  the	  methodology	  suggested	  in	  Stock	  and	  
Watson	  (2006),	  the	  series	  were	  trimmed	  by	  15%,	  meaning	  that	  the	  beginning	  and	  the	  end	  of	  each	  
series	  were	  not	  included	  in	  the	  analysis,	  because	  the	  QLR	  statistic	  is	  dependant	  on	  these	  values.	  
149	  All	  statistics’	  procedures	  were	  performed	  with	  Stata	  12,	  except	  for	  the	  difference	  between	  
coefficients	  tests,	  which	  I	  performed	  online	  at	  http://www.quantpsy.org/corrtest/corrtest.htm	  
(Accessed	  on	  April	  19th,	  2013).	  
150	  Note	  that	  the	  two	  series	  ‘public	  attention	  to	  climate	  change’	  and	  ‘public	  attention	  to	  climate	  
change	  (with	  substantive	  mentions	  to	  the	  automotive	  industry)’	  are	  strongly	  (Spearman’s	  rho	  of	  




aggregated	   series	   of	   congressional	   attention	   to	   climate	   change	   (i.e.	   all	  
Congressional	   record	  results	  citing	  climate	  change)	   (all	   three	  methods);	   (3)	   idem	  
regarding	  executive	  attention	  (all	  three	  methods);	  (4)	  Automotive	  News	  attention	  
to	  climate	  change	  (all	  three	  methods);	  (5)	  Big	  Three	  aggregated	  number	  (%)	  of	  all	  
AFV-­‐related	   patents	   (all	   three	   methods);	   (5)	   idem	   regarding	   outsiders’	   patents	  
(only	  visual	  examination	  and	  correlation	  analysis);	  (6)	  AFV	  market	  share	  (all	  three	  
methods);	   and	   (7)	   Electric	   Drive	   Vehicle 151 	  (EDV)	   market	   share	   (only	   visual	  
examination	  and	  correlation	  analysis).	  The	  remaining	  series	  will	  be	  briefly	  referred	  
to	  in	  the	  visual	  examination,	  and	  more	  prominently	  in	  the	  case	  study	  narrative.	  
VII.2.2. Sources	  for	  the	  qualitative	  case	  study	  (narrative)	  
While	   this	   quantitative	   approach	   shall	   allow	   for	   the	   identification	   of	   general	  
patterns	   (structural	   break	   analysis	   and	   visual	   examination)	   and	   levels	   of	  
association	   (correlation	   analysis),	   I	   will	   not	   attempt	   to	   infer	   definitive	   causal	  
relationships.	  To	  identify	  deeper	  causal	  mechanisms,	  I	  will	  triangulate	  the	  findings	  
with	   the	   longitudinal	   qualitative	   case	   study,	   which	   analyses	   interactions	   and	  
processes	  in	  the	  institutional	  and	  task	  environments	  through	  a	  narrative.	  
Primary	   sources	   for	   developments	   in	   civil	   society	   are	   articles	   from	  
newspapers	  and	  magazines	  (New	  York	  Times;	  Wall	  Street	  Journal;	  Washington	  Post;	  
Economist	   etc.).	   I	   also	   draw	   on	   National	   Research	   Council’s	   and	   governmental	  
reports	   (EPA,	   CARB,	   DOE,	   NHTSA),	   industry	   journals	   (Ward’s	   Automotive;	  
Automotive	   News),	   and	   publications	   by	   automakers	   and	   their	   trade	   association	  
(financial	  reports;	  press	  releases;	  websites;	  advertisements;	  technical	  papers	  etc.).	  
In	   addition,	   I	   build	   on	   secondary	   accounts	   of	   different	   dimensions	   of	  
climate	  change	  and	  the	  car	  industry:	  science,	  environmental	  movement	  and	  public	  
opinion	   (Agrawala,	   1998a;	  Agrawala,	   1998b;	  Corfee-­‐Morlot	   et	   al.,	   2007;	  McCright	  
and	   Dunlap,	   2010;	   Rothenberg	   and	   Levy,	   2012);	   policy	   and	   legal	   developments	  
(Meltz,	   2007;	  Duffield	   et	   al.,	   2008;	  Meltz,	   2008);	   corporate	   cultural	   and	   political	  
strategies	  (Doyle,	  2000;	  Luger,	  2000;	  Kolk	  and	  Levy,	  2001);	  automakers’	  innovation	  
strategies	   and	   technological	   developments	   (Johnson,	   1999;	  Mondt,	   2000;	   Abeles,	  
2004;	  Kemp,	  2005;	  MacCormack,	  2005;	  van	  den	  Hoed,	  2005;	  Hekkert	  and	  van	  den	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  The	  EDV	  category	  comprises	  fuel	  cell	  vehicles	  (FCV),	  hybrid-­‐electric	  vehicles	  (HEV),	  plug-­‐in	  




Hoed,	   2006;	   van	   den	   Hoed,	   2007;	   Bakker	   and	   Van	   Lente,	   2009;	   Bakker,	   2010;	  
Bakker	  et	  al.,	  2012a;	  Bakker	  et	  al.,	  2012b;	  Budde	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Lutsey,	  2012;	  Dijk	  et	  al.,	  
2013);	   broader	   industry	   contexts	   and	   financial	   dimensions	   (Ingrassia,	   2010);	  
environmental	   challenges	   facing	   the	   car	   industry	   (Sperling	   and	   Gordon,	   2009).	  
Drawing	   on	   various	   primary	   and	   secondary	   sources	   I	   aim	   to	   develop	   a	  
comprehensive	  multi-­‐dimensional	  analysis	  of	  the	  climate-­‐change	  problem	  and	  the	  
American	  car	  industry	  responses.	  	  
VII.3. QUANTIFICATION	  APPROACH:	  ANALYSIS	  OF	  ATTENTION	  INDICATORS	  
VII.3.1. Exploratory	  visual	  examination	  
Figure	   VII.2	   present	   time-­‐series	   for:	   (a)	   public	   attention	   to	   climate	   change;	  	  
(b)	  Congressional	  attention;	  (c)	  executive	  and	  regulatory	  attention;	  (d)	  Automotive	  
News	   attention	   to	   climate	   change;	   and	   (e)	   aggregated	   Alternative	   Fuel	   Vehicle	  
(AFV)	  patents	  by	  the	  Big	  Three	  and	  regime	  outsiders	  (other	  manufacturers).	  Figure	  
VII.3	   presents	   time	   series	   for:	   (a)	   Automotive	   News	   attention	   to	   specific	  
technologies;	   (b)	   Big	   Three	   patenting	   of	   specific	   AFV	   technologies;	   (c)	   regime	  
outsiders	  patenting	  of	  specific	  AFV	  technologies;	  (d)	  market	  share	  of	  AFV;	  and	  (e)	  
market	  share	  of	  EDV.	  
• Public	   attention	   to	   climate	   change	   (Figure	   VII.2.a)	   shows	   a	   period	   of	   ‘non-­‐
attention’	   that	   lasts	   until	   about	   1987-­‐8.	   Then	   follows	   a	   period	   of	   moderate	  
attention	   that	   seems	  associated	  with	  political	  developments	   (Senate	  Hearings	  
on	  Climate	  Change	   in	   1988,	  when	   the	  New	   York	   Times	   reported	   that	   “Global	  
Warming	   has	   begun”).	   A	   peak	   in	   attention	   coincides	   with	   the	   Kyoto	  
Conference	   in	   1997;	   followed	   by	   another	   peak	   that	   seems	   connected	   to	  
President	  Bush	  (Jr.)	  rejection	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  in	  2001.	  From	  2005	  onwards,	  
public	  attention	  to	  climate	  change	  surges,	  reaching	  a	  peak	  in	  2007	  and	  a	  low	  in	  
2009.	  This	  was	  a	  period	  of	  many	  symbolic	  events,	  such	  as	  the	  premiere	  of	  the	  
Hollywood	  blockbuster	  The	  Day	  After	  Tomorrow	  (2004);	  the	  2005	  G8	  meeting	  
in	  Scotland,	  where	  UK	  Prime	  Minister	  Tony	  Blair	  declared	  climate	  change	  to	  be	  
top	  priority;	  Hurricane	  Katrina	   (2005),	   and	   the	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	   to	  Al	  Gore	  





• Congressional	   attention	   to	   climate	   change	   (Figure	   VII.2.b,	   area	   plots)	   show	  
similar	  trajectory	  as	  public	  attention	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  public	  attention	  
peaks	   of	   1997	   and	   2001).	   Congressional	   attention	   also	   begins	   to	   slowly	   rise	  
before	   public	   attention,	   which	   may	   be	   related	   to	   the	   publication	   of	   two	  
(contradictory)	  governmental-­‐sponsored	  reports	  on	  climate	  change	  (1983)	  and	  
a	  public	  letter	  (1986)	  by	  Senator	  Al	  Gore	  (and	  others)	  calling	  for	  action	  to	  tackle	  
the	  issue.	  The	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  2000s	  also	  saw	  the	  enactment	  of	  two	  energy	  security	  
legislations	  (2005	  Energy	  Act	  and	  2007	  Energy	  Security	  and	   Independence	  Act)	  
that	   established	   biofuel	   production	   and	   use	   goals.	   Their	   approval	   were	  
somehow	  influenced	  by	  climate	  change	  discussions	  (Yergin,	  2011),	  and	  we	  see	  a	  
‘hump’	  in	  the	  curve	  depicting	  attention	  to	  flex-­‐fuel/biofuel	  and	  climate	  change	  
in	   Figure	   VII.2.b.	   Finally,	   if	   in	   the	   first	   few	   years	   ‘fuel	   efficiency’	   was	  
disconnected	   from	   climate	   change,	   throughout	   the	   period,	   it	   became	   part	   of	  
the	  debate	  on	  the	  issue.	  
• Executive	  and	  regulatory	  attention	  to	  climate	  change	  (Figure	  VII.2.c,	  area	  plots)	  
displays	   a	   trajectory	   much	   different	   from	   public	   and	   Congress	   attention.	  
Although	   there	   is	   some	   executive	   attention	   beginning	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1980s,	   it	  
shows	   a	   very	   slow	   increase	   until	   the	   mid-­‐2000s.	   In	   2007,	   two	   key	   events	  
influenced	  regulatory	  and	  executive	  attention:	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  decided	  
that	   it	   is	   EPA’s	   responsibility	   to	   regulate	   GHG	   emissions	   from	   cars,	   and	  
President	  Bush	  (Jr.)	  gave	  a	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  address	  calling	  for	  cuts	  in	  carbon	  
emissions.	  Executive	  attention	  to	  biofuels	  increases	  after	  the	  energy	  laws	  were	  
enacted;	   and,	   as	   in	   Congressional	   attention,	   ‘fuel	   efficiency’	   became	  
increasingly	  part	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  debate	  (particularly	  after	  2008).	  




Figure	  VII.2	  (a-­‐e,	  top-­‐down):	  Attention	  to	  climate	  change	  in	  the	  US	  and	  AFV	  patents	  
	  




Figure	  VII.3	  (a-­‐e,	  top-­‐down):	  Attention,	  development	  and	  diffusion	  to/of	  AFV	  types	  
	  




• Automotive	  News	  attention	   to	  climate	  change152	  shows	   three	  distinctive	  peaks	  
that	   seem	   associated	   with	   the	   peaks	   in	   public	   attention.	   However,	   some	  
important	   events	   might	   have	   further	   influenced	   the	   industry	   attention:	   the	  
establishment	   of	   the	   ‘Zero-­‐Emission	   Vehicle’	   (ZEV)	  mandate	   in	   California	   in	  
1990;	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  public-­‐private	  initiative	  US	  Partnership	  for	  a	  New	  
Generation	   of	   Vehicles	   (PNGV);	   and	   the	   first	   CAFE	   (Corporate	   Average	   Fuel	  
Economy)	  standard	  rise	  in	  32	  years,	  mandated	  by	  the	  2007	  Act.	  
• Patenting	  of	  AFV	  technologies,	  both	  by	  outsiders	  and	  the	  Big	  Three,	  began	  to	  
slowly	  rise	  in	  the	  late-­‐1980s/1990s	  (possibly	  connected	  to	  the	  ZEV	  mandate,	  and	  
the	   PNGV),	   and	   picks	   pace	   in	   2005	   (when	   there	   were	   multiple	   AFV	  
technologies	   competing	   for	   supremacy).	   The	   steady	   rise	   in	   patenting	  
throughout	   the	   period	   seems	   to	   indicate	   increasing	   industry	   concern	   with	  
climate	  change.	  In	  relative	  terms,	  outsiders’	  patenting	  has	  been	  higher	  than	  the	  
Big	  Three’s,	  until	  2007	  (which	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  CAFE	  rise).	  
• Figure	  VII.3.a,	  b	  and	  c	   seem	  to	  confirm	   the	  occurrence	  of	  various	   technology	  
hype-­‐cycles,	   although	   these	   are	   not	   as	   clean	   as	   represented	   in	   Figure	   VII.1.	  
Based	   on	   these,	   I	   distinguish	   five	   overlapping	   technology	   attention-­‐cycles	  
(‘hypes’):	   1st	   BEV	   hype	   (1988-­‐early-­‐2000s);	   HEV	   hype	   (2001-­‐2009);	   FCV	   hype	  
(1995-­‐2009);	  biofuel	  hype	  (2006-­‐2009)	  and	  new	  BEV	  hype	  (2005	  onwards).	  
• The	  hype-­‐cycles	  (‘ups	  and	  downs’)	  are	  more	  apparent	  in	  the	  Automotive	  News	  
attention	  graph	  (Figure	  VII.3.a)	  than	  in	  the	  patent	  graphs	  (Figure	  VII.3.b	  and	  c).	  
This	   suggests	   that	   technological	   development	   may	   continue	   after	   attention	  
‘bubbles’	  have	  burst.	  The	  qualitative	  case	  study	  will	  further	  analyse	  the	  drivers	  
of	  various	  hype-­‐cycles	  and	  their	  influences.	  	  
• Industry	   attention	   and	   technology	   strategy	   towards	   flex-­‐fuel	   vehicles	   and	  
biofuels	   increased	   substantially	   by	   2005	   (Figure	   VII.3.a	   and	   b).	   Patenting	  
activity,	  however,	  increased	  relatively	  less	  than	  industry	  attention,	  which	  seem	  
to	  indicate	  that	  biofuels	  and	  flex-­‐fuels	  were	  incremental	  innovations	  (requiring	  
some	  tinkering	  with	  ICE,	  but	  no	  substantial	  redesign).	  The	  relatively	  low	  degree	  
of	   biofuel	   patenting	   is	   even	  more	   striking	   considering	   that	   biofuels/flex-­‐fuels	  
have	   reached	   some	  degree	   of	  market	   penetration	   (Figure	  VII.3.d).	   This	   could	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




indicate	  that	  this	  particular	  incremental	  technology	  did	  not	  require	  much	  new	  
development.	  
• Incremental	   improvements	   with	   aICE 153 	  (Figure	   VII.3.b	   and	   c)	   have	   been	  
pursued	  throughout	  the	  entire	  period,	  and	  increasingly	  so	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  
The	   strategy	   accelerated	   in	   the	   early	   2005,	   indicating	   a	   ‘sailing	   ship’	   effect154	  
(Ward,	   1967;	   Tidd	   et	   al.,	   2005),	   whereby	   threats	   from	   radical	   technologies	  
stimulate	  old	  technology	  improvements.	  
• By	  2010,	  there	   is	  substantial	  patenting	  activity	   for	  all	   technical	  options,	  which	  
suggests	   that	   firms	   remain	   uncertain	   about	   which	   powertrain	   option	   will	  
prevail,	  and	  therefore	  adopt	  a	  hedging	  strategy.	  
• Despite	   the	   attention	   and	   patenting	   in	   electric	   drive	   vehicles	   (EDV),	   Figure	  
VII.3.d	  (and	  e)	  show	  that	  actual	  market	  diffusion	  is	  dominated	  by	  biofuel	  and	  
flex-­‐fuel	  vehicles	  (FFV).	  In	  later	  periods,	  electric	  drive	  vehicles	  only	  constitute	  a	  
few	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	  market,	  which	  may	  make	  automakers	  reluctant	  to	  
abandon	   ICE	   vehicles	   –	   unless	   EDV	   sales	   continue	   to	   accelerate.	   Yet,	  
automakers	   prefer	   biofuels	   and	   FFV	   because	   these	   help	   them	   gain	   fuel	  
efficiency	   credits	   and	   because	   these	   incremental	   innovations	   protect	   ICE-­‐
related	  core	  competencies.	  	  
VII.3.2. Testing	  for	  unknown	  ‘structural	  breaks’	  
To	   determine	   periods	   and	   break	   points	   (already	   represented	   in	   the	   figures	  with	  
vertical	   dotted	   lines),	   I	   triangulated	   the	   visual	   analysis	   with	   the	   QLR-­‐test	   for	  
structural	   breaks.	   This	   shall	   enable	   a	   more	   objective	   assessment	   of	   the	   visual	  
examination	   method	   and	   its	   appropriateness	   for	   defining	   sub-­‐periods	   in	   an	  
empirical	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   The	   results	   (breaks)	   are	   presented	   in	   Table	   VII.2	   (see	  
Appendix	  I.2	   for	  the	  statistical	  results),	   in	  which	  I	  have	   linked	  the	  break	  years	  to	  
the	  key	  events	   referred	   to	   in	   the	  visual	   examination.	  The	   results	   indeed	   seem	   to	  
confirm	  the	  visual	  inspection	  of	  attention	  charts.	  Thus,	  based	  on	  these	  results	  and	  
the	  visual	  examination	  exercise,	  I	  distinguish	  five	  periods:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  This	  incremental	  technology	  also	  received	  a	  relatively	  stable	  level	  of	  attention	  from	  the	  
industry	  (Figure	  VII.3.a).	  
154	  Mendonça	  (2013)	  has	  recently	  challenged	  the	  notion	  that	  sailing	  ships	  improved	  performance	  
when	  they	  faced	  competition	  from	  steam	  ships;	  the	  author	  found	  out	  that	  modernization	  of	  




• 1979-­‐1987,	  when	  climate	  change	  had	  low	  salience;	  
• 1987-­‐1996,	   moderate	   public	   and	   political	   attention,	   and	   some	   patenting	  
activity;	  
• 1996-­‐2005,	   gradual	   rise	   in	   public	   attention,	   political	   attention,	   and	  
patenting;	  
• 2005-­‐2009,	   rapidly	   increasing	   public	   and	   political	   attention,	   accelerated	  
patenting	  and	  HEV	  sales;	  	  
• 2009-­‐2012,	  declining	  public	  and	  political	  attention	  because	  of	  the	  financial	  
crisis,	   stagnating	   HEV-­‐sales,	   high	   executive	   (regulatory)	   activities,	   and	  
increasing	  patenting.	  
Table	  VII.2:	  Results	  of	  QLR	  tests	  for	  structural	  breaks	  and	  key	  events	  in	  the	  climate	  change	  
issue	  life-­‐cycle	  	  
	   Breaks	   Key	  events	  







1988:	  NYTs	  announces	  ‘Global	  Warming	  has	  begun’	  
1997:	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  
2004:	  Hollywood’s	  Day	  after	  tomorrow	  	  
2005:	  G8	  meeting	  in	  Scotland	  and	  Hurricane	  Katrina	  
2007:	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  to	  IPCC	  and	  Al	  Gore	  
Congressional	  attention	  





1983:	  Publication	  of	  government	  sponsored	  reports	  on	  
climate	  change	  
1986:	  Letter	  by	  Senator	  Al	  Gore	  
1988:	  Senate	  Hearings	  on	  Global	  Warming	  
1997:	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  
2005:	  Energy	  Act	  
2007:	  Energy	  Independence	  Act	  	  




[1985:	  Discovery	  of	  ozone	  hole]	  
2007:	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  on	  EPA	  responsibility	  to	  
regulate	  GHG	  emissions	  from	  cars;	  President	  Bush	  (Jr.)	  
State	  of	  the	  Union	  address	  calls	  for	  emissions	  cut	  
Automotive	  News	  






1990:	  ZEV	  mandate	  enacted	  in	  California	  	  
1993:	  Partnership	  for	  a	  New	  Generation	  of	  Vehicles	  (PNGV)	  
Mid-­‐1990s:	  industry	  denying	  climate	  change	  
2007:	  CAFE	  standards	  to	  rise	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  32	  years	  
(Energy	  Security	  and	  Independence	  Act)	  
Big	  Three	  AFV	  patents	   1988+	  
1995+	  
2005+	  
Late-­‐1980s:	  GM	  develops	  BEV	  model	  Impact	  
1993:	  PNGV	  
2005:	  rise	  in	  bio-­‐fuel/flex-­‐fuel	  patents	  
Mid-­‐2000s:	  multiple	  technology	  hype-­‐cycles,	  Big	  Three	  
catching	  up	  with	  HEV	  technology	  
AFV	  market	  share	   1996*	  
2005+	  
2007+	  
1996:	  surge	  in	  flex-­‐fuel/ethanol	  (E85)	  vehicle	  sales	  
Mid-­‐2000s:	  consolidation	  of	  HEV	  market	  niche	  
2007:	  Peak	  in	  HEV	  sales	  
Legend:	  *Significant	  at	  1%	  level;	  **Significant	  at	  5%	  level;	  ***Significant	  at	  10%	  level;	  +Insignificant	  local	  peak	  of	  QLR	  
statistic	  
VII.3.3. Meta-­‐analysis	  of	  correlations	  within	  a	  temporal	  bracketing	  
framework	  	  
The	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  correlation	  will	  use	  the	  break	  points	  as	  inputs.	  I	  will	  however	  




correlations,	   I	   will	   look	   for	   differences	   between	   correlations	   before	   and	   after	  
breaking	   points.	   Because	   of	   this	   thesis	   focus	   on	   technology	   developments	   I	   will	  
concentrate	  on	  correlations	  between	  Big	  Three	  patenting	  and	  the	  other	  indicators	  
(Table	  VII.3),	   and	   only	  mention	   some	  other	   interesting	   correlation	  patterns	   that	  
either	  confirms	  or	  negate	  the	  exploratory	  visual	  analysis	  (full	  results	  are	  presented	  
in	  Appendix	  I.3).	  
• Before	  1988155,	  Big	  Three	  patenting	  activity,	  which	  is	  very	  low	  (Figure	  VII.3.e),	  is	  
not	  significantly	  correlated	  to	  any	  proxy	  variable	  (i.e.	  public,	  congressional	  and	  
executive	  attention).	   [In	   fact,	  before	   1988,	  no	   indicator	   is	   correlated	  with	  any	  
other	   (cf.	  Appendix	   I.3).]	  After	   1988,	   it	  becomes	   significantly	   correlated	   to	  all	  
other,	  but	  strongly	  and	  significantly	  so,	  in	  particular,	  with	  outsiders’	  patenting	  
and	   executive	   attention.	   This	   indicates	   that	   industry	   technological	  
development	   activities	   (of	   incremental	   nature,	   Figure	   VII.3.b)	   started	   already	  
after	  the	  first	  peak	  in	  attention	  in	  1988.	  This	  seems	  in	  line	  with	  phase	  2	  of	  the	  
DILC-­‐model.	  
• But	   in	   the	   next	   period,	   1988-­‐1996,	   Big	   Three	   patenting	   is	   only	   significantly	  
correlated	   to	   outsiders’	   patenting,	   which	   seems	   to	   indicate	   some	   kind	   of	  
technological	   competition.	   While,	   overall	   patenting	   activities	   are	   still	   low	  
(Figure	   VII.2.e),	   there	   is	   some	   attention	   to	   BEV	   (Figure	   VII.3.a)	   and	   some	  
patenting	  of	  BEV	  technologies	  (Figure	  VII.3.b	  and	  c).	  The	  case	  study	  will	  show	  
that	   these	  developments	  were	  connected	  to	  California’s	  ZEV	  mandate.	   In	  this	  
second	   period,	   public	   and	   congress	   attention	   become	   strongly	   (0.9667)	   and	  
significantly	   correlated,	   which	   seems	   to	   indicate	   similarities	   between	   the	  
second	   period	   and	   the	   model’s	   phase	   2	   (corroborating	   the	   visual	   analysis).	  
Therefore,	   the	   early	   competition	   between	   regime	   actors	   and	   outsiders	  would	  
configure	  a	  deviation	  from	  the	  model.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155	  Before	  1988,	  no	  indicator	  is	  correlated	  with	  any	  other.	  In	  the	  next	  period,	  1988-­‐1996,	  only	  public	  
and	  congress	  attention	  and	  outsiders’	  patenting	  and	  executive	  attention	  are	  strongly	  (0.9667)	  and	  




Table	  VII.3:	  Summary	  of	  results	  of	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  correlations	  	  
	   	   Before	  1988	   After	  1987	   Before	  1997	   After	  1996	  
Before	  
2005	   After	  2004	  
Between	  
1987	  &	  1997	   After	  1996	  
Between	  









-­‐0.5188	   0.7213	   0.0702	   0.6923	   0.5567	   0.3714	   -­‐0.6000	   0.6923	   0.0000	   0.3714	  
Sig.	   insig.	   *	   insig.	   *	   *	   insig.	   ***	   *	   insig.	   insig.	  
Obs.	   9	   23	   18	   14	   26	   6	   9	   14	   8	   6	  
Sig.	  









-­‐0.3193	   0.3551	   0.0692	   0.7528	   0.3261	   0.5429	   -­‐0.6167	   0.7528	   0.2684	   0.5429	  
Sig.	   insig.	   ***	   insig.	   *	   insig.	   insig.	   ***	   *	   insig.	   insig.	  
Obs.	   9	   23	   18	   14	   26	   6	   9	   14	   8	   6	  
Sig.	  







-­‐0.5085	   0.9098	   0.3650	   0.7934	   0.7548	   0.9429	   0.4833	   0.7934	   0.1190	   0.9429	  
Sig.	   insig.	   *	   insig.	   *	   *	   *	   insig.	   *	   insig.	   *	  
Obs.	   9	   23	   18	   14	   26	   6	   9	   14	   8	   6	  
Sig.	  
difference?	   	   	  
insig.	  









-­‐0.2427	   -­‐0.2308	   0.2379	   -­‐0.4286	   -­‐0.2427	   -­‐0.2308	   -­‐0.4286	   -­‐0.4286	  
Sig.	   insig..	   insig.	   insig.	   insig.	   insig.	   insig.	   insig.	   insig.	  
Obs.	   9	   14	   17	   6	   9	   14	   8	   6	  
Sig.	  






rho	   0.5500	   0.9042	   0.6821	   0.7407	   0.8708	   -­‐0.6000	   0.6000	   0.7407	   0.5476	   -­‐0.6000	  
Sig.	   insig.	   *	   *	   *	   *	   insig.	   ***	   *	   insig.	   insig.	  
Obs.	   9	   23	   18	   14	   26	   6	   9	   14	   8	   6	  
Sig.	  
difference?	   	  










0.8273	   0.8286	  
	  
0.5714	   0.8286	  
Sig.	   *	   **	   insig.	   **	  
Obs.	   11	   6	   8	   6	  
Sig.	  
difference?	  









0.2571	   0.8857	  
	   	  
Sig.	   insig.	   **	  
Obs.	   6	   6	  
Sig.	  
difference?	   	  
Source:	  Author’s	  construction	  based	  on	  results	  presented	   in	  Appendix	   I.3	  and	  significance	  tests	   for	  difference	  
between	  correlations.	  
• Between	   1997	   and	   2005,	   correlations	   between	   Big	   Three	   patenting	   and	   the	  
other	  variables	  are	  not	  significant.	  The	  narrative	  study	  will	  show	  that	  this	  was	  a	  
period	  of	  regulatory	  uncertainty.	  It	  is	  yet	  interesting	  to	  highlight	  the	  association	  




which	  is	  the	  only	  significant	  –	  and	  strong	  (0.8810)	  –	  correlation	  in	  the	  period.	  
This	  seems	  to	  indicate	  early	  technological	  innovation	  by	  outsiders,	  in	  line	  with	  
the	  model’s	   phase	   3.	   Indeed,	   this	   is	   the	  period	  when	   Japanese	  manufacturers	  
started	  selling	  hybrid-­‐electric	  vehicles	  in	  the	  US	  market.	  
• After	   2005,	   Big	   Three	   patenting	   activities	   become	   significantly	   and	   strongly	  
(0.9429)	   correlated	   with	   executive	   attention	   and	   the	   AFV	   (0.8286)	   and	   EDV	  
(0.8857)	  market	  share.	  This	  seems	  to	  indicate	  an	  important	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  
climate	   change	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	   whereby	   dynamics	   affecting	   the	   task	  
environment	   becomes	   more	   important	   than	   those	   from	   the	   institutional	  
environment.	  As	  discussed	   in	   the	  visual	  examination,	   the	  energy	  acts	  of	  2005	  
and	   2007,	   and,	   in	   particular,	   the	   2007	   Supreme	   Court	   decision	   represent	  
important	  events	  leading	  to	  these	  new	  dynamics.	  Indeed,	  from	  2005	  onwards,	  
correlation	   between	   executive	   attention	   and	   AFV	   market	   share	   becomes	  
significant	   and	   strong	   (0.	   9286).	   However,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	   for	   the	  
association	  between	  executive	   attention	  and	  EDV	  market	   share156,	   so	   that	   the	  
correlation	  appears	  to	  capture	  the	  push	  for	  biofuels	  after	  the	  energy	  acts.	  
Throughout	   the	   whole	   period,	   the	   association	   between	   patenting	   and	   public	  
attention	   is	   highest	   after	   1987;	   between	  patenting	   and	   congressional	   attention	   is	  
highest	  after	  1996;	  and	  between	  patenting	  and	  executive	  attention	  is	  highest	  after	  
2005.	  This	  shows	  a	  very	   interesting	  dynamic	  that	  confirms	  the	  sequential	  view	  of	  
the	   DILC-­‐model,	   in	   which	   the	   industry	   first	   responds	   to	   pressures	   from	   civil	  
society;	   then	   to	   policy-­‐making	   (Congress);	   and	   later	   to	   developments	   at	   the	  
executive	  level	  (policy	  implementation).	  The	  correlation	  analysis	  is	  therefore	  very	  
much	  in	  line	  with	  the	  overall	  logic	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model.	  
The	   quantification	   approach	   and,	   in	   particular,	   my	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
correlation	  results,	  pointed	  to	  some	  tentative	  inference	  about	  causality.	  However,	  
correlation	  does	  not	   imply	   strict	   causality,	   and	   –	   even	   though	   the	   analysis	   takes	  
into	  account	  the	  size	  of	  the	  sub-­‐samples	  –	  the	  power	  of	  the	  statistical	  tests	  is	  not	  
very	  high	   (Kenny,	   1987).	   Therefore,	   these	   results	  will	   be	   confronted	  with	   the	   in-­‐
depth	  narrative,	  in	  order	  to	  unveil	  deeper	  causal	  mechanisms.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




VII.4. QUALITATIVE	  APPROACH:	  IN-­‐DEPTH	  NARRATIVE	  
I	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  qualitative	  case	  study	  of	  the	  different	  periods.	  Based	  on	  the	  initial	  
quantitative	   analysis,	   I	   divided	   the	   case	   into	   five	   periods:	   1979-­‐1987;	   1987-­‐1996;	  
1996-­‐2005;	  2005-­‐2009;	  and	  2009-­‐2012.	  Using	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  as	  an	  ideal-­‐type,	  and	  
according	  to	  the	  case	  study	  protocol,	  I	  describe	  for	  each	  period:	  (1)	  problem-­‐related	  
pressures	   (from	   science,	   social	   movements,	   public	   opinion,	   policy-­‐makers,	  
consumers,	   outsiders	   etc.);	   (2)	   response	   strategies	   from	   the	   car	   industry;	   and	   (3)	  
broader	   developments	   in	   task	   or	   institutional	   environments	   that	   (positively	   or	  
negatively)	   influence	   life-­‐cycle	   dynamics	   or	   industry	   strategies.	   As	   in	   the	   safety	  
case	   study,	   to	   guide	   the	   reader,	   here	   I	   also	   adopt	   the	   strategy	   of	   starting	   each	  
period	  with	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	  match	   or	  mismatch	  with	   the	   conceptual	   phase-­‐
model.	  
VII.4.1. 	  Problem	  emergence,	  sense-­‐making	  and	  industry	  indifference	  (1979-­‐
1987)	  
This	  period	  displays	  dynamics	  that	  fit	  well	  with	  DILC’s	  phase	  1:	  (a)	  sense-­‐making	  
processes	   regarding	   climate	   change;	   and	   (b)	   environmentalists	   (and	   scientists)	  
engaged	   in	   attention	   advocacy.	   One	  minor	   deviation	   is	   thus	   that	   a	   mass	   social	  
movement	   is	   already	   present	   (while	   in	   the	  DILC-­‐model	   activists	   coalesce	   into	   a	  
social	  movement	   in	  phase	  2),	  because	   the	  environmental	  movement	  was	   already	  
institutionalized	   (Dunlap	   and	   Mertig,	   1992).	   Other	   is	   the	   presence	   of	   early	  
symbolic	  action	  in	  the	  policy	  domain	  (e.g.	  government-­‐sponsored	  reports	  in	  1983),	  
with	  some	  acting	  as	  issue-­‐advocates	  (e.g.	  Senator	  Al	  Gore	  in	  1986).	  
VII.4.1.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Science,	  social	  movements,	  public	  opinion.	  In	  the	  1970s,	  climate	  change	  emerged	  as	  
a	  scientific	  research	  topic	  (Yergin,	  2011;	  Carey,	  2012).	  A	  series	  of	  scientific	  meetings,	  
conferences	   and	   workshops	   provided	   the	   stage	   for	   academic	   sense-­‐making	   and	  
debates	   (Agrawala,	   1998a),	   e.g.	   the	   World	   Climate	   Conference	   (1979)	   and	   the	  
Villach	  and	  Bellagio	  meetings	  (1987).	  Researchers	  began	  calling	  for	  political	  action	  
to	  develop	  responses	  to	  climate	  change	  (Corfee-­‐Morlot	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  
The	   environmental	   movement,	   which	   had	   emerged	   in	   previous	   decades	  
with	   a	   focus	   on	   addressing	   local	   problems	   (smog,	   water	   pollution),	   shifted	  




Morlot	   et	   al.,	   2007)	   and	   began	   calling	   for	   measures	   to	   tackle	   global	   warming	  
(Corfee-­‐Morlot	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  
Public	   attention	   to	  global	  warming	   remained	   low	   (Figure	  VII.2.a)	  because	  
environmental	  news	  was	  dominated	  by	  other	   issues	   such	  as	  nuclear	  energy,	  acid	  
rain	   and	   the	   ozone	  hole157	  (Corfee-­‐Morlot	   et	   al.,	   2007;	  Dunlap	   and	  Mertig,	   1992).	  
Additionally,	  the	  economic	  recession	  of	  the	  early	  1980s	  dampened	  public	  attention	  
to	  environmental	  issues	  (Dunlap,	  1992).	  
Policy-­‐makers.	  Political	  activity	  was	  symbolic	  and	  aimed	  at	  sense-­‐making.	  The	  1978	  
National	  Climate	  Act	  dedicated	  $50	  million158	  of	  annual	  budget	  to	  research	  funding	  
(Rothenberg	  and	  Levy,	  2012).	  In	  1980,	  the	  Senate	  held	  hearings	  to	  understand	  the	  
problem	  of	  climate	  change	  (Corfee-­‐Morlot	  et	   al.,	  2007).	   In	  1983,	  reports	   from	  the	  
US	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  (EPA)	  and	  the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  
(NAS)	   reached	   conflicting	   conclusions	   regarding	   the	   need	   for	   action	   (Corfee-­‐
Morlot	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  This	  reflected	  scientific	  uncertainty,	  which	  may	  be	  connected	  
to	  the	  lack	  of	  issue-­‐salience	  before	  public	  opinion.	  Senator	  Al	  Gore	  however	  acted	  
as	  a	  policy	  entrepreneur	  and	  engaged	   in	  attention	  advocacy	  when	  he	  and	  others	  
wrote	  a	  public	  letter	  (1986)	  declaring	  to	  be	  ‘deeply	  disturbed’	  about	  climate	  change	  
and	  calling	  for	  policy	  action	  (Yergin,	  2011).	  	  
VII.4.1.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  
The	   car	   industry	   –	   and	   businesses,	   in	   general	   –	   was	   unconcerned	   with	   climate	  
change	   (Rothenberg	  and	  Levy,	   2012),	   thus	   remaining	   in	   its	   ‘zone	  of	   indifference’.	  
Automakers	  were	  more	  engaged	  with	   local	  air	  pollution,	  emission	  standards	  and	  
the	   development	   and	   implementation	   of	   the	   three-­‐way	   catalytic	   converter	   (see	  
Chapter	  V).	  	  
VII.4.1.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
Two	   broad	   industry	   developments	   would	   shape	   future	   responses	   of	   American	  
automakers	  to	  climate	  change.	  The	  first	  development	  was	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  a	  new	  
market	   segment,	  which	   started	  with	  Chrysler’s	  Minivan	   (1984MY),	   and	  morphed	  
into	   Sports	   Utility	   Vehicles	   (Ingrassia,	   2010).	   This	   market	   segment,	   which	  
commanded	   high	   profit-­‐margins	   (Doyle,	   2000),	   was	   purposively	   designated	   as	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  Discovered	  by	  British	  researchers	  in	  1985.	  




‘light-­‐trucks’	  (i.e.	  supposedly	  for	  commercial	  purposes),	  because	  this	  category	  was	  
subject	   to	   more	   lenient	   fuel	   economy	   standards	   (Luger,	   2000).	   The	   light-­‐truck	  
segment	   would	   dominate	   the	   American	   car	   market	   in	   future	   decades	   (Figure	  
VII.4).	  	  
Figure	  VII.4:	  In	  the	  early	  1980s,	  sales	  of	  trucks	  began	  an	  upward	  trajectory	  until,	  in	  1999,	  
more	  trucks	  than	  cars	  were	  sold	  in	  the	  American	  market	  
	  
Source:	  Author’s	  construction	  based	  on	  data	  from	  US	  EPA	  (2012)	  
A	   second	  development	  was	   the	   introduction	  of	   fuel	   economy	   regulations,	  which	  
were	  enacted	   in	   1974	   to	   save	   fuel	  amidst	   the	  energy	  crisis.	  The	  CAFE	  (Corporate	  
Average	  Fuel	  Efficiency)	   standards	   started	   at	   18	  mpg	   for	   1978	  models	   and	  would	  
increase	   to	   27.5	   mpg	   in	   1985	   (Figure	   VII.5).	   GM	   and	   Ford	   initially	   intended	   to	  
comply	  by	  downsizing	  part	  of	   their	   fleet,	  while	  Chrysler	   invested	  US$5	  billion	   in	  
fuel-­‐efficient	   internal	   combustion	   engine	   technologies	   (front-­‐wheel	   drive,	   lighter	  
parts,	   turbocharged	   four-­‐cylinder	   engines)159.	   But	   as	   the	   expanding	   light	   truck	  
market	   became	   the	   industry’s	   cash	   cow	   (Ingrassia,	   2010),	   their	   innovation	   and	  
economic	  positioning	  strategies	  increasingly	  focused	  on	  big,	  gas	  guzzling	  vehicles	  
(Doyle,	   2000).	  When	   this	   created	  problems	   in	  meeting	   the	  CAFE	   standards,	  GM	  
and	   Ford	   lobbied	   the	   NHTSA	   (National	   Highway	   and	   Traffic	   Safety	  
Administration),	   responsible	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   standards,	   which	  
relaxed	  them	  to	  26	  mpg	  for	  1986-­‐1988	  models,	  and	  26.5	  mpg	  for	  1989	  models,	  with	  
the	  27.5	  mpg	  requirement	  postponed	  to	  1990	  (Figure	  VII.5).	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  While	  not	  displayed	  in	  Figures	  VII.3.b,	  I	  also	  collected	  data	  for	  pre-­‐1988	  years.	  It	  shows	  that	  in	  
the	  pre-­‐1988	  era,	  the	  majority	  of	  AFV	  patents	  fell	  in	  the	  aICE	  category,	  which	  is	  in	  line	  with	  




Figure	  VII.5:	  CAFE	  standards	  and	  fuel	  economy	  of	  new	  cars	  
	  
	  Source:	  Author’s	  construction	  based	  on	  data	  from	  NHTSA	  (2011)	  and	  USEPA	  and	  NHTSA	  (2011)	  
VII.4.2. Rising	  public	  concern	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  closed	  industry-­‐front	  
(1987-­‐1996)	  
This	   period	   displays	   the	   following	   dynamics:	   (a)	   increase	   in	   public	   attention;	  	  
(b)	  symbolic	  political	  engagement	  at	  the	  Federal	  and	  global	  level;	  (c)	  creation	  of	  a	  
closed	   industry-­‐front.	   This	   seems	   in	   line	   with	   the	   model’s	   phase	   2.	   In	   some	  
respects,	   however,	   the	  period	  deviated	   from	   the	   ideal	   type:	   (1)	   at	   the	   state	   level,	  
California’s	   Zero	   Emissions	   Vehicle	   (ZEV)	   mandate	   formed	   a	   strong	   piece	   of	  
regulation	   that	   created	   substantial	   pressure	   on	   the	   car	   industry;	   (2)	   symbolic	  
political	  engagement	  soon	  became	  hot	  political	  debate;	  and	  (3)	  there	  was	  an	  early	  
innovation	   race	   on	   a	   radical	   innovation	   (BEV),	   triggered	   by	   an	   incumbent	   firm	  
(GM).	  
VII.4.2.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Science,	   social	   movements,	   public	   opinion.	   The	   late-­‐1980s	   were	   hot	   years	   (with	  
record-­‐high	   temperatures	   and	   droughts),	   which	   stimulated	   public	   attention	   to	  
global	  warming	  (Figure	  VII.2.a).	  Public	  attention	  was	  also	  stimulated	  by	  the	   1988	  
Senate	  Hearing	  on	  global	  warming	   (see	  below)	  and	  by	   framing	   struggle	  between	  
scientists/environmentalists	  and	  climate-­‐sceptics	  supported	  by	  businesses	  (Doyle,	  
2000;	   Luger,	   2000).	  By	   1989,	   the	  percentage	  of	  Americans	  who	  had	  heard	  of	   the	  
‘greenhouse	  effect’	  had	  more	  than	  doubled	  in	  relation	  to	  1981,	  reaching	  almost	  80%	  
according	   to	   one	   survey	   (Corfee-­‐Morlot	   et	   al.,	   2007).	   With	   increased	   public	  
sensibility,	   attention	   to	   global	   warming	   grew	   sharply	   in	   1988-­‐1990,	   with	   the	   car	  
industry	   also	   implicated	   in	   the	   issue	   (Figue	   VII.2.a).	   The	   newly	   created	   (1988)	  




profile	   of	   climate	   change	   with	   comprehensive	   assessment	   reports	   (in	   1990	   and	  
1996),	  which	  reviewed,	  assessed	  and	  integrated	  scientific	  findings	  of	  risk,	  potential	  
consequences	  and	  possible	  mitigation	  options	  (Corfee-­‐Morlot	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  
Policy-­‐makers.	   Political	   action	   occurred	   at	   multiple	   levels.	   At	   the	   global	   level,	  
symbolic	  action	  dominated.	  The	  1988	  Toronto	  Conference	  on	  Changing	  Atmosphere	  
was	  the	  first	  international	  meeting	  of	  western	  governments	  to	  call	  for	  restrictions	  
in	   GHG	   emissions.	   	   The	   first	   IPCC	   report	   (1990)	   provided	   the	   basis	   for	  
international	   negotiations,	   which	   resulted	   in	   heads	   of	   state	   signing	   the	   United	  
Nations	   Framework	   Convention	   on	   Climate	   Change	   (UNFCCC)	   at	   the	   1992	   Rio	  
Earth	  Summit	  (Corfee-­‐Morlot	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Although	  Rio	  1992	  established	  the	  goal	  
of	   stabilizing	   GHG	   concentrations	   at	   a	   level	   that	   would	   prevent	   ‘anthropogenic	  
climate	  change’,	  its	  result	  was	  more	  symbolic	  than	  substantive,	  as	  the	  Framework	  
was	   a	   voluntary,	   non-­‐binding	   agreement	   that	  would	   prove	   elusive	   to	   implement	  
(Kolk	  and	  Levy,	  2001;	  Yergin,	  2011).	  In	  1995	  (Berlin),	  signatory	  parties	  established	  a	  
differentiated	   responsibility	   approach:	   industrialized	   nations	   were	   to	   agree	   on	  
specific	  targets	  and	  timeframes,	  but	  not	  developing	  countries	  (Corfee-­‐Morlot	  et	  al.,	  
2007).	   In	   1996	  (Geneva),	   the	  parties	  accepted	   the	   findings	   from	  the	  second	   IPCC	  
assessment	  report,	  and	  called	  for	  legal-­‐binding	  targets	  and	  timeframes	  (Agrawala,	  
1998b).	   At	   this	  meeting,	   the	   US	   Delegation	   actively	   pushed	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	  
more	  stringent	  measures	  in	  the	  following	  (1997)	  meeting	  in	  Kyoto	  (Johnston,	  1997).	  
At	   the	   US	   Federal	   level,	   the	   1988	   Senate	   hearings	   were	   a	   key	   event,	  
especially	   the	   testimony	  of	  NASA	  climate	   scientist,	   James	  Hansen,	  on	  a	   very	  hot	  
day	   (Yergin,	  2011).	  Hansen	   linked	   the	  hot	   summer	   to	  global	  warming,	   something	  
which	   the	   mass	   media	   keenly	   reported.	   The	   New	   York	   Times’	   front	   page	  
(24/6/1988),	   for	   instance,	   warned	   that:	   ‘Global	  Warming	   has	   begun’	   (Shabecoff,	  
1988).	  The	  1988	  hearings	  “mark[ed]	  the	  emergence	  of	  climate	  change	  as	  a	  political	  
issue”	  (Yergin,	  2011,	  p.	  453).	  Political	  debate	  ensued.	  A	  proposal	  was	  subsequently	  
made	   to	   embed	   global	   warming	   in	   the	   Federal	   Clean	   Air	   Act,	   which	   was	   under	  
Congressional	   revision	   in	   1989-­‐1990	   (Doyle,	   2000;	  Duffield	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   But	   this	  
proposal	   failed	   to	   be	   enacted.	   Proposals	   were	   also	   made	   to	   use	   fuel	   economy	  
legislation	  as	  a	  way	  to	  address	  global	  warming	  (Doyle,	  2000;	  cf.	  Figure	  VII.2.a).	  
Politicians	   soon	   began	   jockeying	   for	   the	   fatherhood	   of	   a	   ‘global	   warming	  




(Doyle,	  2000):	  the	  Global	  Warming	  Prevention	  Act	  (which	  included	  a	  fuel	  efficiency	  
mandate	  of	  45	  mpg	  for	  cars	  and	  35	  mpg	  for	  trucks	  by	  2004);	  the	  National	  Energy	  
Policy	  Act;	  the	  World	  Environment	  Act	  (sponsored	  by	  Senator	  Al	  Gore);	  the	  Global	  
Environmental	   Protection	   Act	   (calling	   for	   a	   50%	   reduction	   in	   automotive	   carbon	  
emissions,	   equivalent	   to	   a	   fuel	   economy	   standard	   of	   55	  mpg);	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	  
Bryan	  Bill	  (focused	  exclusively	  on	  fuel	  economy	  to	  address	  global	  warming).	  But	  all	  
these	  bills	   failed	  to	  pass	  because	  of	  strong	  corporate	  opposition	  (see	  below).	  The	  
1989	  Bryan	  Bill,	  for	  example,	  which	  proposed	  a	  20%	  increase	  in	  CAFE	  standards	  by	  
1995	   and	   40%	   by	   2001	   (equivalent	   to	   about	   40	   mpg),	   was	   publicly	   opposed	   by	  
automakers.	  President	  Bush	  (Sr.)	  subsequently	  threatened	  to	  veto	  it	  (Doyle,	  2000),	  
because	   he	   preferred	   a	   voluntary	   approach	   through	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	  
(PPP)	  aimed	  at	  developing	  advanced	  technologies	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  alternative	  
(mainly	   ethanol/methanol)	   fuels	   (Duffield	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Yergin,	   2011)	   (see	   below).	  
The	  bill	  was	  not	  voted	  in	  1990,	  and	  a	  reintroduced	  version	  died	  in	  1991,	  because	  of	  
coordinated	   opposition	   from	   automakers	   and	   ‘astroturf’	   organizations	   (Doyle,	  
2000).	  
Thereafter,	  political	  action	  at	  the	  Federal	  level	  moved	  away	  from	  regulation	  
and	   towards	   a	   conciliatory	   approach	   through	   PPPs	   (Luger,	   2000).	   The	   newly	  
elected	   (1993)	  president	  Clinton	   took	  similar	  voluntary	  approach	  and	  established	  
another	   PPP	   with	   Detroit	   automakers	   (Partnership	   for	   a	   New	   Generation	   of	  
Vehicles,	  see	  below).	  In	  return	  for	  industry	  participation,	  he	  offered	  a	  moratorium	  
on	  mandated	  fuel	  economy	  increases	  (Luger,	  2000)	  (cf.	  Figure	  VII.5).	  The	  Clinton	  
administration	   did,	   however,	   take	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   international	   climate	   change	  
negotiations	  in	  Berlin	  (1995)	  and	  Geneva	  (1996)	  (Johnston,	  1997).	  
	  At	  the	  US	  state	   level,	  California’s	   	   ‘Zero-­‐Emission	  Vehicle’	   (ZEV)	  mandate	  
(1990)	  was	  a	  strong	  piece	  of	  legislation	  that	  required	  the	  seven	  biggest	  automakers	  
in	   California	   to	   sell	   a	   fleet	   mix	   that	   included	   different	   categories	   of	   vehicles	  
according	   to	   increasingly	   stringent	   emission	   levels	   (Table	  VII.4),	   setting	   a	   tough	  
fine	  (US$5,000160)	  per	  non-­‐compliant	  vehicle	  (Kemp,	  2005).	  The	  plan	  was	  in	  effect	  a	  
‘sales	  mandate’	  for	  BEVs	  (Kemp,	  2005),	  because	  “battery-­‐powered	  electric	  vehicles	  
[were]	  the	  only	  zero	  emission	  automotive	  technology	  on	  the	  horizon”	  (Doyle,	  2000,	  
p.	  274).	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  ZEV-­‐mandate	  was	  influenced	  by	  GM’s	  unveiling	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




a	  BEV	  prototype	  (see	  below).	  By	  1994,	  other	  states	  were	  considering	  adopting	  the	  
Californian	   ZEV	  mandate,	   which	   led	   the	   Big	   Three	   to	   start	   an	   intense	   lobbying	  
campaign	   against	   this	   development	   (Doyle,	   2000).	   The	   ZEV-­‐regulation	   also	  
established	  a	  biannual	  review	  process,	  which	  offered	  carmakers	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
shape	   the	   policy	   process.	   While	   the	   original	   regulation	   survived	   the	   first	   two	  
reviews	  (1992	  and	  1994),	  CARB	  (California	  Air	  Resources	  Board)	  dropped	  the	  1998-­‐
2002	  requirements	  in	  1996	  under	  great	  pressure	  from	  automakers	  (Kemp,	  2005).	  
Table	  VII.4:	  CARB	  original	  sales	  requirements	  under	  the	  LEV/ZEV	  mandate	  













1994	   90%	   10%	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
1995	   85%	   15%	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
1996	   80%	   20%	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
1667	   73%	   -­‐	   25%	   2%	   -­‐	  
1998-­‐2000	   48%	   -­‐	   48%	   2%	   2%	  
2001-­‐2002	   -­‐	   -­‐	   90%	   5%	   5%	  
2003	   -­‐	   -­‐	   75%	   15%	   10%	  
Source:	  Kemp	  (2005,	  p.	  175)	  
Foreign	  automakers.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  ZEV	  mandate	  and	  PNGV,	  Toyota	  decided	  
to	   develop	   a	   car	   with	   100%	   fuel	   economy	   improvement	   (Doyle,	   2000).	   In	   1995,	  
Toyota	  decided	  to	  produce	  the	  car	  by	  December	  1997,	  in	  time	  for	  the	  international	  
climate	  meeting	   in	  Kyoto	   (Yergin,	   2011).	  Honda	  would	   follow	   suit	   and	   announce	  
the	  development	  of	  a	  HEV-­‐prototype	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  HEVs	  were	  initially	  derided	  by	  
the	   rest	   of	   the	   industry,	   because	   twin-­‐powertrains	   substantively	   increased	   costs.	  
GM	  perceived	  HEVs	  as	   ‘interim’	  technology,	  and	  decided	  instead	  to	  focus	  on	  fuel	  
cells,	  which	  would	  “make	  hybrids	  obsolete”	  (MacCormack,	  2005,	  p.	  15).	  
More	  disruptive	  fuel	  cell	  vehicles	  (FCV)	  were	  initially	  pioneered	  by	  Daimler-­‐
Benz	  (Dyerson	  and	  Pilkington,	  2005;	  Hekkert	  and	  van	  den	  Hoed,	  2006).	  In	  1994,	  it	  
unveiled	  a	  cumbersome	  prototype,	  the	  “NECAR	  [New	  Electric	  Car],	  followed	  by	  the	  
smaller	  NECAR	   II	   (1996),	   which	   	   “caus[ed]	  widespread	   optimism	  with	   regard	   to	  
fuel	   cell	   vehicles	   (FCVs)	   among	   a	   broader	   range	   of	   stakeholders”	   (Budde	   et	   al.,	  
2012,	  p.	  1078).	  Daimler	  thus	  put	  fuel	  cells	  ‘on	  the	  map’	  (cf.	  Figure	  VII.3.c)	  as	  a	  zero-­‐




VII.4.2.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  
Social-­‐cultural	   strategies.	   In	   1989,	   the	   Big	   Three,	   the	   American	   Automobile	  
Manufacturers	   Association161	  (AAMA),	   and	   forty	   other	   American	   companies	   and	  
industry	  associations	   formed	  the	  Global	  Climate	  Coalition	   (GCC)	  (Kolk	  and	  Levy,	  
2001;	   Levy,	   2005).	   The	   GCC	   formed	   a	   ‘closed	   industry	   front’	   to	   hinder	   further	  
progression	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  issue	  (Bonardi	  and	  Keim,	  2005).	  	  Throughout	  the	  
1990s,	   the	   GCC	   commissioned	   reports	   that	   attacked	   the	   science	   behind	   global	  
warming	   (Doyle,	   2000),	   e.g.	   by	   accusing	   the	   IPCC	   of	   downplaying	   uncertainties.	  	  
Individual	   automakers	   also	   followed	   this	   strategy,	  with	   Ford	   and	  Chrysler	   being	  
“especially	   vociferous	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   through	   speeches	   and	   editorials,	   in	  
castigating	   concerns	   about	   climate	   change	   and	   emphasizing	   the	   high	   cost	   of	  
precipitate	   action	   in	   the	   face	   of	   uncertainty”	   (Rothenberg	   and	  Levy,	   2012,	   p.	   41).	  
With	   these	   information	   strategies,	   the	   industry	   “tried	   to	   confuse	   the	   public	   by	  
saying	   global	  warming	  was	   based	   on	   bad	   science	   and	  was	   only	   theory,	   not	   fact”	  
(Doyle,	  2000,	  p.	  387).	  	  	  
American	   automakers	   also	   set	   up	   ‘astroturf’	   organizations	   –	   coalition	  
building	   strategies	   –	   that	   created	   pressures	   on	   politicians.	   The	   supposedly	  
‘grassroots’	   Coalition	   for	   Vehicle	   Choice	   (CVC),	   supported	   by	   the	   industry,	   for	  
instance,	   promoted	   the	   view	   that	   stricter	   CAFE	   standards	   would	   limit	   vehicle	  
choice	  and	  ‘outlaw’	  SUVs	  and	  pick-­‐ups	  (Luger,	  2000).	  More	  than	  200	  CVC-­‐enlisted	  
groups	  (dealers,	  parts	  suppliers	  and	  their	  trade	  associations)	  initiated	  letter-­‐writing	  
campaigns	  to	  pressure	  congressmen	  not	  to	  enact	  the	  Bryan	  Bill	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  CVC	  
also	  sponsored	  newspaper	  advertisements	  (Figure	  VII.6)	  that	  suggested	  a	  trade-­‐off	  
between	  fuel	  economy	  and	  car	  safety,	  claiming	  that	  smaller	  and	  lighter	  cars	  were	  
less	   safe	   (Luger,	   2000).	   Consumer	   advocacy	   groups	   criticized	   this	   framing	   as	  
misleading	   (Doyle,	   2000)	   because	   it	   ignored	   the	   importance	   of	   advanced	   engine	  
technologies	   (improved	   fuel-­‐injection	   systems,	   turbo	   charging,	   advanced	   valve	  
management)	   and	   innovative	   safety	   devices	   (airbags,	   high-­‐strength/light-­‐weight	  
materials,	  anti-­‐lock	  brakes).	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Figure	  VII.6:	  CVC’s	  1991	  ad	  on	  a	  supposed	  trade-­‐off	  between	  fuel	  economy	  and	  safety	  
	  
Source:	  Doyle	  (2000,	  p.	  264)	  
The	  American	   car	   industry	   also	   attacked	   the	  Californian	  ZEV	  mandate,	  with	   the	  
AAMA	   officially	   stating	   that	   its	   own	   strategic	   goal	   was	   to	   “[create]	   a	   climate	   in	  
which	  the	  [California	  EV]	  mandate	  [...]	  can	  be	  repealed”	  (cited	  in	  Doyle,	  2000,	  p.	  
294).	   Japanese	  manufacturers	   joined	  this	  attack,	  claiming	  that	  battery	  technology	  
would	   not	   be	   ready	   for	   commercialization	   by	   1998	   (Kemp,	   2005).	   When	   an	  
independent	  Battery	  Technology	  Advisory	  Panel	  concluded	  that	  battery	  costs	  would	  
still	  represent	  a	  barrier	  to	  EV	  diffusion	  by	  1998	  (Doyle,	  2000;	  Kemp,	  2005),	  CARB	  
decided	  (1996)	  to	  drop	  the	  1998-­‐2002	  sales	  requirements.	  
Political	   strategies.	   American	   automakers	   used	   financial	   incentive	   strategies	   and	  
information	   strategies	   to	  water	  down	  Federal	  proposals	   to	   increase	   fuel	  economy	  
standards	   and	   to	   avoid	   adoption	  of	   the	  ZEV	  mandate	  by	  other	   states.	  Campaign	  
contributions	  and	  payment	  of	  personal	  trips	  incentivized	  politicians	  to	  vote	  against	  
legislation,	  resulting,	  according	  to	  one	  analysis	  (cited	  in	  Luger,	  2000,	  p.	  160),	  in	  ‘a	  
strong	  correlation’	  between	  auto	  industry	  donations	  and	  Senators’	  votes	  on	  CAFE	  
proposals.	  Information	  tactics	  included	  direct	  lobbying,	  reporting	  research	  results	  
that	   attacked	   climate	   science,	   and	   commissioning	  policy	  proposals	   (Doyle,	   2000;	  




partnerships	   also	   represented	  a	  kind	  of	  political	   strategy,	  because	   they	   improved	  
the	   Big	   Three’s	   legitimacy	   before	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   the	   public	   (signalling	   their	  
willingness	  to	  take	  action).	  
Innovation	   strategies.	   In	   this	   period,	   environmental	   technology	   strategies	   of	  
American	   automakers	   focused	   on	   incremental	   innovations	   such	   as	   advanced-­‐
Internal	  Combustion	  Engine	   (aICE)	   technologies	   (Figure	  VII.3.b).	  These	   included	  
improved	   fuel	   injection	   systems	   and	   lean-­‐burn	   catalysts	   (Mondt,	   2000).	  Another	  
strategy	  to	  defend	  existing	  ICE	  technology	  was	  the	  development	  of	  ethanol-­‐fuelled	  
or	  flex-­‐fuel	  vehicles	  (FFV),	  which	  were	  capable	  of	  running	  on	  methanol/ethanol	  or	  
gasoline	   or	   a	  mixture	   of	   both	   (e.g.	   E85,	   an	   85%	  ethanol	   fuel	  mixture).	   The	   1988	  
Alternative	  Motor	   Fuels	   Act	   (AMFA)	   assigned	  CAFE	   credits	   to	   the	  production	  of	  
FFVs	  (Duffield	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Automakers	  seized	  this	  option	  and	  focused	  on	  flex-­‐fuel	  
models.	   By	   1997	   almost	   85,000	   E85	   Flex-­‐Fuel	   Vehicles	   were	   sold,	   leased	   or	  
converted,	  about	  1%	  of	  total	  passenger	  car	  sales	  (Figure	  VII.3.d).	  	  
Carmakers	   (except	   GM)	   gave	   relatively	   little	   innovative	   attention	   to	  
alternative	   powertrain	   technologies	   (van	   den	   Hoed,	   2005).	   In	   the	   late	   1980s	  
General	   Motors	   dedicated	   some	   resources	   to	   radical	   innovation	   (BEV)	   for	  
reputational	   reasons,	   under	   sponsorship	   of	   its	   chairman	   Roger	   Smith.	   The	  
resulting	   prototype	   (the	   Impact)	   was	  meant	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   GM	  was	   not	   a	  
stale,	  boring	  company,	  but	   still	  mustered	   innovative	  capabilities	   (Johnson,	   1999).	  
The	   Impact	   ‘show-­‐car’	   had	   several	   innovative	   features:	   an	   advanced	   ‘teardrop’	  
aerodynamic	   design,	   special	   tires	   to	   reduce	   drag,	   regenerative	   braking	   (Johnson,	  
1999),	  innovative	  materials	  such	  as	  fibreglass	  (Kemp,	  2005),	  a	  pack	  of	  32	  lead-­‐acid	  
batteries,	  and	  two	  electric	  motors	  to	  drive	  each	  front	  wheel	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  	  
When	  the	  Impact	  was	  unveiled	  at	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Motor	  Show	  of	   1990,	   it	  
received	  much	  positive	  publicity.	  Smith	  then,	  somewhat	  impulsively,	  decided	  that	  
GM	  would	  market	  the	  car	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  “Ignoring	  advice	  of	  other	  executives	  who	  
feared	   electric	   vehicles	   would	   not	   sell	   and	   might	   become	   part	   of	   California	  
legislation,	  Smith	  publicly	  announced	  a	  production	  programme	  [on	  the	  20th	  Earth	  
Day]	  in	  April	  1990”	  (Kemp,	  2005:	  p.	  174-­‐5).	  CARB	  interpreted	  this	  announcement	  as	  
indicating	   that	  BEVs	  were	   sufficiently	  developed,	   and	   issued	   the	  ZEV	  mandate	   a	  




million	  EV	  programme	  (Doyle,	  2000)	  to	  produce	  25,000	  vehicles	  per	  year	  by	  2000	  
(Kemp,	  2005).	  	  
Other	  carmakers	  feared	  that	  GM’s	  initiative	  might	  spark	  an	  innovation	  race	  
(in	  fact,	  Figure	  VII.3.c	  shows	  a	  significant	  rise	  in	  BEV	  patenting	  by	  outsiders	  in	  the	  
early	   1990s),	   provide	   support	   for	   the	   ZEV-­‐mandate,	   and	   offer	   an	   entry	   point	   to	  
competitors	   (Doyle,	   2000;	   Kemp,	   2005).	   In	   1991,	   the	   Big	   Three	   therefore	   formed	  
another	   closed	   industry-­‐front	   so	   that	   all	   three	   companies	   would	  move	   together	  
technologically	   and	   share	   the	   risks	   of	   developing	   radical	   innovations	   (Keenler,	  
1992).	   The	   US	   Advanced	   Battery	   Consortium	   (USABC)	   was	   a	   public-­‐private	  
partnership	  launched	  by	  President	  Bush	  and	  the	  Big	  Three	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  Although	  
most	  of	  the	  funds	  came	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  Energy	  (DoE),	  the	  Big	  Three	  ran	  
the	  program	  and	  decided	  which	  battery	  developers	  got	   the	  grants	   (Doyle,	  2000).	  
The	  USABC	  fulfilled	  several	   roles	   for	  American	  automakers	   	   (Doyle,	  2000;	  Luger,	  
2000):	   (a)	   improving	   their	   public	   reputation;	   (b)	   controlling	   technical	  
development;	  (c)	  managing	  technological	  expectations	  through	  the	  establishment	  
of	  unrealistic	  mid-­‐term	  goals	  (such	  as	  a	  minimum	  driving	  range	  of	  150-­‐miles)	  “that	  
enabled	   an	   indefinite	   postponement	   of	   progress”	   (Doyle,	   2000:308);	   and	   (d)	  
controlling	   the	   release	  of	   technical	   information	   to	  policy-­‐makers	   to	  prevent	   that	  
standards	   would	   be	   ratcheted	   up.	   According	   to	   a	   former	   GM	   employee,	   “the	  
automakers	   formed	  USABC	   to	  hinder	   rather	   than	  enhance	  product	  development	  
by	  controlling	  research	  and	  development	  efforts”	  (quoted	  	  in	  Doyle,	  2000,	  p.	  309).	  
In	   1992,	  after	  suffering	  substantial	   financial	   losses	   (cf.	  Figure	  VI.17,	  p.	  228)	  
and	  after	  Smith’s	   retirement,	  GM	  downscaled	   its	  BEV	  project	   to	   a	  US$32-­‐million	  
demonstration	   programme	   of	   30-­‐50	   cars/year,	   with	   1/3	   of	   the	   initial	   personnel	  
(Doyle,	  2000;	  Kemp,	  2005).	  GM	  also	  decided	  to	  lease	  its	  electric	  car,	  for	  US$33,995,	  
about	   half	   of	   real	   costs	   of	   $78,000	   (MacCormack,	   2005).	   By	   1996-­‐7,	   GM	   leased	  
about	   760	   units	   (MacCormack,	   2005),	   which	   was	   far	   below	   initial	   expectations.	  
Critics	   accused	   GM	   of	   deliberately	   under-­‐promoting	   electric	   cars	   (Doyle,	   2000;	  
Sperling	  and	  Gordon,	  2009).	  For	  the	  ZEV-­‐mandate’s	  third	  review	  (1996),	  GM,	  Ford	  
and	  Chrysler	  aligned	  their	  position,	  publicly	  complaining	  about	  the	  state	  of	  battery	  
development,	   low	   consumer	  demand,	   and	   lack	  of	   infrastructure	   (Johnson,	   1999):	  




out	  ahead	  of	  the	  others	  –	  although	  GM	  clearly	  had	  the	  technological	  lead”	  (Doyle,	  
2000,	  p.	  322).	  	  
Another	   technological	  project	   that	  provided	   ‘political	   cover’	   (Doyle,	   2000)	  
to	   the	   American	   automakers	   was	   the	   1993	   Partnership	   for	   a	   New	   Generation	   of	  
Vehicles	   (PNGV).	   This	   $300-­‐million	   joint-­‐venture	   with	   Federal	   research	  
laboratories	   aimed	   at	   developing	   a	   ‘production	   prototype’	   by	   2003,	   capable	   of	  
reaching	  a	  fuel	  economy	  of	  c.	  80	  mpg,	  without	  sacrificing	  on	  size,	  performance	  or	  
safety	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  PNGV	  served	  similar	  purposes	  as	  USBAC:	  directing	  technical	  
developments,	  controlling	  technological	  expectations	  and	  playing	  on	   information	  
asymmetries.	   In	   exchange	   for	   their	   participation	   the	   Big	   Three	   also	   secured	   a	  
moratorium	  on	  Federal	  CAFE	  increases	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  The	  Big	  Three	  also	  used	  the	  
PNGV	   to	   pre-­‐empt	   regulatory	   action,	   claiming	   that	   self-­‐regulation	   and	   PPP	  was	  
more	  effective	  than	  ‘command-­‐and-­‐control’	  regulations	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  
Although	   PNGV	   developed	   some	   radical	   technologies	   that	   would	   later	  
become	   innovations	   (e.g.	   lightweight	   materials,	   lithium-­‐ion	   battery	   cell,	   fuel-­‐
flexible	  processors	  for	  a	  fuel	  cell)	  (National	  Research	  Council,	  1997),	  the	  Big	  Three	  
directed	   most	   research	   efforts	   towards	   incremental	   technologies	   for	   advanced	  
diesel	   engines	   (e.g.	   lean-­‐burn	  NOx	   catalysts,	   diesel	   direct	   fuel	   injection	   systems)	  
and	  (diesel)	  hybrid	  powertrains	  (Mondt,	  2000).	  The	  preferred	  option	  for	  reaching	  
the	   2003	   80-­‐mpg	   target	   was	   the	   ‘4SDI’	   engine	   technology,	   a	   four-­‐stroke,	   direct	  
injection	   diesel	   with	   40%	   better	   fuel	   economy	   than	   conventional	   petrol	   engines	  
(Doyle,	   2000).	   But	   since	   diesel	   engines	   did	   not	  meet	   NOx	   or	   particulate	  matter	  
emission	   standards,	   they	   could	   not	   be	   deployed	   until	   diesel	   catalytic	   converters	  
were	  substantially	  improved	  (Mondt,	  2000;	  National	  Research	  Council,	  1997).	  
Market	  positioning	  strategies.	  Despite	  changes	  in	  regulatory	  frame	  conditions	  and	  
pressures	   from	   the	   task	   environment,	   consumer	   demand	   for	   AFVs	   was	   almost	  
inexistent,	   so	   that	   climate	   change	   hardly	   affected	  American	   automakers’	  market	  
positioning	  strategies.	  In	  fact,	  American	  automakers	  were	  firmly	  oriented	  towards	  
selling	  profitable	  light	  trucks.	  
VII.4.2.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
The	  climate	  change	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  was	  hindered	  by	  the	  economic	  recession	  of	  early	  




experienced	  major	  financial	  problems	  as	  light-­‐duty	  vehicle	  sales	  plummeted	  13%	  in	  
1990	  and	  did	  not	  grow	  in	   1991	  (Figure	  VII.4).	  GM	  reported	   financial	   losses	  of	  $5.0	  
billion	   in	   1991	   and	   $25.7	   billion	   loss	   in	   1992	   (cf.	   Figure	   VI.17,	   p.	   228),	   which	   also	  
related	  to	  additional	  expenditures	  for	  pension	  fund	  commitments	  (Ingrassia,	  2010).	  
Ford	  and	  Chrysler	  also	  experienced	  major	  losses	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  (cf.	  Figure	  VI.17,	  
p.	  228).	  These	   financial	  problems	  overshadowed	  attention	   to	  climate	  change,	  and	  
exacerbated	  the	  automakers’	  unwillingness	  to	  invest	  in	  fuel	  efficiency	  technologies	  
(Luger,	  2000).	  
Climate	  change	   life-­‐cycle	  evolution	  was	  also	  hindered	  by	   the	  boom	  of	   the	  
light-­‐truck	  market	   after	   1993	   (Luger,	   2000)	   (Figure	   VII.4).	   This	   lucrative	  market	  
improved	   the	   financial	   situation	   of	   the	   Big	   Three	   (cf.	   Figure	   VI.17,	   p.	   228),	   who	  
perceived	  climate	  change	  as	  a	  potential	  threat	  to	  this	  market	  segment.	  In	  fact,	  the	  
development	  of	   this	   segment	  resulted	   in	  a	   type	  of	   ‘rebound	  effect’	   (cf.	  Small	  and	  
van	   Dender,	   2007;	   also	   Sorrell	   and	   Dimitropoulos,	   2008),	   because	   “any	  
technological	   improvements	   on	   the	   fuel	   efficiency	   front	   were	   being	   more	   than	  
offset	   by	   increasing	   weight	   of	   vehicles	   and	   larger	   engine	   sizes”	   (Levy	   and	  
Rothenberg,	  2002,	  p.	  179).	  
VII.4.3. Political	  stalemate	  and	  defensive	  hedging	  (1996-­‐2005)	  
In	   this	   third	   period,	   (a)	   public	   attention	   to	   climate	   change	   further	   increased;	  	  
(b)	   specialist	   expertise	   was	   elaborated	   in	   policy	   sub-­‐systems	   (CARB,	   PNGV,	  
USABC);	   (c)	   automakers	   acknowledged	   the	   problem,	   but	   opposed	   it	   politically,	  
causing	   controversy	   and	   deadlock;	   (d)	   limited	   macro-­‐political	   pressure	   (i.e.	  
pressure	   from	   the	   legislative	  and	   the	  executive)	  because	  Congress	  and	   the	  Bush-­‐
administration	   opposed	   regulation;	   and	   (e)	   automakers	  moved	   towards	   hedging	  
strategies,	  maintaining	   their	   overall	   commitment	   to	   aICE	   and	   biofuels/FFV,	   but	  
increasing	   R&D	   investments	   in	   more	   radical	   alternatives.	   The	   period	   therefore	  
present	  dynamics	   in	   line	  with	  DILC-­‐model’s	  phase	  3.	  Yet,	   it	  also	  contained	  some	  
deviations,	   because	   it	   included	   elements	   expected	   in	   phase	   4:	   (1)	   the	   political	  
industry	   front	  weakened	  as	   firms	  abandoned	   the	  GCC;	   (2)	   foreign	   firms	   (Toyota,	  
Daimler)	   aimed	   to	   secure	   first-­‐mover	   advantages	  with	   radical	   innovations	   (HEV,	  




VII.4.3.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Social	  movements,	  public	  opinion.	  Public	  attention	  increased	  in	  1997	  (Figure	  VII.3.a)	  
because	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   treaty.	   Progressive	   businesses	   such	   as	   the	   Pew	   Center	   on	  
Global	  Climate	  Change	  began	  to	  endorse	  the	  climate	  change	  issue	  (Rothenberg	  and	  
Levy,	  2012),	  advancing	  a	   ‘win-­‐win’	  discourse	  (Elkington,	   1994),	  which	  argued	  that	  
proactive	  climate	  change	  strategies	  could	  open	  up	  new	  business	  opportunities.	   It	  
further	   accelerated	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	   period,	   due	   to	   (a)	   the	   launch	   of	   the	  
blockbuster	   movie	   The	   Day	   after	   tomorrow	   (2004),	   which	   helped	   to	   “promote	  
climate	  change	  from	  an	  obscure	  scientific	  issue	  to	  one	  of	  popular	  public	  concern”	  
(Corfee-­‐Morlot	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  p.	  2764);	  (b)	  the	  2005	  G8	  meeting	  in	  Scotland,	  where	  
UK	  Prime	  Minister	  Tony	  Blair	  declared	  climate	  change	  to	  be	  top	  priority	  (Yergin,	  
2011);	   and	   (c)	   Hurricane	   Katrina	   (2005),	   which	   became	   a	   powerful	   image	   of	  
potential	  consequences	  of	  a	  changing	  climate	  	  
The	  environmental	  movement	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  legitimate	  actor	  and	  invited	  to	  
the	   international	  climate	  negotiations,	  but	  environmentalists	  also	  staged	  protests	  
and	   demonstrations	   (Carpenter,	   2001;	   Corfee-­‐Morlot	   et	   al.,	   2007).	   And,	   in	   1999,	  
American	  environmental	  groups	  filed	  a	  petition	  (CTA,	  1999)	  to	  the	  EPA	  requesting	  
it	  to	  undertake	  its	   ‘mandatory	  duty’	  of	  regulating	  new	  motor	  vehicle	  emissions	  of	  
greenhouse	   gases	   (CO2;	   methane/CH4;	   nitrous	   oxide/N2O;	   and	  
hydrofluorcarbons/HFCs).	   This	   would	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   the	   start	   of	   a	   decade	   long	  
struggle	  about	  EPA’s	  role	  in	  regulating	  GHG	  from	  motor	  vehicles.	  
Policy-­‐makers.	  At	  the	  global	  level,	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  (1997),	  in	  which	  many	  countries	  
pledged	  to	  reduce	  GHG	  emissions	  by	  an	  average	  of	  5%	  below	  1990	  levels	  by	  2012,	  was	  a	  
significant	   political	   step	   (Doyle,	   2000).	   Although	   the	   US	   played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	  
negotiations,	  Clinton/Gore	  never	  submitted	  the	  treaty	  for	  Senate	  ratification,	  because	  
they	   anticipated	   rejection	   (Doyle,	   2000).	   In	   Europe	   global	   automakers	   (including	  
American	   subsidiaries)	   signed	   a	   ‘voluntary’	   agreement	   (in	   1998)	  with	   the	   European	  
Commission	  to	  reduce	  average	  new	  car	  emissions	  to	  140	  grams	  of	  CO2	  per	  kilometre	  
(c.	  39MPG)	  by	  2008-­‐9.	  
In	  2001,	  the	  newly	  elected	  President	  Bush	  (Jr.)	  rejected	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  
for	  being	  ‘unfair	  and	  ineffective’,	  creating	  regulatory	  stalemate	  at	  the	  Federal	  level	  
(cf.	   Figures	   VII3.b	   and	   VII.3.c).	   A	   few	   US	   congressmen	   proposed	   legislation	   to	  




cap-­‐and-­‐trade	   system	   in	   2003,	   but	   the	   bill	   was	   never	   voted	   on.	   Other	   bills	   also	  
faced	   strong	   opposition	   (Yergin,	   2011).	   In	   2003,	   EPA	  denied	   the	   petition	   filed	   by	  
environmental	  groups,	   arguing	   that	  EPA	  did	  not	  have	  authority	  under	   the	  Clean	  
Air	  Act	   to	  regulate	  GHGs	  (Meltz,	  2007).	  The	  State	  of	  Massachusetts	   (with	  eleven	  
other	   states,	   three	   cities,	   two	   US	   territories,	   and	   several	   environmental	   NGOs)	  
appealed,	  but	  the	  Appeals	  Court	  rejected	  it	  in	  2005.	  
Although	   the	   government	   did	   not	   regulate,	   it	   stimulated	   technological	  
development,	  particularly	  of	  a	  new	  radical	  option	  –	  fuel	  cells	  –	  with	  two	  initiatives.	  
This	  indicates	  a	  shift	  in	  hype-­‐cycles	  from	  BEV	  to	  FCV.	  One	  initiative	  was	  the	  2003	  
FreedomCAR	   and	   Fuel	   Partnership,	   a	   public-­‐private	   research	   programme	   that	  
aimed	  to	  reduce	  the	  cost	  of	   fuel	  cells	   from	  $3,000-­‐to-­‐$4,000	  per	  kilowatt	  hour	   to	  
about	  $45,	  a	  level	  roughly	  comparable	  to	  the	  cost	  of	  internal	  combustion	  engines	  
(Sperling,	   2003).	   The	   other	   was	   the	   2004	  Hydrogen	   Fuel	   Initiative,	   a	   $1.2	   billion	  
research-­‐funding	   project	   that	   resulted	   in	   DoE’s	   Hydrogen	   Program.	   These	  
programs,	   which	   aimed	   at	   both	   energy	   security	   and	   climate	   change,	   increased	  
available	  funding	  (Figure	  VII.7),	  contributed	  to	  fuel-­‐cell	  enthusiasm	  (Bakker	  et	  al.,	  
2012;	  cf.	  Figure	  VII.3.a),	  and	  boosted	  hydrogen/fuel	  cell	  R&D	  (cf.	  FiguresVII.3.b).	  
Figure	  VII.7:	  Department	  of	  Energy	  (DoE)	  funding	  for	  fuel	  cell	  and	  hydrogen	  programmes	  
	  
Source:	  Based	  on	  data	  from	  Peterson	  and	  Farmer	  (2012)	  
Climate	  change	  policy	  also	  experienced	  difficulties	  in	  California.	  Because	  of	  limited	  
market	   demand	   for	   low-­‐emission	   vehicles,	   CARB’s	   fourth	   ZEV	   mandate	   review	  
(1998)	   gave	   automakers	   more	   flexibility,	   e.g.	   postponing	   some	   requirements,	  
establishing	  a	  credit	  system	  (Kemp,	  2005).	  In	  2001,	  CARB	  recognized	  barriers	  due	  
to	   cost,	   lead-­‐time,	   and	   technical	   challenges,	   and	   further	   amended	   the	  mandate,	  
requiring	  only	  2%-­‐sales	  of	  ‘pure-­‐ZEVs’	  (BEVs	  and	  fuel	  cell	  vehicles)	  by	  2003	  (Kemp,	  




requirement	   with	   2%-­‐sales	   of	   ‘Advanced	   Technology	   Partial	   Zero	   Emission	  
Vehicles’	   (AT-­‐PZEVs),	   such	   as	   HEVs,	   plus	   6%	   of	   Partial	   Zero	   Emission	   Vehicles	  
(PZEVs),	  such	  as	  natural	  gas	  and	  ‘super-­‐clean’	  gasoline	  vehicles.	  Even	  so,	  GM	  (and	  
other	  companies)	  contested	  the	  2001	  amendments	   in	  court	  (see	  below),	  which	  in	  
2002	   resulted	   in	   a	   court	   decision,	   which	   prohibited	   CARB	   to	   enforce	   the	  
programme	  (because	  regulating	  ‘fuel	  economy’	  was	  a	  Federal	  prerogative),	  causing	  
gridlock	   for	   the	   ZEV	  mandate.	   To	   overcome	   the	   political	   gridlock	   CARB’s	   2003	  
amendments	   removed	   all	   references	   to	   fuel	   economy,	   delayed	   the	   ZEV	  
requirements	  to	  2005,	  and	  included	  two	  compliance	  paths,	  one	  similar	  to	  the	  2001	  
amendments	  (2%	  pure	  ZEVs	  +	  2%	  AT-­‐PZEVs	  +	  6%	  PZEVs),	  the	  other	  setting	  up	  a	  
mechanism	   to	   promote	   the	   diffusion	   of	   fuel	   cell	   vehicles:	   automakers	   would	   be	  
exempted	  from	  the	  2%	  pure	  ZEV	  requirement	  if	  they	  would	  increase	  sales	  of	  FCVs	  
from	  250	  by	  2008	  to	  50,000	  by	  2017.	  	  
Yet	   a	   positive	   development	   was	   that	   the	   State	   of	   California	   adopted	   the	  
Pavley	  Act	  in	  2002,	  which	  instructed	  CARB	  to	  regulate	  GHG	  emissions	  from	  motor	  
vehicles	   (Sperling	   and	  Gordon,	   2009).	   In	   2004	  CARB	   issued	   new	   rules	   requiring	  
30%	  reductions	  in	  new	  car	  GHG	  emissions	  by	  2016	  (Lutsey,	  2012).	  
Foreign	   automakers.	   PNGV	   had	   an	   unintended	   consequence,	   because	   foreign	  
automakers	   perceived	   it	   as	   a	   serious	   technology	  development	   program	   (Sperling	  
and	  Gordon,	  2009).	  In	  response,	  Toyota	  and	  Honda	  pushed	  the	  commercialization	  
of	   HEVs,	   while	   Daimler-­‐Benz	   (DaimlerChrysler	   from	   mid-­‐1998)	   led	   fuel	   cell	  
developments.	   The	   two-­‐seater	   Honda	   Insight	   (introduced	   in	   the	   US	   market	   in	  
1999)	   and	   Toyota	   Prius	   (introduced	   in	   2000)	   boosted	   the	   environmental	   and	  
technological	   reputation	   of	   Japanese	   companies	   (Abeles,	   2004).	   The	   Prius,	   in	  
particular,	  became	  a	  personal	  statement	  of	  consumer	  environmental	  consciousness	  
(Abeles,	  2004).	  Hybrid	  sales	  accelerated	  after	  2004	  (Figure	  VII.8).	  




Figure	  VII.8	  (a-­‐b,	  left-­‐right):	  Sales	  of	  HEVs	  in	  the	  US	  market	  
	   	  
Source:	   Author’s	   elaboration	   based	   on	   data	   from	   (RITA/BTS,	   2012)	   and	   www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/data/,	  
respectively	  	  
Daimler	   became	   a	   leader	   in	   FCVs	   (Hekkert	   and	   van	   den	   Hoed,	   2006).	   In	   1999,	  
DaimlerChrysler	  managed	  to	  fit	  a	  fuel-­‐cell	  system	  (costing	  $35,000	  apiece)	  on	  a	  5-­‐
seat	  passenger	  car	   (NECAR	  4).	  This	   led	   its	  Chairman	  to	  declare	   that	   “the	  race	   to	  
develop	  the	  fuel	  cell	  car	  is	  over	  [...]	  Now	  we	  begin	  the	  race	  to	  lower	  the	  cost	  to	  the	  
level	  of	   today’s	   internal	   combustion	  engine.	  We’ll	  do	   it	  by	  2004”	   (quoted	   in	  The	  
Economist,	   1999,	  p.	  88).	   In	  2000,	  DaimlerChrysler	  announced	  investments	  of	  $1.4	  
billion	  to	  bring	  FCVs	  to	  market	  (van	  den	  Hoed,	  2005).	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  sell	  40,000	  
fuel	   cell	   cars	   by	   2004,	   ramping	   up	   production	   to	   100,000	   by	   2006	   (Sperling	   and	  
Gordon,	  2009).	  These	  optimistic	  announcements	  triggered	  the	  ‘fuel	  cell	  hype’	  and	  
innovation	   race,	   with	   most	   car	   companies	   starting	   to	   engage	   in	   FCV-­‐research	  
(Bakker,	  2010a)	  (see	  also	  Figures	  VII3.a,	  b	  and	  c).	  
	   In	  the	  late	  1990s,	  most	  car	  companies	  therefore	  had	  a	  fuel	  cell	  and/or	  hybrid	  
R&D	   programme	   (van	   den	   Hoed,	   2007),	   although	   with	   different	   portfolio	  
emphases	  (Oltra	  and	  Saint	  Jean,	  2009;	  cf.	  Figure	  VII.2.d).	  To	  share	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  
FCV	   development,	   many	   R&D	   partnerships	   were	   established,	   such	   as	   between	  
DaimlerChrysler,	   Ford	   and	   Ballard	   (1997);	   GM	   and	   Toyota	   (1999)	   and	   Nissan,	  
Renault	  and	  PSA-­‐Citroën	  (2001)	  (Hekkert	  and	  van	  den	  Hoed,	  2006).	  FCVs	  became	  
the	   industry’s	   preferred	   ‘final’	   technology	   because	   of	   its	   energy	   efficiency,	  
quietness,	   quick	   refuelling,	   and	   zero	   emissions,	   without	   compromising	   on	  
performance	   (Sperling	   and	   Gordon,	   2009).	   High	   relative	   costs	   were	   a	   problem	  
however:	  hundred	  times	  higher	  than	  ICE	  in	  1990s,	  at	  least	  ten	  times	  higher	  in	  the	  




VII.4.3.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  
Socio-­‐cultural	   strategies.	   American	   automakers	   initially	   endorsed	   the	   GCC	  
approach	   of	   contesting	   climate	   science,	   influencing	   public	   opinion	   and	   lobbying	  
Washington	   politicians	   (Doyle,	   2000).	   But	   in	   the	   late	   1990s,	   they	   changed	   their	  
position	  because	  of	  several	  reasons:	  (a)	   fear	  that	  climate	  denial	  campaigns	  would	  
damage	  their	  reputation	  in	  the	  context	  of	  increasing	  public	  concerns	  (Doyle,	  2000);	  
(b)	   foreign	   automakers	   benefitted	   from	   a	   ‘halo	   effect’	   on	   their	   reputations	   for	  
selling	   ‘greener’	  cars	   (Abeles,	  2004);	  and	  (c)	   they	   faced	  credibility	  pressures	   from	  
constructive	  business	  coalitions	  (Pew	  Center)	  and	  the	  ‘win-­‐win’	  business	  discourse.	  
Ford	  abandoned	  the	  GCC	  in	  1999,	  acknowledging	  the	  climate	  change	  problem	  and	  
calling	  upon	   the	  auto	   industry	   to	   show	   leadership.	  GM	  and	  Chrysler	   followed	   in	  
2000.	  This	  was	  a	  major	  change	  in	  position	  (Rothenberg	  and	  Levy,	  2012),	  weakening	  
the	  industry’s	  front.	  
Political	   strategies.	   Although	   American	   automakers	   acknowledged	   the	   climate	  
change	  problem,	   they	  politically	  opposed	   federal	   fuel	   economy	   standard.	  Also	   in	  
California	  they	  testified	  against	  the	  ZEV	  mandate	  in	  CARB’s	  2000	  hearings,	  arguing	  
that	   consumers	   were	   not	   willing	   to	   pay	   for	   BEVs	   (Sperling	   and	   Gordon,	   2009).	  
Automakers	   argued	   in	   favour	  of	   the	   ‘more	  promising’	   fuel	   cell	   technologies,	   and	  
cited	  their	  voluntary	  research	  initiatives	  to	  defend	  that	  regulation	  was	  not	  needed	  
(Doyle,	   2000).	   Although	   CARB	   relaxed	   ZEV	   requirements	   in	   2001,	   the	   industry	  
opposed	  any	  kind	  of	  ZEV	  mandate.	  GM	  thus	  led	  a	  lawsuit	  against	  CARB,	  arguing	  
that	   the	  ZEV-­‐mandate	  was	  pre-­‐empted	  by	  Federal	  CAFE	  standards	   (Metz,	  2008).	  
The	  underlying	  motivation	  was	  that	  carmakers	  preferred	  to	  discuss	  climate	  change	  
regulations	   at	   the	   Federal	   level,	   where	   they	   had	   a	   powerful	   lobbying	   force	   and	  
support	  of	  many	  congressmen	  (Sperling	  and	  Gordon,	  2009).	  	  
Automakers	   also	   opposed	   the	   Pavley	   Act	   (2002),	   suing	   the	   state	   of	  
California	  by	  questioning	  (a)	  whether	  GHG	  was	  a	  pollutant	  under	  the	  CAA	  (which	  
would	  allow	  California	  to	  set	  stricter	  emission	  standards)	  and	  (b)	  whether	  setting	  
GHG	   emission	   standards	  was	   the	   same	   as	   setting	  CAFE	   standards	   (which	  was	   a	  
Federal	  and	  not	  a	  state-­‐level	  duty)	  (Meltz,	  2007).	  The	  legal	  processes	  dragged	  on,	  
gaining	   automakers	   several	   years	   of	   delay.	   Additionally,	   Detroit	   automakers	  




credits	  for	  vehicles	  that	  can	  burn	  E85,	  even	  if	  those	  vehicles	  never	  use	  anything	  but	  
gasoline	  (Sperling	  and	  Gordon,	  2009).	  
Innovation	  strategies.	  On	  technical	  dimensions,	  American	  automakers	  hedged.	  On	  
the	  one	  hand,	   their	  main	  orientation	   remained	   the	   incremental	   improvement	   of	  
ICEs	   and	   the	   marketing	   of	   flex-­‐fuel	   vehicles.	   The	   combined	   share	   of	   aICE	   and	  
FFV/biofuel	  patents	  in	  the	  Big	  Three	  annual	  portfolio	  trebled	  from	  0.5%	  in	  1996	  to	  
an	   average	   of	   1.5%	   in	   1997-­‐2005	   (Figure	   VII.3.b).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	  
accelerated	  investments	  in	  alternative	  powertrain	  technologies,	  but	  without	  strong	  
intention	  of	  mass-­‐marketing	  them	  (Doyle,	  2000).	  
Longer-­‐term	  technology	  strategies	  shifted	   from	  battery-­‐electric	  vehicles	   to	  
fuel	   cell	   vehicles	   (van	   den	   Hoed,	   2007),	   causing	   a	   change	   in	   industry	   attention	  
(Figure	  VII.3.a)	  and	   industry	  patenting	   (Figure	  VII.3.b).	  American	  carmakers	  also	  
established	   the	  California	   Fuel	   Cell	   Partnership	   (1999),	   which	   was	   a	   cooperative	  
joint-­‐venture	  between	  CARB,	  incumbent	  automakers	  and	  oil	  companies	  (Sperling	  
and	  Gordon,	  2009).	  American	  automakers	  began	  own	  fuel	  cell	  R&D	  initiatives.	  GM	  
started	  a	  new	  fuel	  cell	  vehicle	  R&D	  programme	  in	  1997	  (the	  ‘AUTOnomy	  Project’)	  
to	  develop	  its	  own	  fuel-­‐cell	  stack	  technology	  (MacCormack,	  2005).	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  
leapfrog	  hybrid	  Japanese	  cars.	  In	  1997	  Ford	  entered	  in	  a	  joint-­‐venture	  with	  Ballard	  
Power	  Systems	  (a	  supplier	  specialized	  in	  fuel-­‐cells)	  and	  Daimler-­‐Benz	  (Budde	  et	  al.,	  
2012),	   but	   also	   closely	   followed	   the	   Japanese	   lead	   in	   HEVs.	   Ford	   also	   invested	  
heavily	  in	  aICE	  and	  flex-­‐fuel	  vehicles.	  Chrysler	  stuck	  to	  aICEs	  until	  it	  merged	  with	  
Daimler	  (see	  below).	  
From	  2000	  to	  2007,	  fuel	  cell	  enthusiasm	  resulted	  in	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  
hydrogen/fuel	   cell	   prototypes	   (Figure	   VII.9)	   and	   optimistic	   promises	   about	  
technological	  developments	  and	  commercialization).	  But	  gradually	  these	  promises	  
were	  projected	  further	  (about	  10-­‐15	  years)	  into	  the	  future,	  causing	  inflation	  of	  the	  
hydrogen	  hype	  after	  2006/7	  (Bakker,	  2010a).	  




Figure	  VII.9:	  Absolute	  numbers	  (worldwide)	  of	  hydrogen	  and	  battery-­‐electric	  prototype	  
models	  per	  year	  (1966-­‐2009),	  with	  three-­‐year	  moving	  average	  lines	  added	  
	  
Source:	  Bakker	  and	  van	  Lente	  (2009)	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  PNGV	  cooperation,	  each	  of	  the	  Big	  Three	  unveiled	  a	  hybrid-­‐
electric	  diesel	  prototype	   in	  2000.	  But	  only	  GM’s	  Precept	   prototype	  could	  achieve	  
the	  80-­‐mpg	  goal	  set	  for	  2003	  (Table	  VII.5).	  
Table	  VII.5:	  Technical	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Big	  Three’s	  hybrid-­‐diesel	  prototypes	  
	  
	   GM	  Precept	   Ford	  Prodigy	   DaimlerChrysler	  ESX3	  
	  
	   	   	  
Equivalent	  fuel	  economy	   80	  mpg	   72	  mpg	   72	  mpg	  
Heat	  engine	   1.3	  litre,	  3-­‐cylinder	  diesel	   1.2	  litre,	  4-­‐cylinder	  diesel	   1.5	  litre,	  3-­‐cylinder	  diesel	  
Key	  lightweight	  material	   Aluminium	   Aluminium	   Thermoplastics	  
Aerodynamic	  coefficient	  of	  
drag	   0.163	   0.199	   0.22	  
Weight	   2,593	  pounds	   2,387	  pounds	   2,250	  pounds	  
Battery	   NiMH	  or	  Lithium	  polymer	   NiMH	   Lithium	  ion	  
Acceleration	  time	  (0-­‐60MPH)	   11.5	  sec.	   12.0	  sec.	   11.0	  sec.	  
Source:	  US	  DoE	  (2005)	  
Critics	   claimed	   that	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	   PNGV	   were	   more	   political	   than	  
technological,	   because	   it	   could	   be	   used	   by	   government	   and	   industry	   officials	   to	  
claim	   that	   something	   was	   being	   done	   to	   address	   climate	   change	   (Doyle,	   2000).	  




‘produced	   few	   tangible	   results’	   (Stoffer,	   2002).	   The	  main	   reason	  was	   that	   PNGV	  
targeted	   the	   development	   of	   a	   prototype,	   not	   the	   commercialization	   of	   mass	  
produced	  models	  (Sperling,	  2002).	  
Market	   positioning	   strategies.	   The	   Big	   Three’s	   positioning	   strategy	   continued	   to	  
focus	  on	  flex-­‐fuel	  vehicles,	  which	  helped	  them	  obtain	  CAFE	  credits.	  By	  2002,	  flex-­‐
fuel	  vehicles	  (4.87%)	  made	  up	  the	  bulk	  of	  total	  AFV	  sales	  (5.18%	  of	  total	  US	  light-­‐
duty	  sales)	  (Figure	  VII.3.d).	  
Table	  VII.6:	  Alternative	  Fuel	  Vehicles	  available	  in	  the	  market	  by	  1999	  
Manufacturer	   Vehicle	   Powertrain/Range	   Availability	  
BEV	  models	  
General	  Motors	   EV1	   Electric	  NiMH	  batteries/l60	  miles	   For	  lease	  in	  CA/AZ	  
Toyota	   RAV4EV	   Electric	  NiMH	  batteries/l00	  miles	   Avail	  to	  fleets	  
Nissan	   AtraEV	   Electric	  Li-­‐Ion*	  batteries/l20	  miles	   Avail	  to	  fleets	  
Honda	   EVPlus	   Electric	  NiMH	  batteries/SO	  miles	   Avail	  to	  fleets	  
Solectria	   Sunrise	   Electric	  NiMH	  batteries/350	  miles	   For	  sale	  nationwide	  
Solectria	   Force	   Electric	  NiMH	  batteries/l	  00	  miles	   For	  sale	  nationwide	  
General	  Motors	   S10	  Electric	   Electric	  NiMH	  batteries/	  100	  miles	   Avail	  to	  fleets	  
Ford	   Ranger	  EV	   Electric	  Pb-­‐Acid	  batteries/60	  miles	   Avail	  to	  fleets	  
Chrysler	   EPIC	   Electric	  Pb-­‐Acid	  batteries/50	  miles	   Avail	  to	  fleets	  
Lotus	   Elise	  EV	  E	   Electric	  NiMH	  batteries/l20	  miles	   For	  sale	  from	  manufacturer**	  
AC	  Propulsion	   TZero	   Electric	  Pb-­‐Acid	  batteries/100	  miles	  
For	  sale	  from	  
manufacturer**	  
Nissan	   FEV	  II	   Electric	  Li-­‐Ion	  batteries/	  120	  miles	   Demonstration	  
HEV	  models	  
Chrysler	   Intrepid	  ESX	   Hybrid	  gas/electric	  (90	  mpg)	   Demonstration	  
Honda	   JVX	   Hybrid	  gas/capacitor***	  (70	  mpg)	   Demonstration	  
Subaru	   Elten	   Hybrid	  gas/electric	  (unknown)	   Demonstration	  
Ford	   P2000	   Hybrid	  diesel/electric	  (60+	  mpg)	   Demonstration	  
General	  Motors	   EV1	  derivatives	   Hybrid	  gas/electric	  (80	  mpg)	   Demonstration	  
Renault	   VERT	   Hybrid	  turbine/electric	  (unknown)	   Demonstration	  
FCV	  models	  
Daimler-­‐Benz	   NECAR	   Methanol	  fuel	  cell	   Demonstration	  
Toyota	   FCRAV4	   Methanol	  fuel	  cell	   Demonstration	  
Chrysler	   Intrepid	  ESX	  II	   Gasoline	  fuel	  cell	   Demonstration	  
General	  Motors	   EV1	  derivative	   Gasoline	  or	  methanol	  fuel	  cell	   Demonstration	  
Natural	  Gas	  models	  
Chrysler	   Voyager	   Natural	  gas	   Fleet	  sales	  
Ford	   Crown	  Victoria	   Natural	  gas	   For	  sale	  nationwide	  
Ford	   CNG	  Explorer	   Compressed	  natural	  gas	   Fleet	  sales	  
General	  Motors	   S10	  CNG	   Compressed	  natural	  gas	   Fleet	  sales	  
Honda	   Civic	  GX	   Natural	  gas	   For	  sale	  nationwide	  
Flex-­‐Fuel	  Models	  
Ford	   Super	  Mustang	   Ethanol/gasoline	   For	  sale	  nationwide	  
Ford	   Bifuel	  Taurus	   Ethanol/gasoline	   For	  sale	  nationwide	  
General	  Motors	   Cavalier	   Bifuel-­‐natural	  gas/gasoline	   For	  sale	  nationwide	  
Ford	   Contour	   Bifuel	  natural	  gas/gasoline	   For	  sale	  nationwide	  
Source:	  Johnson	  (1999)	   Obs.:	  *Li-­‐Ion	  stands	  for	  lithium-­‐ion	  (a	  variation	  is	  called	  lithium-­‐polymer),	  a	  battery	  
that	   by	   1999	   was	   made	   by	   Sony	   Corporation	   and	   3M	   Corporation;	   **Not	   available	   from	   dealerships;	   ***“A	  
capacitor	   is	   an	   energy	   storage	   device	   that	   can	   hold	   large	   amounts	   of	   charge	   between	   two	   metallic	   plates,	  




In	  fact,	  despite	  early	  BEV	  technology	  developments,	  by	  1999,	  only	  two	  BEV	  models	  
were	  available	  for	  sale	  (Johnson,	  1999),	  both	  from	  outsiders	  (Table	  VII.6).	  In	  2002,	  
when	   it	   leased	  only	  457	  units	  of	   the	   second	  generation	  EV1	   (which	  had	  a	   longer	  
range	  because	  of	  lighter	  materials	  and	  more	  advanced	  (NiMH)	  batteries)	  (Hanssen	  
and	   Spertus,	   2002),	   GM	   decided	   to	   discontinue	   production	   and	   not	   to	   extend	  
expiring	   lease	   contracts	   (Sperling	   and	  Gordon,	   2009).	  This	  decision	   aligned	  with	  
GM’s	  political	  position	  (opposing	  ZEV	  mandate)	  and	  shifting	  strategy	  towards	  fuel	  
cells	   (Sabatini,	   2002).	   The	   decision	   had	   negative	   reputational	   effects,	   because	  
critics	  (see	  e.g.	  the	  documentary	  Who	  killed	  the	  electric	  car?,	  launched	  in	  2006	  by	  a	  
former	   EV1-­‐leasee)	   claimed	   that	   it	   was	   a	   political	   move	   to	   obstruct	   the	   ZEV	  
programme.	  
VII.4.3.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
While	   climate	   change	   gained	   salience,	  American	   automakers	   faced	   financial	   and	  
competitive	  pressures,	  and	  their	  market-­‐shares	  continued	  to	  decline	  (Figure	  VI.16).	  
These	  pressures	  accelerated	  consolidation	  in	  the	  global	  automotive	  industry,	  with	  
Chrysler	  merging	   with	   Daimler	   (1998),	   Hyundai	   taking	   over	   Kia	   (1998);	   Renault	  
and	  Nissan	  establishing	  the	  Renault-­‐Nissan	  Alliance	  (1999);	  Ford	  acquiring	  Volvo	  
(1999);	   GM	   fully	   acquiring	   Saab	   (2000)	   (Orsato	   and	   Wells,	   2007).	   American	  
automakers	  became	  increasingly	  reliant	  on	  the	  profitable	  light-­‐truck	  segment.	  To	  
strengthen	   its	   position	   in	   this	   growing	   market	   (Figure	   VII.4),	   GM	   acquired	   the	  
Hummer	  brand	  in	  1998.	  
The	   oil	   and	   fuel	   prices	   increased	   steeply	   after	   2003	   (Figure	   VII.10),	  
stimulating	  a	  shift	  in	  consumer	  preferences	  towards	  more	  fuel-­‐efficient	  cars.	  Sales	  
of	   SUVs,	   pick-­‐ups,	   vans	   and	   wagons	   began	   to	   decline	   after	   2004	   (Figure	   VII.4),	  
which	  caused	   financial	  problems	   for	  American	  automakers	   (Figure	  VI.17,	  p.	  228).	  
According	   to	   one	   estimate,	   “half	   of	   the	   market	   share	   decline	   of	   the	   Detroit	  
carmakers	  between	  2002	  and	  2007	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  rising	  price	  of	  gasoline”	  
(Klier,	   2009,	   p.	   4).	   To	   sell	   their	   cars,	   American	   carmakers	   offered	   a	   range	   of	  
‘marketing	   gimmicks’,	   such	   as	   zero-­‐interest,	   rebates	   and	   free	   options.	   They	   also	  
aimed	   to	   cover	   automotive	   losses	   with	   profits	   from	   financial	   divisions,	   which	  
diversified	  into	  mortgages,	  including	  sub-­‐prime	  (Ingrassia,	  2010).	  




Figure	  VII.10:	  Motor	  gasoline	  and	  oil	  prices	  in	  the	  US	  in	  real	  2011	  dollars	  
	  
Source:	  Based	  on	  data	  from	  the	  US	  EIA	  (http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm#prices),	  accessed	  on	  October	  
23rd,	  2012	  
VII.4.4. Changing	  gear	  and	  crisis	  (2005-­‐2009)	  
This	   fourth	  period	   –	  which	   ends	   in	   2009	  due	   to	   the	  Great	   Financial	  Crisis	   –	  has	  
some	   elements	   from	   phase	   4	   in	   the	   DILC-­‐model:	   (a)	   sharp	   increase	   in	   public	  
attention;	   (b)	   end	   of	   regulatory	   uncertainty	   (new	   legislation	   during	   the	   second	  
Bush-­‐administration,	  Supreme	  Court	  decision);	  (c)	  spillovers	  to	  the	  economic	  task	  
environment	   through	   the	   emergence	   of	   market	   niches	   for	   low-­‐carbon	  
technologies;	  (d)	  further	  opening	  up	  of	  the	  industry	  front	  and	  innovation	  races	  in	  
FCV,	   HEV	   and	   biofuels/FFV.	   Because	  many	   of	   these	   developments	   point	   in	   the	  
‘right’	   direction,	   this	  period	   can	  be	   seen	  as	  one	  of	   ‘changing	  gear’	   (acceleration).	  
But	  the	  period	  also	  has	  elements	  of	  phase	  3,	  because	  some	  developments	  are	  not	  
yet	  very	  strong:	  (1)	  regulatory	  pressure	  remained	  limited	  (because	  federal	  policies	  
are	   not	   radical);	   (2)	   market	   niches	   remained	   small	   (2-­‐3%);	   (3)	   continuing	  
commitment	   of	   automakers	   to	   aICE	   and	   biofuels/FFV;	   and	   (4)	   automakers	   also	  
invested	   in	  more	   radical	   alternatives,	  but	  did	  not	   fully	   commit	   to	  any	  option	   for	  
fear	   of	   making	   the	   wrong	   bet	   (which	   is	   reinforced	   by	   the	   experience	   of	   hype-­‐
cycles).	  So,	  overall	  I	  assess	  that	  this	  period	  is	  in	  between	  phase	  3	  and	  4.	  
VII.4.4.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Science,	   social	   movements,	   public	   opinion.	   Public	   attention	   greatly	   accelerated,	  
reaching	   an	   unprecedented	   peak	   in	   2007	   (Figure	   VII.3.a),	   because	   of	   several	  
catalytic	  events	  that	  came	  on	  top	  of	  those	  from	  the	  previous	  period:	  (a)	  the	  IPCC’s	  
Fourth	   Assessment	   Report	   (2007)	   reported	   a	   scientific	   consensus	   about	   an	  




boosted	  climate	  change	  awareness;	  and	  (c)	   the	   IPCC	  and	  Al	  Gore	  being	  awarded	  
the	   Nobel	   Peace	   Prize	   (2007).	   Increasing	   public	   attention	   created	   pressure	   on	  
policy-­‐makers	  and	  industry.	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  162	  Oil	   and	   fuel	   prices,	   which	   had	   been	   rising	   steeply	   since	   2003	  
(Figure	   VII.10),	   caused	   concerns	   for	   the	   re-­‐elected	   (2004)	   Bush	   administration,	  
resulting	   in	   the	   2005	  Energy	   Act	   and	   the	  Energy	   Independence	   and	   Security	   Act	  
(2007).	  These	  acts	  signalled	  a	  shift	  in	  policy-­‐orientation,	  because	  they	  were	  the	  first	  
comprehensive	   energy	   policies	   in	  more	   than	   a	   decade.	   They	   also	   contributed	   to	  
unlocking	   the	   federal	   regulatory	   stalemate.	   While	   these	   Acts	   were	   primarily	  
motivated	   by	   oil	   prices	   and	   energy	   security	   concerns,	   they	   also	   stimulated	   low-­‐
carbon	   technologies	   in	   the	   transport	   domain.	   The	   2005	   Energy	   Act	  mandated	   a	  
100%-­‐increase	   in	   the	   volume	   of	   ethanol	  mixed	  with	   gasoline	   between	   2006-­‐2012	  
(Yergin,	   2011),	   and	   provided	   R&D	   subsidies	   for	  HEV,	   FCV	   and	   advanced	   battery	  
research.	   The	   2007	  Act	  mandated	   a	   further	   increase	   in	   biofuel	   production	   to	   36	  
billion	  US	   gallons	   by	   2022	   (Sperling	   and	   Gordon,	   2009),	  making	   biofuels	   into	   a	  
crucial	  national	  strategy	  (cf.	  Figures	  VII.2.b	  and	  c)	  and	  stimulating	  the	  diffusion	  of	  
flex-­‐fuel	   vehicles	   (Figure	   VII.3.d).	   The	   2007	   Act	   also	   raised	   CAFE	   standards	   for	  
passenger	   cars	   to	   a	   minimum	   of	   35MPG	   by	   2020	   (Figure	   VII.5),	   linking	   energy	  
security	  and	  fuel	  efficiency	  to	  the	  climate	  change	  agenda.	  
Also	   in	  2007,	  a	   judicial	  decision	  about	   the	  petition	   filed	   in	   1999	  broke	  the	  
regulatory	  deadlock.	   In	   the	   2007	   case	  Massachusetts	   v.	   EPA,	   the	   Supreme	  Court	  
ruled	   that	   (a)	  carbon	  dioxide	  and	  other	  GHGs	  are	  pollutants,	  and	  thus	  regulated	  
under	   1990	   CAA;	   and	   (b)	   the	   CAA	   does	   not	   authorize	   EPA	   to	   make	   policy	  
considerations	  (Meltz,	  2007).	  This	  judicial	  order	  meant	  that	  existing	  fuel	  efficiency	  
and	  environmental	  regulations	  could	  be	  extended	  to	  address	  climate	  change.	  The	  
ruling	  also	  labelled	  GHGs	  as	  ‘air	  pollutants’,	  which	  gave	  CARB	  the	  right	  to	  legislate	  
GHG	  emissions	  in	  California.	  But	  CARB	  did	  not	  yet	  gain	  the	  means	  to	   implement	  
the	  legislation,	  because	  automakers	  successfully	  lobbied	  the	  Administration	  not	  to	  
grant	  California	  the	  necessary	  waiver	  (Sperling	  and	  Gordon,	  2009).	  The	  argument	  
was	   that	   the	   2007	   Energy	   Act,	   which	   tightened	   fuel	   economy	   standards,	   pre-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162	  While	  global	  climate	  change	  developments	  (negotiations)	  slowed	  down,	  some	  initiatives	  tried	  
to	  address	  automobile	  carbon	  emissions.	  In	  Europe,	  frustration	  with	  automakers,	  who	  were	  on	  
track	  to	  miss	  the	  voluntary	  1998	  agreement,	  led	  policy-­‐makers	  (in	  2007)	  to	  issue	  mandatory	  car-­‐
emission	  standards	  for	  2015	  (130	  gCO2/km	  or	  42MPG).	  Japan	  followed	  suit,	  setting	  its	  standard	  at	  




empted	   the	   need	   for	   California	   to	   have	   its	   own	   GHG	   standards	   (Sperling	   and	  
Gordon,	  2009).	  
Foreign	  automakers	  and	  new	  entrants.	  BEVs	  were	  revitalized	  by	  foreign	  automakers	  
such	  as	  Renault-­‐Nissan,	  which	  in	  2002	  had	  announced	  a	  breakthrough	  in	  lithium-­‐
ion	  battery	  technology	  that	  would	  extend	  the	  driving	  range	  (Yergin,	  2011).	  Renault-­‐
Nissan	  promised	  to	  market	  BEVs	  in	  2010.	  A	  new	  automaker,	  Tesla	  Motors,	  further	  
reinforced	  attention,	  because	  of	  the	  marketing	  of	  its	  Tesla	  Roadster	  (2006)	  in	  terms	  
of	   style,	  verve,	  and	  performance	  gave	  BEVs	  a	  positive	   symbolic	  meaning	   (Yergin,	  
2011).	   The	   subsequent	   surge	   in	   interest	   in	   BEVs	   (Figure	   VII.3.a)	   spurred	   other	  
automakers	  to	  reconsider	  the	  technology	  (Figures	  VII.3.b	  and	  c).	  
Another	   company	   that	  was	   founded	   amidst	   the	   new	  BEV	  hype	   promoted	  
not	   a	   different	   BEV	   model,	   but	   a	   different	   business	   model	   for	   battery-­‐electric	  
vehicles:	   Better	   Place.	   Founded	   in	   2007,	   this	   American-­‐Israeli	   start-­‐up	   company	  
promoted	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  EV	  ownership,	  similar	  to	  mobile	  phone	  subscriptions,	  
which	   includes	   ‘switchable	   batteries’	   to	   tackle	   the	   limited	   driving	   range	   issue163.	  
The	   company	   also	   invested	   in	   recharging	   infrastructures,	   opening	   the	   first	  
recharging	   stations	   in	   Israel	   and	   Denmark.	   In	   2008,	   Better	   Place	   signed	   a	  
partnership	   with	   the	   Renault-­‐Nissan	   Alliance,	   which	   planned	   to	   use	   the	   new	  
entrant’s	   battery-­‐switching	   system	   (Yergin,	   2011).	   The	   success	   of	   such	   system	  
depends	   however	   on	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   dominant	   design	   for	   batteries	   that	   is	  
shared	  throughout	  the	  global	  auto	  industry.	  
VII.4.4.2. Car	  industry	  issue	  responses	  
Socio-­‐cultural	   strategies.	   In	   response	   to	   escalating	   public	   concerns,	   automakers	  
acknowledged	   climate	   change	   in	   their	   annual	   reports	   and	   signalled	   their	  
engagement	   with	   sustainable	   mobility.	   Their	   sustainability	   reports	   were	   then	  
marked	  by	  four	  ‘isomorphic’	  themes	  (Shinkle	  and	  Spencer,	  2012):	  (1)	  recognition	  of	  
the	  global	  warming	  issue	  (‘responsible’	  companies	  do	  not	  challenge	  its	  existence);	  
(2)	   abide	   by	   self-­‐defined	   corporate	   values	   (ethical	   behaviour);	   (3)	  
acknowledgement	   of	   stakeholders’	   importance	   (for	   obtaining	   goodwill	   and	  
legitimacy);	   and	   (4)	   corporate	   role-­‐model	   responsibility	   (which	   should	   pre-­‐empt	  
the	   need	   for	   governmental	  mandates).	   Reflecting	   this	   new	   (public)	   approach	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




societal	   issues,	   automakers	   sponsored	   the	   ‘Sustainable	   Mobility’	   project	   of	   the	  
World	   Business	   Council	   for	   Sustainable	   Development	   (WBCSD),	   a	   CEO-­‐led	  
organization	  founded	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  1992	  Rio	  Earth	  Summit.164	  The	  final	  report	  
(‘Mobility	  2030’),	   sponsored	  by	  eight	  OEMs	   (DaimlerChrysler,	  Ford,	  GM,	  Honda,	  
Nissan,	  Renault,	   Toyota	   and	  Volkswagen),	   two	  oil	   companies	   and	   two	   suppliers,	  
proposed	   a	   long-­‐term	   vision	   for	   transportation	   of	   people	   and	   goods,	   established	  
seven	   sustainable	   mobility	   goals,	   and	   created	   a	   set	   of	   indicators	   to	   measure	  
performance	   (WBSD,	   2004).	   Marketing	   strategies	   also	   embraced	   sustainability	  
messages	  (Mikler,	  2006).	  
Political	   strategies.	   Despite	   their	   positive	   socio-­‐cultural	   strategies,	   the	   industry	  
attempted	   to	   proactively	   shape	   policy	   changes	   with	   political	   and	   technological	  
strategies.	   In	   2007,	   GM,	   Ford	   and	   Chrysler	   joined	   the	   US	   Climate	   Action	  
Partnership	  (USCAP),	  which	  promoted	  ‘legislation	  requiring	  significant	  reductions	  
in	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions’	   (USCAP,	   2009;	   Yergin,	   2011).	   Through	   paid	  
advertisements	  and	  other	  information	  strategies,	  the	  Partnership	  mainly	  called	  for	  
market-­‐based	  approaches	  and	  lobbied	  for	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  legislation	  (Figure	  VII.11).	  
Figure	  VII.11:	  In	  this	  2009	  advertisement,	  the	  USCAP	  lobbied	  for	  cap-­‐and-­‐trade	  legislation	  
	  
Source:	  http://www.us-­‐cap.org/newsroom/;	  accessed	  on:	  September	  25th,	  2012	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Innovation	   strategies.	  By	  2006-­‐2007,	   fuel	  cell	  enthusiasm	  began	  to	  diminish	   	  (see	  
Figure	   VII.3.a	   and	   b)	   because	   of	   cost	   problems,	   technological	   barriers	   (e.g.	  
hydrogen	   storage),	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   hydrogen	   fuelling	   stations	   (Bakker,	   2010).	   New	  
expectations	  about	  HEVs,	  PHEVs,	  and	  BEVs	  superseded	  the	  fuel	  cell	  hype	  (Figures	  
VII.3.a,	  b,	  c,	  and	  VII.9)	  (Oltra	  and	  Saint	  Jean,	  2009;	  Bakker	  et	  al.,	  2012a;	  Dijk	  et	  al.,	  
2013).	  By	   2005,	   sales	   of	  HEVs	   accelerated	   (Figures	  VII.3.d	   and	  VII.8),	   stimulating	  
industry	   attention	   and	   patenting	   (VII.3.a,	   b,	   c).	   GM,	   Chrysler	   and	   Ford	   boosted	  
their	  R&D	  activities,	  leading	  to	  changes	  in	  patenting	  portfolio	  (Figure	  VII.3.b).	  
	   And	  yet,	  despite	  the	  EV-­‐push,	  the	  main	  strategy	  of	  American	  automakers	  to	  
improve	  fuel	  efficiency	  remained	  incremental	  improvement	  of	  internal	  combustion	  
engines	   with	   advanced	   and/or	   flex	   fuel	   technologies.	   This	   resulted	   in	   increased	  
shares	  of	  flex-­‐fuel	  patents	  and	  aICE-­‐related	  patents	  (Figures	  VII.b	  and	  d).	  American	  
automakers	  accelerated	  the	  deployment	  of	  aICE	  technologies	  such	  as	  variable	  valve	  
timing,	   continuously	   variable	   transmission,	   gasoline	   direct	   injection,	  
turbocharging,	   six-­‐speed	   transmission,	   cylinder	   deactivation,	   and	   diesel	   engines	  
(Lutsey,	  2012).	  Figure	  VII.12	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  still	  room	  for	  improving	  the	  average	  
fuel	  economy	  by	  deploying	  more	  efficient,	  already	  developed	  technologies	  to	  more	  
models,	   such	   as	   turbo	   engines	   (Figure	   VII.12.a),	   gasoline	   direct	   injection	   (Figure	  








Source:	  Based	  on	  data	  from	  US	  EPA	  (2012)	  
Market	   positioning	   strategies.	   Economic	   positioning	   of	   American	   automakers	  
continued	   to	   focus	   on	   biofuels	   and	   flex-­‐fuel	   vehicles,	   which	   sold	   in	   increasing	  
numbers	   (Figure	   VII.3.d).	   The	   HEV	   market,	   which	   expanded	   rapidly	   after	   2005	  
(Figure	   VII.8),	   also	   attracted	   attention.	   Toyota’s	   second-­‐generation	   Prius,	   larger	  
and	  more	  powerful	  but	  at	  similar	  cost	  ($20,000),	   led	  the	  way.	  By	  2007,	  Prius	  was	  
the	   8th	   top	   selling	   car	   in	   the	   U.S	   (13	   for	   all	   light-­‐duty	   vehicles)	   (Sperling	   and	  
Gordon,	  2009).	  In	  response	  to	  Toyota’s	  first-­‐mover	  advantages,	  Ford	  produced	  its	  




and	   GM,	   in	   2007	   (Sperling	   and	   Gordon,	   2009).	   From	   2005-­‐2006,	   Ford	   sold	   an	  
average	   of	   c.	   18,000	   Escape	   hybrids,	  which	   became	   the	   4th	   all-­‐time	   seller	   among	  
HEVs	   models.	   Other	   companies	   followed,	   leading	   to	   an	   innovation	   race	   and	   a	  
rapid	   increase	   in	  the	  number	  of	  available	  models	  (from	  14	   in	  2007	  to	  24	   in	  2009;	  
Figure	   VII.13).	   Although	   absolute	   HEV	   sales	   peaked	   in	   2007	   (Figure	   VII.8),	   it	  
corresponded	  to	  just	  2%	  of	  the	  US	  light-­‐duty	  vehicle	  market	  (Figure	  VII.3.d).	  
Figure	  VII.13:	  The	  race	  for	  the	  HEV	  market	  accelerated	  in	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  
	  
Source:	  Based	  on	  data	  from	  RITA/BTS	  (2012)	  
VII.4.4.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
General	  market	  conditions	  worsened,	  as	  rising	  oil	  prices	  continued	  to	  depress	  sales	  
of	   light-­‐trucks.	   The	   trend	   accelerated	   with	   the	   outbreak	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis,	  
which	  depressed	  also	  car	  sales	  (Figure	  VII.4).	  American	  carmakers	  thus	  continued	  
to	   offer	   the	   range	   of	   ‘marketing	   gimmicks’	   (zero	   interest	   loans,	   rebates,	   free	  
options).	   Declining	   light-­‐truck	   sales	   and	   ‘legacy’	   costs	   (pensions,	   health	   care)	  
caused	  major	   losses	   for	  American	  automakers,	  peaking	  at	   $41.5	  billion	   for	  GM	   in	  
2007	   (Figure	  VI.17,	  p.	   228),	  when	   the	   subprime	  bubble	  burst.	  The	   financial	   crisis	  
caused	  major	   financial	   troubles	   for	   the	  Big	  Three.	   “Once	  again	  the	  Detroit	  Three	  
were	   reaping	   the	   consequences	   of	   their	   lack	   of	   foresight”	   (Sperling	   and	  Gordon,	  
2009,	   p.	   55).	   They	   now	   had	   to	   compete	   for	   the	   HEV	   and	   other	   ‘fuel-­‐efficient’	  
market	  segments	  “as	  a	  matter	  of	  economic	  survival”	  (Mikler	  and	  Harrison,	  2011,	  p.	  
197)	  
VII.4.5. The	  climate	  change	  issue	  at	  crossroads	  (2009-­‐2012)	  
While	  most	  developments	   in	   the	  previous	  period	  pointed	   in	   the	   ‘right’	  direction,	  




different	  directions.	  On	  the	   ‘positive’	   side,	   this	   fifth	  period	  has	  some	  elements	  of	  
the	   conceptual	  phase	  4:	   (a)	   climate	   change	  was	   addressed	   at	   the	  macro-­‐political	  
level	   (Obama	   administration);	   (b)	   administrative	   activity	   remained	   high	   (Figure	  
VII.3.c);	   (c)	   the	   political	   position	   of	   US	   automakers	   weakened	   (because	   of	  
bankruptcy	  and	  bailout),	  which	  made	  them	  more	  receptive	  to	  social	  and	  political	  
expectations	  about	  fuel	  efficiency	  and	  climate	  change;	  (d)	  automakers	  jockeyed	  for	  
position	  with	  various	   low-­‐carbon	   technologies,	   leading	   to	  high	  patenting	  activity	  
across	   multiple	   categories	   (Figure	   VII.3.b).	   But	   the	   period	   also	   had	   ‘negative’	  
developments,	  which	  fit	  with	  phase	  3:	  (1)	  decreased	  level	  of	  public	  attention	  (Figure	  
VII.3.a);	  (2)	  political	  attention	  to	  climate	  change	  decreased	  after	  2009	  (Figure	  3b);	  
(3)	  new	  regulations	  are	  not	  radical	  and	  do	  not	  create	  a	  new	  market	  segment;	   (4)	  
markets	   for	   HEV,	   BEV,	   PHEV	   remain	   small	   (2-­‐3%	   of	   overall	   sales);	   and	   (5)	  
automakers	  remain	  committed	  to	  aICE	  and	  biofuels/FFV.	  Although	  car	  companies	  
continue	   to	   invest	   in	   radical	   green	   options,	   they	   do	   not	   fully	   commit	   to	   any	   of	  
them.	  This	  period	  is	  therefore	  best	  characterized	  as	  still	  between	  phase	  3	  and	  4.	  
VII.4.5.1. Pressures	  around	  issue	  
Public	   attention.	   After	   2007	   public	   attention	   to	   climate	   change	   declined	  
substantially	   (Figure	  VII.2.a),	  because	   concerns	   shifted	   to	   the	   financial/economic	  
crisis.	  In	  2009,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  Gallup	  started	  asking	  Americans	  about	  their	  
preference	   in	   the	   trade-­‐off	   between	   environmental	   protection	   and	   economic	  
growth,	  a	  majority	  of	  those	  polled	  favoured	  the	  economy	  (Jacobe,	  2012).	  The	  gap	  in	  
favour	  of	  economic	  growth	  reached	  a	  record	  of	  eighteen	  percentage	  points	  in	  2011	  
(Figure	   VII.14).	   A	   similar	   trend	   was	   observed	   with	   concern	   for	   global	   warming,	  
which	  declined	  steadily	  from	  2007-­‐2011	  according	  to	  another	  Gallup	  poll	  (Newport,	  
2012).	  While	   a	   decline	   in	   public	   attention	   is	   expected	   after	   the	   issue	  moves	   to	   a	  
‘policy	   implementation’	   stage,	   this	   time	   the	   decline	   due	   to	   the	   competing	  
economic	  issue	  would	  bring	  different	  implications	  to	  the	  process	  dynamics.	  




Figure	  VII.14:	  For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  25	  years,	  Americans	  favoured	  economic	  growth	  over	  
environmental	  protection	  
	  
Source:	  Jacobe	  (2012)	  
Additionally,	   conservative	   groups	   and	   thinktanks	   sponsored	   ‘climate	   change	  
deniers’	  who	   tried	   to	   reopen	   the	   scientific	   debate	  by	  manipulating	   evidence	   and	  
intimidating	   scientists	   (McCright	   and	   Dunlap,	   2010).	   They	   jumped	   on	   the	   2009	  
‘Climategate’	  scandal	  (based	  on	  leaked	  emails	  from	  the	  Climatic	  Research	  Unit	  at	  
the	  University	  of	  East	  Anglia),	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  IPCC	  manipulated	  data	  and	  that	  
climate	  change	  was	  a	  hoax	  (Pooley,	  2010).	  These	  activities	  contributed	  in	  creating	  
more	   doubt	   in	   public	   opinions	   about	   climate	   change.	   The	   timing	   of	   this	   attack	  
coincided	  with	  the	  preparations	  for	  the	  international	  climate	  change	  negotiations	  
in	  Copenhagen	  (2009).	  	  
Policy-­‐makers.	  International	  climate	  negotiations	  stalled	  because	  of	  failed	  talks	  in	  
Copenhagen	  (2009)	  and	  a	  lower-­‐profile	  meeting	  in	  Cancun	  (2010).	  In	  Durban	  (2011)	  
countries	  agreed	  to	  delay	  further	  talks	  until	  2015,	  when	  they	  will	  discuss	  a	  possible	  
international	   treaty	   that	   could	   come	   into	   force	   in	   2020.	   So,	   this	   period	   ends	  
without	  a	  clear	  successor	  for	  the	  Kyoto	  protocol.	  	  
	   At	   the	   federal	   level,	   however,	   the	   newly	   elected	   (2008)	   Obama	  
administration	   strengthened	   regulatory	   pressures	   on	   automakers.	   The	  
administration	  also	  bailed	  out	  Chrysler	  and	  GM	  (in	  2009),	  which	  went	  bankrupt	  
during	   the	   economic	   crisis.	  Using	  his	   strengthened	  negotiating	   position,	  Obama	  
secured	   an	   agreement	   on	   CAFE	   and	   GHG	   emission	   standards	   between	   auto	  




executive	  branch	  activity	  increased	  sharply	  (Figure	  VII.2.c),	  with	  EPA	  and	  NHTSA	  
accelerating	  the	  creation	  and	  implementation	  of	  mobile	  GHG-­‐emission	  regulations	  
and	  stricter	  CAFE-­‐standards.	  	  
The	  resulting	  2009	  Light-­‐Duty	  Vehicle	  Greenhouse	  Gas	  Emission	  Standards	  
and	  Corporate	  Average	  Fuel	  Economy	  Standards	  Rule	  (the	  ‘LDV	  Rule’)	  created	  GHG	  
emission	  standards	  for	  light-­‐duty	  vehicles	  starting	  in	  2012,	  which	  will	  increase	  5%	  
per	  year,	  until	  reaching	  35.5MPG	  (on	  average)	  by	  2016	  (Figure	  VII.5).	  The	  rules	  also	  
allowed	  California	  to	  start	  implementing	  the	  Pavley	  Act	  in	  2009	  (Lutsey,	  2009).	  In	  
2011,	   the	   Federal	   government,	   California	   and	   automakers	   agreed	   on	   long-­‐term	  
GHG/CAFE	   standards	   (Lutsey,	   2012),	   which	   should	   increase	   to	   54.5MPG	   (on	  
average)	  by	  2025	  (Figure	  VII.15).	  These	  GHG	  regulations	  remain	  weaker	  than	  those	  
in	  Europe	  (and	  Japan),	  which	  is	  considering	  95	  gCO2/km	  (c.	  60MPG)	  for	  2020.	  
Figure	  VII.15:	  Development	  of	  GHG	  emissions/CAFE	  standards	  
	  
Source:	  Lutsey,	  2012	  
Obama	   not	   only	   tightened	   regulations,	   but	   also	   supported	   green	   innovation.	   As	  
part	  of	  the	  ‘green	  stimulus’	  programme,	  he	  promoted	  a	  domestic	  battery	  industry,	  
issuing	   US$5-­‐billion	   in	   grants	   and	   loan	   guarantees	   to	   battery	   makers,	  
entrepreneurs,	  major	  auto	  companies	  and	  equipment	  suppliers	  (Dijk	  et	   al.,	  2013).	  
Obama	  also	  promised	  to	  bring	  one	  million	  PHEVs	  and	  BEVs	  to	  the	  road	  by	  2015,	  
signalling	  a	  shift	  in	  federal	  technology	  priority	  from	  hydrogen/fuel	  cells	  to	  battery-­‐
electric	  vehicles	  (Bakker	  et	  al.,	  2012a,	  2012b).	  
The	  stalemate	  for	  the	  California	  ZEV-­‐regulations	  was	  unlocked	  by	  the	  2007	  
Supreme	  Court	   decision,	   and	   the	   2009	  Obama	  deal	  with	   the	   automakers.	   CARB	  




FCVs).	   CARB	   created	   an	   Enhanced	   AT	   PZEV	   category	   (Enhanced	   Advanced	  
Technology	  Partial	  Zero	  Emission	  Vehicles)	  and	  a	  new	  compliance	  path	  for	  2012-­‐
2014,	  which	  allowed	  carmakers	  to	  sell	  7,500	  FCVs	  +	  c.	  58,000	  ‘Enhanced	  AT	  PZEV’	  
instead	   of	   25,000	   FCVs.	   A	   2012	   amendment	   further	   increased	   requirements	   for	  
ZEVs	   and	   PHEVs	   to	   15.4%	   of	   annual	   sales	   in	   2025	   (CARB,	   2012)	   (Figure	   VII.16).	  	  
Nine	  other	   (East	   and	  West	  Coast)	   states	  began	  procedures	   to	   also	   adopt	   a	  ZEV-­‐
mandate.	  	  
Figure	  VII.16:	  Amendments	  to	  California’s	  ZEV	  regulation	  
	  
Source:	  CARB	  (2012)	  
Foreign	   automakers.	   Japanese	   automakers	   push	   for	   environmentally	   friendly	  
products	   resulted	   in	   positive	   publicity	   and	   actual	   technological	   and	   corporative	  
lead.	   Since	   the	   1998MY,	   the	   Union	   of	   Concerned	   Scientists	   ranked	   automakers’	  
positioning	   strategies	   for	   environmentally	   friendly	   products	   (with	   technological	  
controls	   of	   both	  GHG	   and	   conventional	   pollutant	   emissions).	   Table	   VII.7	   shows	  
that	  (a)	  the	  Japanese	  automakers	  have	  the	  most	  environmentally-­‐friendly	  fleet;	  and	  
(b)	   the	   Big	   Three’s	   ‘green’	   strategies	   either	   failed	   or	   represented	   ‘greenwashing’	  
attempts.	   In	   all	   five	   rankings,	   Honda’s	   fleet	   came	   first,	   while	   Toyota’s	   came	  
consistently	   second	   or	   third.	   Volkswagen	   also	   started	   to	   fare	   well,	   by	  
deemphasizing	   diesel	   engines	   in	   the	  US	  market	   (Union	   of	  Concerned	   Scientists,	  
2010).	  On	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  ranking	  are	  the	  Big	  Three’s	  gas-­‐guzzling	  fleet.	  




Table	  VII.7:	  Automaker	  ranked	  by	  average	  new-­‐vehicle	  GHG	  and	  conventional	  pollutants	  
emissions	  
Rank	   1998MY	   2001MY	   2003MY	   2005MY	   2008MY	  
1	   Honda	   Honda	   Honda	   Honda	   Honda	  
2	   Toyota	   Toyota	   Nissan	   Toyota	   Toyota	  &	  Hyundai	  
3	   Nissan	   Nissan	   Toyota	   Hyundai	   -­‐	  
4	   GM	   Ford	   Ford	   Nissan	   Volkswagen	  
5	   Ford	   GM	   DaimlerChrysler	   Volkswagen	   Nissan	  
6	   DaimlerChrysler	   DaimlerChrysler	   GM	   Ford	   Ford	  
7	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   GM	   GM	  
8	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   DaimlerChrysler	   Chrysler	  
Source:	  Union	  of	  Concerned	  Scientists	  (2010)	   Obs.:	   Only	   the	   top	   six	   automakers	   were	   evaluated	   in	   model	  
years	  1998,	  2001,	  and	  2003.	  
After	   securing	   the	   top	   position	   as	   the	   biggest	   automaker	   in	   the	   world	   in	   2008,	  
Toyota	   faced	   a	   safety	   and	   quality	   scandal	   in	   2009-­‐10	   (Allen	   and	   Sturcke,	   2010):	  
because	  of	  incidents	  of	  sudden	  acceleration	  (attributed	  to	  sticking	  pedals	  or	  floor	  
mats),	  Toyota	  was	  forced	  to	   issue	  a	  series	  of	  recalls	   involving	  millions	  of	  vehicles	  
worldwide.	   Some	   of	   these	   recall	   programmes	   included	  HEV	  models	   such	   as	   the	  
best-­‐seller	  Prius.	  The	  ‘sticky	  Pedal	  Recall’	  caused	  such	  a	  public	  upheaval	  in	  the	  US,	  
that	  Toyota	  was	  invited	  to	  testify	  before	  Congress.	  Not	  only	  the	  sales	  of	  the	  Prius	  
declined,	   but	   also	   Toyota	   lost	   market-­‐share	   in	   2010	   and	   2011,	   losing	   the	   second	  
place	  in	  the	  American	  market	  to	  Ford	  (Ward’s	  Automotive	  Group,	  2013).	  
Although	  positioning	  of	  FCVs	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  difficult	  undertaking,	  some	  
automakers	  stuck	  to	  the	  fuel	  cell	  commitment.	  Honda	  announced	  in	  2008	  it	  would	  
lease	   up	   to	   200	   of	   its	   FCX	   Clarity	   model	   in	   markets	   in	   Southern	   California	  
(Milliken,	  2008),	  in	  a	  three-­‐year	  lease	  programme	  for	  US$600/month165.	  One	  year	  
later,	  Daimler	  finally	  started	  producing	  a	  small	  batch	  of	  Mercedes-­‐Benz	  B-­‐Class	  F-­‐
CELL	   –	   the	   first	   fuel	   cell	   automobile	   in	   series	   production	   –	   leased	   in	   the	   US	  
(California)	   and	  Germany	   beginning	   in	   2010	   (Daimler,	   2012).	   In	   September	   2012,	  
Hyundai	   unveiled	   the	   ix35	   fuel	   cell	   model	   during	   the	   Paris	   Auto	   Show,	   and	  
criticized	   other	   automakers	   for	   ‘jumping	   the	   gun’	   and	   releasing	   BEVs	   before	  
sufficient	  vehicle	  charging	  infrastructure	  were	  in	  place,	  thus	  hurting	  sale	  prospects.	  
With	   production	   of	   the	   FCV	   model	   due	   to	   start	   in	   December	   2012,	   Hyundai	  
promised	  to	  be	  the	  first	  OEM	  to	  mass-­‐produce	  FCVs	  by	  2015	  (King,	  2012).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




VII.4.5.2. Car	  industry	  responses	  
Socio-­‐cultural	   strategies.	   To	   increase	   the	   chances	   of	   Federal	   bailouts,	   American	  
automakers	  tried	  to	  enhance	  their	  social	  and	  political	  legitimacy	  by	  subscribing	  to	  
environmental	  and	  fuel	  economy	  expectations.	  GM’s	  first	  Viability	  Plan	  (December	  
2008),	  for	  instance,	  claimed	  that:	  “General	  Motors	  well	  understands	  the	  challenges	  
to	   energy	   security	   and	   the	   climate	   (…)	   and	   believes	   that	   (…)	   we	   must	   look	   to	  
advanced	   vehicle	   technologies	   to	   reduce	   petroleum	  dependency	   and	   greenhouse	  
gas	  emissions”	  (p.	  4).	  With	  the	  surging	  interest	  in	  electric	  vehicles,	  automakers	  also	  
showcased	  PHEV	  and	  BEV	  concept-­‐cars	  such	  as	  the	  Chevy	  Volt.	  The	  first	  Viability	  
Plan	  therefore	   included	  ambitious	   investment	  plans	   in	  green	  technologies	   (Table	  
VII.8).	  
	  Table	  VII.8:	  Investment	  plans	  in	  GMs	  first	  Viability	  Plan	  (2008)	  
Technology	  
Fuel	  economy	  improvement	  
impact	   2009-­‐2012	  Investment	  
Hybrid	  (BAS+)	   12-­‐15%	   $467	  M	  
Strong	  hybrid	  (large	  vehicle)	   30-­‐35%	   $515	  M	  
Strong	  hybrid	  (small	  vehicle)	   35-­‐55%	   $315	  M	  
Extended	  range	  electric	  vehicle	  
(e.g.	  Volt)	   100-­‐120%	   £758	  M	  
Source:	  GM	  (2008)	  
The	  Viability	  Plan	  was	  reviewed	  by	  the	  Presidential	  Task	  Force	  on	  the	  Auto	  Industry	  
(ATF),	  which	  Obama	  created	  for	  fear	  of	  being	  accused	  of	  interfering	  with	  day-­‐to-­‐
day	  management.	  The	  Auto	  Task	  Force	  rejected	  the	  focus	  on	  green	  cars,	  because	  of	  
limited	  financial	  prospects.166	  GM’s	  second	  Viability	  Plan	  (2009)	  therefore	  paid	  less	  
attention	   to	   green	   innovation	   and	   did	   not	   include	   green	   resource	   allocations	  
(Rattner,	  2010).	  
Political	  strategies.	  Because	  Detroit	  automakers	  needed	  Federal	  funds	  for	  survival,	  
they	  became	  more	  cooperative	  towards	  environmental	  regulations	  and	  signed	  up	  
to	   various	   substantial	   CARB	   and	   CAFE	   agreements.	   By	   2012,	   however,	   they	  
resumed	   defensive	   political	   strategies,	   arguing	   and	   lobbying	   against	   the	   ZEV-­‐
mandate.	  An	  industry	  petition	  to	  EPA	  against	  California’s	  regulation	  argued	  that:	  	  
It	   is	   impossible	   to	  predict	   today	  whether	   infrastructural	  developments,	  oil	  
prices,	   consumer	   confidence	   and	   other	   factors	   will	   converge	   such	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166	  In	  his	  memoirs,	  ATF’s	  director	  notes	  that:	  “We	  discussed	  the	  prospects	  of	  the	  Volt,	  and	  it	  
quickly	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  car	  had	  commercial	  clay	  feet.	  (…)	  The	  bottom	  line	  was	  that	  there	  
was	  no	  way	  for	  the	  Volt	  or	  any	  next-­‐generation	  car	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  GM’s	  finances	  any	  




automakers	  will	  be	  able	   to	  persuade	  buyers	   to	   [buy	  sufficient	  numbers	  of	  
electric-­‐drive	   cars].	   Current	   data	   and	   trends	   suggest	   that	   it	   is	   highly	  
unlikely	   that	   the	   industry	  will	   be	   able	   to	  meet	   that	  mandate.	   (Quoted	   in	  
Automotive	  News,	  March	  12th,	  2012).	  
Automakers	   also	   opposed	   the	   Californian	   ZEV-­‐mandate	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	  
discourage	  nine	  other	  states	  from	  adopting	  it.	  
Innovation	   strategies.	   Before	   the	   crisis,	   Ford	   and	  GM	  displayed	   BEV	   and	   PHEV-­‐
prototypes	  (Chevy	  Volt,	  Ford	  Airstream).	  GM	  even	  announced	  production	  plans	  for	  
the	  Volt,	  signalling	  a	  shift	   in	  strategy	  from	  fuel	  cells	   to	  BEVs.	  The	  financial	  crisis	  
created	  delays,	  because	  the	  Auto	  Task	  Force	  was	  unenthusiastic	  about	  the	  Volt.	  But	  
in	  2010	  the	  first	  Volt	  rolled	  off	  the	  factory	  production	  lines.	  
Following	   the	   (re)established	   Californian	   ZEV-­‐regulations,	   automakers	  
announced	  BEV	  commercialization	  plans	  to	  meet	  required	  sale-­‐quotas.	  The	  Green	  
Car	   Reports	   (a	   consumer-­‐support	  website	   for	   green	   cars)	   qualified	  many	  models	  
(Chevrolet	  Spark	  EV,	  Ford	  Focus	  Electric,	  Honda	  Fit	  EV,	  Toyota	  RAV4	  EV,	  and	  the	  
Fiat	  500e)	  as	  ‘compliance	  cars’,	  which	  are	  “not	  meant	  to	  lure	  in	  consumers,	  or	  sell	  
in	  any	  kind	  of	  volume.	  They’re	  only	  built	   to	  meet	  California	  regulations	  for	  zero-­‐
emission	  vehicles”	  (published	  on	  3/5/2012).	  These	  models,	  which	  are	  conversions	  of	  
existing	  gasoline	  vehicles	  rather	  than	  purposively-­‐built	  BEVs,	  are	  sold	  below	  cost-­‐
price.	  
Despite	  the	  BEV-­‐push,	  advanced-­‐ICE	  (and	  flex-­‐fuel)	  technologies	  remained	  
automakers’	  preferred	  strategy	  to	  improve	  fuel	  efficiency	  (Lutsey,	  2012),	  leading	  to	  
accelerated	   deployment	   of	   aICE	   technologies	   such	   as	   variable	   valve	   timing,	  
continuously	   variable	   transmission,	   gasoline	   direct	   injection,	   turbocharging,	   six-­‐
speed	  transmission,	  cylinder	  deactivation,	  and	  diesel	  engines	  (Figure	  VII.12).	  
Market	   positioning	   strategies.	   The	   2009	   Car	   Allowance	   Rebate	   System	   (CARS),	  
commonly	  known	  as	   the	   ‘Cash	   for	  Clunkers’	   scheme,	  positively	   affected	  demand	  
for	   more	   fuel-­‐efficient	   cars.	   The	   US$3-­‐billion	   car	   scrappage	   program	   offered	  
consumers	  a	  credit	  of	  US$3,500-­‐US$4,500	  toward	  the	  purchase	  of	  a	  new,	  more	  fuel-­‐
efficient	   vehicle	   (Pugh,	   2010;	   Klier	   and	   Rubenstein,	   2012).	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
programme,	  almost	  700,000	  cars	  had	  been	  traded	  in,	  with	  Toyota	  emerging	  as	  the	  
biggest	   ‘winner’,	  accounting	  for	   19.4%	  of	  sales	  (Table	  VII.9).	   In	  the	  top-­‐ten	  list	  of	  




ten	  models	   scrapped	   were	   from	   the	   Big	   Three	   (Table	   VII.9).	   The	   CARS	   scheme	  
helped	  HEVs	  reach	  a	  peak	  in	  relative	  sales	  in	  2009	  (Figure	  VII.3.e),	  but	  the	  segment	  
market-­‐share	  declined	  thereafter,	  with	  the	  niche	  apparently	  saturated.	  Moreover,	  
Cash	  for	  Clunkers	  also	  encouraged	  the	  diffusion	  of	  more	  fuel	  efficient	  ICE-­‐vehicles	  
(Dijk	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  	  
Table	  VII.9:	  Official	  US	  DoT	  ranking	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  ‘cash	  for	  clunkers’	  programme	  
Rank	   Top	  trade-­‐in	  models	   Top	  new	  models	   Top	  new-­‐model	  manufacturers	  
1	   Ford	  Explorer	  4WD	   Toyota	  Corolla 	   Toyota	   19.4%	  
2	   Ford	  F150	  Pickup	  2WD	   Honda	  Civic	  	   General	  Motors	  	   17.6%	  
3	   Jeep	  Grand	  Cherokee	  4WD	   Toyota	  Camry	  	   Ford	  	   14.4%	  
4	   Ford	  Explorer	  2WD	   Ford	  Focus	  FWD	  	   Honda	  	   13.0%	  
5	   Dodge	  Caravan/Grand	  Caravan	  2WD	   Hyundai	  Elantra	  	   Nissan	  	   8.7%	  
6	   Jeep	  Cherokee	  4WD	   Nissan	  Versa	  	   Hyundai	  	   7.2%	  
7	   Chevrolet	  Blazer	  4WD	   Toyota	  Prius	  	   Chrysler	  	   6.6%	  
8	   Chevrolet	  C1500	  Pickup	  2WD	   Honda	  Accord	  	   Kia	  	   4.3%	  
9	   Ford	  F150	  Pickup	  4WD	   Honda	  Fit	   Subaru	  	   2.5%	  
10	   Ford	  Windstar	  FWD	  Van	   Ford	  Escape	  FWD	   Others	   6.2%	  
Source:	  USDOT	  (2009)	  
While	   the	  HEV	  niche	   segment	   seemed	  saturated,	  automakers	   started	   to	  position	  
PHEVs	  and	  BEVs	  in	  the	  US	  market.	  GM	  sold	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  Chevy	  Volt’s	  in	  
2010	   for	   c.	  US$33,500	   (GCC,	   2010),	   including	   the	   new	   $7,500	   tax	   credit	   from	   the	  
Federal	  government	  for	  PHEVs	  with	  such	  a	  range,	  but	  excluding	  state	  credits.	  The	  
Volt	   competed	   directly	   with	   the	   Nissan	   Leaf	   (Yergin,	   2011),	   a	   BEV	   model	   also	  
launched	   in	   2010	   for	   c.	   US$25,300,	   including	   the	   same	   incentives	   as	   the	   volt	  
(Bristow,	   2010).	   Despite	   incentives,	   prices	   were	   still	   too	   high	   compared	   to	  
conventional	  models,	  and	  sales	  of	  BEVs	  remained	   low	  (Table	  VII.10).	  Toyota	  also	  
started	  selling	   its	  PHEV	  version	  of	   the	   third	  generation	  Prius	   in	  2012,	  but	   it	  only	  
qualified	  to	  a	  US$2,500	  Federal	  incentive,	  due	  to	  its	  limited	  battery	  range,	  and	  thus	  
cost	  c.	  US$30,000	  (Blanco,	  2011).	  Sales	  of	  the	  Prius	  PHEV	  were	  less	  than	  half	  those	  
of	  the	  Volt.	  Besides	  Tesla’s	  models,	  other	  four	  PHEV/BEV	  models	  were	  on	  sale	  in	  
the	  US	  by	  September	  2012:	  Toyota	  RAV4	  EV,	  Mitsubishi	  i-­‐MiEV,	  Honda	  Fit	  EV	  and	  
Smart	  Fortwo	  EV.	  167	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Table	  VII.10:	  Sales	  in	  the	  US	  market	  of	  selected	  PHEV	  and	  BEV	  models	  
	   2010	   2011	   2012	   Total	  
Chevy	  Volt	  (PHEV)	   326	   7,671	   23,461	   31,458	  
Toyota	  Prius	  PHEV	   -­‐	   -­‐	   12,750	   19,512	  
Nissan	  Leaf	  (BEV)	   19	   9,674	   9,819	   12,750	  
Sources:	  HybridCar.com;	  Voelcker	  (2012)	  
VII.4.5.3. Influences	  of	  broader	  industry	  contexts	  on	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  
Because	  of	  the	  economic	  crisis,	  general	  market	  conditions	  worsened	  dramatically.	  
Plummeting	  sales	  (Figure	  VII.4)	  caused	  major	  financial	  problems	  for	  Chrysler	  and	  
GM	   (Figure	   VI.17,	   p.	   228).	   The	   government	   rescued	   both	   companies	   with	   a	  
managed	   bankruptcy	   (2009)	   and	   substantial	   bailout	   (US$8	   billion	   and	   US$30	  
billion	  loans	  to	  Chrysler	  and	  GM	  respectively),	  with	  Chrysler	  being	  later	  acquired	  
by	   Fiat.	   All	   Detroit	   automakers	   subsequently	   restructured	   (shutting	   down	  
factories,	   reducing	   staff,	   disinvesting	   brands),	   cut	   costs	   and	   returned	   to	  
profitability	  (Pugh,	  2010;	  Klier	  and	  Rubenstein,	  2012).	   	  
VII.5. ANALYSIS	  
VII.5.1. Pattern	  matching	  with	  phases	  in	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  
While	  the	  case	  study	  showed	  good	  fit	  with	  the	  DILC-­‐model,	  the	  empirical	  periods	  
in	   the	   case	   study	  were,	   as	   expected,	  more	   complex	   than	   the	   conceptual	   phases,	  
with	   e.g.	   some	   periods	   containing	   elements	   from	  multiple	   phases.	   Indeed,	   there	  
were	   two	   important	   deviations	   between	   the	   case	   and	   the	   phase	   model:	   (1)	   the	  
industry	   front	   opened	   up	   earlier	   than	   predicted	   (in	   the	   third	   rather	   than	   fourth	  
period).	  	  This	  early	  ‘opening	  up’	  was	  related	  to	  radical	  innovations	  (FCV	  and	  HEV)	  
promoted	   by	   foreign	   companies,	   which	   triggered	   responses	   from	   American	  
automakers;	   and	   (2)	   lack	  of	   a	   single	   technological	   solution	   to	  which	  automakers	  
could	   reorient	   in	   later	   phases	   of	   the	   DILC-­‐model.	   Both	   deviations	   relate	   to	   the	  
theoretical	  goal	  of	  the	  case	  study	  (investigating	  technology	  hype-­‐cycles),	  and	  thus	  
were	  somehow	  expected.	  I	  will	  elaborate	  on	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  in	  
the	  next	  section.	  
If	  deviations	  can	  be	  explained	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  model’s	  conceptualization,	  
then	   its	   internal	   validity	   remains.	   This	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   case.	   The	   case	   showed	  
deviations	  in	  each	  period,	  because:	  (a)	  public	  attention	  experienced	  significant	  ups	  




level	   policy	   developments	   at	   the	   state,	   federal	   and	   global	   level	   experienced	  
advances	   and	   deadlocks;	   (c)	   conservative,	   climate-­‐change	   denying	   organisations	  
attempted	  to	  reopen	  the	  science;	  and	  (d)	  influences	  from	  wider	  industry	  contexts	  
and	  other	  issues	  (such	  as	  safety	  and	  energy	  security).	  
Despite	  the	  complexities	  and	  deviations,	  which	  I	  noted	  at	  the	  start	  of	  each	  
period,	  I	  try	  to	  identify	  an	  underlying	  pattern	  using	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  as	  heuristic.	  
The	  empirical	  goal	  of	  this	  case	  study,	  stated	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  Chapter,	  was	  
to	  assess	  at	  which	   stage	   is	   the	  American	  auto	   industry	  climate	  change	   issue	   life-­‐
cycle.	  As	   in	   the	  other	   case	   studies,	   I	  do	  not	   expect	   a	  perfect	  match	  between	   the	  
ideal-­‐type	   DILC-­‐model	   and	   this	   complex	   case.	   Yet,	   for	   the	   33-­‐year	   period,	   the	  
model	  allows	  me	  to	  identify	  an	  overall	  pattern,	  in	  which	  the	  climate	  change	  issue	  
life-­‐cycle	   progressed	   through	   the	   following	   phase-­‐sequence:	   1	   –	   2	   –	   3	   –3½	   –	   3½.	  
This	  suggests	  that	  the	  fourth	  and	  fifth	  period	  were	  stuck	  between	  phase	  3	  and	  4,	  
which	  is	  the	  most	  difficult	  transition	  in	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  (entailing	  radical	  policies,	  
substantial	   market	   demand,	   and	   industry	   reorientation).	   Especially	   in	   the	   fifth	  
period,	   developments	   point	   in	   different	   directions,	   which	   may	   prolong	  
uncertainties	  and	  hedging	  strategies.	  
	   For	  the	  years	  until	  the	  mid-­‐term	  review	  of	  CAFE	  rules	  in	  2018,	  I	  suggest	  the	  
following	  theory-­‐informed	  assessment,	  using	  concepts	  from	  the	  DILC-­‐model:	  
• Policy:	  Current	  CAFE	  standards	  are	  not	  yet	  tough	  enough	  to	  accelerate	  radical	  
green	   innovations.	   While	   policy-­‐implementation	   activity	   is	   currently	   high	  
(Figure	  3b),	  Congressional	  attention	  has	  decreased	  since	  2009,	  which	  suggests	  
that	   the	  political	   appetite	   for	   tough	   legislation	  may	  be	   limited	   in	   the	  coming	  
years.	  
• Policies	  and	  public	  opinion.	  Strong	  public	  concerns	  are	  needed	  to	  create	  support	  
for	  radical	  policies,	  which	  might	  facilitate	  a	  shift	  towards	  phase	  4	  in	  the	  DILC-­‐
model.	  But	  public	  attention	  for	  climate	  change	  has	  been	  declining	  since	  2007	  
(Figure	  VII.2.a).	   Increase	   in	   public	   concern	  with	   climate	   change	  will	   need	   to	  
return	  to	  spur	  a	  transition	  to	  phase	  4.	  This	  is	  unlikely	  if	  the	  American	  economy	  
fails	  to	  return	  to	  a	  substantive	  growth	  path.	  
• Industry	   political	   strategy.	   The	   industry	   has	   a	   track-­‐record	   of	   successfully	  
obstructing	  or	  delaying	  policies.	  Politically,	  I	  expect	  industry	  actors	  to	  continue	  




these	   threaten	   current	   investments	   in	   aICE	   to	   comply	   with	   recent	   CAFE	  
standards	  (cf.	  Lutsey,	  2012).	  
• Industry	  innovation	  strategy.	  In	  terms	  of	  technical	  implementation,	  automakers	  
are	  therefore	  likely	  to	  continue	  on	  the	  path	  of	  biofuels/FFV	  and	  incrementally	  
improving	  ICEs,	  which	  enables	  them	  to	  meet	  CAFE	  standards.168	  I	  do	  not	  expect	  
major	   industry	   commitment	   to	   radical	   green	   options	   in	   the	   next	   few	   years,	  
because	  of	  high	  risks	  and	  costs,	  low	  market	  demand	  (see	  below),	  and	  because	  
of	   limited	  policy	  pressure.	   Instead,	   I	   expect	  automakers	   to	  continue	   to	  hedge	  
and	  develop	  capabilities	  in	  multiple	  low-­‐carbon	  technologies	  (as	  visible	  in	  their	  
patenting	   portfolio,	   Figure	   VII.3.b).	   This	   diversity	   shows,	   firstly,	   that	  
automakers	   are	   preparing	   for	   low-­‐carbon	   futures,	   but,	   secondly,	   that	   they	  
remain	   uncertain	   about	   the	   best	   long-­‐term	   option	   (which	   delays	   full	  
commitment	  as	  I	  argued	  above).	  	  
• Market	  demand:	  Sales	  of	  electric-­‐drive	  vehicles	  (EDV)	  declined	  since	  2008,	  but	  
expanded	   again	   in	   2012	   (Figure	   VII.3.e).	   Demand	   is	   still	   relatively	   small,	  
however,	   providing	   insufficient	   incentive	   for	   automakers	   to	   take	   the	   risk	   of	  
aggressively	   developing	   and	  marketing	   electric	   vehicles.	   Projections	   of	   future	  
sales	   are	   uncertain,	   but	   even	   in	   optimistic	   scenarios	   electric-­‐drive	   markets	  
remain	   relatively	   small.	   In	   2009,	   a	   positive	   scenario	   by	   DoE	   (Figure	   VII.17)	  
predicted	  that	  HEVs	  might	  achieve	  25%	  market-­‐share	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  
when	  the	  stringency	  of	  regulations	  will	  be	  ratcheted	  up	  (Lutsey,	  2012),	  and	  that	  
PHEVs	  might	  achieve	   10%	  market	  share	  by	  2030,	  and	  BEVs	  about	  5%	  (Figure	  
VII.17).	   These	   estimates	   may	   be	   rather	   optimistic.	   HEV	   market	   shares,	   for	  
instance,	  hovered	  between	  2-­‐3%	  since	  2007	  instead	  of	  increasing	  to	  6%	  by	  2012	  
as	  in	  DOE’s	  scenario.	  If	  market	  demand	  for	  electric	  cars	  remains	  relatively	  low,	  
the	  industry	  may	  call	  for	  a	  rollback	  of	  long-­‐term	  standards	  during	  the	  mid-­‐term	  
review	  (2018)	  of	  CAFE	  rules	  (which	  it	  did	  successfully	  during	  the	  1998	  review	  of	  
the	  ZEV	  mandate).	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  “This	  is	  a	  strategy	  of	  least-­‐compliance,	  to	  meet	  the	  regulatory	  requirements	  at	  as	  low	  a	  level	  of	  
compliance	  as	  the	  regulation	  allows	  and	  with	  the	  lowest	  possible	  risk	  to	  the	  business”	  (Wells	  and	  




Figure	  VII.17:	  US	  DOE	  Multi-­‐Path	  Study’s	  Optimistic	  Scenario	  of	  EV	  Market	  Shares	  
	  
Source:	  Gaines	  and	  Nelson	  (2009)	  
• New	   entrants.	   Dynamics	   may	   speed	   up	   (towards	   phase	   4)	   if	   new	   entrants	  
dedicated	   to	   electric	   drive	   are	   successful.	   Tesla	   Motors,	   for	   instance,	   might	  
drive	  down	  production	  costs	  and	  enter	   larger	  markets	   (as	   it	  plans);	  Tesla	  has	  
recently	   announced	   its	   first	   quarterly	   profits	   in	   the	   1Q2013.	   Although	   new	  
entrants169	  could	  break	   the	  mould	  of	   the	  American	  automobile	   industry,	   they	  
have	   to	   compete	   against	   powerful	   incumbents	   locked	   into	   ICE	   technology,	  
which	  is	  still	  supported	  by	  policies,	  market	  demand	  and	  public	  opinion.	  
Until	  2018,	  I	  therefore	  expect	  the	  climate	  change	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  to	  remain	  stuck	  in	  
‘phase	  3½’	  or	  even	  cycle	  back	  to	  phase	  3:	  electric	  drive	  market	  share	  may	  build	  up	  
slowly,	  but	  not	  yet	  stimulate	  automakers	  to	  fully	  reorient	  towards	  a	  single	  solution;	  
and	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  public	  support,	  there	  will	  not	  be	  political	  will	  to	  strengthen	  
regulations	  and	  there	  could	  even	  be	  regulatory	  rollbacks.	  
VII.5.2. Explanation-­‐building	  based	  on	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  	  
VII.5.2.1. Technology	  hype-­‐cycles	  
The	  co-­‐existence	  of	  multiple	  solutions	  and	  technology	  hype-­‐cycles	  adds	  complexity	  
to	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	   because	   they	   increased	   uncertainties	   and	   risks.	   Firms	   are	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  Other	  new	  entrants	  developing	  electric	  vehicles	  are	  BetterPlace,	  Fisker	  Automotive	  (from	  
California)	  and	  BYD	  Auto	  (from	  China).	  All	  three	  are	  facing	  financial	  troubles.	  The	  first	  filed	  for	  
bankruptcy	  in	  Israel	  in	  May	  2013.	  Fisker	  Automotive	  stopped	  production	  in	  Summer	  2012	  and	  is	  
seeking	  new	  investors	  (its	  battery	  supplier,	  A123	  Systems	  went	  bankrupt).	  BYD	  Auto	  could	  be	  a	  
game	  changer,	  due	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  Chinese	  market	  (which	  could	  help	  drive	  drown	  mass-­‐
production	  costs),	  and	  because	  it	  may	  benefit	  from	  substantial	  state	  support.	  Yet,	  BYD	  reported	  a	  




reluctant	  to	  fully	  commit	  to	  radical	  green	  options,	  because	  “moving	  from	  the	  lab	  to	  
the	  marketplace	  is	  hugely	  expensive	  and	  very	  risky”	  (Sperling	  and	  Gordon,	  2009,	  p.	  
77).	  Committing	   to	   the	   ‘wrong’	   technology	  can	  have	  major	   implications,	  possibly	  
even	  bankruptcy.	  So,	  diversity	  of	  green	  options,	  and	  awareness	  of	  previous	  hype-­‐
disappointment	  cycles,	  may	  delay	  full	  industry	  commitment.	  
The	   original	   formulation	   of	   the	   DILC-­‐model	   implicitly	   assumes	   that	   the	  
technical	   solution	  becomes	   increasingly	   clear	   as	   the	   issue	  progresses,	   so	   that,	   by	  
phase	  4,	  there	  is	  a	  single,	  clear-­‐cut	  option	  towards	  which	  firms	  can	  reorient.	  This	  
did	   not	   (yet)	   happen	   in	   the	   case	   study,	   which	   instead	   showed	   successive	  
technology	   hype-­‐cycles.	   I	   therefore	   advance	   the	   following	   proposition,	   which	  
elaborates	  an	  implicit	  assumption	  in	  the	  DILC-­‐model:	  the	  shift	  from	  phase	  three	  to	  
phase	   four	   requires	   the	   convergence	   of	   industry	   actors	   (and	   other	   stakeholders)	  
towards	  a	  dominant	  solution.170	  The	  absence	  of	  convergence	  helps	  explain	  why	  the	  
fourth	  and	  fifth	  empirical	  period	  still	  had	  elements	  of	  phase	  three.	  
In	   Chapter	   VI,	   I	   suggested	   that	   four	   factors	  may	   prevent	   issue	   life-­‐cycles	  
from	   ‘closing	   down’	   (possibly	   leading	   to	   cyclical	   path	   in	   which	   issues	   move	  
backwards	  and	  forwards	  through	  phases):	  (1)	  changing	  interpretations	  and	  framing	  
of	   the	   issue;	   (2)	   changes	   in	   the	   orientation	   and	   relative	   strength	   of	   issue-­‐
proponents	  and	  issue-­‐opponents;	  (3)	  influence	  from	  other	  issues;	  and	  (4)	  changes	  
in	   wider	   industry	   contexts.	   Technology	   hype-­‐cycles	   relate	   to	   factors	   (1)	   and	   (2)	  
because	  they	  represent	  changes	  in	  interpretations	  of	  solutions	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  
orientation	   of	   industry	   actors,	   policy-­‐makers	   and,	   potentially,	   consumers.	   These	  
factors	   provide	   deeper	   explanations	   of	   why	   ongoing	   hype-­‐cycles	   complicate	   the	  
shift	  from	  phase	  three	  to	  phase	  four	  in	  the	  DILC-­‐model.	  
VII.5.2.2. Regime	  reorientation	  towards	  ‘green’	  vehicles	  	  
During	   the	   case	   study	   period,	   some	   changes	   have	   occurred	   in	   elements	   of	   the	  
industry	  regime.	  Firstly,	  the	  industry	  has	  developed	  competencies	  in	  radically	  new	  
technologies	  (fuel	  cells,	  electric	  drive).	  But	  automakers	  are	  not	  yet	  fully	  committed	  
to	   them,	   and	   also	   have	   elaborated	   existing	   competencies	   via	   advanced	   ICE	   and	  
biofuels/FFV.	  The	  innovation	  races	  and	  hype-­‐cycles	  from	  the	  late	  1990s	  (FCV,	  HEV,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  The	  convergence	  of	  industry	  actors	  also	  actively	  contributes	  to	  making	  a	  solution	  dominant.	  
But	  firms	  are	  not	  the	  only	  relevant	  actors	  in	  creating	  a	  dominant	  design.	  Other	  actors	  (e.g.	  




BEV)	   did	   begin	   to	   undermine	   the	   ICE	   dominance.	   But	   to	   avoid	   risks,	  
manufacturers	  used	   “a	  gradual,	   contained	  experimentation	   [of	  alternative	  vehicle	  
technologies],	   as	   much	   as	   possible	   anchored	   within	   the	   status	   quo”	   (Wells	   and	  
Nieuwenhuis,	  2012,	  p.	  1686).	  
Secondly,	   beliefs	   have	   only	   marginally	   changed:	   the	   industry	   no	   longer	  
denies	   the	   existence	   of	   climate	   change	   and	   perceives	   it	   as	   a	   relevant	   issue.	   But	  
climate	   change	   has	   not	   (yet)	   entered	   the	   core	   ‘mindset’	   or	   become	   part	   of	   the	  
industry’s	  identity	  or	  mission	  (despite	  advertisements).	  Thirdly,	  climate	  change	  has	  
entered	   industry-­‐specific	   policies,	   initially	   via	   technology	   development	   programs	  
(USABC,	   PNGV,	   Hydrogen	   Fuel	   initiative),	   and	   recently	   also	   via	   CAFE	   and	   fuel	  
economy	   regulations.	   While	   these	   regulations	   create	   some	   pressure	   on	   the	  
industry,	  they	  are	  not	  (yet)	  very	  tough	  to	  substantive	  alter	  the	  regime.	  	  
	   So,	   the	   changes	   in	   industry	   regime	   elements	   are	   not	   yet	   very	   substantial.	  
This	  seems	  in	  line	  with	  the	  DILC-­‐model,	  which	  suggests	  that	  major	  regime	  change	  
does	  not	  happen	  until	  phase	  4	  or	  5.	  I	  expect	  limited	  regime	  change	  until	  the	  issue	  
life-­‐cycle	  moves	  to	  phase	  4.	  	  
VII.6. CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  
VII.6.1. Evaluation	  of	  the	  mixed-­‐methods	  approach	  
I	  believe	  that	   the	  novel	  methodology	  that	   I	  proposed	  showed	   its	   full	  potential	   in	  
this	   case	   study,	   being	   particularly	   suitable	   to	   link	   theory	   (the	  DILC-­‐model)	   and	  
empirical	   analysis.	   The	   visual	   examination	   and	   the	   quantitative	   structural-­‐break	  
analysis	   helped	   to	   systematically	   identify	   periods,	   which	   were	   used	   for	   a	   meta-­‐
analysis	   of	   correlations.	  The	   visual	   examination	   and	   the	   correlation	   analysis	   also	  
provided	  initial	  insights	  (patterns	  and	  relationships)	  into	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  and	  issue	  
attention-­‐cycle	   dynamics.	   The	   sub-­‐periods	   could	   then	   be	   used	   in	   the	   in-­‐depth	  
qualitative	   case	   study	   narrative,	   which	   also	   further	   investigated	   deeper	  
mechanisms	  behind	  the	  initial	  insights.	  
The	  quantification	   approaches	  did	  however	  present	   limitations,	   related	   to	  
the	   length	   of	   the	   time-­‐series	   that	   I	   used.	   Because	   sub-­‐periods	   represented	   small	  
sample	  sizes,	  the	  power	  of	  the	  statistical	  tests	  was	  low.	  I	  suggest	  that	  this	  issue	  can	  




however	  may	  require	  programming	  skills	  to	  automatically	  collect	  data	  from	  online	  
database.	  	  
VII.6.2. Implications	  for	  thesis’	  research	  focus	  and	  questions	  
The	   case	   study	   has	   shown	   the	   usefulness	   (versatility)	   of	   the	   DILC-­‐model	   for	  
comprehensive	   analyses	   of	   societal	   problems	   and	   industry	   reorientation	   in	   a	  
contemporary	  setting.	  It	  also	  brought	  about	  important	  insights	  to	  further	  elaborate	  
the	  model,	   the	  most	   important	   of	  which,	   discussed	   above,	   relates	   to	   technology	  
hype-­‐cycles.	  
As	  a	  second	  elaboration	  I	  propose	  is	  to	  nuance	  the	  implicit	  sequential	  view	  
of	   technological	   reorientation	   in	   the	   DILC-­‐model	   (incremental	   innovation,	  
hedging,	  diversification,	  full	  reorientation).	  Whereas	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  assumes	  that	  
incumbent	  firms	  do	  not	  engage	  in	  radical	  innovation	  until	  phase	  3,	  the	  case	  study	  
showed	   that	   automakers	   already	   developed	   and	   publicly	   displayed	   BEVs	   in	   the	  
second	  period,	  followed	  by	  FCV,	  HEV,	  and	  PHEV	  in	  later	  periods.	  So,	  rather	  than	  a	  
sequential	  process,	   radical	   and	   incremental	   innovation	  co-­‐existed	   simultaneously	  
from	  early	  periods.171	  
To	  explain	  this	  deviation,	  I	  problematize	  the	  distinction	  between	  symbolic	  
and	   substantive	   action	   (Chapter	   II),	   particularly	   the	   idea	   that	   technology	   (only)	  
represents	   substantive	   action	   in	   the	   economic	   task	   environment.	   I	   propose	   that	  
technology	   can	   also	   be	   used	   for	   political	   and	   socio-­‐cultural	   reasons	   towards	   the	  
institutional	  environment,	  as	   indeed	  raised	  in	  the	  review	  chapter.	  The	  case	  study	  
entailed	  several	  examples	  of	  this:	  
• In	  1990	  GM	  showcased	  the	  Impact	  for	  reputational	  reasons	  (showing	  it	  was	  still	  
an	  innovative	  company).	  The	  unintended	  consequence	  was	  that	  it	  triggered	  an	  
early	   BEV-­‐related	   innovation	   race,	   because	   CARB	   interpreted	   the	   car	   as	  
indicating	   that	  BEVs	  were	  market-­‐ready,	  which	   led	   it	   to	   introduce	   the	   tough	  
ZEV-­‐mandate.	  	  
• The	   industry	   established	   public	   private	   partnerships	   (USABC,	   PNGV)	   to	  
develop	  new	  technologies.	  Although	  these	  PPPs	  carried	  costs,	  they	  also	  offered	  
the	   industry	   political	   and	   reputational	   benefits:	   control	   of	   technology	  
developments,	   control	   over	   information	   provision	   to	   policy-­‐makers,	   limiting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  industry	  was	  equally	  committed	  to	  both.	  The	  case	  study	  clearly	  





internal	   competition,	   enhancing	   public	   reputation,	   signalling	   that	   self-­‐
regulation	   was	   better	   than	   formal	   regulation,	   signalling	   willingness	   to	   take	  
substantive	   action,	   managing	   technical	   expectations	   (e.g.	   promising	   major	  
technical	  breakthroughs	  5-­‐10	  years	  in	  the	  future).	  	  
• Toyota	   improved	   its	   green	   credentials	   with	   the	   Prius,	   creating	   an	  
environmental	  ‘halo	  effect’.	  
• The	  industry	  shaped	  social	  and	  political	  expectations	  by	  parading	  concept	  cars	  
and	  prototypes	  and	  making	  promises	  about	  marketing	  plans.	  For	  example,	  the	  
ZEV	   regulation	   ‘forced’	   technologies	   as	   much	   as	   technologies	   ‘forced’	  
modifications	   to	   it.	  The	   industry	  has	  however	  a	   track-­‐record	  of	  missing	   these	  
promises,	   and	   deferring	   new	   promises	   further	   into	   the	   future	   (which	   aim	   to	  
delay	  actual	  implementation).	  
These	   examples	   indicate	   that	   symbolic	   reasons	   are	   important	   for	   the	   (early)	  
engagement	   of	   incumbents	   with	   radical	   innovation.	   So,	   the	   elaboration	   of	   the	  
DILC-­‐model	  is	  to	  acknowledge,	  firstly,	  that	  technology	  strategies	  may	  be	  pursued	  
for	   substantive	  and	   symbolic	   reasons	   and,	   secondly,	   that	   early	   engagement	  with	  
radical	   innovation	   tends	   to	   be	   motivated	   primarily	   by	   symbolic	   reasons.	   This	  
insight	   represents	   important	   clue	   to	   answer	   this	   thesis’	   third	   research	   question	  
(‘when	   and	   why	   do	   industry	   actors	   decide	   to	   develop	   substantive	   technological	  




VIII. DISCUSSION	  AND	  CONCLUSION	  
VIII.1. INTRODUCTION	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  aimed	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  debate	  concerning	  how	  incumbent	  firms	  
may	  be	  stimulated	  to	  help	  to	  address	  ‘Grand	  Societal	  Challenges’	  (or	  societal	  issues	  
in	  general).	  This	  constitutes	  a	  new	  and	  important	  topic	  in	  innovation	  studies	  and	  
associated	   policy	   agendas.	   In	   so	   doing,	   I	   have	   attempted	   to	   address	   a	   gap	   left	  
under-­‐addressed	   for	   many	   decades	   in	   science,	   technology	   and	   innovation	   (STI)	  
studies,	  where	   the	   connection	   between	   technological	   developments	   and	   broader	  
societal	  issues	  remained	  under-­‐theorized.	  
To	  guide	  my	  theory	  building	  and	  research	  effort,	  I	  have	  raised	  and	  sought	  to	  
answer	  the	  following	  research	  questions:	  
A) How	   do	   societal	   issue-­‐related	   pressures	   (on	   industries),	   from	   different	  
domains	  (namely,	  civil	  society,	  science,	  political	  arena,	  economy),	  evolve?	  
B) How	  do	  industries	  respond	  to	  changing	  pressures	  around	  societal	  issues,	  in	  
terms	  of	  technological,	  political,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  strategies?	  	  
C) In	   particular,	   when	   and	   why	   do	   industry	   actors	   decide	   to	   develop	  
substantive	  technological	  responses?	  
As	   a	   first	   approach	   to	   answering	   these	   questions,	   I	   have	   developed	   a	   new	  
framework	  –	  the	  Dialectic	   Issue	  Life-­‐Cycle	  (DILC)	  model	  –	  that	  combines	  insights	  
from	   existing	   theories	   to	   explain	   how	   societal	   issues	   and	   industry	   response	  
strategies	   co-­‐evolve	   over	   time.	   The	   model	   was	   inspired	   by	   insights	   from	   the	  
Greening	  of	   Industry	   literature	  (reviewed	   in	  the	   introductory	  Chapter	   I):	  namely,	  
that	   societal	   problems	   and	   industry	   response	   strategies	   progress	   in	   stages,	  
representing	   a	   longitudinal,	   multi-­‐dimensional	   co-­‐evolutionary	   process	   at	   the	  
organizational-­‐field	   level.	   I	   thus	   used	   a	   field-­‐level	   background	   framework	   of	  
industry	  dynamics	   (the	   ‘Triple	  Embeddedness	  Framework’)	   to	  develop	   the	  DILC-­‐
model,	   which	   is	   based	   on	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   theory	   (reviewed	   in	   Chapter	   II).	   My	  
review	   showed	   that	   this	   theory,	   from	   the	   Business	   &	   Society	   field,	   had	   some	  
theoretical	   and	   methodological	   under-­‐conceptualizations	   (gaps)	   about:	   (a)	   the	  
processes	   through	   which	   an	   industry	   shifts	   to	   substantive	   responses	   (e.g.	  




(industry-­‐level)	  strategies;	  (c)	  the	  relationship	  between	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  and	  issue	  
attention-­‐cycles;	  and	  (d)	  the	  criteria	  for	  the	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	  identification	  
of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  stages.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  these	  gaps,	  I	  discussed	  insights	  from	  
Science,	   Technology	   &	   Innovation	   (STI)	   studies;	   from	   Organizational	  
Institutionalism	   works	   on	   corporate	   political	   activities	   and	   inter-­‐organizational	  
relationships,	   and	   from	   issue	   attention-­‐cycle	   theory	   and	   studies	   on	   technology	  
hype-­‐cycles.	  
In	   Chapter	   III,	   I	   mobilized	   the	   reviewed	   literature	   to	   develop	   the	   DILC-­‐
model,	   which	   both	   provides	   a	   conceptual	   answer	   to	  my	   research	   questions	   and	  
represents	  an	  analytical	  framework	  through	  which	  more	  nuanced	  answers	  can	  be	  
derived	   (based	   on	   findings	   from	   empirical	   cases).	   In	   Chapter	   IV,	   I	   discussed	  
ontological,	  epistemological	  and	  methodological	  issues	  that	  guided	  the	  application	  
of	  the	  model	  to	  empirical	  cases,	  which	  were	  selected	  according	  to	  conceptual	  (and	  
practical)	   criteria.	   In	   subsequent	   chapters	   (V-­‐VII),	   I	   proceeded	   to	   empirically	  
explore	   the	   framework	   with	   the	   aid	   of	   a	   novel	   mixed-­‐methods	   approach,	   by	  
studying	   the	   responses	   of	   the	   American	   automobile	   industry	   to	   three	   different	  
societal	   issues	  (local	  air	  pollution,	  car	  safety	  and	  climate	  change).	  Each	  empirical	  
chapter	  ended	  with	  a	  pattern-­‐matching	  analysis,	  an	  explanation	  building	  exercise	  
that	   looked	   at	   individual	   case	   idiosyncrasies,	   an	   evaluation	   of	   the	   quantitative	  
methods,	  and	  implications	  to	  the	  thesis’	  research	  focus	  and	  questions.	  
	   This	   concluding	   chapter	   will	   now	   answer	   the	   research	   questions	   and	  
compare	   them	   with	   the	   three	   empirical	   case	   studies.	   In	   section	   VIII.2,	   I	   will	  
explicitly	   elaborate	   the	   conceptual	   answers	   based	   on	   the	  DILC-­‐model,	   and	   then	  
discuss	  how	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  match	  or	  not	  these	  answers	  (i.e.	  to	  what	  degree	  
do	  the	  cases	  match	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  conceptualization?).	  I	  will	  show	  that	  the	  cases	  
had	  a	  relatively	  good	  match	  with	  the	  model,	  but	  all	  presented	  deviations,	  some	  of	  
which	  are	  significant	  and	  can	  be	  used	  to	  nuance	  the	  answers	  and	  refine	  the	  model.	  
Thus,	   in	  section	  VIII.3,	  I	  will	  advance	  nuances	  and	  refinements	  to	  my	  conceptual	  
answers	  and	  model,	  based	  on	  these	  deviations	  and	  also	  on	  key	  findings	  of	  the	  case	  
studies.	  
As	   this	   thesis	   employed	   a	   novel	  mixed-­‐methods	   (quantitative-­‐qualitative)	  
methodology,	  section	  VIII.4	  discusses	  and	  evaluates	   it,	  which,	   I	  argue,	  represents	  




this	  and	  other	  original	  claims	  to	  knowledge	  that	  I	  have	  made	  in	  this	  thesis.	  In	  the	  
final	  section	  VIII.6,	  I	  will	  make	  a	  reflection	  on	  these	  contributions,	  by	  recognizing	  
the	   limitations	   of	   my	   research	   and	  model,	   qualifying	   the	   generalizability	   of	   my	  
findings	  and	  conclusions,	  and	  identifying	  areas	  for	  future	  research.	  
VIII.2. ANSWERING	  THE	  RESEARCH	  QUESTIONS	  
Before	   I	   present	   the	   answers	   to	  my	   research	   questions,	   I	  will	   explain	   how	   I	  will	  
proceed	   in	  my	  analysis	  of	  matches	  and	  mismatches	  between	  empirical	  cases	  and	  
conceptual	   model.	   For	   questions	   A	   and	   B,	   matches	   and	   mismatches	   can	   be	  
assessed	  on	  two	  levels:	  (1)	  whether	  every	  empirical	  period,	  in	  which	  I	  divided	  each	  
case’s	  overall	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	  matches	  or	  not	  any	  of	   the	   five	  conceptual	   phases	  of	  
the	  DILC-­‐model172;	   and	  (2)	  whether	  sequence	  of	  phases	   that	   result	   from	  this	   first	  
pattern-­‐matching	   analysis	   matches	   or	   deviates	   from	   the	   ‘normal’	   sequence	   of	  
phases	  (1	  –	  2	  –	  3	  –	  4	  –	  5).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  research	  question	  C,	  the	  pattern-­‐matching	  
exercise	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  point	  (1):	  my	  conceptual	  answer	  to	  the	  third	  research	  
question	  explains	  when	  –	  in	  which	  stage	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  –	  the	  industry	  begins	  
to	  shift	   from	  symbolic	  to	  substantive	  (technology)	  strategies,	  and	  why,	   i.e.	  which	  
are	   the	   causes	   for	   the	   shift.	  Here,	   a	   ‘good	  match’	  means	   that	   the	   empirical	   case	  
confirmed	  this	  conceptual	  pattern	  and	  the	  proposed	  causal	  mechanisms.	  	  
Regarding	   point	   (1),	   a	   perfect	   match	   is	   very	   unlikely	   due	   to	   empirical	  
complexities	   and	  contingencies,	   so	   that	   a	   ‘good	  match’	  happen	   if	  key	  underlying	  
processes	   of	   a	   given	   conceptual	   phase	   can	   be	   identified	   in	   the	   empirical	   period,	  
even	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  deviations.	  The	  DILC-­‐model	  will	  present	  internal	  validity,	  if	  
deviations	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  mechanisms	  posited	  in	  the	  model.	  Yet,	  even	  if	  
they	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  model’s	  mechanisms,	  some	  empirical	  deviations	  may	  
warrant	   nuancing	   the	   answer	   and	   refining	   the	   conceptual	   model	   (e.g.	   if	   they	  
recurred	   in	   the	   cases	   or	   if	   they	   indicate	   the	   existence	   of	   different	   processes	   and	  
mechanisms	  at	  work	  in	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle),	  which	  I	  will	  do	  in	  the	  section	  VIII.3.	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VIII.2.1. Research	  question	  A	  
How	  do	  societal	  issue-­‐related	  pressures	  (on	  industries),	  from	  different	  domains	  
(namely,	  civil	  society,	  science,	  political	  arena,	  economy),	  evolve?	  
Conceptual	   answer.	   In	   the	  DILC-­‐model,	   societal	   issue-­‐related	  pressures	   evolve	   in	  
phases/stages.	   They	   first	   emerge	   in	   civil	   society	   through	   the	   actions	   of	   activists	  
(phase	   1)	   and,	   later	   (phase	   2),	   social	   movement	   organizations,	   both	   of	   whom	  
engage	  in	  attention	  advocacy	  (attempts	  to	  draw	  attention	  from	  other	  actors	  to	  the	  
issue),	   promoting	   a	   particular	   framing	   to	   the	   issue	   that	   poses	   a	   threat	   to	   the	  
industry.	  This	  process	  results	  in	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  urgency	  (possibly	  influenced	  by	  
new	  scientific	  understandings)	  that	  is	  reflected	  in	  increasing	  public	  attention	  to	  the	  
issue,	   which	   spills	   over	   to	   the	   political	   arena,	   where,	   in	   phase	   3,	   policy-­‐makers	  
engage	   in	   heated	   debates	   on	   the	   problem	   and	   propose	   solutions.	   The	   growing	  
visibility	  of	  the	  issue	  in	  this	  phase	  also	  attracts	  attention	  from	  industry	  outsiders,	  
as	  an	  initial	  demand	  from	  concerned	  consumers	  means	  the	  issue	  spilled	  over	  to	  the	  
economic	  environment.	  The	  highest	  visibility	  of	  the	  process	  happens	  when	  macro-­‐
politicians	   (e.g.	   the	   president,	   other	   political	   leaders)	   get	   involved:	   this	   is	   the	  
turning	   point	   in	   the	   evolution	   of	   societal	   issues,	   between	   phases	   3	   and	   4.	  More	  
substantive	  pressures	  from	  the	  economic	  environment	  happen	  (either)	  through	  the	  
implementation	   of	   strong	   regulation	   (one	   capable	   to	   force	   innovation	   into	  
markets)	   and	   (or)	   through	   competitive	   struggles	   in	   the	   task	   environment	   for	   a	  
growing	   market	   niche	   (phase	   4),	   both	   of	   which	   influence	   mass	   consumer	  
preferences	  (which	  also	  change	  with	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  the	  issue)	  (phase	  5).	  	  
Discussion	  of	  match	  and	  mismatch	  between	  empirical	  cases	  and	  conceptual	  pattern.	  
In	   terms	  of	  how	   issue-­‐related	  pressure	  evolves,	   the	  case	   studies	   seem	  to	  confirm	  
the	  underlying	  processes	  conceptualized	  by	  the	  DILC-­‐model,	  because	  each	  period	  
of	  the	  three	  cases	  could	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  conceptual	  phase.	  Yet,	  periods	  also	  
showed	  deviations,	  some	  of	  which	  warrant	  nuancing	  the	  answer	  and	  refining	  the	  
model.	   In	   the	   following	   analysis173,	   for	   each	   case	   study	   I	   will	   first	   discuss	   the	  
matches	  and	  show	  which	  sequence	  of	  phases	  each	  empirical	  case	  followed.	  Then	  I	  
will	   discuss	   the	   deviations	   in	   each	   case,	   indicating	  which	   ones	   seem	   to	  warrant	  
nuancing	  the	  answers	  and/or	  refining	  the	  model.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




• Local	  air	  pollution	  and	  the	  American	  automobile	  industry	  (case	  study	  1):	  In	  the	  
first	  period	  pressure	  came	  from	  civil	  society	  (concerned	  citizens	  and	  media),	  as	  
in	  the	  model’s	  phase	  1.	  The	  second	  period	  matched	  phase	  2	  dynamics:	  it	  started	  
when	   new	   social	   movement	   organizations	   enacted	   pressure	   and	   engaged	   in	  
attention	   advocacy,	   leading	   to	   minor	   spillovers	   to	   public	   opinion.	   The	   third	  
period	  was	  close	  to	  the	  predicted	  pattern	  (phase	  3)	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  issue	  
spilled	  over	  to	  the	  policy	  domain	  when	  public	  opinion	  became	  more	  concerned	  
(i.e.	   public	   attention	   increased	   considerably).	   So,	   the	   third	   period	   was	   of	  
political	  debate,	  but	  also	  entailed	  initial	  regulations	  (early	  emission	  standards),	  
which	  is	  a	  deviation	  (see	  below)	  connected	  to	  multi-­‐level	  governance	  dynamics	  
(i.e.	  developments	  in	  California).	  While	  the	  fourth	  period	  matched	  the	  model’s	  
phase	  4,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  strict	  regulations	  were	  introduced	  (1970	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  
–	  CAA),	  it	  also	  deviated,	  as	  there	  was	  no	  visible	  demand	  for	  low	  emission	  cars	  
(see	  below).	  The	  enactment	  of	   the	  CAA	  was	   followed	  by	  a	  decrease	   in	  public	  
attention	  to	  the	  issue,	  so	  that	  it	  represented	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  process.	  The	  
fifth	   period	   was	   however	   still	   close	   to	   phase	   4,	   because	   policy	   and	   public	  
opinion	  pressure	  weakened,	  but	  not	  due	  to	  the	  factors	  suggested	  in	  the	  DILC-­‐
model’s	  phase	  5	  (see	  below).	  
I	  expected	  this	  case	  to	  follow	  a	  ‘normal’	  issue	  life-­‐cycle,	  and	  the	  case	  study	  
showed	   that	   the	  air	  pollution	   life-­‐cycle	   indeed	   followed	  a	   standard	   (‘normal’)	  
sequence	  of	  phases.	  Yet,	  it	  did	  not	  reach	  phase	  five	  in	  the	  last	  analysed	  period,	  
with	  the	  air	  pollution	  life-­‐cycle	  being	  interrupted	  in	  ‘phase	  4.5’,	  as	  the	  issue	  was	  
institutionalized	   in	   the	   socio-­‐political	   environment	   but	   not	   in	   the	   task	  
environment	  (see	  discussion	  of	  deviations	  below).	  In	  this	  sense,	  from	  the	  1940s	  
to	   the	   1980s,	   this	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   progressed	   through	   the	   following	   phases174:	  	  
1	  –	  2	  –	  3	  –	  4	  –	  4.5.	  While	  I	  could	  identify	  each	  period	  with	  a	  conceptual	  phase,	  in	  
each	  period	  there	  were	  deviations.	  
In	   the	   first	   empirical	   period,	   the	   case	   presented	   two	   deviations	   from	   the	  
model:	  attention	  advocacy	  came	  also	  from	  the	  media	  (LA	  Times),	  and	  scientific	  
research	   contributed	   to	   sense-­‐making	   efforts.	   The	   first	   point	   seems	   a	   minor	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  assessment,	  as	  in	  the	  other	  case	  studies,	  is	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  only	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deviation,	  in	  that	  the	  model	  posits	  action	  by	  ‘affected	  groups,	  citizens,	  and	  other	  
activists’	  and	  in	  the	  case	  activism	  came	  from	  concerned	  citizens	  and	  the	  media	  
–	   so,	   the	   underlying	   process	   of	   attention	   advocacy	   through	   activism	   in	   civil	  
society	   was	   present.	   However,	   it	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   media	   in	  
drawing	  attention	  to	  problematic	  conditions.	  Regarding	  the	  second	  point,	  the	  
model	   does	   make	   explicit	   reference	   to	   new	   scientific	   understandings	  
contributing	  to	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  urgency	  in	  phase	  2,	  but	  this	  second	  deviation	  
is	   an	   important	   one,	   because	   scientific	   research	   not	   only	   started	   in	   the	   first	  
period	  but	  in	  fact	  directly	  contributed	  to	  an	  issue	  framing	  that	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  
the	  car	  industry	  (cars	  were	  identified	  as	  the	  source	  of	  the	  problem).	  Moreover,	  
this	  same	  underlying	  process	  of	  science	   influencing	  the	   issue-­‐framing	  in	  early	  
periods	  was	  present	   in	  the	  car	  safety	  and	  climate	  change	   issue	   life-­‐cycles	  (see	  
below),	  indicating	  the	  need	  to	  incorporate	  it	  in	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  model.	  
A	   third	   deviation	   happened	   in	   period	   3,	   when	   there	   was	   no	   spillover	   to	  
(niche)	  markets,	   something	   that	   also	   did	   not	   happen	   in	   the	   fourth	   and	   fifth	  
periods.	  This	   seems	  a	   substantive	  deviation.	  While	   the	  DILC-­‐model	  proposes	  
that	  spillovers	  to	  mass	  markets	  may	  happen	  not	  only	  through	  a	  slow	  process	  of	  
building	   up	   demand	   but	   also	   through	   regulation,	   it	   is	   expected	   that	   niche	  
markets	  will	  emerge	  before	  regulation	  is	  enacted.	  This	  deviation	  is	  a	  reason	  why	  
the	  issue	  did	  not	  move	  beyond	  phase	  4.	  
Another	  more	  substantive	  deviation	  happened	  in	  the	  fifth	  period,	  when	  the	  
issue	  was	   interrupted	  by	  decreasing	  pressure	   from	  public	  opinion	  and	  policy-­‐
makers.	  The	  model	  does	  posit	  declining	  pressure	  and	  attention	  to	  the	  issue	  in	  
phase	  5,	  due	  to	  the	   institutionalization	  of	  the	   issue	  both	  in	  the	  socio-­‐political	  
(institutional)	   and	   in	   the	   economic	   (task)	   environment.	   In	   this	   case,	  
institutionalization	   only	   happened	   in	   the	   socio-­‐political	   environment.	   The	  
decreased	   pressure	   and	   attention	   was	   due	   to	   incumbents	   drawing	   on	  
competing	  (economic)	  issues	  and	  on	  changes	  in	  the	  macro-­‐context	  (rise	  of	  the	  
anti-­‐regulatory	   discourse)	   to	   avoid	   further	   regulatory	   developments	   on	   air	  
pollution.	  I	  shall	  return	  to	  these	  deviations	  to	  nuance	  the	  research	  question.	  	  
• Automobile	   safety	  and	   the	  American	  automobile	   industry	   (case	  study	  2):	  The	  
first	  period	  of	  the	  automobile	  safety	  life-­‐cycle	  was	  about	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  




concerns	   led	   to	   sense-­‐making	   activities	   –	   the	   main	   process	   at	   work	   in	   the	  
period,	  which	  fits	  well	  with	  phase	  1	  –	  and	  led	  to	  an	  early	  issue	  framing	  (based	  
on	   the	   ‘3E’:	   driver	  Education,	   law	   Enforcement,	   and	   road	  Engineering),	  which	  
however	   did	   not	   pose	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   car	   industry.	   The	   key	   processes	   in	   the	  
second	   period	   matched	   well	   with	   pressure	   dynamics	   in	   phase	   2:	   increasing	  
public	   attention	   to	   auto-­‐safety,	   which	   caused	   the	   issue	   to	   spillover	   to	   the	  
political	  arena.	  The	   third	  period,	  however,	   represented	  an	   interruption	  of	   the	  
automobile	  safety	  life-­‐cycle,	  due	  to	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  The	  fourth	  period	  
was	  very	  complex:	  it	  was	  primarily	  about	  framing	  struggles	  (phase	  2),	  as	  a	  new	  
technical	   framing	  emerged;	  but	   it	  also	  contained	  elements	   from	  phase	   1	   (new	  
sense-­‐making	  leading	  to	  emergence	  of	  the	  new	  problem	  definition,	  informed	  by	  
scientific	   research	   on	   crash-­‐engineering	   and	   advocated	   by	   doctors);	   phase	   3	  
(defensive	   hedging	   by	   automakers;	   small	   firms	   deviating	   from	   the	   closed	  
industry-­‐front	   –	   see	  discussion	  of	  next	   answer);	   and	  phase	   4	   (involvement	  of	  
macro-­‐politicians).	  Despite	  this	  complexity	  I	  assess	  the	  period	  as	  akin	  to	  phase	  
2,	  due	  to	  the	  prominence	  of	  the	  framing	  struggle.	  The	  fifth	  period	  showed	  an	  
underlying	   dynamic	   that	   fits	   well	   with	   phase	   3:	   although	   public	   attention	  
initially	  stayed	  at	  moderate	  levels,	  the	  issue	  spilled	  over	  to	  the	  political	  debate	  
(which	   was	   a	   highly	   visible	   framing	   struggle),	   leading	   in	   turn	   to	   a	   surge	   in	  
public	   attention	   by	   the	   mid-­‐1960s.	   The	   design-­‐oriented	   approach	   to	   safety	  
gathered	   pace	   and	   influenced	   policy-­‐makers,	   who	   engaged	   in	   increasingly	  
heated	  debates	  in	  investigative	  hearings,	  until	  a	  strong	  safety	  act	  was	  enacted	  in	  
1966.	   The	   sixth	   period	   presented	   a	   dynamics	   that	   fit	   well	   with	   phase	   4:	   the	  
safety	  issue	  spilled	  over	  to	  the	  task	  environment	  when	  the	  implementation	  of	  
regulations	  and	  safety	  standards	  began;	  but	  spillovers	  to	  consumers	  remained	  
limited,	   and	  public	   attention	   to	   safety	  decreased	   following	   the	   1973	  oil	   shock	  
and	   subsequent	   recession.	   Developments	   in	   the	   seventh	   period	   indicated	   a	  
return	   to	   phase	   3	   of	   the	   DILC-­‐model:	   the	   core	   dynamic	   was	   a	   new	   framing	  
struggle	   in	   the	   political	   arena	   (about	   the	   passive	   restraint	   standard),	   which	  
resulted	  in	  increasing	  public	  attention.	  In	  the	  eight	  period,	  the	  auto-­‐safety	  issue	  
life-­‐cycle	  seemed	  to	  have	  moved	  forward	  again,	  presenting	  new	  dynamics	  that	  
fit	  with	  the	  model’s	  phase	  4:	  regulatory	   ‘frame	  conditions’	  were	  changed	  with	  




became	  part	  of	  consumer	  preferences,	  which	  created	  market	  demand	  for	  safety	  
features.	   In	   the	   final	   (ninth)	   period,	   the	   auto-­‐safety	   issue	   spilled	   over	   to	  
mainstream	   markets,	   with	   demand	   for	   safety	   spreading	   to	   mainstream	  
customers,	  as	  in	  the	  model’s	  phase	  5.	  
So,	   automobile	   safety	   life-­‐cycle	   in	   the	   United	   States	   followed	   a	   more	  
complex	   pathway	   (the	   case	   being	   divided	   into	   nine	   analytical	   periods	   was	  
already	   indicative	   of	   this),	   as	   the	   issue	   did	   not	   always	   progress	   in	   the	   ‘right’	  
direction:	  some	  periods	  represented	  a	  move	  ‘backwards’	  to	  earlier	  phases.	  	  The	  
case	   thus	   did	  not	   follow	   the	   ‘normal’	   sequence	   of	   phases	   –	   the	   nine	   periods	  
(from	   1900	   to	   2000)	   corresponded	   to	   the	   following	   sequence:	  	  
	  1	  –	  2	  –	  interruption	  –	  2	  –	  3	  –	  4	  –	  3	  –	  4	  –	  5	   ,	  which	  suggests	  the	  auto	  safety	  life-­‐
cycle	  was	  interrupted	  (during	  World	  War	  II)	  and	  later	  followed	  a	  cyclical175	  path	  
until	  it	  reached	  phase	  5.	  
So,	  my	   empirical	   investigation	   did	   reveal	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   interrupted	  
pathway,	  and	  the	  cyclical	  pathway,	  confirming	  part	  of	  Bigelow’s	  et	   al.’s	   (1993)	  
typology.	   I	   also	  contributed	   to	  nuance	   their	   list	  of	   factors	   interfering	  with	  an	  
issue	   life-­‐cycle,	   by	   identifying	   (in	   Chapter	   VII)	   dynamic	   processes	   (causal	  
mechanisms)	   that	   cause	   an	   issue	   to	   deviate	   from	   the	   ‘normal’	   DILC-­‐model	  
pathway:	   (1)	   changes	   in	   interpretations	   and	   framing;	   (2)	   changes	   in	   the	  
orientation	  and	  relative	  strength	  of	  issue-­‐proponents	  and	  issue-­‐opponents;	  (3)	  
alignment	  with	   or	   competition	   from	  other	   issues;	   and	   (4)	   changes	   in	  macro-­‐
contexts.	  While	   the	  DILC-­‐model	   accounts	   for	   the	   first	   two	  mechanisms,	   the	  
third	  and	  fourth	  represent	  aspects	  that	  could	  be	  incorporated	  to	  it.	  I	  will	  return	  
to	  this	  point	   in	  the	  discussion	  of	  possible	  nuances	  and	  refinements	   in	  section	  
VIII.3.	  
Despite	   a	   relatively	   good	  match	   between	   periods	   and	   phases,	   there	   were	  
also	   deviations	   (see	   also	   pattern-­‐matching	   analysis	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   case	  
study).	  Certain	   empirical	   periods	  were	   rather	   complex,	   displaying	   conceptual	  
mechanisms	   from	   multiple	   theoretical	   phases.	   Some	   deviations	   due	   to	  
empirical	  complexity	  are	  expected,	  because	  the	  DILC-­‐model,	  based	  on	  which	  I	  
gave	  the	  conceptual	  answer	  above,	  is	  an	  ideal-­‐type	  model,	  and,	  as	  such,	  should	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  As	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  II	  (p.	  36),	  a	  cyclical	  path	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  issue	  cycles	  back	  and	  forth	  
through	  phases	  until	  it	  reaches	  a	  resolution,	  i.e.	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model,	  industry	  regime	  




be	   used	   as	   a	   heuristic	   tool.	   Yet,	   the	   case	   study	   revealed	   four	   important	  
deviations	   that	   warrant	   nuancing	   the	   conceptual	   answer	   and	   refining	   the	  
model:	   (1)	   outside	   professional	   communities	   and	   scientific	   research,	   which	  
developed	  a	  new	  problem-­‐framing	  in	  the	  fourth	  period,	  were	  more	   important	  
than	  social	  movements	  (as	  proposed	  in	  the	  model)	  in	  getting	  car	  design	  on	  the	  
safety	  agenda;	  (2)	  changes	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  auto-­‐safety	  (behavioural	  vs.	  
technological	  framing)	  influenced	  the	  direction	  of	  issue-­‐evolution,	  and	  at	  times	  
–	  most	   notably,	   in	   the	   fourth	   period	   (1946-­‐1955)	   –	   it	  was	   as	   if	   two	   issue	   life-­‐
cycles	   were	   at	   work;	   and	   (3)	   competing	   issues	   (air	   pollution,	   car	   quality	  
concerns,	   scandals	   about	   secret	   recall	   campaigns,	   Japanese	   competition,	   car	  
styling,	   profitability	   problems)	   and	   changing	   macro-­‐contexts	   (Great	  
Depression,	   Second	   World	   War,	   rise	   of	   an	   activist	   culture,	   energy	   crises,	  
economic	   recession,	   demographics,	   health	   and	   safety	   movement,	   micro-­‐
electronics	   revolution)	   positively	   or	   negatively	   influenced	   car	   safety	   life-­‐cycle	  
dynamics.	  	  
• Climate	  change	  and	  the	  American	  automobile	  industry	  (case	  study	  3):	  The	  first	  
period	  of	  this	  case	  displayed	  dynamics	  that	  fit	  well	  with	  DILC’s	  phase	  1:	  sense-­‐
making	   processes	   regarding	   climate	   change;	   and	   environmentalists	   (but	   also	  
scientists)	   engaging	   in	   attention	   advocacy.	   The	   second	   period	   displayed	  
dynamics	   that	   had	   a	   relative	   good	   match	   with	   phase	   2:	   increase	   in	   public	  
attention;	  and	  symbolic	  political	  engagement	  at	  the	  Federal	  and	  global	   levels.	  
In	  the	  third	  period,	  public	  attention	  to	  climate	  change	  further	  increased;	  and	  a	  
market	  niche	  emerged	  for	  alternative-­‐fuel	  vehicles	  (AFV).	  The	  period	  therefore	  
present	  dynamics	   in	   line	  with	  phase	  3.	  The	   fourth	  period	  contained	  elements	  
from	  phase	   4	   –	   increased	   attention,	   new	   regulations,	   and	   growth	  of	   the	  AFV	  
market	  niche	  –	  but	  also	  from	  phase	  3	  –	  regulations,	  while	  enacted,	  where	  not	  
yet	  strong	  enough	  to	  force	  industry	  reorientation,	  and	  while	  the	  market	  niche	  
grew,	   it	  was	  still	   too	  small	   to	   incentivize	   the	   industry	   to	   reorient.	   In	   the	   fifth	  
period,	  this	  pattern	  seemed	  to	  have	  repeated	  itself,	  with	  processes	  pointing	  to	  
contradictory	  directions:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  climate	  change	  was	  addressed	  at	  the	  
macro-­‐political	   level	   (Obama	   administration),	   so	   that	   executive	   activity	   was	  




strong	  enough,	  and	  the	  market	  niche	  remained	  small.	  So,	  the	  fourth	  and	  fifth	  
periods	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  between	  phases	  3	  and	  4.	  
This	  analysis	  reveals	  that	  the	  climate	  change	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  in	  the	  American	  
automobile	   industry	   progressed	   through	   the	   following	   phases	   from	   1979	   to	  
2012:	   1	  –	  2	  –	  3	  –	  3.5	  –	  3.5.	  So	  far,	  this	  life-­‐cycle	  seems	  to	  be	  following	  a	  ‘normal’	  
pathway,	  in	  which	  processes	  have	  progressed	  in	  the	  ‘standard/normal’	  direction	  
(therefore,	   contradicting	   my	   initial	   expectation).	   Yet,	   it	   is	   currently	   stuck	  
between	   phases	   3	   and	   4	   (‘phase	   3.5’),	   due	   to	   absence	   of	   strong	   piece	   of	  
regulation	   and	   consumer	   demand	   that	   could	   make	   the	   industry	   converge	  
towards	  a	  single	  (radical)	  technical	  solution.	  
Some	  periods	   also	   showed	  deviations	   from	   the	   conceptual	   pattern:	   in	   the	  
first	   period,	   there	   were	   two	   deviations,	   as	   (1)	   a	   social	   (environmental)	  
movement	  already	  existed	  and	  (2)	  there	  was	  early	  symbolic	  action,	  influenced	  
by	  climate	  science	  and	  by	  politicians	  (some	  of	  which	  acting	  as	  issue-­‐advocates).	  
In	  the	  second	  period	  there	  were	  two	  other	  deviations:	  (1)	  California	  enacted	  a	  
strong	  piece	  of	   regulation	   (the	   ‘Zero-­‐Emission	  Vehicle	  mandate’)	   that	  created	  
substantive	   pressure	   on	   the	   car	   industry	   (such	   pressure	   is	   expected	   only	   in	  
phase	   4);	   and	   (2)	   symbolic	   political	   engagement	   at	   the	   federal	   level	   soon	  
became	   a	   hot	   political	   debate	   (which	   is	   expected	   in	   phase	   3).	   In	   the	   fourth	  
period,	  political	  pressure	  was	  limited	  and	  the	  market	  niche	  for	  alternative-­‐fuel	  
vehicles	   remained	   small,	   i.e.	   there	   was	   low	   market	   pressure	   (both	   factors	  
contributed	  to	  an	  assessment	  that	  the	  period	  corresponded	  to	  ‘phase	  3.5’).	  And	  
in	  the	  fifth	  period,	  public	  and	  political	  attention	  were	  drawn	  away	  from	  climate	  
change	  due	   to	   the	   financial	   crisis;	   regulation	  was	  not	   strong	   enough	   to	  drive	  
radical	   innovations	   (electric	   cars)	   to	  mass	  markets;	   and	   the	  market	  niche	   for	  
electric-­‐drive	  vehicles	  even	  declined	  (albeit	  it	  grew	  again	  in	  2012).	  
All	   those	   deviations	   seem	   to	   be	   due	   to	   the	   following	   mechanisms:	  	  
(a)	   fluctuating	   levels	  of	  attention	  (which	  was	   influenced	  both	  by	   internal	   life-­‐
cycle	   dynamics,	   e.g.	   denial	   campaigns,	   and	   by	   competing	   issues	   such	   as	   the	  
financial	   crisis);	   (b)	   multi-­‐level	   (international	   and	   in	   California)	   policy	  
developments	   (which	   led	   to	   fluctuations	   in	   the	   relative	   strength	   of	   issue	  
proponents	   and	   opponents);	   and	   (c)	   influences	   from	  wider	   industry	   contexts	  




which	  used	  by	  the	  industry	  to	  resist	  change).	  I	  shall	  return	  to	  these	  deviations	  
and	  mechanisms	  below	  to	  nuance	  the	  first	  answer	  and	  propose	  improvements	  
to	  the	  model.	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  deviations	  from	  the	   ‘normal’	  pathway	  found	  in	  cases	  studies	  2	  and	  3,	  I	  
conclude	   that,	  overall,	   the	  DILC-­‐model	  presents	   internal	   validity	  on	   the	   pressure	  
side,	  because	  (a)	  empirical	  periods	  had	  a	  relatively	  good	  fit	  with	  a	  conceptual	  phase	  
and	   (b)	   most	   deviations	   from	   the	   ‘normal’	   pathway	   could	   be	   explained	   with	  
recourse	  to	  causal	  mechanisms	  posited	  by	  the	  model.	  Because	  the	  three	  cases	  also	  
were	  chosen	   so	   that	   they	  varied	   in	  key	  characteristics	   (‘maximum	  variation’	   case	  
selection	   criterion),	   the	   case	   studies	   also	   demonstrated	   the	   versatility176	  of	   the	  
model.	   I	   believe	   however	   that	   some	   substantive	   deviations,	   together	   with	   some	  
recurrent	  findings,	  warrant	  nuances	  to	  the	  conceptual	  answer	  and	  refinements	  of	  
the	  model	  (see	  section	  VIII.3).	  
VIII.2.2. Research	  question	  B	  
How	  do	  industries	  respond	  to	  changing	  pressures	  around	  societal	  issues,	  in	  terms	  of	  
technological,	  political,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  strategies?	  
In	  the	  DILC-­‐model,	  industry	  response	  strategies	  to	  societal	  problems	  also	  progress	  
through	   phases,	   as	   issue-­‐related	   pressures	   increase.	   Firms-­‐in-­‐industry	   initially	  
downplay	  or	  deny	   the	  problem,	   in	  response	   to	  activist	  pressures	   (phase	   1).	  As	  an	  
issue	   framing	   that	   poses	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   industry	   emerges,	   the	   industry	   deploys	  
collective	   defensive	   strategies	   geared	   towards	   the	   institutional	   environment	  
through	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   closed	   industry-­‐front	   (‘Inter-­‐Organizational	  
Relationship’	   –	   IOR)	   (phase	   2).	   In	   this	  phase,	   escalating	  pressures	   from	  different	  
domains	  tend	  to	  make	  denial	  ineffective,	  so	  that	  individual	  firms	  start	  to	  engage	  in	  
incremental	   (symbolic)	   innovations	   that	   stay	   within	   the	   bounds	   of	   the	   industry	  
regime.	  Collectively,	  and	  as	  pressure	  grows	  substantively	   in	   the	  political	  domain,	  
they	   also	   engage	   in	   collective	   political	   strategies	   to	   contest	   (or	   influence)	   the	  
official	   issue	   framing,	   giving	   rise	   to	   a	   highly	   visible	   framing	   struggle	   (phase	   3).	  
Tensions	  between	  individual	  and	  collective	  strategies	  become	  unsustainable	  when	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176	  Versatility	  means	  “the	  degree	  to	  which	  [a	  conceptual	  model]	  can	  encompass	  a	  broad	  domain	  of	  
developmental	  patterns	  without	  modification	  of	  its	  essential	  character”	  (Poole	  et	  al.,	  2000,	  p.	  43).	  
In	  this	  thesis	  cases,	  the	  versatility	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  means	  it	  was	  able	  to	  ‘encompass	  




the	   issue	   spills	   over	   to	   the	   economic	   environment	   (starting	   in	   phase	   3	   with	  
outsiders	   and	   concerned	   consumers	   exerting	   pressure).	   Competitive	   games	   are	  
played	  out	   between	   individual	   incumbent	   firms	   and	  outsiders,	   due	   to	   a	   growing	  
market	   niche	   or	   due	   to	   the	   implementation	   of	   strict	   regulation	   (phase	   4).	   If	  
spillovers	  to	  the	  task	  environment	  are	  happening	  due	  to	  a	  regulatory	  mandate,	  the	  
industry	   may	   deploy	   confrontational	   strategies:	   play	   strategic	   games	   with	  
regulators	   (to	  make	  the	  regulation	  void)	  or	  challenge	  regulation	   in	  courts.	  Yet,	   if	  
confrontational	   strategies	   fail	   to	   stop	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   progression,	   and,	   thus,	  
regulatory	   and	  market	   pressures	   build	   up,	   individual	   firms	  will	   start	   responding	  
with	  new	  economic	  positioning	  strategies,	  thus	  departing	  from	  the	  closed	  industry-­‐
front,	   which,	   in	   this	   phase	   4,	   will	   crumble.	   The	   ensuing	   innovation	   race,	   when	  
individual	  firms	  (incumbents	  and	  outsiders)	  compete	  in	  terms	  of	  innovations,	  may	  
accelerate	  the	  spillover	  process	  to	  the	  economic	  environment,	  leading	  to	  increased	  
mass	  market	  demand	  for	  new	  technologies	  (phase	  5).	  The	  result	  of	  this	  process	  is	  
the	  reorientation	  of	  the	  industry	  regime.	  
Discussion	  of	  match	  and	  mismatch	  between	  empirical	  cases	  and	  conceptual	  pattern.	  
The	  three	  cases	  also	  presented	  a	  relatively	  good	  fit	  with	  the	  DILC-­‐model’s	  overall	  
logic	   of	   how	   industry	   responses	   to	   societal	   issues	   evolve.	   But	   minor	   and	   major	  
deviations	  were	  also	  found:	  
• Local	  air	  pollution	  and	  the	  American	  automobile	  industry	  (case	  study	  1):	  In	  the	  
first	  period,	  the	  car	  industry	  largely	  ignored	  the	  issue	  or	  denied	  its	  involvement,	  
a	   dynamic	   that	   fits	   the	   conceptual	   phase	   1.	   The	   second	   period	   fit	   well	   with	  
phase	  2:	  the	  industry	  responded	  to	  the	  new	  issue	  framing	  that	  pointed	  to	  cars	  
as	  air	  pollution	  sources	  by	  creating	  collective	  organizations	   (the	  Air	   Pollution	  
Foundation;	   Automobile	   Manufacturers	   Association’s	   Vehicle	   Combustion	  
Products	   Committee)	   to	   investigate	   the	   problem;	   these	   associations	   also	  
represented	  a	   ‘closed	   industry-­‐front’	   to	  defend	  the	   industry	  regime.	  The	  third	  
period	  matched	  well	  with	  phase	   3:	  while	   the	   industry	   still	   resisted	   regulation	  
collectively,	  with	  information,	  lobbying	  and	  other	  framing	  strategies,	  individual	  
automakers	   also	  made	   incremental	   engine	   improvements,	   and	  pursued	   some	  
defensive	   hedging	   towards	   alternative	   solutions	   such	   as	   catalysts.	   The	   fourth	  
period	  was	  of	  regulatory	  implementation	  struggles	  between	  regulators	  and	  the	  




patenting.	   Cracks	   appeared	   in	   the	   industry-­‐front	   as	   General	   Motors	   (GM)	  
became	  a	  product	  champion	  for	  catalysts	  and	  sought	  first-­‐mover	  advantages.	  In	  
this	  period,	  the	  industry’s	  technical	  regime	  changed	  substantially,	  as	  expected	  
in	  phase	  4.	  This	  period	  therefore	  matched	  well	  phase	  4,	  but	   it	  also	  presented	  
deviations	   (see	  below).	  The	   final	   (fifth)	  period	  also	  deviated	   from	  the	  general	  
pattern,	  as	  further	  changes	  to	  the	  industry	  regime	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  changes	  in	  
the	   technical	   element	   –	   I	   thus	   assessed	   that	   the	   air	   pollution	   life-­‐cycle	   only	  
reached	   ‘phase	   4.5’	   in	   the	   period	   under	   consideration.	   This	   analysis	   of	   how	  
industry	  response	  evolved	  in	  the	  air	  pollution	  case	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  
how	  issue-­‐related	  pressure	  evolved,	  confirming	  that	  the	  air	  pollution	  life-­‐cycle	  
followed	  a	  ‘normal’	  sequence	  of	  phases,	  but	  without	  reaching	  phase	  5.	  
While	   incumbent’s	   strategic	   responses	   fitted	   well	   with	   the	   conceptual	  
pattern,	   there	  were	   a	   few	  deviations	   from	   the	   ‘normal’	  DILC	  pathway.	   In	   the	  
second	  period	  (akin	  to	  phase	  2),	  Ford	  departed	  from	  the	  closed	  industry-­‐front	  
by	  carrying	  out	  R&D	  on	  a	  more	  radical	  technical	  solution	  (catalytic	  converters),	  
which	  would	   be	   expected	   in	   phase	   3.	   In	   the	   fourth	   period,	   even	   though	   the	  
industry-­‐front	   was	   then	   opening	   up,	   with	   GM	   becoming	   a	   champion	   of	  
catalytic	   converters,	   the	   industry	   collectively	   counter-­‐mobilized	   against	   air	  
pollution	  regulations	  when	  they	  faced	  financial	  problems	  (in	  the	  late	  1970s).	  As	  
no	  market	  for	  low-­‐emission	  cars	  emerged	  (as	  expected	  in	  a	  ideal	  typical	  phase	  
4),	   competitive	   games	   between	   outsiders	   and	   incumbents	   were	   played	   out	  
during	   the	   fourth	   period	  more	   on	   the	   institutional	   environment	   than	   on	   the	  
market.	   A	   substantive	   deviation	   happened	   in	   the	   fifth	   period:	   while	   the	  
technical	   and	   regulatory	   elements	   of	   the	   regime	   changed,	   there	   was	   no	  
comprehensive	   reorientation	   in	   foundational	   beliefs	   and	   mission.	   These	  
substantive	  deviations	  in	  periods	  4	  and	  5	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  lack	  of	  changes	  in	  
consumer	   preferences	   (there	   was	   no	   effective	   demand	   even	   from	   ‘concerned	  
consumers’).	  
While	  the	  model	  supposes	  two	  routes	  –	  regulatory	  and	  incremental	  building	  
up	   of	   demand	   –	   leading	   to	   spillovers	   to	   mass	   markets,	   it	   seems	   that	   these	  
processes	  are	  both	  necessary	   in	   the	   life-­‐cycle	   process	   for	   a	   full	   industry	   regime	  
reorientation	   to	   happen.	   This	   notion	   seems	   to	   be	   confirmed	   also	   by	   findings	  




early	   research	   on	   catalysts	   and	   GM’s	   becoming	   a	   champion	   of	   catalytic	  
converters)	   in	   fact	   confirmed	  a	  key	  mechanism	   (conceptualized	   in	   the	  DILC-­‐
model)	   driving	   the	   issue	   forward	   or	   impeding	   its	   progress:	   the	   closing-­‐down	  
and	   opening-­‐up	   of	   the	   industry-­‐front.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   Ford’s	   deviation	  
happened	  when	  the	  industry-­‐front	  was	  still	  closed,	  and	  thus	  was	  resisted	  by	  the	  
rest	   of	   the	   industry.	  On	   the	  other,	  GM’s	   initiative	   came	  when	  AMA’s	  Vehicle	  
Combustion	   Products	   Committee	   had	   already	   been	   dissolved,	   and	   amidst	  
mounting	   pressures	   from	   outsiders	   (suppliers	   and	   foreign	   competitors).	   The	  
initiative	  therefore	  was	  not	  only	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  the	  front,	  
but	  in	  fact	  represented	  the	  ‘burial’	  of	  the	  closed	  industry-­‐front.	  Afterwards,	  GM,	  
Ford	   and	   Chrysler	   diverged	   in	   their	   political	   positions	   regarding	   emission	  
standards,	  and	  all	  accelerated	  R&D	  efforts	  (see	  Figure	  V.3.d).	  Even	  though	  the	  
air	  pollution	   life-­‐cycle	  did	  not	  move	   to	  phase	  5,	   the	  dissolution	  of	   the	  closed	  
industry-­‐front	  represented	  an	  important	  development	  that	  enabled	  changes	  in	  
the	  industry	  regime’s	  technical	  element.	  	  
• Automobile	   safety	   and	   the	   American	   automobile	   industry	   (case	   study	   2):	  
Industry	  response	  in	  the	  first	  period,	  when	  the	  automobile	  safety	  emerged	  as	  an	  
issue,	  deviated	  from	  the	  conceptual	  pattern,	  as	  there	  were	  no	  ‘denial’	  strategies	  
(see	   below).	   In	   the	   second	   period,	   the	   industry	   deployed	   some	   incremental	  
innovations,	  and	  formed	  an	  IOR	  (the	  Automobile	  Safety	  Foundation	  –	  ASF)	  that	  
created	   a	   closed	   industry-­‐front	   (which	   endorsed	   the	   3E	   framing).	   The	   period	  
thus	   seemed	   to	  match	   phase	   2.	   In	   the	   third	   period,	   the	   Second	  World	  War	  
interrupted	  the	  automobile	  safety	  life-­‐cycle	  (with	  the	  industry	  contributing	  to	  
the	  war	  effort).	  In	  the	  fourth	  period,	  the	  industry	  engaged	  in	  a	  public	  framing	  
struggle	  (as	  in	  phase	  2):	  through	  the	  ASF,	  it	  contested	  the	  emerging	  technical	  
framing	   (focused	   on	   car	   design)	   by	   defending	   the	   3E	   approach.	   In	   the	   fifth	  
period,	   while	   this	   framing	   struggle	   became	  more	   visible,	   as	   it	   moved	   to	   the	  
political	   domain	   where	   the	   industry	   strongly	   defended	   its	   position	   with	  
collective	  public	  relation	  and	  political	  strategies,	   individual	  automakers	  began	  
to	  hedge	  by	  setting	  up	  safety	  departments	   to	  carry	  out	  R&D.	  These	  processes	  
therefore	  match	  phase	  3.	  The	  industry	  response	  dynamic	  in	  the	  sixth	  period	  fit	  
well	   with	   phase	   4:	   while	   individual	   automakers	   speeded	   up	   R&D	   and	  




(ABS),	  airbags)	  and	  deployed	  innovations	  in	  response	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  
the	   1966	   safety	   act,	   it	   collectively	   resisted	   further	   tightening	  up	  of	   regulation	  
with	   confrontational	   strategies.	   Yet,	   GM’s	   initial	   support	   to	   airbags	   caused	   a	  
crack	  in	  the	  industry-­‐front	  (as	  in	  phase	  4).	  But	  industry	  response	  in	  the	  seventh	  
period	   indicated	   the	   issue	   moved	   backwards	   to	   phase	   3:	   there	   was	   a	   highly	  
visible	  political	  framing	  struggle	  (about	  the	  proper	   ‘passive	  safety’	  technology,	  
and	   whether	   regulations	   were	   cost-­‐effective),	   with	   incumbents	   forming	   an	  
informal	  ‘closed	  industry-­‐front’.	  In	  the	  next	  period,	  industry	  strategies	  pointed	  
to	  a	  move	  forwards	  to	  phase	  4:	  with	  pressures	  coming	  from	  outsiders	  (namely,	  
Mercedes,	   which	   was	   successfully	   selling	   safety)	   and	   with	   safety	   concerns	  
becoming	   part	   of	   consumer	   preferences,	   significant	   cracks	   appeared	   in	   the	  
industry-­‐front,	  and	  individual	  firms	  began	  to	  jockey	  for	  position	  in	  the	  market	  
that	   now	   demanded	   safety	   features.	   The	   final	   (ninth)	   period	   is	   close	   to	   the	  
conceptual	  phase	  5:	  as	  auto-­‐safety	  issue	  spilled	  over	  to	  mainstream	  markets,	  the	  
American	   automobile	   industry	   regime	   fully	   reoriented,	   with	   the	   inclusion	   of	  
safety	  in	  core	  beliefs	  and	  missions.	  	  
This	  account	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  how	  car	  safety-­‐related	  pressures	  
evolve	  and	  confirms	  the	  interrupted	  cyclical	  pattern.	  It	  shows	  that	  incumbent’s	  
strategic	  responses	  deviated	  from	  the	  conceptual	  pattern	  in	  early	  periods;	  when	  
the	  issue	  was	  interrupted;	  and	  when	  it	  cycled	  back	  to	  an	  earlier	  phase.	  But	  in	  
the	  final	  three	  periods,	  the	  response	  pattern	  adhered	  to	  the	  conceptual	  logic.	  In	  
the	   first	   period,	   deviations	   were	   due	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   denial	   campaigns,	  
because	  the	  industry	  accepted	  the	  3E-­‐framing,	  which	  posed	  no	  threat	  to	  it.	  The	  
complex	   fourth	  period	   (after	   the	   interruption	  by	  WWII),	  which	   I	   analysed	  as	  
more	   akin	   to	   phase	   2,	   contained	   two	   elements	   from	   phase	   3:	   new	   entrants	  
exerting	  pressure	  on	  the	  regime	  by	  developing	  safety	  innovations	  and	  defensive	  
hedging	  by	  incumbents	  (which	  established	  safety	  research	  departments).	  In	  the	  
fifth	  period,	  which	  had	  mostly	  phase	   3	   elements,	   Ford	   responded	  with	   safety	  
innovations	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  gain	  a	  competitive	  edge	  –	  this	  was	  not	  a	  response	  
to	   the	   safety	   issue	   as	  much	   as	   it	  was	   a	   response	   to	  market	   competition	  with	  
Chevrolet	   (GM).	   Yet	   again,	   the	   remainder	   incumbent	   industry,	   and	   GM,	   in	  
particular,	  resisted	  Ford’s	  initiative	  and	  apprehended	  it,	  re-­‐closing	  the	  front	  in	  




akin	  to	  phase	  4),	  but	  still	  there	  was	  no	  visible	  demand	  for	  safer	  cars.	  Only	  in	  the	  
subsequent	   period,	   when	   the	   life-­‐cycle	   moved	   back	   to	   phase	   3,	   demand	   for	  
safety	   features	   emerged,	   initially	   in	   luxury	   markets.	   Thereafter	   industry	  
responses	   followed	   the	  conceptual	  pattern:	  breaking	  up	  of	   industry-­‐front	  and	  
competition	   in	   markets	   (eight	   period/phase	   4)	   and	   full	   reorientation	   of	   the	  
regime	  (ninth	  period/phase	  5).	  
My	   analysis	   in	   Chapter	   VI	   identified	   four	   mechanisms	   leading	   to	   an	  
interrupted	  and	  cyclical	  path	  (see	  discussion	  of	  previous	  answer,	  case	  2);	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  deviations	   in	   the	   response	   side,	   they	  may	  be	  explained	  by	   changes	   in	  
interpretations	   and	   framings,	   and	   by	   changes	   in	   the	   orientation	   and	   relative	  
strength	   of	   issue-­‐proponents	   and	   issue-­‐opponents.	   For	   example,	   pressure	   by	  
new	  entrants,	  hedging	  by	  incumbents,	  and	  Ford’s	  departure	  from	  the	  industry-­‐
front	   were	   mainly	   caused	   by	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	   framing	   (and	   Ford’s	  
initiative,	  by	  an	  interpretation	  that	  it	  could	  gain	  market	  share	  from	  advertising	  
safety).	  Moreover,	  the	  emergence	  of	  consumer	  demand	  seems	  a	  key	  mechanism	  
behind	  changes	  in	  the	  strategic	  orientation	  of	  the	  industry	  regime,	  as	  until	  the	  
1980s,	   regulation	   alone	   was	   not	   sufficient	   to	   cause	   this	   reorientation,	  
confirming	  the	  notion	  that	  I	  raised	  in	  the	  previous	  discussion	  of	  case	  study	  1.	  	  
• Climate	   change	  and	   the	  American	  automobile	   industry	   (case	   study	   3):	   In	   the	  
first	  period,	   the	  car	   industry	   remained	   indifferent	   to	  climate	  change,	  as	   there	  
was	  no	  visible	  pressure	  on	  it	  (this	  period	  is	  thus	  akin	  to	  phase	  1	  mainly	  due	  to	  
dynamics	   on	   the	   pressure	   side).	   A	   key	   development	   of	   the	   second	   period	  
matched	   phase	   2:	   the	   industry	   joined	   the	   Global	   Climate	   Coalition	   (GCC),	  
which	  represented	  a	  closed	  industry-­‐front	  that	  deployed	  defensive	  strategies	  in	  
response	  to	  climate	  change-­‐related	  pressures.	  In	  the	  third	  period,	  automakers	  
acknowledged	  the	  problem	  (abandoning	  the	  GCC),	  but	  continued	  to	  politically	  
oppose	   regulations,	   and	   set	   up	   a	   new	   IOR	   in	   the	   task	   environment,	   the	  
Partnership	  for	  a	  New	  Generation	  of	  Vehicles	  (PNGV).	  Yet,	  they	  moved	  towards	  
technology	   hedging	   strategies,	   while	   still	   maintaining	   their	   overall	  
commitment	  to	  the	  internal	  combustion	  engine	  (ICE).	  So,	  the	  response	  pattern	  
in	   the	   third	   period	   seems	   to	   fit	   well	   with	   phase	   3.	   In	   the	   fourth	   period,	  
spillovers	  to	  the	  economic	  task	  environment	  through	  the	  emergence	  of	  market	  




front	   in	   the	   task	   environment	   and	   innovation	   races	   in	   fuel	   cell,	   hybrid	   and	  
biofuel	   technologies.	   Yet,	   the	   American	   automobile	   industry’s	   innovation	  
strategy	  continued	   to	  be	  centred	  on	   the	   incremental	  development	  of	   the	   ICE	  
(with	   advanced	   technologies	   (aICE)	   and	   biofuel/flex-­‐fuel	   vehicles	   (FFV)).	  
Individual	  American	  automakers	  invested	  in	  more	  radical	  alternatives,	  but	  did	  
not	   fully	   commit	   to	  any	  option	   for	   fear	  of	  making	   the	  wrong	  bet	   (which	  was	  
reinforced	   by	   the	   experience	   of	   hype-­‐cycles).	   Therefore,	   while	   automakers	  
developed	   new	   competences	   and	   acquired	   new	   capabilities,	   at	   the	   industry	  
level,	  these	  changes	  did	  not	  amount	  to	  a	  reorientation	  of	  the	  industry	  regime.	  
The	  response	  pattern	  in	  this	  period	  therefore	  is	  in-­‐between	  phases	  3	  and	  4.	  In	  
the	   fifth	   period,	   the	   political	   position	   of	   American	   automakers	   weakened	  
(because	  of	  bankruptcy	  and	  bailout),	  which	  made	  them	  more	  receptive	  to	  social	  
and	  political	  expectations	  about	  fuel	  efficiency	  and	  climate	  change.	  Individual	  
automakers	   jockeyed	   for	   position	   with	   various	   low-­‐carbon	   technologies,	  
leading	  to	  high	  patenting	  activity	  across	  multiple	  categories.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  
industry	   remained	   committed	   to	   an	   innovation	   strategy	   centred	   on	   aICE	  
technologies	  and	  biofuels/FFV.	  So,	   the	   industry	   response	  strategy	   in	   this	   fifth	  
period	   was	   still	   between	   phase	   3	   and	   4:	   although	   American	   car	   companies	  
continued	   to	   invest	   in	   radical	   green	   options	   (e.g.	   fuel	   cell	   or	   battery-­‐electric	  
vehicles),	   they	  did	  not	   fully	   commit	   to	   any	  of	   them.	  As	   in	   the	  historical	   case	  
studies,	   the	  pattern	  of	   industry	  response	   in	  the	  climate	  change	   life-­‐cycle	   is	   in	  
line	   with	   the	   analysis	   of	   how	   climate	   change-­‐related	   pressures	   evolved:	   it	  
followed	  a	  ‘normal’	  sequence	  of	  phases,	  but	  is	  stuck	  between	  phases	  3	  and	  4,	  i.e.	  
in	  ‘phase	  3.5’.	  
Industry	  response	  during	  empirical	  periods	  deviated	   in	  some	  aspects	   from	  
the	   conceptual	   phases.	   A	   first	   deviation	   appeared	   in	   the	   second	   period	  
(identified	  as	  phase	  2),	  which	  contained	  elements	  of	  phase	  4:	  GM	  developed	  a	  
radical	   innovation	   (the	   Impact	   electric	   vehicle)	   and	   triggered	   an	   early	   race	  
around	  the	  technology.	  This	  development	  was	  not	  so	  much	  a	  response	  to	  issue-­‐
related	  pressures	   as	   it	  was	   an	   attempt	  by	  GM	   to	   show	   technological	   prowess	  
(symbolic	   strategy).	   Indeed,	   subsequently,	   the	   incumbent	   industry	   formed	  




Partnership	  for	  a	  New	  Generation	  of	  Vehicles	  (PNGV)	  –	  that	  closed	  the	  industry-­‐
front	  in	  the	  technology	  domain	  (task	  environment).	  
In	  the	  third	  period	  (which	  I	  analysed	  as	  akin	  to	  phase	  3),	  the	  emergence	  of	  
the	   ‘win-­‐win’	   discourse	   and	   increasing	   public	   concern	   with	   the	   issue	   led	  
incumbent	  automakers	  to	  abandon	  the	  Global	  Climate	  Coalition	  (GCC)	  –	  while	  
this	   seemed	   to	   represent	   an	   early	   opening	   up	   of	   the	   industry-­‐front	   in	   the	  
institutional	   environment,	   in	   practice	   incumbents	   continued	   with	   defensive	  
political	  and	  technological	  strategies.	  But	  as	  outsiders	  (Japanese	  manufacturers)	  
secured	   a	   first-­‐mover	   advantage	   in	   the	   hybrid-­‐electric	   vehicle	   (HEV)	  market	  
niche,	  later	  in	  this	  third	  period	  incumbents	  departed	  from	  the	  industry-­‐front	  in	  
the	   task	   environment	   (also	   earlier	   than	   expected),	   each	   adopting	   a	   different	  
technology	  hedging	  strategy.	   	  So,	   the	  period	  also	  contained	  phase	  4	  elements	  
and	  processes.	  
In	   the	   subsequent	   period,	   incumbent	   American	   automakers	   did	   innovate	  
with	  HEV	  models,	  but	  their	  technology	  strategy	  was	  still	   firmly	  committed	  to	  
the	   incremental	   development	   of	   the	   internal	   combustion	   engine	   (ICE).	  
Moreover,	   the	   co-­‐existence	   of	  multiple	   technologies	   competing	   for	   attention	  
from	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  consumers	  meant	  that	  the	  industry	  regime	  (technical	  
element)	   did	   not	   reorient	   towards	   a	   dominant	   technical	   solution,	   because	  
individual	   automakers	   were	   reluctant	   to	   fully	   commit	   to	   any	   option,	   still	  
fearing	  commitment	  to	  the	  ‘wrong’	  technology.	  In	  the	  fifth	  period,	  the	  industry	  
faced	   severe	   financial	   problems,	   so	   that,	   initially,	   American	   automakers	  
(namely,	  GM	   and	  Chrysler)	  manifested	   intention	   to	   develop	   ‘green	   cars’	   as	   a	  
way	   to	   secure	  political	  will.	  Yet,	   this	   strategy	  was	   rejected	  by	   the	  Presidential	  
Task	  Force	  on	  the	  Auto	  Industry	  (ATF),	  because	  of	  limited	  prospects	  for	  radical	  
alternative-­‐fuel	   vehicles	   in	   prevailing	   market	   conditions.	   Thus,	   the	   period	  
repeated	  the	  pattern	  from	  the	  previous	  one,	  with	  the	  industry	  still	  preferring	  to	  
follow	  a	  strategy	  of	  incremental	  innovation,	  and	  not	  committing	  to	  any	  single	  
radical	  option.	  These	  findings	  emphasize	  that	  the	  crucial	  ‘turning	  point’	  in	  the	  
American	   automobile	   industry	   climate	   change	   life-­‐cycle	   did	   not	   happen	   yet.	  
This	   is	   a	   crucial	   finding	   (conclusion),	   which	   should	   be	   further	   explored	   in	  
future	   research	   (see	   section	   VIII.6).	   It	   brings	   about	   key	   policy	   implications,	  




industry	   actors	   (and	   other	   stakeholders)	   towards	   a	  dominant	   solution,	  which	  
has	  not	  yet	  happened.	  Public	  policy	  should	  aim	  at	  promoting	  this	  convergence,	  
for	  instance.	  
Based	  on	  this	  discussion,	  I	  conclude	  that	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  exhibits	  internal	  validity	  
also	   on	   the	   response	   side,	   because	   empirical	   periods	   could	   be	   identified	   with	  
conceptual	   phases	   and	  most	   deviations	   could	   be	   explained	  with	   recourse	   to	   the	  
models	  mechanisms.	  However,	  nuances	  and	  refinements	  are	  also	  warranted	  based	  
on	  findings	  about	  how	  the	  industry	  responds	  to	  societal	  issues	  (see	  next	  section).	  	  
Because	  in	  the	  three	  case	  studies,	  both	  pressures	  and	  responses	  appeared	  to	  
match	   the	   same	   conceptual	   stage,	   a	   key	   conclusion	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   that	   issue-­‐
related	  pressures	  on	  industries	  and	  industry	  responses	  to	  these	  pressures	  do	  indeed	  
co-­‐evolve	  in	  stages,	  as	  proposed	  in	  the	  DILC-­‐model.	  	  	  
Another	  general	  conclusion	  based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  is	  that	  
the	  closing-­‐down	  and	  opening-­‐up	  of	  an	  ‘industry	  front’	  is	  a	  key	  process	  leading	  to	  
delays	   and	   accelerations	   in	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   Industry	   reorientation	   towards	  
substantive	   technological	   strategies	   that	  help	  address	  societal	  challenges	  seem	  to	  
only	   take	   place	   if	   there	   is	   no	   closed	   industry-­‐front.	   This	   is	   a	   finding	  with	   policy	  
implications	  that	  should	  be	  explored	  in	  further	  research	  (see	  section	  VIII.6).	  
VIII.2.3. Research	  question	  C	  
In	  particular,	  when	  and	  why	  do	  industry	  actors	  decide	  to	  develop	  substantive	  
technological	  responses?	  
In	  phase	  1,	  industry	  actors	  do	  not	  develop	  technologies	  in	  response	  to	  the	  issue;	  in	  
phase	  2,	  they	  only	  develop	  incremental	  innovations,	  which	  are	  a	  symbolic	  response	  
to	   institutional	  pressures,	   in	   line	  with	   the	   creation	  of	   a	  defensive	   IOR	   (industry-­‐
front)	  against	  the	  issue.	  The	  development	  of	  substantive	  technological	  response	  to	  
an	  issue	  begins	  with	  hedging	  strategies	  (exploring	  new	  domains	  and	  technological	  
solutions)	  in	  phase	  3	  of	  the	  Dialectic	  Issue	  Life-­‐Cycle’s	   ‘normal’	  pathway:	  firms	  in	  
the	   industry	   begin	   to	   explore	   new	   fields	   to	   gain	   the	   knowledge	   about	   how	   to	  
develop	  radical	  technologies,	  in	  case	  it	  becomes	  necessary	  to	  market	  these,	  due	  to	  a	  
possible	   regulatory	   mandate	   and	   to	   prospective	   changes	   in	   mass	   consumer	  
preferences.	   But	   the	   shift	   towards	   substantive	   technological	   responses	   (radical	  




industry-­‐front,	  and	  phase	  5,	  due	  to	  both	  regulatory	  pressures	  and	  market	  pressures	  
(from	  outside	   competitors	   and	   consumers).	   Therefore,	   the	   reasons	  why	   industry	  
actors	   initially	   decide	   to	   develop	   radical	   technologies	   are	   two-­‐fold:	   (1)	   the	   first	  
cause	  is	  that	  the	  issue	  begins	  to	  affect	  their	  secondary	  involvement	  arena,	  posing	  
an	  indirect	  threat	  to	  their	  shared	  identity:	  the	  industry	  begins	  its	  learning	  process	  
to	  develop	  these	  technologies	  before	  they	  become	  mandated/demanded	  –	  although	  
this	   institutional	  pressure	  represents	  a	  so-­‐called	   ‘distal	  cause’,	   it	   is	  nevertheless	  a	  
‘necessary’	  one	  (Van	  de	  Ven	  and	  Poole,	  2005);	  (2)	  the	  second	  cause	  is	  actually	  what	  
leads	   to	   the	   radical	   innovation177:	   the	   industry	   deploys	   a	   radical	   innovation	   in	  
response	  to	  a	  societal	   issue	  because	  (and	  only	  when)	  the	  issue	  affects	   its	  primary	  
involvement	  arena;	  in	  other	  words,	  because/when	  the	  issue	  spills	  over	  to	  the	  task	  
(economic)	   environment	   (either	   due	   to	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   strong	   piece	   of	  
regulation	   or	   to	   the	   existence	   of	   significant	   demand).	   This	   spillover	   to	   the	   task	  
environment	  is	  an	  ‘immediate’	  and	  ‘necessary’	  cause	  (idem).	  	  
Discussion	  of	  match	  and	  mismatch	  between	  empirical	  cases	  and	  conceptual	  pattern.	  
All	   three	   cases	   fit	   relatively	   well	   with	   this	   conceptual	   pattern,	   but	   they	   also	  
presented	  important	  deviations:	  
• Local	  air	  pollution	  and	   the	  American	  automobile	   industry	   (case	   study	   1):	  The	  
industry	  started	  to	  develop	  more	  radical	  technologies	  in	  the	  third	  period/phase	  
3;	   the	   oxidation	   catalyst	   innovation	   only	   came	   to	   market	   during	   the	  
implementation	  process	  (phase	  4)	  of	  the	  1970	  CAA;	  and	  the	  three-­‐way	  catalytic	  
converter	  (an	  architectural	  innovation	  that	  contained	  radical	  innovations	  such	  
as	  an	  electronic	  sensor)	  was	  only	  deployed	  in	  the	  fifth	  period,	  when	  the	  closed	  
industry-­‐front	   crumbled.	   One	   important	   deviation	   was	   that	   Ford	   began	  
research	   on	   catalysts	   already	   in	   the	   second	   period	   (phase	   2),	   i.e.	   it	   began	  
investigation	  of	  more	  radical	  technical	  solutions	  earlier	  than	  expected.	  
• Automobile	   safety	   and	   the	   American	   automobile	   industry	   (case	   study	   2):	  
Chrysler	   (second	   period/phase	   2)	   and	   Ford	   (fourth	   period/phase	   2)	   both	  
innovated	   with	   safety	   features,	   departing	   from	   the	   industry-­‐front,	   but	   these	  
were	  still	   incremental	   innovations.	   In	   fact,	  Chrysler’s	   response	  was	  connected	  
to	   lobbying	   by	   Dr.	   Claire	   Straith,	   i.e.	   a	   response	   to	   pressures	   from	   the	  
institutional	  environment.	  And	  Ford’s	  strategy	  was	  a	  response	  not	  to	  the	  safety	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




issue	  itself	  but	  to	  market	  (competition)	  issues.	  More	  substantive	  technological	  
innovations	   were	   only	   brought	   to	   market	   during	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	  
1966	  car	  safety	  act,	  with	  Chrysler	  innovating	  with	  an	  early	  version	  of	  anti-­‐lock	  
braking	  system	  (ABS)	  and	  GM,	  with	  airbags.	  However,	  the	  industry,	  as	  a	  whole,	  
only	   used	   substantive	   (innovation)	   strategies	   in	   the	   late	   1980s,	  when	  marked	  
demand	  for	  safety	  was	  significant.	  
This	   case	   actually	   revealed	   that	   the	   causality	   –	   as	   implied	   in	   my	  
conceptual	   answer	   –	   indeed	   seems	   to	   be	   from	   ‘industry	   front	   opening	   up’	   to	  
‘substantive	   response	   by	   incumbents’,	   because	   in	   two	   episodes,	   when	   the	  
industry-­‐front	   was	   still	   closed,	   the	   industry	   as	   a	   whole	   did	   not	   engage	   in	  
substantive	   response:	   in	   the	   1930s,	   Chrysler	   innovated	   with	   passenger	  
protection	  features,	  but	  it	  remained	  committed	  to	  the	  regime,	  not	  referring	  to	  
safety	   in	   advertisements	   –	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   industry	   did	   not	   follow	   the	  
initiative;	   in	   the	   1950s,	  when	  Ford	  attempted	  to	  gain	  a	  competitive	  edge	  with	  
safety	   features,	   it	  was	   constrained	   by	  GM,	  which	  managed	   to	   keep	   the	   front	  
closed.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  the	  1980s,	  with	  pressure	  coming	  from	  an	  outsider	  
(Mercedes-­‐Benz)	  and	  with	  new	  consumer	  demand	  for	  safety,	  the	  industry-­‐front	  
crumbled	   and	   all	   industry	   actors	   engaged	   in	   substantive	   responses.	   By	   the	  
1990s,	  all	  elements	  of	  the	  industry	  regime	  had	  been	  reoriented	  around	  safety.	  
• Climate	  change	  and	  the	  American	  automobile	  industry	  (case	  study	  3):	  This	  case	  
presented	  a	  significant	  deviation	  from	  the	  conceptual	  pattern,	  as	  in	  the	  second	  
period	  GM	  deployed	  a	  substantive	  technological	  strategy	  (a	  radical	  innovation,	  
an	   electric	   vehicle),	   which	  was	   followed	   by	   electric	   vehicle	   technology	   being	  
developed	   by	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   industry	   (a	   first	   technology	   hype-­‐cycle	   around	  
battery	   electric	   vehicles).	   From	   then	   on,	   the	   industry	   developed	   both	  
incremental	  and	  radical	   innovations	  (e.g.	  advanced	  ICE	  technologies,	   flex-­‐fuel	  
vehicles,	   HEVs,	   BEVs,	   fuel-­‐cell	   prototypes).	   The	   development	   of	   both	  
incremental	   and	   radical	   innovation	   by	   incumbent	   industry	   actors	   therefore	  
began	  in	  the	  second	  periods	  and	  continued	  throughout	  the	  life	  cycle.	  
While	   the	   cases	   matched	   fairly	   well	   the	   conceptual	   answer,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
proposed	   causal	  mechanisms,	   the	   deviations	   in	   the	   third	   case	   seems	   to	  make	   a	  
refinement	   to	   the	   DILC-­‐model	   warranted,	   because	   it	   puts	   into	   question	   its	  




VIII.3. NUANCES	  AND	  REFINEMENTS	  
VIII.3.1. Nuances	  and	  refinements	  based	  on	  discussion	  of	  research	  question	  A	  	  
Three	   refinements/nuances	   need	   to	   be	   made	   regarding	   the	   answer	   to	   the	   first	  
research	   question.	   The	   first	   refinement	   regards	   issue	   framing,	   different	   actors’	  
interpretations,	  and	  meanings	  attached	  to	  the	  societal	  issue	  (processes	  and	  aspects	  
that	  came	  out	  more	  strongly	  in	  case	  study	  2).	  While	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  incorporates	  
the	  process	  of	  ‘construction’	  of	  a	  societal	  issue	  as	  such,	  and	  posits178	  this	  process	  in	  
phase	   1,	   the	   case	   studies	   showed	   that	   framing	   and	   reframing	   of	   an	   issue	   is	   a	  
continuous	  process	  present	  in	  all	  phases	  of	  the	  life-­‐cycle.	  
For	   instance,	   the	   issue	   of	   air	   pollution,	   initially	   viewed	   as	   an	   acceptable	  
nuisance	   from	   economic	   progress,	  was,	   in	   the	   first	   period,	   framed	   by	   the	  media	  
and	   others	   as	   a	   problematic	   condition;	   in	   the	   second	   period,	   new	   scientific	  
understandings	   showed	   that	   the	   issue	   was	   caused	   mainly	   by	   cars	   (and	   not	  
stationary	  sources);	  in	  the	  third	  period	  it	  received	  a	  stronger	  ‘health-­‐threat’	  framing	  
(influenced	  by	  science	  and	  voiced	  by	  social	  movement	  organizations);	  in	  the	  fourth	  
and	   fifth	   periods,	   when	   new	   regulation	   (the	   1970	   Clean	   Air	   Act)	   was	   being	  
implemented	  to	  bring	  emission-­‐control	  technologies	  to	  markets,	  the	  industry	  tried	  
to	  attach	  an	  economic	  framing	  to	  the	  problem	  (calling	  for	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  that	  
included	  non-­‐pecuniary	  costs	  such	  as	  fuel	  economy	  penalties).	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   car	   safety,	   the	   initial	   framing	   was	   that	   the	   problem	  was	   a	  
matter	  of	  driver’s	  education,	  road	  engineering,	  and	  law	  enforcement	  –	  the	  ‘triple	  E’	  
framing,	   supported	   by	   industry	   and	   safety	   organizations,	   which	   dominated	   the	  
discourse	  until	   the	   1950s.	  After	   the	   second	  World	  War,	   a	   new	   technical	   framing	  
emerged,	   influenced	   by	   research	   on	   crash-­‐protection	   and	   crash-­‐worthiness	  
engineering,	   which	   was	   promoted	   by	   professional	   communities	   (engineers	   and	  
medical	  doctors)	   and	  advocated	  by	   activists	   such	  as	  Ralph	  Nader.	  This	   technical	  
framing	  was	  then	  adopted	  by	  the	  1966	  safety	  act,	  during	  whose	  implementation	  the	  
industry	  again	  tried	  to	  attach	  an	  economic	  framing	  to	  it.	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  See	  specification	  of	  phase	  1	  (Chapter	  III):	  “Affected	  groups,	  individual	  citizens,	  and	  other	  
activists	  […],	  feeling	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency,	  first	  articulate	  concerns	  about	  a	  critical	  situation	  and	  
frame	  it	  as	  a	  problematic	  condition.	  Issues	  are	  initially	  ill-­‐defined	  and	  fuzzy;	  concerned	  activists	  
do	  not	  fully	  grasp	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  facts	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  issue:	  there	  is	  much	  




And	  in	  the	  climate	  change	  case,	   in	  the	   first	  period	  there	  was	  an	  emerging	  
scientific	  framing	  influencing	  the	  discourse	  of	  social	  movement	  organizations	  and	  
politicians,	   against	   which	   in	   the	   second	   period	   the	   industry	   deployed	   denial	  
strategies	   that	   played	   on	   scientific	   uncertainties	   	   (‘there’s	   no	   scientific	   proof	   of	  
climate	   change’).	   It	   later	   abandoned	   the	   denial	   stance	   in	   favour	   of	   an	   economic	  
framing,	   calling	   for	   market-­‐based	   mechanisms	   to	   address	   climate	   change	   and	  
contesting	  the	  economic	  efficiency	  of	  addressing	  it	  through	  innovation	  for	  lack	  of	  
demand	  (i.e.	   it	  was	  not	  cost	  effective	  in	  prevailing	  markets	  to	  sell	  alternative-­‐fuel	  
vehicles).	  
So,	  the	  first	  nuancing	  to	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  and	  first	  conceptual	  answer	  is	  that	  
framing	  begins	   in	  phase	   1,	   but	   it	   is	   an	   important	  continuous	   process	   that	   causes	  
changes	  in	  direction,	  accelerations	  and	  delays	  in	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  
	   The	  second	  refinement,	  connected	  to	  the	  first	  one,	  is	  that	  scientific	  research	  
plays	  an	  important	  role	  both	  in	  early	  sense-­‐making	  efforts	  and	  in	  this	  continuous	  
framing	   process.	   In	   the	   three	   cases,	   scientific	   research	   and	   new	   theories	   have	  
resulted	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   ‘technical	   framing’,	   i.e.,	   one	   that	   calls	   for	  
technological	  solutions	  –	  such	  as	  catalytic	  converters	  and	  safety	  features	  –	  and/or	  
contests	   the	  use	  of	   certain	   technologies,	   such	  as	   the	   internal	   combustion	  engine	  
(and	   thus	   advocates	   the	   use	   of	   alternative	   technologies	   such	   as	   electric-­‐drive	  
vehicles).	  This	  is	  key	  in	  moving	  the	  industry	  out	  of	  their	  zone	  of	  indifference	  and	  
triggering	  an	  open	  ‘dialectical	  processes’	  (struggles	  between	  issue-­‐proponents	  and	  
issue-­‐opponents).	  
Moreover,	   in	   the	   three	   cases	   scientists	   played	   an	   active	   role:	   in	   the	   air	  
pollution	   case,	   Prof.	   Haagen-­‐Smit’s	   (who	   also	   served	   as	   a	   public	   official	   in	   Los	  
Angeles)	   research	   was	   key	   in	   associating	   smog	   to	   cars,	   and	   later,	   science	   also	  
played	  a	  role	  in	  portraying	  air	  pollution	  as	  a	  health	  hazard;	  in	  the	  car	  safety	  case,	  
the	  active	  role	  was	  played	  by	  individual	  researchers/scientists	  (Hugh	  De	  Haven;	  Dr.	  
Claire	  Straith),	  and	  two	  community	  of	  professionals	  (crash	  engineers	  and	  medical	  
doctors);	   and	   in	   the	   climate	   change	   case,	   the	   role	   is	   being	   played	   by	   the	  
international	  community	  of	  climate	  scientists	  	  
So,	   the	   second	   nuancing	   to	   the	   first	   research	   answer	   is	   that	   science	   also	  
plays	  a	  continuous	  role	  in	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  process.	  I	  also	  propose	  a	  refinement	  to	  




individual	  citizens,	  scientists,	  and	  other	  types	  of	  activists,	  feeling	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency,	  
first	   articulate	   concerns	   about	   a	   critical	   situation	   and	   frame	   it	   as	   a	   problematic	  
condition.	  Issues	  are	  initially	   ill-­‐defined	  and	  fuzzy;	  concerned	  activists	  do	  not	  fully	  
grasp	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   facts	   that	   gave	   rise	   to	   the	   issue:	   there	   is	   much	  
uncertainty	  about	  causes	  and	  consequences,	  so	  that	  these	  groups	  engage	  in	  sense-­‐
making	  which	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  scientific	  research”.	  
	   The	   third	   nuancing	   regards	   the	   role	   of	   (a)	   competing	   issues,	   i.e.	   factors	  
external	   to	  the	  dynamics	  of	   the	   focal	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	  yet	  strategic	   to	  regime	  actors	  
and	   thus	   affecting	   and	  affected	  by	   industry	   regime	  developments;	   and	   (b)	  macro-­‐
contextual	  developments,	   i.e.	   external	   to	   the	  core	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  dynamics	  and	   to	  
the	  industry	  regime.	  My	  case	  studies	  were	  indeed	  structured	  so	  as	  to	  account	  for	  the	  
influence	  of	  such	  factors,	  and	  their	  importance	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  the	  role	  played	  
by	  economic	  issues	  at	  the	  regime	  level	  (auto	  industry	  financial	  problems	  in	  the	  late	  
1970s,	  early	  1990s	  and	  late	  2000s)	  or	  cultural	  developments	  at	  the	  macro	  level	  (new	  
environmentalist	  discourse	   in	   the	   1960s/70s,	  broader	  health	  and	  safety	  movement,	  
rise	   of	   women	   as	   chief	   household	   decision-­‐maker	   in	   the	   1980s).	   The	   model	   and	  
conceptual	  answer	  employed	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘spillover’	  as	  a	  core	  mechanism	  through	  
which	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   progresses:	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  moves	   forward	  when	   the	  
issue,	   initially	   confined	   to	   debates	   in	   one	   arena	   (e.g.	   civil	   society),	   begins	   to	   be	  
discussed	  in	  another	  arena	  (e.g.	  policy	  domain).	  This	  core	  mechanism	  cannot	  fully	  
account	  for	  the	  influence	  of	  competing	  issues	  and	  macro-­‐contexts	  on	  the	  issue	  life-­‐
cycle.	   Instead,	   a	   possible	   explanans	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	   refine	   the	  model	   is	   the	  
concept	  of	  ‘alignment’	  between	  internal	  (life-­‐cycle)	  and	  external.	  The	  incorporation	  
of	  this	  ‘mechanism’	  into	  the	  model	  could	  be	  the	  goal	  of	  future	  research.	  
VIII.3.2. Nuances	  and	  refinements	  based	  on	  discussion	  of	  research	  question	  B	  	  
Regarding	  the	  answer	  to	  research	  question	  B,	  the	  first	  nuancing	  that	  I	  propose	  is	  in	  
line	  with	  the	  first	  one	  outlined	  above:	  the	  fact	  that	  framing	  is	  a	  continuous	  process	  
in	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle.	  Thus,	  framing	  struggles	  may	  occur	  in	  all	  phases	  (and	  not	  only	  
in	  phase	  2),	  but	   only	   if	   the	  prevailing	   framing	  represents	  a	   threat	   to	   the	   industry	  
regime.	  The	   safety	   case	   shows	   that,	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   a	   threatening	   framing,	   the	  




	   The	  second	  nuancing	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  third	  one	  outlined	  above:	  the	  role	  
of	   competing	   issues	   and	  macro-­‐level	  developments,	   and	   the	  need	   to	   account	   for	  
alignment	   of	   processes.	   The	   industry	   strategically	   draws	   on	   competing	   issues	  
(playing	  on	  supposed	   trade-­‐offs,	  e.g.	  between	  emission-­‐control	  or	   safety	  and	   fuel	  
economy;	   jobs	   and	   regulation	   etc.)	   and	   on	   favourable	   discourses	   (e.g.	   anti-­‐
regulation	   ideology)	   to	   delay	   issue	   progress.	   This	   is	   a	   strategic	   response	   not	   yet	  
incorporated	  in	  the	  model	  that	  may	  warrant	  further	  research	  (see	  section	  VIII.4).	  	  
VIII.3.3. Nuances	  and	  refinements	  based	  on	  discussion	  of	  research	  question	  C	  	  
Based	  on	  the	  pattern-­‐matching	  analysis	  of	  the	  third	  case	  study	  with	  the	  conceptual	  
answer	   to	   question	   C,	   I	   proposed	   to	   nuance	   the	   sequential	   view	   implicit	   in	   the	  
DILC-­‐model	   (incremental	   innovation,	  hedging,	  diversification/radical	   innovation,	  
full	   reorientation),	   and	   to	   problematize	   the	   distinction	   between	   symbolic	   and	  
substantive	  strategies,	  particularly	  the	  notion	  that	  radical	  technology	  development	  
is	   necessarily	   substantive	   strategy.	   The	   third	   case	   study,	   in	   particular,	   showed	  
many	   instances	   when	   radical	   technology	   development	   was	   used	   as	   a	   symbolic	  
strategy	  towards	  the	  institutional	  environment:	  e.g.	  GM’s	  Impact,	  USABC/PNGV,	  a	  
parade	   of	   battery-­‐electric	   and	   fuel-­‐cell	   vehicle	   prototypes	   –	   yet,	   they	   all	   brought	  
about	  significant	  unintended	  consequences,	  such	  as	  the	  enactment	  of	  California’s	  
ZEV	  mandate	   (influenced	  by	  GM’s	   Impact)	  or	  Toyota’s	  development	  of	   the	  Prius	  
HEV	  (a	  response	  to	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  PNGV).	  
The	   nuance	   that	   I	   therefore	   propose	   is	   that	   incumbents	   can	   engage	  with	  
radical	   innovation	  in	  early	  periods,	  but	  are	  then	  motivated	  primarily	  by	  symbolic	  
reasons.	   Does	   this	   proposition	   hold	   for	   the	   historical	   cases?	   I	   argue	   so,	   as	   each	  
contained	   at	   least	   one	   example	   of	   this	   early	   development	   of	   technologies	   for	  
symbolic	  reasons	  (i.e.	  aimed	  at	  the	  institutional	  environment):	  in	  the	  air	  pollution	  
case,	   Ford’s	   early	   research	   on	   catalysts	   (vanadium	   pentoxide)	   was	   keenly	  
publicized	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  public	  and	  political	  goodwill,	  and	  Chrysler	  followed	  
suit	  by	  announcing	  development	  of	  better	  tuned	  engines	  that	  produced	  less	  fumes.	  
In	  fact,	  Chrysler’s	  incremental	   ‘Clean	  Air	  Package’	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  incumbent	  
industry	   to	   pre-­‐empt	   the	   need	   and	   then	   influence	   (frame)	   the	   content	   of	  
regulation.	   In	   the	   safety	   case,	   early	   technological	   developments	   by	   Chrysler	   and	  




through	   what	   mainly	   amounted	   to	   public	   relations	   or	   marketing	   strategy.	   A	  
refinement	  to	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  is	  thus	  to	  include	  as	  a	  possibility	  the	  development	  
of	   more	   radical	   innovation	   in	   the	   second	   phase,	   but	   as	   a	   symbolic	   response	   to	  
institutional	  pressures.	  
VIII.4. EVALUATION	  AND	  DISCUSSION	  OF	  THE	  COMBINED	  QUANTITATIVE-­‐
QUALITATIVE	  METHODOLOGY	  
In	   Chapter	   IV,	   I	   proposed	   a	   novel	   mixed-­‐methods	   approach	   to	   investigate	   the	  
relationship	   between	   issue	   life-­‐cycles	   and	   issue-­‐attention	   cycles	   (including	  
technology	  hype-­‐cycles).	  The	  case	  studies	  showed	  the	  usefulness	  of	  these	  methods,	  
and	  that	  attention	  indicators	  can	  be	  fruitfully	  used	  to	  generate	  first	  insights	  about	  
relationships	  and	  developments.	  The	  combined	  analysis	  of	  quantitative	  attention	  
indicators	   and	   of	   qualitative	  material	   revealed	   that	   the	   dynamics	   of	   attention	   is	  
indeed	  connected	  to	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  dynamics.	  	  
	   Visual	  analysis	  of	  indicator	  charts	  was	  employed	  in	  all	  case	  studies,	  in	  order	  
to	   help	   structuring	   the	   narrative	   approach	   (‘temporal	   bracketing’).	   This	   was	   the	  
only	   quantification	   approach	   used	   in	   the	   air	   pollution	   case	   study,	   which	   did	  
however	  help	  to	  establish	  initial	  patterns	  and	  relationships	  that	  were	  later	  explored	  
in	   the	   narrative	   analysis.	   I	   noted,	   however,	   that	   this	   method	   rested	   on	   my	  
subjective	  judgement,	  and	  therefore	  I	  used	  in	  combination	  with	  qualitative	  criteria	  
for	   identifying	   different	   periods.	   The	   method,	   used	   in	   combination	   with	   other	  
quantification	   approaches,	   was	   also	   fruitfully	   employed	   in	   the	   second	   and	   third	  
case	  studies.	  
In	  the	  second	  case	  study,	  I	  also	  employed	  a	  correlation	  analysis	  of	  attention	  
indicators,	   which	   revealed	   interesting	   ‘within	   period’	   relationships	   (that	   were	  
further	  explored	  in	  the	  narrative	  analysis):	  (a)	  early	  connection	  between	  public	  and	  
political	  attention	  with	  the	  ‘objective’	  side	  of	  the	  issue	  (i.e.,	  number	  of	  car-­‐related	  
fatalities)	   (which	   indicated	   sense-­‐making	   and	   framing	   processes);	   (b)	  
disconnection	   between	   attention	   indicators	   and	   the	   ‘objective’	   side	   of	   the	   issue	  
later	   on	   in	   the	   life-­‐cycle	   (with	   attention	   indicators	   more	   connected	   to	   visible	  
societal	   struggles	   in	   the	   institutional	   domain);	   (c)	   technology	   development	   in	  
response	   to	   the	   issue	   being	   firstly	   developed	   by	   outsiders	   and	   later	   by	   regime	  




outsiders’	  and	  incumbents’	  technology	  development	  towards	  the	  end	  (phases	  4	  and	  
5)	  of	  the	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  (indicating	  an	  innovation	  race).	  A	  fifth	  quantitative	  insight,	  
revealed	  by	   the	  visual	   inspection	  of	  attention	   indicators,	  was	  not	  explored	   in	   the	  
correlation	  analysis	  and	  represent	  an	  area	  for	   future	  research	  (see	  section	  VIII.5):	  
the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  problem	  framings	  and	  technical	  solutions	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  
captured	  by	  attention	  indicators	  (media	  usage	  of	  issue-­‐related	  terms	  and	  patenting	  
by	  types).	  
The	  third	  case	  study	  showed	  the	  full	  potential	  of	  the	  novel	  mixed-­‐methods	  
approach.	   The	   statistical	   analysis	   seems	   to	   have	   confirmed	   that	   the	   visual	  
examination	  is	   in	  itself	  a	  valid	  method	  to	  devise	  a	  temporal	  bracketing	  structure,	  
because	  the	  visual	   insights	  were	  corroborated	  by	  the	  statistical	   test	   for	  structural	  
breaks	   (QLR	   test).	   The	   meta-­‐analysis	   of	   correlation	   matched	   the	   DILC-­‐model’s	  
overall	  logic	  of	  how	  issue-­‐related	  pressures	  evolve,	  because	  it	  revealed	  that	  industry	  
attention	  was	  firstly	  (up	  to	  the	  second	  period)	  correlated	  to	  public	  attention;	  then	  
(up	  to	  the	  third	  period)	  to	  congressional	  attention;	  and	  later	  (during	  the	  fourth	  and	  
fifth	  period)	  to	  executive	  attention.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  analysis	  matched	  the	  DILC-­‐
model’s	  conceptualization	  of	  a	  ‘normal’	  pathway:	  initial	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  dynamics	  is	  
centred	  on	  the	  public	  domain,	  it	  later	  spills	  over	  to	  the	  policy-­‐making	  (in	  the	  case,	  
Congress)	   domain,	   and	   after	   a	   law	   is	   enacted,	   to	   the	   policy-­‐implementation	  
(executive)	   domain.	   While	   this	   is	   an	   interesting	   result	   that	   emphasizes	   the	  
analytical	  potential	  of	   the	  methodology,	   I	  note	   that	   it	  must	  be	   treated	  with	  care,	  
because	  of	  the	  limited	  power	  of	  the	  statistical	  (correlation)	  tests	  due	  to	  the	  small	  
size	   of	   the	   samples	   that	   I	   used.	   Indeed,	   I	   believe	   it	   is	   always	   fundamental	   to	  
complement	  the	  analysis	  with	  a	  qualitative	  approach.	  	  
	   Overall,	  my	  assessment	  is	  that	  the	  methodology	  that	  I	  proposed,	  combining	  
quantitative	   and	   qualitative	   methods,	   is	   particularly	   useful	   in	   applying	   the	  
framework	   (the	   DILC-­‐model)	   to	   the	   empirical	   cases.	   The	   quantitative	   methods	  
provide	   a	   way	   to	   structure	   the	   empirical	   case	   in	   sub-­‐periods	   and	   reveal	   initial	  
insights	   into	   relationships	   that	   were	   subsequently	   explored	   through	   qualitative	  
methods.	   Yet,	   the	   quantitative	   methods	   did	   present	   some	   issues.	   The	   use	   of	   a	  
meta-­‐analysis	  of	  correlations	  proved	  problematic	  in	  the	  second	  case	  study,	  mainly	  
due	  to	  issues	  with	  low	  quality	  of	  data	  and	  short	  time-­‐series.	  This	  was	  circumvented	  




be	   improved,	   if	   instead	   of	   yearly	   data	   points	   one	   uses	   quarterly	   or	   monthly	  
intervals	   (which	  will	   result	   in	   larger	   sample	   sizes).	   This	   kind	  of	   analysis	   of	   issue	  
life-­‐cycles	   and	   issue	   attention-­‐cycles	   should	   be	   developed	   and	   improved,	  
something	  that	  is	  facilitated	  by	  increasing	  availability	  of	  public	  sources	  of	  ‘big	  data’.	  
VIII.5. CONTRIBUTIONS	  AND	  ORIGINAL	  CLAIMS	  TO	  KNOWLEDGE	  
This	  thesis	  makes	  four	  contributions	  to	  knowledge179:	  
1. In	   the	   field	   of	   science,	   technology	   and	   innovation	   (STI)	   policy	   research,	   it	  
contributes	  by	  developing	  a	  model	  that	  improves	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  co-­‐
evolution	  between	  societal	  issues,	  technologies	  and	  industries,	  thus	  helping	  to	  
close	  a	  long-­‐standing	  gap	  in	  the	  literature	  (Nelson,	  1977;	  Morlacchi	  and	  Martin,	  
2009).	   The	   DILC-­‐model	   is	   an	   analytical	   ‘ideal	   type’	   that	   includes	   in	   its	  
specification	  how	  policy	  problems	  emerge	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (through	  advocacy	  
and	  activism	  in	  the	  institutional	  environment)	  and	  evolve	  (through	  a	  dialectical	  
process	   between	   issue-­‐proponents	   and	   issue-­‐opponents,	   usually	   incumbent	  
industry	  actors).	  The	  conceptual	  model	  was	  applied	  to	  three	  case	  studies,	  which	  
revealed	  insights	  into	  why	  some	  problems	  remain	  under-­‐addressed	  in	  spite	  of	  
technological	  developments:	  this	  is	  due	  to	  strong	  resistance	  by	  the	  incumbent	  
industry	   to	   change	   its	   practices	   (industry	   regime),	   and	   to	   insufficient	   social,	  
cultural	   and	   economic	   pressures	   that	   could	   incentivise/force	   the	   industry	   to	  
reorient	  its	  regime	  so	  as	  to	  address	  the	  issue.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  Acknowledgements,	  my	  DPhil	  research	  and	  thesis	  contributed	  to	  the	  DESTABLE	  
project	  (ERC	  grant,	  no.	  204246),	  led	  by	  Prof.	  Frank	  Geels,	  and	  which	  also	  included	  a	  second	  DPhil	  
candidate,	  (now)	  Dr.	  Bruno	  Turnheim.	  The	  DESTABLE	  project	  focused	  on	  the	  destabilization	  of	  
socio-­‐technical	  regimes	  as	  key	  to	  transitions	  towards	  sustainability.	  Because	  destabilization	  is	  
(was)	  an	  under-­‐investigated	  topic	  in	  transitions	  theory	  (part	  of	  the	  STI	  field),	  the	  project	  created	  
opportunity	  for	  each	  team	  member	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  original	  contributions.	  While	  starting	  
with	  similar,	  general	  questions	  (What	  is	  a	  destabilization	  process?	  How	  do	  actors	  enact	  and	  
respond	  to	  this	  process?	  What	  is	  the	  role	  of	  societal	  issues	  in	  destabilizing	  a	  socio-­‐technical	  
regime?),	  each	  of	  us	  handled	  them	  very	  differently:	  Prof.	  Geels	  reflected	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  
destabilization	  processes	  for	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘multi-­‐level	  perspective’	  (MLP),	  for	  transitions	  theory	  
and	  innovation	  studies,	  and	  for	  developing	  and	  refining	  the	  TEF;	  Dr.	  Turnheim	  looked	  at	  
questions	  of	  time/timing	  in	  a	  destabilization	  process,	  of	  multiple	  levels	  of	  change	  processes,	  of	  
normativity,	  and	  of	  socio-­‐cultural	  change	  (with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  coal	  industry	  and	  the	  energy	  field	  
in	  the	  UK);	  and	  I	  looked	  at	  the	  organizational-­‐field	  level,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  industry	  
strategies	  and	  the	  development	  of	  technologies	  in	  response	  to	  pressures	  connected	  to	  societal	  
issues.	  Furthermore,	  as	  I	  will	  make	  explicit	  in	  this	  section,	  I	  also	  developed	  a	  novel	  methodology	  




2. The	  thesis	  contributes	  to	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  theory,	  because	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  helps	  
to	   address	   three	   open	   questions	   about:	   (a)	   the	   processes	   through	   which	   an	  
industry	   shifts	   to	   substantive	   responses	   (e.g.	   technological	   strategy);	   (b)	   the	  
interplays	  between	   firm-­‐level	  and	  collective	   (industry-­‐level)	   strategies;	   (c)	   the	  
relationship	  between	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  and	  issue	  attention-­‐cycles;	  and	  (d)	  the	  
criteria	  for	  the	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	  identification	  of	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  stages.	  
The	  first	  two	  gaps	  were	  addressed	  by	  mobilizing	  insights	  from	  other	  fields	  (STI,	  
Organizational	   Institutionalism);	   the	   third	   gap	   was	   addressed	   with	   the	  
development	  of	  a	  novel	  methodology;	  and	  the	   fourth	  gap	  was	  addressed	  with	  
the	   explicit	   inclusion	   of	   qualitative	   indicators	   for	   phase	   shifts	   in	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  (Chapter	  III)	  and	  also	  through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
novel	  qualitative-­‐quantitative	  methodology.	  	  
3. The	   third	   contribution	   is	   related	   to	   item	   (c)	   above.	   In	   this	   thesis,	   I	   used	   a	  
mixed-­‐methods	   approach	   to	   systematically	   analyse	   an	   array	   of	   attention	  
indicators	  within	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   framework,	   something	   that,	   to	   the	  best	  of	  
my	  knowledge	  (as	  shown	  in	  my	  literature	  review),	  has	  not	  been	  previously	  done.	  
My	  assessment	  is	  that	  the	  methodology	  was	  particularly	  fortuitous.	  Thus,	  this	  
thesis’	  fourth	  contribution	  is	  methodological.	  
4. The	   final	   contribution	   relates	   to	   a	   contemporary	   problem	   (a	   ‘Grand	   Societal	  
Challenge’)	  and	  debate,	  and	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  policy	  lesson:	  the	  thesis	  has	  
shown	   that	   the	   climate	   change	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   American	  
automobile	  issue,	  is	  at	  crossroads.	  A	  key	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  strategy	  of	  individual	  
industry	  actors	  has	  not	  yet	  converged	  towards	  a	  dominant	  solution,	  with	  many	  
alternative-­‐fuel	  vehicle	  technologies	  competing	  for	  domination.	  This	  in	  turn	  is	  
due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  strong	  piece	  of	  regulation	  at	  the	  US	  federal	  level	  forcing	  zero-­‐
emission	  vehicles	  to	  market,	  and	  because	  effective	  demand	  for	  those	  vehicles	  is	  
still	   low.	   The	   full	   reorientation	   of	   the	   American	   car	   industry	   around	   climate	  
change	   will	   not	   happen	   until	   regulatory	   and	  market	   pressures	   build	   up	   and	  
become	  aligned.	  
VIII.6. LIMITATIONS,	  GENERALIZABILITY	  AND	  FUTURE	  RESEARCH	  
The	  contributions	  of	   this	   thesis	  present	  at	   least	   four	   limitations,	  which	  represent	  




theorization,	   the	  DILC-­‐model	   cannot	   yet	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   ‘middle-­‐range	   theory’	  
(not	  the	  least	  because	  it	  still	  scores	  too	  low	  on	  simplicity),	  and	  should	  be	  tested	  in	  
different	   settings	   (industries,	   countries)	   to	   confirm	   its	   versatility,	   because	   the	  
theoretical	  framework	  was	  applied	  to	  only	  one	  context:	  the	  American	  automobile	  
industry.	  While	  cases	  were	  critically	  selected	  to	  enable	  testing	  and	  improving	  the	  
model,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  some	  mechanisms	  were	  contingent	  to	  the	  American	  context.	  
Indeed,	  a	  study	  based	  on	  the	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism	  (VoC)	  approach	  (Mikler,	  2006)	  
proposes	   that	   American	   carmakers	   base	   their	   strategies	   on	   instrumental	  
considerations	  and	  thus	  adopt	  a	  confrontational	  position	  in	  face	  of	  regulations	  that	  
call	   for	   innovations	   ‘not	   demanded	   by	   consumers’.	   Mikler	   (2006)	   found	   that	  
automakers	  in	  Germany	  take	  a	  more	  cooperative	  stance	  towards	  governmental	  and	  
societal	  demands;	  while	  in	  Japan	  automakers	  tend	  to	  respond	  to	  societal	  demands	  
with	  substantive	  strategies	  due	  to	  a	  corporate	  culture	  that	  strives	  for	  excellence.	  
Yet,	  globalization	  processes	  appear	  to	  have	  led	  to	  a	  convergence	  in	  business	  
strategies	  (Levy	  and	  Newell,	  2000),	  and	  resistant	  strategies	  have	  been	  found	  also	  in	  
places	   like	  Europe	  (in	  recent	  years,	   for	   instance,	  automakers	  operating	   in	  Europe	  
signed	  a	  voluntary	  agreement	  with	  the	  EU	  to	  sell	  cars	  that	  meet	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  
carbon	   emissions,	   but	   did	   not	   fulfil	   it).	   Notwithstanding,	   the	   application	   of	   the	  
DILC-­‐model	   to	   non-­‐US-­‐based	   cases	   is	   necessary	   to	   further	   test	   its	   versatility.	  
Furthermore,	   it	  will	   be	   interesting	   to	   follow	   a	   life-­‐cycle	   process	   that	   impacts	   on	  
multiple	  industry	  regimes,	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  how	  response	  by	  these	  industries	  
(and	  changes	  in	  regimes)	  co-­‐evolve.	  Indeed,	  climate	  change	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  affect	  
multiple	   industries,	   and	   a	   question	   to	   be	   investigated	   is	  whether	   two	   (or	  more)	  
industries	  are	  in	  the	  same	  stage	  or	  not	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  life-­‐cycle.	  
Ultimately,	  the	  application	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  to	  more	  empirical	  cases	  and	  
the	  expansion	  of	  its	  ‘case	  study’	  base	  shall	  allow	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  simplified	  
patterns,	  mechanisms,	  and	  processes	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  transforming	  the	  model	  into	  
a	  middle-­‐range	   theory	  of	  how	  societal	   issues,	   industry	   regimes,	   and	   technologies	  
co-­‐evolve.	   Therefore,	   the	   search	   for	   and	   development	   of	   a	   simpler	   and	   more	  
elegant	  model	  (for	  instance,	  a	  stage-­‐model	  not	  based	  on	  interrelated	  propositions	  
but	  on	  simplified	  processes)	  is	  an	  important	  area	  for	  future	  research.	  
Secondly,	   and	   related	   to	   the	   first	   limitation,	   even	   though	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  




developed	  based	  on	  the	  American	  context.	  As	  this	  literature	  is	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  
the	  DILC-­‐model,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  the	  confirmation	  of	  the	  model’s	  specification	  was	  
contingent	   to	   the	   cases	   selected.	   In	   the	   concluding	   remarks	   to	   Chapter	   IV,	   I	  
suggested	  that,	  in	  theory,	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  and	  findings	  based	  on	  it	  could	  apply	  to	  
industries	   with	   the	   following	   characteristics:	   (a)	   economically	   big	   and	  
concentrated	  on	  few	  large	  firms	  (oligopoly);	  (b)	  politically	  powerful;	  (c)	  culturally	  
visible;	   and	   (d)	   supplying	   differentiated	   products	   (‘innovations’)	   directly	   to	   the	  
final	  consumer.	  While	   the	  DILC-­‐model	  and	   these	   findings	  of	   the	   thesis	  could	  be	  
potentially	   generalizable	   to	   industries	   such	   as	   pharmaceutical	   and	   consumer	  
electronics,	   one	   important	   avenue	   for	   further	   research	   is	   to	   apply	   the	  model	   to	  
different	  countries,	  industries	  and	  issues180	  in	  order	  to	  further	  test	  the	  versatility	  of	  
the	  model.	  	  
	   The	  third	  limitation	  (in	  fact,	  a	  set	  of	  limitations)	  refers	  to	  the	  quantification	  
approach.	  While	   I	  have	  been	  cautious	   in	  making	   ‘definitive’	   claims	  based	  on	   the	  
quantitative	  methods,	  which	  I	  therefore	  complemented	  with	  a	  qualitative	  analysis,	  
it	   is	   important	   to	   highlight	   the	   limitations	   of	   each	   of	   the	   three	   quantitative	  
methods	  that	  I	  have	  employed.	   	  Firstly,	  underlying	  each	  approach	  are	  (attention)	  
indicators,	  which,	  by	  definition,	  do	  not	  capture	  all	  qualitative	  aspects	  of	   the	   real	  
phenomenon	  or	  entity	   it	   tries	   to	  depict.	   I	  note,	  however,	   that	   in	  the	  second	  case	  
study,	  the	  visual	  examination	  of	  two	  ‘qualitatively	  differentiated’	  indicators	  (media	  
usage	  of	  different	  car	  safety-­‐related	  terms	  and	  car	  safety	  patents	  by	  types)	  showed	  
that	   the	   co-­‐evolution	   of	   problem	   framings	   and	   technical	   solutions	   seems	   to	   be	  
captured	  by	  more	  nuanced	  quantitative	  data.	  This	  insight	  could	  be	  systematically	  
investigated	   with	   quantitative	   methods	   (e.g.	   correlation	   analysis)	   in	   future	  
research.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180	  I	  believe	  that	  one	  increasingly	  important	  contemporary	  issue	  to	  which	  the	  model	  could	  be	  
applied	  is	  digital	  (online)	  privacy	  and	  the	  responses	  of	  the	  Internet	  industry.	  This	  issue	  has	  
received	  an	  important	  impetus	  in	  2012,	  when	  the	  former	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  (CIA)	  
employee	  and	  National	  Security	  Agency	  (NSA)	  contractor	  Edward	  Snowden	  disclosed	  classified	  
NSA	  document	  about	  global	  mass	  surveillance	  of	  unsuspected	  individuals	  through	  the	  
interception	  of	  Internet	  and	  telephone	  data.	  Speculatively,	  I	  would	  say	  that	  this	  event	  is	  akin	  to	  
the	  ‘Ralph	  Nader	  scandal’	  in	  the	  1960s,	  which	  contributed	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  strong	  1966	  
safety	  act.	  An	  analysis	  of	  this	  case	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  the	  DILC-­‐model	  could	  test	  this	  hypothesis	  and	  
identify	  in	  which	  phase	  the	  digital	  privacy	  life-­‐cycle	  is.	  A	  key	  complication,	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  
online	  privacy	  issue	  threats	  the	  legitimacy	  not	  only	  of	  the	  Internet	  industry,	  but	  of	  national	  
governments	  ‘invading’	  citizens’	  privacy	  through	  mass	  surveillance	  programmes.	  It	  would	  be	  





Each	  quantitative	  method	  also	  presents	  individual	  limitations.	  An	  issue	  with	  
the	   visual	   inspection	   of	   attention	   charts	   is	   that	   it	   is	   based	   on	   a	   subjective	  
interpretation,	   something	   that	   could	   be	   addressed	   if	   more	   than	   one	   researcher	  
carries	   out	   the	   analysis.	   The	   correlation	   analysis	   has	   issues	   associated	   to	   sample	  
size,	  which	  limits	  the	  power	  of	  the	  statistical	  tests.	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  this	  issue	  
can	  be	  countered	  by	  using	  longer	  time-­‐series	  with	  quarterly,	  monthly,	  or	  even	  daily	  
observations.	  A	  second	  issue	  with	  the	  correlation	  analysis	  is	  that	  correlation	  does	  
not	   imply	   causality,	   so	   that	   findings	   have	   to	   be	   compared	   with	   theory	   and	  
qualitative	  evidence.	  And,	  finally,	  the	  structural	  break	  analysis	  (the	  QLR	  test)	  has	  
similar	   limitation	   to	   the	  correlation	  analysis,	   related	   to	   sample	   size,	  which	  could	  
therefore	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Future	  research	  should	  aim	  at	  improving	  
the	  novel	  mixed	  methodology	  by	  refining	  the	  quantification	  approaches.	  	  
The	   fourth	   limitation	   relates	   to	   the	   concepts	   that	   I	   have	   proposed	   as	  
underlying	   an	   issue	   life-­‐cycle,	   which	   represented	   core	  mechanisms	   in	   the	   DILC	  
model.	  These	  concepts	  were	  also	  used	  to	  analyse	  processes	  in	  individual	  cases,	  and	  
to	  help	  explain	  deviations	  between	  cases	  and	  the	  ideal	  type	  model.	  For	  instance,	  I	  
have	  drawn	  on	  the	  notions	  of	   ‘spill	  over’	  and	   ‘attention	  threshold’	   to	  refer	   to	   the	  
process	  of	  how	  an	  issue,	  from	  being	  confined	  in	  one	  arena	  (e.g.	  civil	  society),	  starts	  
to	  be	  discussed	  in	  another	  arena	  (e.g.	  policy-­‐making	  domain).	  I	  also	  employed	  the	  
notion	  of	  ‘dialectics’	  (e.g.	  framing	  or	  competitive	  struggles)	  as	  the	  core	  underlying	  
process	  in	  the	  DILC	  model.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘alignment’	  between	  
processes,	  which	  I	  raised	  as	  a	  way	  to	  refine	  the	  model’s	  specification.	  In	  my	  analysis,	  
I	  have	  not	  strictly	  defined	  these	  and	  other	  concepts,	  so	  that	  future	  research	  should	  
do	   so	   and	   could	   aim	   at	   refining	   them.	   This	   could	   be	   done	   qualitatively,	   by	  
developing	   more	   rigorous	   definitions	   based	   on	   existing	   theories,	   but	   also	  
quantitatively.	  For	  instance,	  research	  could	  aim	  at	  establishing	  what	  constitutes	  an	  
‘attention	  threshold’	  above	  which	  an	  issue	  ‘spills	  over’	  to	  a	  different	  arena.	  
	   I	   also	   propose	   four	   topics	   for	   future	   research	   that	   aim	   not	   at	   addressing	  
limitations	  but	  to	  expand	  the	  DILC-­‐model.	  Firstly,	  in	  the	  car	  safety	  case,	  it	  was	  as	  if	  
two	  life-­‐cycles	  were	  happening:	  one	  was	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  of	  the	  issue	  framed	  as	  a	  3E	  
problem;	  the	  other	  was	  the	  life-­‐cycle	  of	  the	  issue	  framed	  as	  a	  technical	  problem	  with	  
cars.	  As	  I	  have	  pointed	  out	   in	  the	  nuancing	  to	  the	   first	  research	  answer,	   framing	  




interpretations,	  theories,	  and	  beliefs.	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  these	  processes	  lead	  to	  
changes	   in	   direction,	   and	   speed	   in	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle.	   I	   have	   not	   systematically	  
investigated	  this	  suggestion,	  which	  could	  be	  explored	  in	  future	  research.	  
	   Secondly,	  while	  my	   case	   studies	   did	   account	   for	   influences	   from	   external	  
factors	   (competing	   issues	   and	  macro-­‐contextual	  developments)	  on	   the	   issue	   life-­‐
cycle,	  this	  is	  something	  not	  yet	  systematically	  incorporated	  in	  the	  DILC-­‐model.	  In	  
particular,	  a	  recurring	  finding	  from	  the	  case	  studies	  was	  that	  economic	  problems	  
tend	   to	   disrupt	   issue-­‐cycles,	   i.e.	   the	   focal	   issue	   ‘misaligned’	   with	   economic	  
developments.	   In	   principle,	   however,	   economic	   problems	   could	   represent	   a	  
window	   of	   opportunity	   for	   intervention	   in	   the	   industry	   regime,	   such	   as	   when	  
Chrysler	  was	  bailed	  out	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  when	  GM	  and	  Chrysler	  were	  rescued	  
in	   the	   late	  2000s.	  Future	   research	  could	   investigate	  multiple	   issue	   interaction,	   in	  
order	   to	   refine	   the	   model	   by	   including	   ‘alignments’	   and	   ‘misalignments’	   with	  
external	   factors	   as	   a	   causal	   mechanism	   leading	   to	   different	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	  
trajectories.	   As	   this	   would	   entail	   tracing	   various	   institutional	   and	   economic	  
developments	   that	   affect	   an	   industry	   regime,	   the	   investigation	   could	   explore	  
theoretical	  possibilities	  related	  to	  the	  ‘Triple	  Embeddedness	  Framework’.	  	  
	  	  	   Thirdly,	   in	   answering	   research	   question	   C,	   I	   proposed	   that	   substantive	  
technological	   responses	   only	   happen	   when	   the	   issue	   spills	   over	   to	   the	   task	  
environment,	  due	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  strong	  piece	  of	   regulation	  or	  to	  the	  
existence	   of	   significant	   demand.	   One	   open	   question	   is	   therefore	   whether	   it	   is	  
possible	   to	   distinguish	   theoretical	   routes	   (sequence	   of	   causal	   mechanisms	   and	  
processes)	  that	  lead	  to	  changes	  in	  demand	  and	  in	  regulation.	  While	  I	  have	  indicated	  
processes	  leading	  to	  changes	  in	  regulation	  in	  case	  study	  1181	  and	  processes	  leading	  to	  
changes	  in	  demand	  in	  case	  study	  2182,	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  question	  can	  only	  be	  fully	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181	  See	  discussion	  in	  Chapter	  V:	  “The	  [1970	  Clean	  Air	  Act]	  was	  the	  culmination	  of	  reinforcing	  
processes,	  which	  explain	  why	  the	  local	  air	  pollution	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  followed	  the	  regulatory	  route	  
in	  the	  US:	  	  
(a)	  decreasing	  legitimacy	  of	  automakers;	  (b)	  increasing	  political	  frustration	  over	  the	  industry’s	  
delay	  tactics;	  (c)	  macro-­‐cultural	  trends	  such	  as	  rising	  environmentalism	  and	  social	  activism;	  (d)	  
political	  jockeying	  between	  Senator	  Muskie	  and	  President	  Nixon”	  
182	  See	  discussion	  in	  Chapter	  VI:	  “…new	  consumer	  attitudes	  were	  related	  to:	  (1)	  public	  and	  political	  
debates	  about	  auto-­‐safety	  and	  over	  passive	  restraint	  regulations;	  (2)	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  the	  
health-­‐and-­‐safety	  movement;	  (3)	  demographic	  changes;	  (4)	  consumer	  education	  about	  relative	  
car	  safety;	  and	  (5)	  car	  industry	  (regime	  actors’	  and	  outsiders’)	  advertisements	  of	  seatbelts	  and	  
other	  safety	  features.	  The	  key	  mechanisms	  unifying	  this	  process	  seems	  to	  be	  (a)	  ‘attention	  
advocacy’	  by	  activists	  and	  social	  movements	  and	  political	  struggles	  in	  the	  institutional	  
environment	  and	  (b)	  outsiders’	  strategies	  in	  the	  task	  environment.	  While	  these	  mechanisms	  were	  




addressed	   with	   future	   research	   that	   apply	   the	   DILC-­‐model	   to	   more	   cases	   of	  
industry	   issue	   life-­‐cycles.	   The	   building	   up	   of	   evidence	   could	   reveal	   whether	   the	  
processes	  that	  I	  have	  identified	  consistently	  reoccur	  and	  in	  which	  order.	  
Finally,	  the	  third	  case	  study	  has	  indicated	  that	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  third	  to	  the	  
fourth	   phase	   –	   the	   ‘turning	   point’	   in	   the	   issue	   life-­‐cycle	   process	   –	   is	   the	   most	  
difficult	   one.	  This	   transition	   entails,	   for	   instance,	   convergence	   of	   industry	   actors	  
(and	  other	  stakeholders)	  towards	  a	  dominant	  solution.	  Future	  research	  could	  aim	  
at	  identifying	  which	  processes	  facilitate	  or	  prevent	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  third	  to	  
the	   fourth	   phase.	   In	   the	   historical	   case	   studies,	   public	   attention	   to	   the	   issue	  
escalated	   to	   unprecedented	   levels	   during	   the	   ‘turning	   point’,	   something	   that	  
seemed	  to	  incentivize	  politicians	  to	  enact	  strong	  pieces	  of	  legislation.	  Furthermore,	  
a	  key	  process	  that	  has	  consistently	  reappeared	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  was	  the	  opening	  
up	   of	   the	   ‘industry-­‐front’	   (the	   dissolution	   of	   defensive	   inter-­‐organizational	  
relationships).	  This	  process	  seems	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  an	  issue	  life-­‐cycle	  ‘turning	  
point’.	   What	   causes	   a	   closed	   industry-­‐front	   to	   crumble?	   And	   are	   there	   other	  
processes	   facilitating	   or	   preventing	   this	   crucial	   transition?	   These	   are	   important	  
questions	   with	   practical	   implications	   to	   the	   development	   of	   appropriate	   policy	  
aimed	  at	  addressing	  ‘Grand	  Societal	  Challenges’.	  	  n	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APPENDIX:	  STATISTICAL	  RESULTS	  
1. RESULTS	  OF	  CORRELATION	  TESTS	  OF	  CASE	  STUDY	  2	  
List	  of	  variables:	  
• fatalities	  =	  yearly	  number	  of	  automobile-­‐related	  fatalities	  
• bigthree	  =	  yearly	  sum	  of	  safety-­‐related	  patents	  by	  General	  Motors,	  Chrysler	  and	  
Ford	  
• outsiders	   =	   yearly	   sum	   of	   safety-­‐related	   patents	   by	   other	   automakers	   and	  
suppliers	  
• publicattention	  =	  yearly	  average	  of	  number	  of	  articles	  on	  automobile	  safety	  in	  
the	  Chicago	  Tribune,	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  New	  York	  Times,	  Wall	  Street	   Journal,	  
and	  Washington	  Post	  
• congressional	   record	   =	   yearly	   number	   of	   safety-­‐related	   outputs	   in	   the	  
Congressional	  Record	  
• federalregister	  =	  yearly	  number	  of	  safety-­‐related	  outputs	  in	  the	  Federal	  Register	  




Results	  for	  the	  whole	  period	  [1900-­‐2000]	  
	  
	   	  
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
                     65       65       65       65       65       65 
federalreg~r     0.6615*  0.8621*  0.6330*  0.7913*  0.6912*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
                    101      101      101      101      101 
congressio~d     0.5995*  0.7852*  0.9545*  0.7530*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
                    101      101      101      111 
publicatte~n     0.7617*  0.7125*  0.7850*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000 
                    101      101      101 
  fatalities     0.6387*  0.7492*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000 
                    101      101 
   outsiders     0.7278*  1.0000 
              
               
                    101 
    bigthree     1.0000 
                                                                    
               bigthree outsid~s fatali~s public~n congre~d federa~r
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   




Results	  for	  first	  sub-­‐period	  [1900-­‐1924]	  
	  
	   	  
              
                      .        .        .        .        . 
                      0        0        0        0        0        0 
federalreg~r          .        .        .        .        .        . 
              
                      .        .        .        . 
                     25       25       25       25       25 
congressio~d          .        .        .        .        . 
              
                 0.2578        .   0.0000 
                     25       25       25       25 
publicatte~n     0.2352        .   0.8159*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0248        . 
                     25       25       25 
  fatalities     0.4478        .   1.0000 
              
                      . 
                     25       25 
   outsiders          .        . 
              
               
                     25 
    bigthree     1.0000 
                                                                    
               bigthree outsid~s fatali~s public~n congre~d federa~r
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   
> 01) pw




Results	  for	  second	  sub-­‐period	  [1925-­‐1942]	  
	   	                
                 0.8973        .   0.9346   0.2956   0.9670 
                      7        7        7        7        7        7 
federalreg~r     0.0606        .  -0.0386   0.4629   0.0195   1.0000 
              
                 0.3261        .   0.0145   0.2929 
                     18       18       18       18       18 
congressio~d     0.2455        .   0.5654   0.2624   1.0000 
              
                 0.6351        .   0.5814 
                     18       18       18       18 
publicatte~n     0.1201        .   0.1393   1.0000 
              
                 0.0574        . 
                     18       18       18 
  fatalities     0.4556        .   1.0000 
              
                      . 
                     18       18 
   outsiders          .        . 
              
               
                     18 
    bigthree     1.0000 
                                                                    
               bigthree outsid~s fatali~s public~n congre~d federa~r
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   
> 01) pw




Results	  for	  third	  sub-­‐period	  [1943-­‐1946]	  
	   	                
                 0.2929        .   0.0513   0.3675   0.0513 
                      4        4        4        4        4        4 
federalreg~r    -0.7071        .   0.9487   0.6325   0.9487   1.0000 
              
                 0.5528        .   0.0000   0.2000 
                      4        4        4        4        4 
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                      4        4        4        4 
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                      4        4        4 
  fatalities    -0.4472        .   1.0000 
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   outsiders          .        . 
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    bigthree     1.0000 
                                                                    
               bigthree outsid~s fatali~s public~n congre~d federa~r
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   
> 01) pw




Results	  for	  fourth	  sub-­‐period	  [1947-­‐1955]	  
	   	                
                 0.1287   1.0000   0.2679   0.2679   0.4140 
                      9        9        9        9        9        9 
federalreg~r    -0.5455   0.0000  -0.4140  -0.4140  -0.3118   1.0000 
              
                 0.0249   0.9913   0.1942   0.2950 
                      9        9        9        9        9 
congressio~d     0.7321  -0.0043   0.4770   0.3933   1.0000 
              
                 0.0146   0.6614   0.0159 
                      9        9        9        9 
publicatte~n     0.7730  -0.1703   0.7667   1.0000 
              
                 0.0008   0.2430 
                      9        9        9 
  fatalities     0.9048* -0.4341   1.0000 
              
                 0.5300 
                      9        9 
   outsiders    -0.2423   1.0000 
              
               
                      9 
    bigthree     1.0000 
                                                                    
               bigthree outsid~s fatali~s public~n congre~d federa~r
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   
> 01) pw




Results	  for	  fifth	  sub-­‐period	  [1956-­‐1966]	  
	   	  
              
                 0.2171   0.8547   0.0366   0.4127   0.2171 
                     11       11       11       11       11       11 
federalreg~r    -0.4046  -0.0627   0.6331   0.2752   0.4046   1.0000 
              
                 0.4563   0.5823   0.5637   0.2160 
                     11       11       11       11       11 
congressio~d    -0.2511   0.1868   0.1959   0.4055   1.0000 
              
                 0.2976   0.0523   0.0510 
                     11       11       11       11 
publicatte~n     0.3458  -0.5974   0.6000   1.0000 
              
                 0.3205   0.5444 
                     11       11       11 
  fatalities     0.3307  -0.2055   1.0000 
              
                 0.3829 
                     11       11 
   outsiders    -0.2924   1.0000 
              
               
                     11 
    bigthree     1.0000 
                                                                    
               bigthree outsid~s fatali~s public~n congre~d federa~r
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   
> 01) pw




Results	  for	  sixth	  sub-­‐period	  [1967-­‐1976]	  
	   	                
                 0.0359   0.0001   0.2600   0.2763   0.3104 
                     10       10       10       10       10       10 
federalreg~r     0.6650   0.9268* -0.3939  -0.3818  -0.3576   1.0000 
              
                 0.0980   0.2411   0.0251   0.0251 
                     10       10       10       10       10 
congressio~d    -0.5521  -0.4085   0.6970   0.6970   1.0000 
              
                 0.1282   0.1905   0.0008 
                     10       10       10       10 
publicatte~n    -0.5144  -0.4512   0.8788*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0806   0.3435 
                     10       10       10 
  fatalities    -0.5771  -0.3354   1.0000 
              
                 0.0231 
                     10       10 
   outsiders     0.7038   1.0000 
              
               
                     10 
    bigthree     1.0000 
                                                                    
               bigthree outsid~s fatali~s public~n congre~d federa~r
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   
> 01) pw




Results	  for	  seventh	  sub-­‐period	  [1977-­‐1984]	  
	   	                
                 0.1853   0.8435   0.0007   0.9551   0.6494 
                      8        8        8        8        8        8 
federalreg~r     0.5212   0.0838   0.9341*  0.0240   0.1916   1.0000 
              
                 0.1884   0.0039   0.3518   0.0710 
                      8        8        8        8        8 
congressio~d     0.5181   0.8810*  0.3810  -0.6667   1.0000 
              
                 0.6684   0.1195   0.8665 
                      8        8        8        8 
publicatte~n    -0.1807  -0.5952  -0.0714   1.0000 
              
                 0.0806   0.4556 
                      8        8        8 
  fatalities     0.6506   0.3095   1.0000 
              
                 0.1540 
                      8        8 
   outsiders     0.5543   1.0000 
              
               
                      8 
    bigthree     1.0000 
                                                                    
               bigthree outsid~s fatali~s public~n congre~d federa~r
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   
> 01) pw




Results	  for	  eighth	  sub-­‐period	  [1985-­‐1991]	  
	   	                
                 0.8769   0.2289   0.0408   0.0085   0.7876 
                      7        7        7        7        7        7 
federalreg~r    -0.0727   0.5225  -0.7748   0.8829*  0.1261   1.0000 
              
                 0.0008   0.1194   0.4821   1.0000 
                      7        7        7        7        7 
congressio~d    -0.9550* -0.6429  -0.3214   0.0000   1.0000 
              
                 0.7876   0.1194   0.0522 
                      7        7        7        7 
publicatte~n     0.1261   0.6429  -0.7500   1.0000 
              
                 0.6701   0.5887 
                      7        7        7 
  fatalities     0.1982  -0.2500   1.0000 
              
                 0.1591 
                      7        7 
   outsiders     0.5946   1.0000 
              
               
                      7 
    bigthree     1.0000 
                                                                    
               bigthree outsid~s fatali~s public~n congre~d federa~r
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   
> 01) pw




Results	  for	  ninth	  sub-­‐period	  [1992-­‐2000]	  
	   	                
                 0.1875   0.0656   0.0358   0.8473   0.7971 
                      9        9        9        9        9        9 
federalreg~r     0.4833   0.6360   0.7000   0.0753  -0.1004   1.0000 
              
                 0.9830   0.8467   0.1098   0.6736 
                      9        9        9        9        9 
congressio~d     0.0084  -0.0756  -0.5690   0.1639   1.0000 
              
                 0.5739   0.0351   0.7971 
                      9        9        9        9 
publicatte~n     0.2176   0.7017  -0.1004   1.0000 
              
                 0.2242   0.1163 
                      9        9        9 
  fatalities     0.4500   0.5607   1.0000 
              
                 0.2418 
                      9        9 
   outsiders     0.4352   1.0000 
              
               
                      9 
    bigthree     1.0000 
                                                                    
               bigthree outsid~s fatali~s public~n congre~d federa~r
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   
> .01) pw




Results	  for	  sub-­‐period	  [1985-­‐2000]	  
	  	   	                
                 0.0021   0.0000   0.0155   0.0001   0.0260 
                     16       16       16       16       16       16 
federalreg~r     0.7102*  0.8660* -0.5931*  0.8277* -0.5538*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0098   0.0035   0.5715   0.0486 
                     16       16       16       16       16 
congressio~d    -0.6239* -0.6834*  0.1531  -0.5000*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0053   0.0000   0.0009 
                     16       16       16       16 
publicatte~n     0.6615*  0.8800* -0.7476*  1.0000 
              
                 0.2603   0.0823 
                     16       16       16 
  fatalities    -0.2992  -0.4474   1.0000 
              
                 0.0004 
                     16       16 
   outsiders     0.7795*  1.0000 
              
               
                     16 
    bigthree     1.0000 
                                                                    
               bigthree outsid~s fatali~s public~n congre~d federa~r
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   
> .05) pw

















































1983	   2.77416	   insig.	   5.30635	   10%	   0.59358	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	   0.35778	   insig.	   0.25556	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1984	   1.89573	   insig.	   4.09216	   insig.	   0.64357	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	   0.20986	  insig.	   0.25873	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1985	   2.80265	   insig.	   25.7704	   1%	   14.4402	   1%	   n/a	   n/a	   0.67907	  insig.	   0.22093	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1986	   2.17146	   insig.	   10.1977	   1%	   4.93987	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	   0.69052	  insig.	   0.87472	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1987	   4.32801	   insig.	   4.88839	  insig.	   3.12545	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	   1.49487	   insig.	   4.19361	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1988	   2.50234	   insig.	   3.69468	  insig.	   1.45697	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	   2.03019	   insig.	   3.44616	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1989	   2.66837	   insig.	   4.10497	   insig.	   0.77411	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	   0.22947	   insig.	   2.08105	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1990	   2.50711	   insig.	   3.4292	   insig.	   0.68917	   insig.	   3.98576	   insig.	   0.99301	   insig.	   2.69666	  insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1991	   1.95631	   insig.	   3.13237	   insig.	   0.85063	  insig.	   2.74653	   insig.	   1.40172	   insig.	   1.05137	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1992	   2.02533	   insig.	   2.87534	   insig.	   0.65775	   insig.	   3.10537	   insig.	   0.11999	   insig.	   1.30389	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1993	   1.54933	   insig.	   2.2747	   insig.	   0.68522	   insig.	   3.54303	   insig.	   0.10547	   insig.	   0.75218	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1994	   2.23309	   insig.	   2.71196	   insig.	   0.9641	   insig.	   2.34468	   insig.	   0.10901	   insig.	   1.58156	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1995	   1.83462	   insig.	   2.67074	   insig.	   0.77377	   insig.	   3.50831	   insig.	   1.66713	   insig.	   0.72594	   insig.	   n/a	   n/a	  
1996	   3.24217	   insig.	   5.08127	   10%	   0.47194	   insig.	   1.62037	   insig.	   0.47524	   insig.	   0.91858	   insig.	   24.8984	   1%	  
1997	   1.78132	   insig.	   3.07961	   insig.	   0.44108	   insig.	   0.71689	   insig.	   0.13485	   insig.	   1.26449	   insig.	   2.22999	   insig.	  
1998	   1.31934	   insig.	   3.11014	   insig.	   0.57139	   insig.	   0.7832	   insig.	   0.10173	   insig.	   8.2708	   1%	   1.16837	   insig.	  
1999	   3.02494	   insig.	   3.0892	   insig.	   0.74336	   insig.	   0.4596	   insig.	   0.10293	   insig.	   2.54052	   insig.	   1.10071	   insig.	  
2000	   1.65064	   insig.	   3.35025	   insig.	   0.52703	   insig.	   0.27581	   insig.	   0.50546	  insig.	   4.34243	   insig.	   0.97698	  insig.	  
2001	   1.28567	   insig.	   3.09305	   insig.	   0.28889	  insig.	   0.30537	   insig.	   0.33944	   insig.	   2.2987	   insig.	   0.80282	   insig.	  
2002	   1.26644	   insig.	   3.33582	   insig.	   0.28606	  insig.	   0.32258	   insig.	   0.20432	   insig.	   2.6908	   insig.	   0.7771	   insig.	  
2003	   1.87498	   insig.	   2.74259	   insig.	   0.27488	   insig.	   0.27047	   insig.	   0.37699	  insig.	   2.20413	   insig.	   0.54417	   insig.	  
2004	   6.02052	   5%	   3.81937	   insig.	   2.11922	   insig.	   0.24957	   insig.	   0.49813	   insig.	   2.19342	   insig.	   0.67373	   insig.	  
2005	   13.6571	   1%	   2.84174	   insig.	   2.77	   insig.	   0.2689	   insig.	   4.96784	  insig.	   1.70962	   insig.	   0.81988	   insig.	  
2006	   5.31196	   10%	   4.66704	  insig.	   4.35491	   insig.	   0.37564	   insig.	   3.26758	   insig.	   2.8945	   insig.	   0.69035	  insig.	  
2007	   5.52167	   10%	   2.1713	   insig.	   16.9919	   1%	   4.52196	   insig.	   0.24835	   insig.	   61.1978	   1%	   3.06851	   insig.	  
Obs.:	  Critical	  values	  for	  the	  QLR	  statistic	  with	  15%	  trimming	  were	  obtained	  from	  Table	  14.6	  in	  Stock	  and	  Watson	  





3. RESULTS	  OF	  CORRELATION	  TESTS	  OF	  CASE	  STUDY	  3	  
List	  of	  variables:	  
• public	  =	  yearly	  number	  of	  articles	  on	  climate	  change	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  Washington	  Post	  and	  USA	  Today	  
• congress	  =	  yearly	  number	  of	  climate-­‐change-­‐related	  outputs	  in	  the	  Congressional	  Record	  
• executive	  =	  yearly	  number	  of	  climate-­‐change-­‐related	  outputs	  in	  the	  Federal	  Register	  
• anews	  =	  yearly	  number	  of	  articles	  on	  climate	  change	  in	  the	  Automotive	  News	  
• bigthree	  =	  yearly	  sum	  of	  AFV	  patents	  by	  General	  Motors,	  Chrysler	  and	  Ford	  
• outsiders	  =	  yearly	  sum	  of	  AFV	  patents	  by	  other	  selected	  automakers	  
• afv	  =	  market	  share	  of	  alternative	  fuel	  vehicles	  in	  the	  US	  
• edv	  =	  market	  share	  of	  electric	  drive	  vehicles	  in	  the	  US	  




Results	  for	  the	  whole	  period	  
	   	                
                 0.0007   0.0244   0.0002   0.2398   0.0004   0.0026   0.0000 
                     14       14       14       14       12       12       13       14 
         edv     0.7934*  0.5963   0.8330* -0.3363   0.8531*  0.7832*  0.9066*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.5758   0.0000   0.0000 
                     18       18       18       18       17       17       18 
         afv     0.8184*  0.8490*  0.8962*  0.1414   0.9142*  0.8848*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0006   0.0000   0.0684   0.0000 
                     32       32       32       23       32       32 
   outsiders     0.7526*  0.5711*  0.8892*  0.3866   0.9161*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0007   0.0000   0.0658 
                     32       32       32       23       32 
    bigthree     0.7510*  0.5670*  0.8649*  0.3900   1.0000 
              
                 0.0117   0.1129   0.6407 
                     25       25       25       25 
       anews     0.4961   0.3251   0.0982   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000 
                     34       34       34 
   executive     0.8716*  0.7314*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000 
                     34       34 
    congress     0.8601*  1.0000 
              
               
                     34 
      public     1.0000 
                                                                                      
                 public congress execut~e    anews bigthree outsid~s      afv      edv
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   




Results	  for	  before	  1987	  (inclusive)	  
	   	                
                      .        .        .        .        .        .        . 
                      0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0 
         edv          .        .        .        .        .        .        .        . 
              
                      .        .        .        .        .        . 
                      0        0        0        0        0        0        0 
         afv          .        .        .        .        .        .        . 
              
                 0.0753   0.0336   0.6952        .   0.1250 
                      9        9        9        0        9        9 
   outsiders    -0.6193  -0.7059  -0.1526        .   0.5500   1.0000 
              
                 0.1524   0.4022   0.1621        . 
                      9        9        9        0        9 
    bigthree    -0.5188  -0.3193  -0.5085        .   1.0000 
              
                      .        .        . 
                      0        0        0        0 
       anews          .        .        .        . 
              
                 0.1223   0.3427 
                      9        9        9 
   executive     0.5532   0.3590   1.0000 
              
                 0.4611 
                      9        9 
    congress     0.2827   1.0000 
              
               
                      9 
      public     1.0000 
                                                                                      
                 public congress execut~e    anews bigthree outsid~s      afv      edv
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   




Results	  for	  after	  1987	  (exclusive)	  
	   	                
                 0.0007   0.0244   0.0002   0.2398   0.0004   0.0026   0.0000 
                     14       14       14       14       12       12       13       14 
         edv     0.7934*  0.5963   0.8330* -0.3363   0.8531*  0.7832*  0.9066*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.5758   0.0000   0.0000 
                     18       18       18       18       17       17       18 
         afv     0.8184*  0.8490*  0.8962*  0.1414   0.9142*  0.8848*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0002   0.1399   0.0000   0.0684   0.0000 
                     23       23       23       23       23       23 
   outsiders     0.6976*  0.3175   0.8994*  0.3866   0.9042*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0001   0.0964   0.0000   0.0658 
                     23       23       23       23       23 
    bigthree     0.7213*  0.3551   0.9098*  0.3900   1.0000 
              
                 0.0117   0.1129   0.6407 
                     25       25       25       25 
       anews     0.4961   0.3251   0.0982   1.0000 
              
                 0.0001   0.0765 
                     25       25       25 
   executive     0.6971*  0.3607   1.0000 
              
                 0.0002 
                     25       25 
    congress     0.6821*  1.0000 
              
               
                     25 
      public     1.0000 
                                                                                      
                 public congress execut~e    anews bigthree outsid~s      afv      edv
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   




Results	  for	  before	  1996	  (inclusive)	  
	   	  
              
                      .        .        .        .        .        .        . 
                      0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0 
         edv          .        .        .        .        .        .        .        . 
              
                 0.6667   0.6667   1.0000   0.6667   0.6667   0.6667 
                      3        3        3        3        3        3        3 
         afv     0.5000   0.5000  -1.0000   0.5000   0.5000   0.5000   1.0000 
              
                 0.5869   0.7045   0.0144   0.3063   0.0018 
                     18       18       18        9       18       18 
   outsiders     0.1373   0.0961   0.5657  -0.3849   0.6821*  1.0000 
              
                 0.7819   0.7849   0.1363   0.5292 
                     18       18       18        9       18 
    bigthree     0.0702   0.0692   0.3650  -0.2427   1.0000 
              
                 0.0448   0.0288   0.3415 
                      9        9        9        9 
       anews     0.6778   0.7197  -0.3598   1.0000 
              
                 0.0005   0.0014 
                     18       18       18 
   executive     0.7346*  0.6946*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000 
                     18       18 
    congress     0.9039*  1.0000 
              
               
                     18 
      public     1.0000 
                                                                                      
                 public congress execut~e    anews bigthree outsid~s      afv      edv
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   




Results	  for	  after	  1996	  (exclusive)	  
	   	                
                 0.0007   0.0244   0.0002   0.2398   0.0004   0.0026   0.0000 
                     14       14       14       14       12       12       13       14 
         edv     0.7934*  0.5963   0.8330* -0.3363   0.8531*  0.7832*  0.9066*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0045   0.0015   0.0000   0.1773   0.0001   0.0003 
                     15       15       15       15       14       14       15 
         afv     0.6893*  0.7419*  0.8643* -0.3679   0.8505*  0.8198*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0052   0.0030   0.0056   0.9465   0.0024 
                     14       14       14       14       14       14 
   outsiders     0.7011*  0.7307*  0.6967*  0.0198   0.7407*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0061   0.0019   0.0007   0.4273 
                     14       14       14       14       14 
    bigthree     0.6923*  0.7528*  0.7934* -0.2308   1.0000 
              
                 0.7783   0.7777   0.0456 
                     16       16       16       16 
       anews     0.0765  -0.0767  -0.5059   1.0000 
              
                 0.0082   0.0045 
                     16       16       16 
   executive     0.6353*  0.6696*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0013 
                     16       16 
    congress     0.7316*  1.0000 
              
               
                     16 
      public     1.0000 
                                                                                      
                 public congress execut~e    anews bigthree outsid~s      afv      edv
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   




Results	  for	  before	  2005	  (inclusive)	  
	   	                
                 0.5887   0.9389   0.9394   1.0000   0.4821   0.0068   0.0713 
                      7        7        7        7        7        7        7        7 
         edv     0.2500   0.0360   0.0357   0.0000   0.3214   0.8929*  0.7143   1.0000 
              
                 0.0446   0.0143   0.0190   0.2453   0.0030   0.0001 
                     12       12       12       12       12       12       12 
         afv     0.5874   0.6831   0.6620   0.3636   0.7762*  0.8881*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0010   0.0538   0.0000   0.2951   0.0000 
                     27       27       27       18       27       27 
   outsiders     0.5978*  0.3752   0.8331*  0.2612   0.8797*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0011   0.0772   0.0000   0.0850 
                     27       27       27       18       27 
    bigthree     0.5920*  0.3459   0.7756*  0.4171   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.1575   0.2514 
                     18       18       18       18 
       anews     0.8673*  0.3476   0.2851   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0006 
                     27       27       27 
   executive     0.7702*  0.6176*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000 
                     27       27 
    congress     0.8066*  1.0000 
              
               
                     27 
      public     1.0000 
                                                                                      
                 public congress execut~e    anews bigthree outsid~s      afv      edv
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   




Results	  for	  after	  2005	  (exclusive)	  
	   	                
                 0.3518   0.9108   0.0366   0.1390   0.0188   0.2080   0.0938 
                      8        8        8        8        6        6        7        8 
         edv     0.3810   0.0476   0.7381  -0.5714   0.8857  -0.6000   0.6786   1.0000 
              
                 0.9394   0.5887   0.0025   0.1802   0.0416   0.2657 
                      7        7        7        7        6        6        7 
         afv    -0.0357   0.2500   0.9286* -0.5714   0.8286  -0.5429   1.0000 
              
                 0.5441   0.7872   0.1562   0.0416   0.2080 
                      6        6        6        6        6        6 
   outsiders     0.3143  -0.1429  -0.6571   0.8286  -0.6000   1.0000 
              
                 0.4685   0.2657   0.0048   0.3965 
                      6        6        6        6        6 
    bigthree     0.3714   0.5429   0.9429* -0.4286   1.0000 
              
                 0.2604   0.1600   0.0580 
                      8        8        8        8 
       anews     0.4524   0.5476  -0.6905   1.0000 
              
                 0.9108   0.9108 
                      8        8        8 
   executive    -0.0476   0.0476   1.0000 
              
                 0.1017 
                      8        8 
    congress     0.6190   1.0000 
              
               
                      8 
      public     1.0000 
                                                                                      
                 public congress execut~e    anews bigthree outsid~s      afv      edv
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   




Results	  for	  second	  sub-­‐period	  [1988-­‐1996]	  
	  
              
                      .        .        .        .        .        .        . 
                      0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0 
         edv          .        .        .        .        .        .        .        . 
              
                 0.6667   0.6667   1.0000   0.6667   0.6667   0.6667 
                      3        3        3        3        3        3        3 
         afv     0.5000   0.5000  -1.0000   0.5000   0.5000   0.5000   1.0000 
              
                 0.0992   0.1116   0.0072   0.3063   0.0876 
                      9        9        9        9        9        9 
   outsiders    -0.5833  -0.5667   0.8167* -0.3849   0.6000   1.0000 
              
                 0.0876   0.0769   0.1875   0.5292 
                      9        9        9        9        9 
    bigthree    -0.6000  -0.6167   0.4833  -0.2427   1.0000 
              
                 0.0448   0.0288   0.3415 
                      9        9        9        9 
       anews     0.6778   0.7197  -0.3598   1.0000 
              
                 0.0358   0.0424 
                      9        9        9 
   executive    -0.7000  -0.6833   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000 
                      9        9 
    congress     0.9667*  1.0000 
              
               
                      9 
      public     1.0000 
                                                                                      
                 public congress execut~e    anews bigthree outsid~s      afv      edv
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   




Results	  for	  third	  sub-­‐period	  [1997-­‐2005]	  
	  
              
                 0.9572   0.5379   0.2657   0.8717   0.6228   0.0416   0.0416 
                      6        6        6        6        6        6        6        6 
         edv     0.0286  -0.3189  -0.5429   0.0857   0.2571   0.8286   0.8286   1.0000 
              
                 1.0000   0.6432   0.4927   0.1827   0.1390   0.0039 
                      8        8        8        8        8        8        8 
         afv     0.0000   0.1952   0.2857  -0.5238   0.5714   0.8810*  1.0000 
              
                 1.0000   0.4440   0.9108   0.1195   0.1600 
                      8        8        8        8        8        8 
   outsiders     0.0000   0.3172   0.0476  -0.5952   0.5476   1.0000 
              
                 1.0000   0.5204   0.7789   0.2894 
                      8        8        8        8        8 
    bigthree     0.0000   0.2684   0.1190  -0.4286   1.0000 
              
                 0.1017   0.4076   0.0710 
                      8        8        8        8 
       anews     0.6190  -0.3416  -0.6667   1.0000 
              
                 0.1600   0.7735 
                      8        8        8 
   executive    -0.5476   0.1220   1.0000 
              
                 0.7735 
                      8        8 
    congress    -0.1220   1.0000 
              
               
                      8 
      public     1.0000 
                                                                                      
                 public congress execut~e    anews bigthree outsid~s      afv      edv
                   
    Sig. level     
    Number of obs  
    rho            
                   
   Key             
                   
. spearman public congress executive anews bigthree outsiders afv edv if year>=1997 & year<2005, stats(rho obs p) st(0.01) pw
